376. Telegram 1828 From the Embassy in Guyana to the Department of State1
1828. Subject: Guyana’s Hostile Votes on the Korean Issue at UNGA: How Do We React? Ref: (A) State 257118 (B) Georgetown 1606 (C) Georgetown 1816.
Summary: Embassy recommends reaction against Guyana UNGA Korean votes by delaying or scrapping pending AID loans and possibly delaying Guyana’s admission to IDB. Immediate decision needed on recommended delay of training loan now apparently ready for signature. End summary.
1. Guyana and Cuba were only Western Hemisphere nations to vote against us on all three UNGA first committee Korean question votes. GOG decision to oppose us was made by Burnham and a majority of Cabinet after reading Kissinger letter appealing for support (ref C) and after Embassy’s repeated emphasis, per Departmental instruction, that vote would normally be reflected in our bilateral relations (ref B).
2. Under circumstances, we believe some clear and unequivocal reaction is essential if we are to retain any credibility. Probably less difficult for us to react against Guyana than against some other countries because of our limited interests here and Guyana’s general hostile posture on other issues.
3. We see several ways we can retaliate:
[Page 977]A) First, we could delay formal signing of AID public service training loan which may be ready for signature momentarily. Our signature on this loan immediately after Guyana’s repeated votes against us on the Korean issue and with our protest and request on its Zionism vote still unanswered would be a clear signal that the votes were of little importance or that we were not serious in our démarches. Depending on our overall relations, the loan might then be offered again for signing after delay of at least two months.
B) We could tell GOG that a re-evaluation in Washington determined that Guyana’s voting record and response to the Secretary’s request on issues of vital interest to the U.S. showed there was insufficient mutuality of interest to justify proceeding with the loan.
C) We could delay presenting the dols 3.5 million AID food crops sub-sector loan to the GOG until late in FY76 (we would obviously hold off at least pending determination on reinstatement of training loan). That would probably preclude subsequent signing until FY77.
D) With or without explanation under B, we could scrap the AID food crops sub-sector loan.
E) We could presumably delay or prevent Guyana’s admission to the IDB, either by recommending to the appropriate congressional committee that the words quote and Guyana unquote be deleted from Section 24 of the pending IDB bill or by allowing the bill to pass but then instructing our IDB representative not to ratify the IDB article change which would allow the admission of Guyana. If the admissions of Guyana and the Bahamas are inextricably tied together, perhaps the benefit to the Bahamas is sufficiently marginal to nonetheless justify this action. If not, Bahamas might bring pressure through CARICOM states to induce Guyana to modify its consistently anti-U.S. international stance in an effort to gain admission for both countries. Delay or denial of IDB membership would be most effective practicable sanction we could impose on Guyana. Judging from repeated high level GOG inquiries, access to IDB is much more important to Guyana than continuation or termination of any U.S. AID project or entire AID program, which GOG seems to regard as marginal.
4. Obviously, there are other possible retaliatory measures, but they would either require major policy changes, would be meaningless, would be long-delayed, or all three. We could, for example, veto loans to Guyana from IDB’s FSO after Guyana’s admission. We could consistently vote against Guyana’s candidates in international organizations, but our vote in such circumstances is usually no more important than, say, Grenada’s. We could exclude Guyana and similar countries from the GSP, but the GSP is marginal for Guyana. We could adopt a negative stance toward Guyana in the IBRD, but that would give Burnham a propaganda weapon without cutting off loans. Further[Page 978]more, some of the above would clearly be overreaction for a quote mere unquote UNGA vote. Looking ahead, however, we do recommend Guyana be considered for exclusion from any sugar quota legislation, and that EximBank grant no further postponement (rollover) of loan payments.
5. Obviously, any reaction risks counteraction and escalation, but Guyana has few ways it can hurt the U.S. It needs our imports worse than we need its small market. There are no significant U.S. investments left to nationalize. Refusal to make payments under the Reynolds/OPIC agreement would destroy Guyana’s vital international credit rating. Expulsion of USAID Mission (before we voluntarily withdraw it) would invite termination of the approximately dols 20 million pipeline of approved loans. Guyana is already systematically hostile in international organizations and on the propaganda front. GOG control of the media and of foreign govt grants has already hamstrung our USIS operation, and an [garble] to close it down [garble] USIS or Embassy personnel would invite retaliation against Guyana’s Embassy in Washington, Consulate General in New York, its network of honorary consuls and its active information and propaganda program in the U.S. Burnham could, of course, abrogate the treaty allowing emergency use of [garble] Atkinson field, but the DOD has already determined the treaty has no further military utility and we are ourselves going toward possible abrogation.
6. We recommend as minimum, immediate Departmental approval of alternative (A) above. We recommend that the Department determine if some variation of (E) is feasible and advise us. If so, we recommend heavy foot dragging on membership. If no, we recommend alternatives B and C, with (C) evolving into alternative (D) if our bilateral relations continue to deteriorate.
7. USAID Director concurs on alternative (A) but is submitting dissent on alternative (E). He recommends and I concur, that he and I come to Washington Nov 20–21 for review of entire bilateral aid program.
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Summary: The Embassy outlined ways the United States could signal its displeasure over Guyanese opposition to the U.S. position on key issues at the United Nations.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750378–0868. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. All brackets are in the original except those indicating garbled text. In telegram 225930 to all diplomatic posts and telegram 228331 to Georgetown, September 22 and 24, the Department identified the Korea resolutions before the UN as vitally important to the United States, adding that other countries’ votes on the issue would in many cases have an impact on bilateral relations. (Both ibid., D750328–0593 and D750332–0806) In telegram 254964 to Georgetown, October 28, Kissinger wrote Wills requesting Guyana’s support for the U.S. position on Korea at the UN. (Ibid., D750373–0030) In telegram 1816 from Georgetown, October 29, the Embassy informed the Department that the Guyana would oppose the U.S. position in order to maintain solidarity with the Non-Aligned Movement. (Ibid., D750375–0293) In telegram 258993 to Georgetown, November 3, the Department authorized the Embassy to hold up signing an AID training loan, noting that other measures recommended in telegram 1828 were under review. (Ibid., D750381–0821) In telegram 277688 to Georgetown, November 24, the Department informed the Embassy that because the legislation providing for Guyana’s admission to the IDB was already well advanced, it was not feasible to impede Guyanese member-ship. (Ibid., D750409–0631) Telegram 1606 from Georgetown is dated September 25. (Ibid., D750333–0338)
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