426. Telegram 3091 From the Embassy in Haiti to the Department of State1
3091. Subject: Mixed Haitian Reaction to Carter Victory: Government Apprehensive, People Enthusiastic.
1. Begin summary: Haitian reaction to U.S. election was predictably two-fold. Government circles apprehensive about return of Democratic administration to White House for reasons ranging from simple uncertainty about intentions of a new administration to fears that it might revert to the well-remembered démarches of the Kennedy Administration against the regime of Papa Doc. Apart from senior government officials, however, most people welcomed Carter election because they perceive him as progressive figure who embodies their hopes for greater economic development and increased human rights in Haiti. This group, in the main, does not expect interventionism from a Carter Administration but does expect it to keep government more aware of U.S. policy concerns. Given this dichotomy, naivete of Haitian reaction and complexity of our relationship with Haiti, initial contacts with Hai [Page 1094] tians by new administration should be especially deliberate, measured and balanced. End summary.
2. As reporting in USIS channels indicates, 1976 U.S. Presidential election was followed with intense interest by Haitian Government and public. Both the campaign and the election night results were reported in unprecedented detail. All three Presidential debates were shown on television and election night coverage prompted constant phone calls to radio stations and dominated all conversations following day.
3. This coverage made profound effect on Haitians who have so little experience of democracy themselves. One friend of the Embassy was still expressing his amazement after the election that Carter had had the temerity to contradict the President of the most powerful country in the world in a public debate. Even more impressive, of course, to many Haitians who have become accustomed to presidents for life, was the fact that an incumbent President could be challenged and beaten.
4. It was quite clear before the balloting that senior government officials were pulling for President Ford. When the results came, their private reactions to us were predictably cool and apprehensive. The Education Minister observed, “We don’t have very good luck with Democrats.” The Minister of Agriculture hoped that the next Democratic administration would not repeat mistakes previous ones had made regarding Haiti. He singled out Kennedy administration’s sanctions against Francois Duvalier and said they were wrong because Haiti’s problems were misunderstood and also because no equivalent action taken against far greater violations in South Africa. The Foreign Minister was somewhat more balanced. “So he won, we’ll just have to wait and see.” He then went on to recall that the Haitians had been similarly worried about the election of FDR because of his association with the Wilson Administration’s occupation of Haiti but that their fears had not been borne out since Roosevelt quickly moved to end the occupation. He evidently hoped that GOH fears about Carter would also be disproved.
5. According to one well-informed young journalist, GOH reaction is more pessimistic than indicated above. He thinks the government firmly believes the Carter victory will mean reduction in foreign aid, restriction of foreign investment, cooling of relations, and even an overt attempt on the part of the U.S. to overthrow Duvalier. According to this same source, Haitian Ambassador in Washington Salomon wrote President Duvalier before the election giving his personal analysis of the effects on Haitian-U.S. relations if Carter should win. Salomon reportedly predicted problems for the Duvalier government and we are told that President Duvalier toyed with the idea of publishing Salomon’s [Page 1095] letter—presumably to gird the loins of Haitian patriots—until wiser heads prevailed.
6. Response to election by both government and non-government circles is in tradition of Haitian overreaction and sensitivity to developments in its single most important neighbor to the north. Government response based on almost paranoic fear of white intervention dating from independence, reinforced by U.S. occupation 1914–1933, pressures of Kennedy administration, non-stop plotting of exile groups—mostly located in the U.S.—to gain power and seated in failure to achieve more than modicum measure of political, economic or social progress in nearly two centuries of independence. Non-government response fed by same factors but with reverse goals in mind. Although naive and simplistic, their response accurately reflects importance Haitians attribute to U.S. role overseas.
7. Little countries always tend to over-exaggerate the interest of big countries in them but U.S. has in fact many interests in Haiti dating from emergence of Haiti as first independent and Black republic in Western Hemisphere. U.S. big stick policy has been replaced in recent years by expanding interest in assisting the most needy and improving Haitian human rights performance. Our policy has been complicated by heavy, economically inspired, illegal emigration to U.S. and reinforced by the fact that Haiti remains our friendliest Black neighbor in the Caribbean. Americans and American investment are welcome and country so far is free from the racial tensions of the area despite marked sensitivity on this question and despite its being one of poorest countries in the world. The complexity of our relationship with Haiti and the acute—if naive—sensitivity of all Haitians towards the new administration argue for as deliberate, measured and balanced an exposition of new administration policy for Haiti as possible.
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Summary: The Embassy reported on Haitian reaction to the U.S. Presidential elections, noting that the public welcomed Carter’s victory but that officials feared that U.S.-Haitian relations would cool under a Democratic administration.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760419–0847. Confidential. Repeated to Santo Domingo.
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