8. Telegram 9439 From the Embassy in Colombia to the Department of State1
9439. Subj: Bogota Mtg of LA FornMins: Summary of Events and Critique.
Dept Pass All ARA Diplomatic Posts.
Begin summary: OCIS tel presents a chronology and interpretation of developments surrounding the conference of LA FornMins held at Bogota from Nov 14 to 16 73. The conference stemmed from an offer by the Secy in Oct to enter into dialogue with the Latin Americans and was given shape and substance by the tenacious efforts of the Colombian FornMin. Despite a shaky start and lack of time to prepare, both the preparatory mtg of experts and the conference itself came off well and the twenty three participants came away generally satisfied with the results. They exercised restraint in their discussions and, with but few exceptions, eschewed confrontation in favor of a consensus on priority grievances and problem areas. They also recognized that the primary responsibility for development and integration lies with the Latin Americans themselves. Secy Kissinger’s timely message to the conference on the last day of the mtg, in which he reiterated his desire to meet with them, overcame lingering doubts of his interest in LA and the conference closed on an optimistic note. The dels approved three documents: a “Document of Bogota” setting forth LA aspirations and responsibilities, their determination to help bring about a just international economic order, and an exhortation to speed up LA integration; an eight point agenda for the expected mtg in Mexico next year with the Secy; and a memo dealing with the preparation and organization of the Mexico mtg. The Latins want not just one mtg with the Secy, but a continuing dialogue. End summary.
Background:
1. The Bogota mtg of LA FornMins came into being as a result of Colombian FornMin Vazquez’s initiative following the Secy’s Oct 5 remarks in New York calling for a new dialogue in the hemisphere. [Page 32] Vazquez, moving with exceptional speed, sent a circular tel on Oct 10 to sound out other LA Mins on the idea of a Bogota conference to prepare for a mtg with the Secy. His idea was to obtain a LA consensus on key issues to be discussed with the Secy. He received so many objections and requests for clarification that he subsequently sent an Oct 22 note to all LA diplomatic missions in Bogota in which he clarified and amplified the concepts outlined in his Oct 10 cable. He suggested in the note that the theme of the Bogota mtg be, “Latin American cooperation in its political and economic aspects.” The principal aim of the mtg, the note said, would be to “adopt criteria and objectives of LA multilateral action.”
2. During the early stages of his initiative, Vazquez made special efforts to keep the USG informed of the status of the proposal and of his concept of the nature and scope of the mtg. On Oct 16, he explained to the Chargé d’Affaires that with the change of govt in Chile the GOC felt the time was propitious to begin a constructive dialogue with a view to harmonizing the relationships between the U.S. and LA. He described the Bogota mtg as preparatory to a subsequent mtg with the Secy and said that he believed his initiative could result in the establishment of an organ of consultation, outside of the OAS framework. Vazquez indicated that he believed the Bogota mtg could avoid a confrontation with us. It was not his intention, he said, to put the U.S. on the spot.
3. The mtg became a certainty toward the end of Oct, by which time a majority of the LA Mins had accepted the Colombian invitation, although two major Latin countries, Argentina and Brazil, declined to send their FornMins. They did agree, however, to participate at the sub ministerial level.
Preparatory Mtg:
4. The preparatory phase of the Bogota mtg opened on Nov 8. Mexican Amb to the OAS Rafael de la Colina was elected chairman of the group. Vazquez had prepared all papers himself and by the time the meeting opened he had ready a draft “Declaration of Bogota,” consisting of three major headings: 1) International Position of LA, 2) the Conditions of Hemispheric Cooperation and 3) Cooperation Among the Countries of LA. Under part 3, the draft stated that the nations of LA were ready to “initiate a frank and friendly dialogue with the U.S.” The Mexicans moved immediately to jettison the draft and submitted in its place a skeleton outline that focused on LA problems for discussion with the Secy. The Peruvians also tabled their own document, which placed heavy emphasis on economic aggression and means to prevent it.
5. After four days of deliberation, [Page 33] the preparatory mtg produced an eight point document for consideration by the Mins. The eighth point contained sixteen items pertaining to LA–U.S. relations. During the preparatory mtg the moderates prevailed and the dels skirted issues that could have lent themselves to a Latin-U.S. confrontation. At the same time, many dels expressed concern over the level of U.S. interest in LA, pointing out that U.S. responsibilities and involvement in other parts of the globe, as well as domestic problems, made it unlikely that the U.S. could or would devote priority attention to LA. During this phase of the mtg, the Brazilian delegation emerged as an important voice for moderation. During both the preparatory phase and the subsequent ministerial mtg, the Brazilians acted as conciliators and appeared to be motivated by a belief that bilateral relations with the U.S. were of greater importance than any multilateral declaration. The Brazilians consistently worked to tone down language that could have led to confrontation between the Latins and the U.S.
