86. Telegram 10288 From the Embassy in Mexico to the Department of State1
10288. Department for ARA Rogers—Brasilia for Crimmins from Jova. Subject: Visit with President Echeverria’s Emissary, Fernando Gutierrez Barrios.
1. Last night President Echeverria sent his emissary, Fernando Gutierrez Barrios (Under Secretary of Interior) to see me at home on an urgent basis. Gutierrez Barrios said President concerned at what he perceived as deterioration in Mexico/U.S. relations and hoped some frank talk might put things right. Gutierrez said both he and the President recognized that deterioration was in large part fault of Mexico and that Echeverria’s own statements and actions had undoubtedly played a strong role. U.S./Mexican good relations were of key importance for both sides, particularly when a new administration (and presumably a calmer one) would take office here within a year. The President would not wish to bequeath his successor an additional problem and was eager to do his part to put things back on an even keel.
2. Gutierrez diagnosed the deterioration through the following “symptoms:” 1) Recent declaration (I think by General Chapman) that [Page 283] it would be necessary to deport five million illegals; 2) Unduly strong declaration by some U.S. Government spokesman on Mexican declaration of two hundred mile limit; 3) Recent series of declarations from DEA and congressional sources that 85 percent of our heroin problem was of Mexican origin etc.; 4) The New York Times Cowan article of Nov. 20 on Mexican/U.S. relations; and, most recently 5) My own call that very morning on Minister of Finance telling him that we could not support Mexico’s IDB dairy loan in its present form.
3. I told Gutierrez that while his diagnosis of the illness itself might be correct, as indeed there are feelings of sorrow and hurt on our part, his attribution of the symptoms was mistaken. The statement on massive deportations was probably taken out of context and, however grave the problem, was not U.S. Government’s position at this time and I personally hoped it never would be. The statement on the 200 miles was perhaps exaggerated in tone while the various statements on the drug problem would probably have been made even if we had been in a honeymoon stage with Mexico in view of the gravity and our own frustrations with the problems. I stressed that our reluctance re: Mexico’s IDB project stemmed not from any antipathy to the GOM but from our very real dissatisfaction with the project itself, with its failure to reach the little people and our genuine concern re: its effect on Congressional actions as replenishment of IDB. Thus it was in no sense retaliatory.
4. At the same time it would be idle to pretend that we did not feel some sense of hurt and disappointment at some of Echeverria’s more wounding statements and particularly at various Mexican attitudes and actions in the multilateral field and cited anti-Zionism and Korean issues specifically. This hurt and disappointment, however, was in no sense related to the symptoms he had described; we respected Mexico and its sense of dignity, we considered it as an equal and it would never occur to us to engage in such blatantly retaliatory tactics with a friend and next door neighbor; we recognized that such tactics could even be counterproductive.
5. Gutierrez said he appreciated my analysis of situation. He hoped that something might be done to turn the situation around and specifically asked for help on IDB loan, which meant so much to Echeverria personally and which would have such a favorable political impact in Mexico. I again stressed that our opposition was based on solid technical considerations but said that it was still possible that Mexican attitudes might have made some elements within the U.S. Government feel somewhat less positive in considering these technical aspects. . . . I then suggested that it would be well for the GOM not to be too prideful re: the dairy project and that it might consider reformulating it in such a [Page 284] way as to cause us less difficulty. If this were done it would be easier for me to ask Washington to look on the project in a more favorable light.
6. Gutierrez Barrios emphasized that Echeverria wanted friendship with the U.S., and hoped that I would stress this in Washington and would visit him immediately on my return. I told him of the possibility that Bill Rogers might visit here on December 1 or 2 and suggested that this too would be ideal opportunity for frank discussion with Echeverria to clear atmosphere.
7. An hour later, I was called from opening of art exhibit as Gutierrez had returned to residence. He said President had asked him to return to assure me that once back from Washington I should visit President for a conversation that “should smooth any and all differences in both the bilateral and the multilateral fields.” Echeverria was particularly pleased that Rogers might come, urged that he do so and said he would look forward to meeting with him if he did come. Gutierrez stressed the importance to Mexico of a friendship and cooperation in the political and economic fields. I observed that Mexico must keep this in mind while playing its Third World role. It was possible to be both our friend and a Third World leader, so long as the latter was not overdone. Gutierrez said the President wanted me to know that he was going to lunch with the leaders of the Jewish community next Thursday and was looking for a way out of the anti-Zionism dilemma (I understand that fifty tourist charter flights from U.S. alone have been cancelled). He said the President also wanted me to know that he had already given instructions to reformulate the IDB dairy project.
8. Comment and recommendation: Believe this illustrates that Mexicans are capable of setting a message, whether inadvertent or not, without our having to be explicit or so crass as to lay the old macho on the table. (I know that my recent absences in Washington and Caracas and now again to Washington have also occasioned speculation, however unwarranted.)
9. I recommend that you come for the consular conference and that we call on Echeverria giving him a reasoned but frank itemization (Gutierrez Barrios urged that we be specific) of Mexican actions which have made us unhappy, making sure we are on firm ground in each case. I also strongly recommend that we continue to insist, although perhaps somewhat enigmatically, that no actions taken by us are in any way intended as retaliatory, as such would be unworthy of our relationship.
10. If you cannot attend the consular conference I ask that I be sent firm and detailed instructions to discuss above matters with President Echeverria, together with specific suggestions for actions he might take, both bilateral and unilateral, for improving relations. Perhaps an extra push on the American prisoner issue might be opportune.
[Page 285]11. We remind you that we have been through similar handwringing experiences before with the President, and his mood of repentence has not necessarily been a lasting one.
-
Summary: Jova informed Rogers of two November 21 conversations with Gutiérrez Barrios, whom Echeverría sent to confer with Jova because the Mexican President felt that bilateral relations had become strained.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750408–0067. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated for information to Brasilia. In an October 24 memorandum to Rogers, Falk explored possible actions to be taken against Mexico due to its opposition to U.S. positions in multilateral forums. (Ibid., ARA/MEX Files: Lot 76D110, 30th UNGA—Korean Issue, 9–12/75) In a November 5 staff meeting, Kissinger stated that while the U.S. response to unfavorable positions adopted by big countries should be weighed in context of the overall relationship with the country in question, he was “beginning to get to the point where we may have to do something about the Mexicans,” inasmuch as their behavior was “getting beyond the line.” When informed by Rogers that a message to that effect had been conveyed to Rabasa, Kissinger added, “I think if it doesn’t stop we have to do something retaliatory.” (Ibid., Transcripts of Kissinger Staff Meetings, Entry 5177, Lot 78D448, Secretary’s Staff Meeting, November 5, 1975) The New York Times article is not further identified.
↩