454. Telegram 3672 From the Embassy in Jamaica to the Department of State1
3672. For Assistant Secretary Rogers from Ambassador. Subject: Conversation with Minister of National Security and Justice—Eli Matalon. Ref: Kingston 3581.
1. [less than 1 line not declassified] has been disturbed by what was characterized by head of Jamaican CID as “temporary” stoppage in customary mutual exchange of information. FYI: They have until August 29 been giving us useful [less than 1 line not declassified] Cuban and Chinese material on a weekly basis. End FYI.
2. I raised the subject during my last visit with Manley (reftel), and he suggested I discuss with Security Minister Eli Matalon.
3. An unusually frank one-to-one discussion took place AM Sept 16, which unearthed an interesting scenario, cleared up a number of unresolved items, and raised new speculations.
4. Matalon confirmed that the stoppage of information flow was by his personal orders with PM’s concurrance. He said that the flow had become a one-way street, and he was receiving nothing in return. This had not previously been the case under my predecessor De Roulet and the then-DCM Roberts. He had not trusted Chargé Hewitt, however, and while the information flow had continued on the lower level, he had been unwilling to talk with him on major matters. So far as I was concerned, he had no reservations and was prepared to talk completely openly and to make any information I wished available at any time, but [Page 1166] he preferred to deal only with me. (Note: Soft Soap is an inexpensive negotiating commodity.)
5. He said that he had definite, firsthand information derived covertly from the highest opposition sources (Seaga), that a substantial U.S. financial commitment had been made to the opposition and that a threat of withdrawal of this support had recently been made unless the opposition took certain immediate steps. This was known to the Prime Minister and had served to increase his willingness to listen to his left wing, anti-U.S. advisors.
6. Matalon said he believed former Ambassador De Roulet had been involved in the arrangements, and that he thought it entirely possible that the CIA was also involved. He had no confirmation yet but had been actively working on it. He said he had visited De Roulet in New York last year, faced him with a list of his Jamaican visitors, and had asked him to desist without success.
7. I made the usual demurrers, as I had previously to the Prime Minister, about no such activity by the USG. Matalon said he believed me, but that he had proof of his allegations regarding support from U.S. sources of the opposition which he would make available at the proper time on my request.
8. Matalon said that the “conservatives” in the Cabinet were now a minority, and that they were working against “tremendous odds” and under great pressure. He said his only concern was to solve the economic crisis which was upon them with a minium of disruption and to preserve an independent Jamaica. He realized that they would have to turn elsewhere for economic help but that many of the Prime Minister’s advisors were proposing turning to the Russians or even the Chinese as “benefactors.” He said he wanted no benefactor unless it were the U.S. and felt that Jamaica’s problems would be solved on a business-like basis with her traditional friends. He said that the U.S. had never dictated policy in return for her help but that either of the others most certainly would. If there were to be any other benefactor, he and others in the Cabinet would most certainly “bail out.”
9. The Minister said that, while there might be a rapproachement with Cuba, he had his job to do. Others in the government might choose to appear unaware, but, for example, he knew that in the shortly arriving Cuban agricultural delegation, there were two high ranking security types “who wouldn’t know a bean if they saw one.” He said that it was supposed to have been fully understood with the Cubans that there would be no passing of information or intelligence activity on either side but purely technical and cultural cooperation. He was also aware that the Chinese were indulging in other than purely representational activities, and that when the Russians got here, it would become an even more active ballgame.
[Page 1167]10. He felt that we had a community of interest, and that U.S. resources were much greater than his. He would be pleased if he could cooperate but that “it had to be a two-way street.” He said he was studying the Cuban apparatus and confirms he is sending CID Chief Humphrey and one or two senior and experienced officers to Havana for ostensible training. He feels we have a properly professional capability, and that he needs such help. “I am all alone against the Cubans, Russians and Chinese.”
11. Matalon is going to Washington September 24 for three days to talk with newly-arrived Ambassador Rattray about the bulk commodity proposal he had outlined to you when we lunched with the Prime Minister and would be willing to talk to anyone on the above subjects if considered desirable, but that he did not plan to call you. He did say that he had purposely insisted on coming to the PM’s lunch to meet you and make a personal assessment. His appraisal was that you were a man with whom he thought he could do business, though you had not perhaps fully understood yet what he had in mind in connection with the “Trade Package.”