Mtg of the FornMins:
6. The ministerial phase of the conference opened on Nov 14 with sixteen FornMins in attendance (Argentina Bolivia Brazil Haiti Jamaica Paraguay and Uruguay were represented below the ministerial level). Occasional proposals of a radical nature were advanced, mostly by the Peruvian, Mexican and Venezuelan dels, but these were subsequently turned back or moderated by the Uruguayans, Chileans, Brazilians and Central Americans. Even the radical delegations, however, appeared to be restrained by the prospect of a new dialogue with the U.S. Accordingly, the Cuban question was shunted aside and the requisite Latin American support for Panama in regard to its negotiations with the U.S. was expressed in non-accusatory terms. The Brazilian del, in addition to its efforts at conciliation, earned respect for its skill and diligence. The skepticism which had marked the start of the mtg dissipated to a considerable degree as the shape of the final documents began to emerge. The compromises involving the Panama question (phrases such as “occupying army” and “violation of sovereignty” were dropped in favor of a firm but not shrill declaration of support for Panama) provided demonstrable proof that the mtg could produce a genuine Latin consensus that was something more than a condemnation of the U.S. and its LA policies.
7. The Secy’s message, on the final day of the conference, was extremely well received and served to dissipate any lingering suspicion among the dels that the Secy was not interested in the conference or in meeting with his Latin American colleagues. The impact of the message was instantaneous and uniformly positive. Vazquez stated to the Chargé d’Affaires, who had delivered it, that it allowed a most successful conference “to end on a note of perfection.”
8. The mtg concluded on Nov 16 when the Mins approved three documents. The first was the “Document of Bogota,” a fourteen point statement reflecting the preparatory mtg’s proposal for heightened [Page 34] intra-LA cooperation as well as the “general panorama of relations between LA and the U.S.” (Bogota 9331 and 9335). The “Bases for a New Dialogue Between LA and the U.S.” comprised the second document. It consists essentially of the proposed agenda for a later mtg between the Latins and the U.S. In order to avoid confusion on the part of end users of the documents we should point out that the preparatory meeting presented one document to the Mins that contained eight items for discussion with the U.S.; the eighth item contained sixteen points. The Mins separated this document into the eight point agenda for use with the Secy and the fourteen point “Document of Bogota.” In short, the document produced by the preparatory meeting contains the material included in the eight point agenda (bases for a new dialogue) and the “Document of Bogota.”
9. The third document approved by the Mins was a memo outlining the procedures for a future mtg in Mexico with the Secy.
10. The “Document of Bogota” (Bogota 9437) points out the readiness of the Latins to engage in a new dialogue with the U.S. The document notes the new position of LA and its ability to accelerate development through regional cooperation. It takes into account the Latins own historical, cultural and social evolution as they contribute to a nationalism and common will and underscores the fact that economic and social development, as the primary responsibility of each Latin nation, carries with it the obligation for regional cooperation. The document urges CECLA to continue its tasks of coordination, both within LA and with other developing countries. The LA Energy Organization is cited as a cause for satisfaction in this regard. The document also notes the need for restructuring of the inter-American system and expresses confidence in the success of the current efforts of the OAS special committee created by Resolution 127 of the OAS Gen Assembly. The Mins urged completion of the draft of the UN Charter of Economic Rights and Obligations of States. They expressed pleasure at the achievements of LA Reps in sub-regional, regional and international orgs. The Mins also urged increased LA participation in world trade, advocated a number of measures designed to improve the Latin American’s trading position as well as measures to gain greater access to technology. They called for greater cooperation among the sub-regional economic organizations of Latin America. They also called for accelerated studies of land, sea and air transport and urged the developing nations to intensify their efforts to eliminate dependency.
11. The “Bases for a New Dialogue Between LA and the U.S.” (Bogota 9439) is essentially an agenda for the proposed 1974 mtg with the Secy in Mexico. The agenda points are: a) cooperation for development; b) coercive measures of an economic nature; c) restructuring inter-American System; d) solution of the Panama Canal question; e) the [Page 35] structure of international commerce and the monetary system; f) multinational enterprises; g) transfer of technology; and h) general panorama of relations between LA and the U.S.
12. The memo on a future mtg with the Secy (Bogota 9433) calls for a mtg at the Ministerial level to be held in Mexico early in 74 at a date to be agreed upon by the Mexican FornMin and the Secy. The agenda for the mtg will be delivered to the Secy by the President of the Bogota Conference (FornMin Vazquez) and will remain confidential until delivery. The Mins remain ready to discuss any additional topics that the Secy may wish to raise. The LA Mins will, under terms of the memo, meet in Mexico to examine the agenda points prior to meeting with the Secy. At that time the Latin Mins will decide on the advisability of designating spokesmen to treat specific subjects in the meeting with the Secy.
