440. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Kubisch) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Porter)1

  • Circular 175 Procedure: Request for Authorization to Negotiate and Conclude an Executive Agreement with the Government of The Commonwealth of The Bahamas Regarding Our Continued Use of Military Facilities, Continued Exercise of Certain Operating Rights and the Status of U.S. Forces in The Bahamas

Tripartite talks with representatives of the Bahamas (GCOB) and United Kingdom (UK) Governments resulted in an agreement by the GCOB to permit U.S. military facilities and operating rights to continue in The Bahamas after independence which occurred on July 10, 1973. An interim agreement to preserve the status quo pending the conclusion of definitive arrangements was concluded on July 20, 1973 pursuant to the Acting Secretary’s authorization dated July 9, 1973. This memorandum requests your authorization for the negotiation and conclusion of definitive arrangements.

The definitive agreements would delineate the facility and operating rights which we seek to maintain in return for certain monetary, matériel and other considerations. As the tripartite formula is no longer appropriate in the post-independence period, we propose to designate our Ambassador, Ronald I. Spiers, as the principal negotiator with the Bahamian Government. He will act in coordination with the Departments of State and Defense and have the support of their technical experts available, as required.

Specific foreseeable U.S. military requirements on which we would hope to achieve GCOB agreement include the following:

1. Continued use of the Atlantic Undersea Test and Evaluation Center (AUTEC) on Andros Island, the U.S. Naval Facility on Eleuthera Island and the U.S. Air Force Eastern Test Range facilities on Grand Ba[Page 1124]hama Island through 1988; and a Coast Guard Long Range Aid to Navigation (LORAN) Station through 1974;

2. Continued operating rights for U.S. military vessels and aircraft to utilize indefinitely Bahamian air space and waters (essential for our security and NATO planning). We also desire to retain certain wartime and emergency powers accorded us in the 1941 Leased Bases Agreement with the UK, but we do not regard the land rights portion of these as essential to the conclusion of a generally satisfactory agreement; and

3. A Status of Forces agreement covering U.S. personnel assigned to our facilities in The Bahamas.

In addition, we propose an exchange of notes with the UK to terminate existing agreements between the U.S. and the UK that will be extended or superseded by our new U.S.–GCOB arrangements. This bilateral U.S.–UK agreement would also complement a conferral of third party rights on the UK in the text of the U.S.–GCOB facilities agreement, permitting the UK to continue to use our facilities in The Bahamas.

The UK desires the following:

1. Continued use of our AUTEC and Eastern Test Range facilities as long as the U.S. retains them;

2. Continued use of its Joint Relay Station in Nassau;

3. Conclusion of a Status of Forces agreement covering their military personnel in The Bahamas; and

4. Rights to utilize Bahamian airspace and territorial seas similar to those which we seek.

As evidenced by their acceptance of the July 20 Carry Over Agreement, the Bahamian Government appears disposed to grant all of our essential requirements. For its part, it is interested in achieving some special relationship with the U.S. after independence based upon the geographic proximity of the islands to the U.S. and the extent of U.S. private investment (approximately $1 billion) and tourism there. In its view, such a relationship would be manifested through (1) U.S. measures for enhanced Bahamian security and (2) U.S. economic concessions. The Bahamian Government believes that its post-independence security problems would best be met by (1) international recognition of the islands as an archipelago; (2) entry into or association with NATO; (3) entry into the OAS and adherence to the Rio Pact; and (4) enhanced Bahamian police and Coast Guard capability through training of personnel and acquisition of equipment as well as funds for annual operating costs.

Economically, the Bahamians mainly desire (1) cash for lease of the facilities; (2) eligibility for U.S. defense articles and training; (3) U.S. measures to stimulate tourism to the islands such as continuation in [Page 1125] Nassau of our Customs and Immigration preclearance facility, as well as an increase in customs exemptions for visitors to The Bahamas; and (4) access to a number of U.S. cities for the Bahamian flag international airline. (A preliminary determination has been made that The Bahamas on independence succeeded to existing air rights. Accordingly, service by presently operating airlines to the U.S. has not been interrupted.)

Although the Bahamians have not insisted that all of the foregoing desires be satisfied before agreement can be reached, they are, understandably, seeking as much as possible. During the preliminary talks, we have made clear to them our problems in fulfilling all of their expectations: archipelago concepts must await resolution in the 1974 Law of the Sea Conference; the North Atlantic Treaty limits new membership in NATO to European states, and then only by unanimous vote; and we are closing bases at home and abroad rather than paying for retaining them. Nevertheless, we think that considering the value of our military facility and operating rights in The Bahamas we should be reasonably forthcoming with this new neighbor so that our relations are propitiously initiated.

Based upon the preliminary talks, we believe that we can obtain all that we require if we were to negotiate toward this maximum offer:

1. Annual payment of approximately $500,000 as land rent for the facilities.

2. Provided that adequate legal authority can be found, payments over 15 years to the GCOB of an additional amount presently estimated not to exceed $23.6 million which may be used toward the acquisition of certain defense articles and services, including training, appropriate to the needs of the country. The $23.6 million figure is the result of a DOD survey of Bahamian security requirements. (The issue of legal authority is discussed in further detail at pages 4–5 of the Memorandum of Law at Tab C.)

