374. Telegram 806 From the Embassy in Guyana to the Department of State1
806. Subject: Guyana’s Growing Ties with Cuba.
1. Summary: PM Burnham’s recent visit to Cuba highlighted increasing political, ideological and prospective economic ties binding the two nations. Cuba is probably already the Western Hemisphere nation with which Guyana’s leaders are most ideologically attuned. The incipient links seem likely to strengthen and broaden, with potential political ramifications on Guyana’s relations with Brazil, Venezuela, Surinam and with her CARICOM partners. Limited and declining U.S. interests in Guyana and Guyana’s present policy of general antagonism to the U.S. in international fora and alignment with Socialist camp seem to give the U.S. little motivation to attempt to reverse or slow this development unless it is judged likely to harm greater U.S. interests in other CARICOM states. End summary.
2. Prime Minister Burnham’s recent visit to Havana, the first by a Western Hemisphere chief of govt other than Chile’s Allende since Castro’s accession to power, illustrated the growing ties between Guyana and Cuba. Cuba has now probably become the Western Hemisphere nation with which top political leaders of the GOG as well as some top technocrats feel most closely politically attuned. PM Burnham and other top PNC leaders have since his return from Cuba spoken increasingly of Guyana’s commitment to orthodox socialism (Georgetown 773). PNC Chairman and Deputy PM Ptolemy Reid and Labor Minister Carrington have defended dictatorship of the proletariat as appropriate for Guyana, and they and Burnham have vehemently denounced concept of free enterprise.
3. Though Cuba, unlike most of the English-speaking Caribbean states, is not a member of CARICOM, the indications of a developing special relationship between Cuba and Guyana are rapidly increasing. The announcement was made by Burnham and Castro in April that resident Embassies will be established in Georgetown and Havana. Foreign Minister Ramphal told me subsequently that the Cuban Embassy in Georgetown should open in June (now doubtful) but that plans for a Guyanese Embassy at Havana are not yet settled. Burnham announced that Castro would pay a return visit to Guyana later in 1975, and dates between August and September have been subsequently unofficially mentioned. A resident Cuban fishing mission has been in Georgetown since early 1974, and Cuban trade and technical missions have been frequent visitors. Approximately one-third of the audience of around eighty people at a recent lecture in Georgetown marking the 105th anniversary of the birth of Lenin and sponsored by the Guyana-Soviet friendship society appeared to be Cubans, presumably in large part from the mission, approximately 10 Cuban fishing trawlers and one mother ship presently operate out of Georgetown. As part of the fisheries agreement with Cuba, 45 Guyanese are presently being trained in fishing in Cuba, with a group of roughly similar size due to go to Cuba in September.
4. Trade is still minimal between Guyana and Cuba, and exports of the two countries are much more competitive than complementary. Guyana has shipped several loads of timber to Cuba, though much of the timber prepared for shipment was rejected as unsatisfactory by the Cuban inspectors. The GOG has just announced that 10,000 tons of rice are to be shipped to Cuba and that Cuban cement will be purchased by Guyana in return. Burnham has also promoted among Guyanese the idea that Cuba offers attractive market for local timber despite unsatisfactory first shipments.
5. Several technical delegations from Guyana have visited Cuba over the past year and Burnham was accompanied by the Ministers of Agriculture and Education on his Cuban trip. Cuban assistance to Guyana in sugar production was offered and accepted in principle and now seems likely to newly nationalized Demerara Sugar Company (Georgetown 782). The Minister of Health travelled to Cuba earlier in the year. Our conversations with members of some of these delegations showed strong opinion that Cuba offered an excellent model for Guy [Page 973] ana in the fields of health, education, social mobilization and some aspects of agriculture. There was little apparent concern with the lack of civil liberties or the large Soviet presence in Cuba.
6. In training and education, the two countries have agreed in principle on a plan whereby Guyana would establish a Spanish language training program with Cuban participation or assistance, possibly by expanding existing Spanish Department at the University of Guyana, to train prospective Guyanese students to Cuba. An initial class for Guyanese going to Cuba for subsequent technical training has already begun using Cuban-supplied propaganda laden materials. The Cubans have agreed to accept a significant but unspecified number of medical trainees for M.D. and related degrees. The Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Health told us that Guyana prefers such training in Cuba over training in the West because of the greater emphasis on practical experience in public health and preventive medicine in Cuba and because of the lesser likelihood that Cuban-trained physicians will emigrate from Guyana to countries in the developed world. Burnham later publicly called on Guyanese medical students at UWI (Jamaica) to do their internships in Cuba rather than in the developed countries. At the Havana meeting, Burnham and Castro also agreed that Guyana would train Cuban students in English. We understand a special English program at the University of Guyana will be set up for 40 Cuban students within the next several months. In the cultural field, though Cuba has not yet shown intensive activity, it and the PRC are the only nations during the past year that have sent large performing groups to Guyana. Cuba’s group was here early this year during Republic Day ceremonies. It was warmly received at the top level but seemed to evoke little popular interest. In the religious field, the Caribbean Council of Churches sponsored a visit to Guyana in April of Cuban Baptist leader who emphasized that his role was not only to give spiritual leadership but also “affirm (Cuban) Govt policy.”