Critique:
13. The alacrity with which Vazquez moved to designate Bogota as the venue of a LA Conference stemmed from complex motives which can be reduced to one or two key considerations. He has striven for some time to become a leader in the field of intra-Latin American cooperation and seeks especially to wring from his colleagues a consensus on law of the sea matters to take to the 74 Conference in Santiago, Chile. He has pushed for a patrimonial sea concept which he hopes will satisfy the aspirations of the 200 milers and will, at the same time, be acceptable to the U.S. A conservative, he has nevertheless ingratiated himself with the Peruvians and others by mouthing anti-imperialist phrases from time to time to gain his objectives. Vazquez recognized immediately that he could turn the Secy’s initiative to his ends if he could bring off a successful mtg in Bogota which, while it would have no direct bearing on the LOS issue, would show him in a good light and cement his claim to be a principal LA spokesman.
14. In relative terms, we consider the mtg to have been a success on several grounds. The Secy’s call for dialogue combined with the absence of the U.S. were perhaps the key factors. The Latin Americans found themselves closeted with the express purpose of coming up with a consensus they would present to Secy Kissinger. When they examined this aspect they soon realized it would be futile to adopt an adversary stance and so set about devising a realistic set of grievances. The Panama Canal Treaty caused more controversy than any other item but it represents for the Latin Americans one of the last Leonine agreements standing in the way of a mature relationship. Multinational enterprises also emerged as an important and sensitive issue. Just before the conference opened former President of Colombia Alberto Lleras Camargo wrote a long editorial in which he said that the real problem [Page 36] between North and South is that the U.S. Govt always comes to the defense of its businessmen (Bogota 9235).
15. From the Latin American perspective these matters stand in the way of truly good relations and they want a resolution favorable to them. Secondly, the fact that sixteen FornMins showed up on such short notice and reached a consensus largely devoid of anti American cant is in itself indicative of a new mood. Many who criticize the conference tend to cite Costa Rica’s or Mexico’s advocacy of positions on which there could be not consensus—Cuba and democratic institutions—and forget that these nations did not pursue their aims, but dropped them in favor of a unified position.
16. The Mexican FornMin is convinced that the U.S. Govt is ready to deal with the Cuban question and for that reason he tried to win his colleagues over to the inclusion of the Cuban question in the final document. Rabasa said on several occasions that the Secy likes tough problems and that if the Latin Americans present a united front on the question the Secy will grapple with it and resolve it once and for all. He was astute enough to wait for a later chance, although he egged on the Jamaicans in the hope of working his will on the convention.
17. Many of the dels came to Bogota convinced they were wasting their time. As the conference wore on they began to recognize they could agree on priorities in their relations with the U.S. The Secy’s message on the last day of the conference, coming as it did from Tokyo in the midst of important negotiations, overcame lingering suspicion there would be no meeting with him and induced the dels to stop tinkering with their bill of complaints to concentrate on the organization of the future conference in Mexico.
18. In their closing speeches at the conference the FornMins of Colombia and Mexico made it plain they and their colleagues are not interested in one mtg with the Secy; they want to establish permanent communications and consultation directly with him. From our conversations here with the dels it is apparent that just as important to them as their material problems is their felt need for attention from the highest levels of our govt. Even though the grievances and problems they raise are difficult or impossible to resolve in their favor, U.S. interests in the area can be helped by just the type of dialogue they propose. If they believe their views are receiving sympathetic consideration this belief will attenuate a good deal of the criticism and philippics we now hear and that in itself will serve our ends in the short run.
19. The Bogota mtg, in common with numerous earlier Latin conferences, has been hailed by many of its participants as a turning point in hemispheric relations. The distinguishing characteristics of this conference, however, responsibility and moderation on the part of the participants, count heavily in its favor and give some little substance to [Page 37] those who hope this may prove to be a watershed in LA–U.S. relations. The Latin Americans operating without U.S. tutelage produced a responsible starting point for the new dialogue that they genuinely want. From this vantage point the conference emerges as a reasonable manifestation of a group of nations moving toward greater maturity and self-respect.
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Summary: This telegram reported on the November 14–16 Bogotá meeting of Latin American Foreign Ministers, noting that many participants saw the conference as a “turning point in hemispheric relations.” The meeting was held in response to Kissinger’s invitation to enter into a “new dialogue.”
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to USUN and CINCSO. The reference to telegram 9439 in paragraph number 11 constitutes an apparent typo in the original text. Telegrams 9235 and 9437 from Bogotá are both dated November 17. (Ibid.)
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