12. Regarding this package, he and the government had been making extensive computations, and we wished to discuss their approach to USG with Rattray. What he hoped was that “Technical Teams” could be put together on both sides to discuss the proposition and try to negotiate out a deal. Mayer Matalon would head up the Jamaican side. He was aware that there were grave problems with any government to government financing of the $150 to $170 million he was talking about, but that other financing might be available for what he had in mind.
13. When I pressed for details, Matalon said he was not quite ready but would probably give me a copy of the initial document before he goes to Washington. However, what to emerge was that what he envisages is some sort of a bargaining session where he does not expect to get what is initially asked for and where a whole series of trade-offs can be laid on the table, including Jamaica’s major asset, bauxite. In this connection, he specifically mentioned future arrangements with the U.S. companies and the possibility of the GOJ providing bauxite for a stockpile in the U.S.
Comment: A. The assumption by the PNP that support is being given the opposition by USG may be paranoiac but is almost impossible to refute.
B. It is possible that anyone of a number of private groups are giving support, including perhaps one or more aluminum companies.
C. The fact that Matalon claims current information after De Roulet’s death (who had the motive and the means) gives credence to such a possibility.
[Page 1168]D. It is equally possible Matalon’s (and the Prime Minister’s) allegations are self-serving red herrings.
E. The juxtaposition of discussions regarding intelligence, economic assistance and fear of Communist influence suggests a willingness to cooperate in a broad range of U.S. interest areas for a quid pro quo.
F. I suggest that an opening may exist for useful access to Cuba and recommend that consideration be given to conversation by SRF with Matalon, when he is in Washington. He might not give much before discussion of his quid pro quo, but it would flatter him as an amateur sleuth and might be productive down the road with little risk now. I don’t see where we have anything to lose.
G. I further recommend willingness to listen, though perhaps skep-tically, when the Jamaicans are ready to talk about their proposition.
H. The fact is that their economic plight is desperate, and, regardless of the probability that this whole scenario is well-orchestrated, if we don’t lend an ear, they have no choice but to seek elsewhere. Not that I currently believe they can be successful in finding another “benefactor” on the scale they need, but they will do a lot of thrashing around, and some of Manley’s advisors are more ideological than patriotic or realistic.
I. In brief, Matalon is offering fuller Jamaican cooperation in several areas at an unknown price to us. We may only be considered the lesser of possible evils. However, I think he can deliver now. I am not sure how much longer he and his friends will be able to do so.
J. If no solution to their problems is found with our cooperation, I see no alternative to an increasingly leftist authoritarian regime under the P.N.P. The opposition lacks muscle and would probably be no improvement from our point of view anyway. If we do nothing, they still need our market for their bauxite, but the price will inevitably be higher and the stability of supply lower.
14. SRF advised on content this message.
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Summary: Gerard reported on a September 16 meeting in which National Security Minister Eli Matalon explored the possibility of linking Jamaican cooperation in a range of areas to the provision by the United States of a package of economic aid.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser Papers, Presidential Country Files for Latin America, 1974–1977, Box 4, Jamaica—State Department Telegrams, To Secstate—Nodis. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Stadis. All brackets are in the original except those indicating text that remains classified. In telegram 3581 from Kingston, September 11, Gerard reported on part of his September 9 meeting with Manley in which the Ambassador expressed concern that previously routine exchanges of intelligence between the U.S. and Jamaican Governments were no longer taking place. (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Kingston 1963–1969, Roger Channel) In telegram 3770 from Kingston, September 25, Gerard reported on a September 23 meeting in which Matalon laid out the general shape of proposed U.S. assistance, including credits to finance Jamaican exports, in exchange for trade and investment benefits, more favorable treatment of U.S. bauxite interests, and expanded exchanges of information. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750333–0110) In telegram 240693 to Kingston, October 9, the Department indicated that the Jamaican Government should be encouraged to formulate more realistic proposals. (Ibid., D750350–0441)
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