7. Despite the fact that historically Moscow-line Communist-controlled opposition People’s Progressive Party (PPP) has regularly sent delegates to Communist Party Congresses overseas, including all such congresses and international Communist mass orientation meetings in Cuba, direct ties between the ruling People’s National Congress (PNC) in Guyana and the Communist Party of Cuba are now developing. Ulises Estrada, Deputy Head of the Americas Dept of the PCC, accompanied PM Burnham back to Guyana in April. While here, Estrada conferred with PNC leaders and party groups. The PNC organ “New Nation” on April 20 claimed that during Estrada’s visit “formal relations were established between the People’s National Congress and the Cuban Communist Party.” Isabella Hernandes Apanes, Head of the Caribbean and Americas Division of the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Af [Page 974] fairs, has also visited Guyana on several occasions, and Cuban Council of Ministers Member Juan Orteja was here in April. Leo Ird Durante, Head of the PNC Labor Desk, returned from Cuba on May 7 after representing Guyana at Cuba’s Labor Day celebration (where he seems to have displaced the PPP). He announced that another PCC top official was expected shortly in Guyana for further talks with the PNC on closer relations and announced that the PNC would seek Communist assistance for a New Trade Union Center. The govt-owned press, while denouncing training of Guyanese labor leaders in the West (echoing Burnham and other PNC figures) has editorialized in favor of such training in Cuba. Since Guyana is moving toward a de facto one-party state and a self-proclaimed dictatorship of the proletariat and since subordination of GOG to PNC is progressing rapidly, this developing tie with the PNC (which now proclaims a doctrinaire Socialist ideology) could be highly significant in the context of GOG-Cuba bilateral relations.
8. Cuba is already beginning to be spoken of as a model for Guyana in the same way as are Tanzania and the PRC. However, the PRC is distant and alien. Its local representatives by and large neither speak English nor mingle with Guyanese leaders in a “Caribbean” way. Tanzania is distant, weak and at present anything but a successful economic model. Cuba is Caribbean, widely perceived locally as successful, contains a substantial African element, and is ideologically attractive to the professed radical Socialists who are leading Guyana. Previously, PM Burnham had distrusted and feared the Soviet Union as a supporter of the opposition PPP and has been suspicious of Cuba as an actual or potential surrogate for the USSR. These fears have not vanished, and his radical shift may be based in part on his perception of a decline of the West on the world scene. With the current weakness of the PPP and a resident Soviet presence, Burnham may now feel that the USSR and Cuba can be won over to a position of support for the demonstrably more effective, radicalizing and vehemently anti-capitalist PNC.
9. On a radio talk show April 16, Burnham reiterated his belief that Guyana could serve as a “bridge” between Cuba and the rest of CARICOM, noted his conviction that Cuba would eventually join CARICOM, and spelled out his hope that Guyana would lead the other CARICOM countries on a Socialist path. If present incipient trend continues, Cuba seems likely, possibly along with the PRC, to become Guyana’s principal ally and external political mentor.
10. While the direct implications of such a development for the U.S. seem to be minimal, given our limited interest in Guyana and with Guyana in any event already following a policy of consistent opposition to the U.S. in international fora, effect on Guyana’s relations with [Page 975] her CARICOM partners and with neighboring Venezuela, Brazil and soon-to-be independent Surinam, likely to be more significant. Since we lack effective leverage with Burnham and the GOG, there is little we can do directly with the GOG to deter its developing special relationship with Cuba. However, an effective channel might be through carefully rationalized low-keyed expressions of concern to other less radical Caribbean States, such as Venezuela, Trinidad and Tobago, and Barbados with which Guyana has important ties, and possibly to Brazil. These approaches would focus on negative implications of close Guyanese-Cuban relations, on the economic and political development of CARICOM, on the security of Venezuela and Brazil, etc; without giving erroneous impression that U.S. is still advocating isolation of Cuba in hemisphere. If Burnham became convinced that his relationship with Cuba was endangering his much more vital relations with those countries, he might return to a more moderate and pragmatic course less antagonistic to our interests.
-
Summary: The Embassy reported on deepening ties between Guyana and Cuba and the potential implications for the region.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750192–0311. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Brasília, Bridgetown, Caracas, Kingston, Lima, Port of Spain, Paramaribo, and USCINCSO for POLAD. Telegram 773 from Georgetown, May 23, is Document 373. Telegram 782 from Georgetown is dated May 28. (D750187–0110)
↩