Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part 1, Documents on Mexico; Central America; and the Caribbean, 1973–1976

428. National Intelligence Estimate 87.7–73¹

Washington, February 1, 1973.

THE BAHAMAS

Conclusions

A. There will be some new and potentially vexing problems in U.S.-Bahamian relations attendant on the forthcoming independence of the Bahamas in July 1973. Local pressures on the multitude of U.S. interests in the islands are growing. The Bahamians are increasingly concerned about achieving tighter control over their resources and preventing outsiders from holding jobs that could be held by native Bahamians. U.S. citizens, especially those who reside in the islands, will inevitably face new difficulties, and U.S. investors, though attracted by the absence of an income tax, will encounter new restrictions on their operations.

B. The U.S. has three important military installations in the Bahamas for which rent has never been a requirement. The Bahamian Government will insist on renegotiating the base agreements in an effort to obtain some financial compensation, economic and military assistance, and a bilateral defense arrangement with the U.S. The negotiations will probably be difficult, but the Bahamian Government leaders are unlikely to press their demands in such a way as to jeopardize the prospects for an overall agreement.

C. Prime Minister Pindling is a skilled politician and will almost certainly remain in power for the next few years, but he [less than 1 line not declassified] will have a difficult time asserting effective control over his government. The more extreme nationalists among his top advisors will still wield considerable influence, as will certain shady operators dealing in real estate, banking, and gambling. Nevertheless, Pindling is a cautious man who understands that he must work closely with international business circles. He is aware of the importance of financial assistance from the U.S., and he is unlikely to press for nationalizations or widespread expulsions that might damage the image of the Bahamas.

D. Under Pindling, both a sharp economic decline and rapid radicalization of politics will probably be avoided, at least for the next several years. But, over the longer run, the prospects for the Bahamian economy are not particularly good. In time, the problems caused by growing mismanagement and corruption together with unfulfilled expectations may open the way to power to less responsible and less capable leaders. Although, in such a situation, Cuban leaders might consider some form of political involvement in Bahamian affairs, they would be constrained by fear of the U.S. reaction. And any Bahamian government would try to make sure that relations with the U.S. Government do not deteriorate to the point where the islands’ vital links with the U.S. are affected.

[Omitted here is the body of the Estimate.]

1. Summary: This estimate analyzed problems in U.S.-Bahamian relations that were likely to arise as a result of Bahamian independence in July 1973.

   Source: Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council Files, Job 79R01012A, Box 472, Folder 4. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the Central Intelligence Agency, the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and the NSA participated in the preparation of this estimate. All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in the estimate except the representative of the FBI, who abstained because the subject was outside his jurisdiction. All brackets are in the original except those indicating text omitted by the editors or that remains classified.