Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part 1, Documents on Mexico; Central America; and the Caribbean, 1973–1976

447. National Intelligence Analytical Memorandum 87–1–74¹

Washington, June 11, 1974.

PROSPECTS FOR THE CARIBBEAN

Précis

Long a protected colonial preserve, the Caribbean is being swept by nationalism and by the spirit of assertiveness common throughout the underdeveloped world. The area is characterized by small land areas, a general lack of natural resources, and populations large enough to burden economies but too small to provide markets of scale.

A troubled future for the Caribbean seems inevitable. Socio-political problems are mounting, and the risk of turbulence is growing. The basic problem will be one of too many people and too few opportunities.

Frustrations over social and political inequities, unemployment, and poor public services are creating a climate exploitable by radicals and demagogues. The trend toward personalist authoritarianism will continue and power will be retained by increasingly repressive means. There are likely to be crises of varying intensity and duration, but they will probably remain localized.

Outside influences are generally constrained by the region’s strong insularity.

—Cuba is carefully cultivating its neighbors but its influence will grow slowly, particularly so long as it is a Soviet client.

—China and the USSR will try to increase their official presence and their influence within the limits of opportunities offered, but the region remains a low priority for them.

The U.S. is the major influence on the area. Various points of conflict with the U.S. will develop but few are likely to pit a united Caribbean against the U.S. However, the contradictory needs and insecurities of the countries, and in many cases, the personalities of their leaders will make them difficult to deal with.

—An adversary relationship is predictable on the terms of U.S. investment in the Caribbean (U.S. private investment totals $3.4 billion), especially for the highly visible extractive industries.

—Chances are good that the U.S. can retain its military facilities in the area, but at greater cost.

—The U.S. will remain an important market for the area’s products and the U.S. will continue to supply a significant portion of the region’s imports.

—The political fragmentation of the region, the lack of self-confidence by local governments, and a desire to avoid even symbolic connection with the colonial past will continue to complicate U.S.-Caribbean relations. It will be easier to deal bilaterally with these fragmented states. But because the image of independence will be an overriding requirement for the new countries, they will often be more comfortable dealing through international organizations, especially in such matters as aid and assistance.

[Omitted here is the body of the memorandum.]

1. Summary: Noting frustrations over inequality, unemployment, and poor public services, this memorandum concluded that the Caribbean faced a troubled future and predicted that points of conflict between the nations of the region and the United States would develop.

   Source: Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council Files, Job 79R01012A, Box 484, Folder 4. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the Central Intelligence Agency, the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and the NSA participated in the preparation of this memorandum. All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in the memorandum except the representatives of the FBI and the Atomic Energy Commission, who abstained because the subject was outside their jurisdiction. All brackets are in the original except those indicating text omitted by the editors.