449. Telegram 1369 From the Embassy in The Bahamas to the Department of State and the Department of Defense1
1369. Subj: Facilities Negotiations. Ref: State 162871.
1. Ambassador and EmbOff met with MinExtAff Adderley and Permanent Secretary Russell, pursuant instructions reftel.
2. Ambassador noted that he had fully reported GCOB position on facilities talks conveyed by Adderley June 28 (Nassau 1177) and he had now received instructions re response.
3. Washington had expressed disappointment in departure from what we had considered to be agreed context of negotiations, that U.S. facilities and operating rights requirements would be considered in context of specific security interests of both countries. In pre-independence negotiations we had tried to make clear that quid pro quo for our facilities and operating rights could not be related to general economic assistance. U.S. now reaffirms this point.
4. On assumption we had such an agreed context, U.S. sent technical survey team to Nassau last September with Bahamian agreement to review Bahamian security requirements with a view ultimately to determining what U.S. contributions in this field might be agreed upon as appropriate in connection with quid for facilities and operating [Page 1147] rights. So far GCOB has not commented on technical survey team’s report.
5. Ambassador said on question of operating rights we would find useful an indication of which specific rights appear troublesome to GCOB, and would welcome a GCOB counter-draft to ours.
6. Ambassador went on to state Washington finds reduction in period of agreement from 15 to 10 years not acceptable. Any shorter period would make it necessary to consider alternative of a phase-out agreement. Key date was 10 July 1988 and any period expiring prior to that would require consideration of phase-out alternative. Ambassador also clarified our AUTEC site requirements in accordance with para 6 reftel.
7. Ambassador concluded by stating that we had basic conceptual problem in connection with these negotiations and we must have a meeting of minds before we can get very far on specifics. U.S. is prepared to consider a package only in security context and not in wider economic area. Unless we can achieve such an approach we would reluctantly be forced to consider phase-out, a result which Ambassador believed would not be in best interests of either side. In sum, continued use of U.S. facilities must rest on agreement concerning a reasonable payment. We would hope GCOB would review its position in light this U.S. response and, having rejected our half-million-dollar-per-year payment offer, come up with a definitive counter-offer.
8. MinExtAff, after hearing Ambassador out, noted that he had not been a participant in pre-independence talks but his recollection of record was Bahamians had made clear all along their interest in economic assistance which GCOB considered part of “security” problem since Bahamian security was very much a function of its economic situation. As he recalled, U.S. had also spoken in terms of economic elements of package, even though these somewhat vague and required spelling out in subsequent negotiations. He admitted Bahamian interest in survey report and in security assistance but only as one element in overall package. He said he would review record of earlier talks and get back to us, but thought that U.S. had a very bad case on this point. Bahamian position has never varied.
9. Adderley did not comment on other elements Ambassador’s presentation except to note that GCOB had thought 10-year period would be acceptable to U.S. since present agreements were scheduled to conclude in 1983.
10. Adderley clearly had law of the sea and GCOB archipelago position uppermost on his mind and spent rest of lengthy session dealing with these issues, as reported in septel.
11. Comment: Adderley’s comments make it clear that in his view U.S. had never either sought to or made clear, and Bahamians had [Page 1148] never accepted, idea that quid pro quo for our facilities and operating rights package could not be related to economic assistance. We are sure that when Bahamians come back to U.S. on this point they will attempt to show that U.S. had viewed this as legitimate subject for consideration in listing of quids during pre-independence discussions. Bahamians take a much wider view of their “security” needs than simply fulfilling technical survey report. Embassy believes that we should continue to make points we have repeatedly made in past:
A. That for U.S. facilities question is pretty much a cost benefit calculation and we are willing to pay Bahamians in form of rent some figure up to what it would cost U.S. to relocate.
B. Bahamas is too wealthy a country to qualify in competition with others for U.S. economic assistance, and U.S. public and congressional views today are increasingly less hospitable to economic assistance.
C. There are many areas, particularly in transfer of U.S. expertise, where U.S. can be helpful to Bahamas in very relevant ways, but these should be specifically identified and considered on their own merits and not be made part of a general quid pro quo package on bases.
12. Reftel, as well as State 162871, which arrived just as we were going into session with Adderley, do not in our judgment accurately characterize pre-independence talks, either on Bahamian side or ours, since we were prepared at that time to include economic quids, and, as we see record, were viewed by Bahamians only as being “too intangible” in the form they were put forward. This does not mean that GCOB ever dismissed or rejected idea of economic assistance, and opted for security assistance instead. U.S. handling during tripartite independence talks may have been “deft and firm” but we doubt it will be lasting. As final comment we would like to call once more to Department’s attention inter-relationship between how we fare in facilities talks and how we handle Bahamian LOS concerns. They see a relationship, whether it is explicit or not, and Adderley’s subsequent jeremiad on this issue indicates that way we handle LOS issues can have definite backlash on how we come out on security talks. Somebody up there better be putting these two together.
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Summary: The Embassy reported on a July 31 meeting between Ambassador Spiers and Adderley in which it became clear that the Bahamian Government had never accepted the view that an agreement on military facilities would not involve a program of economic assistance.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D740208–0920. Secret; Priority to Department of State. Repeated to London and CINCLANT. In telegram 1177 from Nassau, July 1, the Embassy reported that Adderley had suggested that talks on military facilities should lead to an agreement involving considerable U.S. financial aid to The Bahamas. (Ibid., D740174–0756) In telegram 162871 to Nassau, July 26, the Department noted that there was “no realistic prospect for bilateral economic or developmental assistance to the GCOB.” (Ibid., D740203–0797) In telegram 165649 to Nassau, July 30, the Department transmitted additional guidance for Spiers’s July 31 meeting with Adderley. (Ibid., D740207–0497) In telegram 2130 from Nassau, December 31, the Embassy transmitted a Bahamian request that the target date for completion of the negotiations be moved to June 30, 1975. (Ibid., D750001–0554)
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