3. Maintenance of the air strip at the U.S. Naval Facility on Eleuthera in operating condition (cost of which has amounted to approximately $100,000 annually in the past), as well as making the strip available for use by the Government of The Bahamas and, subject to the authorization of the Government of The Bahamas, properly insured civilian and commercial aircraft.

4. A continuous review of employment practices at the U.S. facilities in order to insure that there will be no unfair treatment in the employment of Bahamians or in their compensation. (In this connection, the Department of Defense is exploring the possibility of structuring the salaries of specially employed U.S. contractor employees so as to avoid invidious comparisons with salaries to Bahamians for the same work.)

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5. Augmentation of the presence and frequency of U.S. Coast Guard patrols in the area of The Bahamas, to be conducted by larger vessels whenever available, for the purposes of search and rescue missions and as a means of serving mutual security interests.

6. Support, or sponsorship, should the Government of The Bahamas so desire, of Bahamian membership in the UN specialized agencies, the OAS and the Rio Pact.

7. Review with The Bahamas Government and the British Government of the difficult security and economic problems the Bahamian Government foresees as arising out of the geography of The Bahamas and the existing law of the sea with a view to formulating possible solutions which might command wide international consensus.

8. While noting continuing balance of payments difficulties in the U.S., recommendation of a review of existing customs rates and practices to see whether any modifications could be effected which would provide a further spur to tourism.

9. Where they meet the Bank’s standards, prompt and favorable consideration of Bahamian projects being considered by the Ex-Im Bank.

10. Consideration of The Bahamas as a location for offshore deep water ports for the transshipment of petroleum to the extent the U.S. finds it has a requirement for such ports abroad.

As its contribution to the entire package for obtaining continued use of its own and U.S. facilities, and exercise of general operating rights, the UK is prepared to make a parallel offer set forth at Tab D.

To achieve settlement on this basis, we propose to offer and hold to as long as feasible an annual land rental of about $500,000 for the lease of the bases. (The U.S. Armed Services are prepared to go as high as $3.5 million annually, although an offer above a “fair rental value” of $500,000 for the land could pose legal difficulties.)

At Tab B there are attached the text of a draft U.S.–GCOB Facilities and Status of Forces Agreement, a U.S.–GCOB Operating Rights Agreement, and a U.S.–UK Agreement relating to continued UK use of U.S. facilities in The Bahamas. However, if the Case bill is enacted it would appear desirable to have the provisions covering facilities and status and those concerning operating rights in a single agreement. We anticipate that simultaneously with the signature of these agreements we would execute with the GCOB a lease of our military facilities, a memorandum of understanding regarding foreign military sales, and an exchange of notes outlining the remaining elements of the U.S. offer, described above. The proposed agreements at Tab B have been reviewed by the Office of the Legal Adviser. That office has determined that they can be concluded as executive agreements under present law, but rec[Page 1127]ommends congressional consultation regarding the form of the various proposed agreements. A memorandum of law is annexed at Tab C.

Although, as the memorandum of law at Tab C concludes, the proposed agreements can all properly be concluded as executive agreements under present law, the Congress has exhibited during recent years an ever-increasing interest in the form and substance of international agreements relating to U.S. military facilities abroad. Accordingly, we plan to offer to consult with the concerned Congressional committees prior to the formal negotiations. Should these consultations result in a request that any part of the proposed agreement be submitted to the Congress for approval, further recommendations to you regarding this matter will be forthcoming.

NSDM 221 of June 5, 1973 requested a progress report on negotiations by July 10 and directed that any agreement worked out should be on an ad referendum basis and submitted to the President for final approval. Our initial response to this NSDM reported on the interim carry over agreement which will preserve our military rights in The Bahamas while negotiations continue on a definitive agreement. There is annexed at Tab A a proposed supplementary progress report describing as the basis for the further negotiations the approach recommended in this memorandum.

The Department of Defense concurs in the foregoing.

Recommendations:

1. That you authorize the Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs or his designee to engage in negotiations based upon the draft agreements at Tab B for the purposes and in the manner described above, including consultation with the concerned congressional committees.

2. That you authorize the Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, subject to the concurrence of L, PM, H, DOD, and other concerned offices and agencies, to approve changes in the texts of the agreements at Tab B resulting from negotiations and consistent with the U.S. objectives described above.

3. That you authorize the Chief of the United States Diplomatic Mission in Nassau to sign the resulting agreements, subject to the President’s approval in accordance with NSDM 221.

4. That if you approve the foregoing recommendations, you approve the transmission to Gen. Scowcroft of the memorandum at Tab A informing him of your decisions.

  1. Summary: Kubisch requested authorization for negotiations with The Bahamas on the continued use of military facilities there, outlining U.S. objectives and the prospects for successful talks.

    Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P830032–0676. Confidential. Attached to a February 6, 1976, memorandum from Rogers to Sisco, published as Document 460. Referenced attachments have not been found. Drafted by Burke and Michel on October 16 and cleared by Shlaudeman, Feldman, Harry Anderson in EUR, Eleanor McDowell in L/T, John MacKenzie in H, Hugh Camitta in L/OA, Ted Borek in L/ARA, Alan Ford in PM/PA, Jonathan Stoddart in PM/ISO, and Gen. Wallace in DOD/ISA. Porter approved all four recommendations on October 23. NSDM 221 is published as Document 433.