Office of the Historian

469. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford1

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

  • P.L.–480 for Jamaica

Last May Secretary Kissinger requested that you approve small P.L.–480 Title I programs for Afghanistan and Jamaica. You approved the program for Afghanistan, but disapproved the program for Jamaica (Tab C).

Secretary Kissinger now requests (Tab A) that you reconsider your adverse decision on the $2.5 million program for Jamaica. Secretary Kissinger notes that Castro is cultivating Jamaica to broaden Cuba’s influence in the Caribbean, that Jamaican Prime Minister Manley’s suspicion of our motives is growing, and that by being forthcoming on this P.L.–480 program—which is fully justified on humanitarian grounds—we can deny Manley this pretext for attacking us in his election campaign.

Jim Lynn continues to oppose the program (Tab B). He argues that Jamaica can finance its own school food feeding program, that we have terminated AID development projects pending settlement of investment disputes between the Government of Jamaica and U.S. bauxite companies, and that the program is too small to have major political impact.

I believe that it is very important that you approve the program for Jamaica. Our relations with that country are slowly deteriorating. Prime Minister Manley, although he does not entirely trust the Cubans, seems to be increasingly persuaded of the validity of their argument that the United States is attempting to “destabilize” the GOJ because [Page 1210] we don’t like their Socialist form of government or their close relations with Cuba. Also, faced with an impending election and increasing dissatisfaction with the economic and political situation in the country, Manley is attempting to use the “destabilization” theme as an emotional campaign issue. This is being heard not only in Jamaica, but elsewhere in the Caribbean.

The mother/child and school feeding program proposed clearly will not reverse the trend in our relations, but there is a good chance that it can:

—make it more difficult for Manley to continue using the “destabilization” theme as a campaign issue;

—hold matters where they are with Manley, for the moment, while some additional initiatives are firmed up, by providing some concrete evidence to counter the “destabilization” line;

—provide some concrete evidence to the people of Jamaica of our continued concern for them (despite the Manley charges).

The proposed program is a continuation of our contribution to a program originally AID inspired but now carried out largely with Jamaican resources. It would not provide economic support, as opposed to humanitarian assistance, nor would we wish to do so at this time. Not continuing it, however, will be seen as a distinctly negative action and provide additional fuel for the “destabilization” charges. Further slippage in our relations could also negatively affect the negotiations with the major bauxite companies, which are proceeding well. The Prime Minister has raised continuation of this program with us directly, and obviously sees it as an indicator of our intentions in our bilateral relationship.

The program can be accommodated within your 1976/TQ budget level for P.L.–480.

Recommendation

I strongly recommend that you approve Secretary Kissinger’s request to continue the $2.5 million P.L.–480 Title I program in Jamaica.

  1. Summary: Scowcroft endorsed Kissinger’s recommendation that Ford reconsider his decision not to authorize a small aid program for Jamaica, noting that U.S. assistance would help to undercut the destabilization charges being leveled against the United States.

    Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser Papers, NSC Latin American Staff Files, 1974–1977, Country Files, Box 4, Jamaica—Economic, Development, Social 1. Confidential. Sent for action. The memorandum is not initialed, and no approval or disapproval of the memorandum’s recommendation is indicated. None of the attachments have been found. In telegram 3373 from Kingston, August 12, the Embassy observed that if the aid program were not approved, “we can be certain that the situation will be turned against us” and that the decision would be cited by some as evidence of a destabilization campaign. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760311–0268) A September 27 memorandum from Davis to Borg transmitted Ford’s approval of the request to authorize the aid program. (Ibid., P760182–0976)

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