Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part 1, Documents on Mexico; Central America; and the Caribbean, 1973–1976

372. Country Analysis and Strategy Paper¹

Georgetown, undated.

Summary of U.S. Interests in Guyana

Guyana’s importance to the United States has continued to decline.

Its small population, GNP, size and location make Guyana of little strategic importance to our national defense interests. Guyana is an unlikely source of potential subversion to its three South American neighbors (because of poor communications, the relative internal strength of two of them—Brazil and Venezuela—and language/cultural isolation) and with respect to its CARICOM partners is an unlikely source of potential subversion in the CASP timeframe. Aside from calcined bauxite, Guyana is not a major source of any strategic material, and its other exports are not of a quantity to be of significance to the U.S. There is no large-scale U.S. investment remaining in Guyana, and the level of imports from the U.S. is among the lowest of the Americas, with little prospect of marked improvement. There are only a few hundred U.S. citizens in Guyana, no known narcotics flow to the U.S., no serious human rights problem, no appreciable starvation or natural disaster potential, and little prospect of the Moscow-line Communist-controlled PPPs gaining power over the short or middle term.

However, over the short term, Guyana’s membership on the U.N. Security Council, its current position as a “Third World” leader, the prospect of its IDB and OAS membership, and the possibility that it may become a Socialist bellwether for the English-speaking Caribbean seem to warrant greater concern and more program flexibility than would otherwise be the case. We should recognize that, regardless of resource expenditure, we have minimal ability to deflect Guyana’s votes from a radical Third-World line or change its example from a course we are not anxious that the rest of the Caribbean follow.

Over the long term, Guyana has some potential for aiding in resolving the world food crisis through increasing its agricultural production, and current limited drilling could strike oil, with consequent increased U.S. investment and resource interest. Furthermore, Guyana’s resident diplomatic relations with the PRC and projected resident missions of the Soviet Union, Cuba and possibly other Communist countries give it some political intelligence interest. But at the present time, with many urgent claims on U.S. taxpayer resources from other quarters and other countries, Guyana seems to be a place where our interests would be adequately served by a low level of involvement.

Though in comparison with most other ARA countries we therefore have no priority interests in Guyana, in the local context (as outlined above) our interest in U.S. economic prosperity and world order and in the supportive interests of favorable disposition of Guyanese and economic, social and political development of Guyana are given relative priority.

AMBASSADOR’S OVERVIEW

For at least the past two years, the overview in the Guyana CASP has taken as a point of departure that Guyana’s importance to the U.S. had been customarily measured more by Guyana’s “potential for trouble” than by its intrinsic value to the U.S. Accepting this idea by implication, the subsequent rationale has held that since this potential had neither materialized nor threatened to do so in any way affecting vital U.S. interests, we should avoid making waves in Guyana by simply getting along as best we could with a government whose policies at home and abroad were bound to be unpleasant for us much of the time. As a consequence, recommended USG actions were designed to deter or to limit damage at points where we were particularly vulnerable.

December 31, 1974, marked a watershed in U.S.-Guyana relations, when agreement was reached on terms of compensation for the nationalization of Reynolds Metals’s bauxite mining subsidiary in Guyana. With the removal of this most visible and indeed significant hostage to GOG trouble-making potential, there are no genuinely major issues to confront the policy maker and even relatively few U.S. interests which can be challenged painfully or promoted gainfully in Guyana. While this outlook might create a temptation to “cop out” with a stance of benign neglect, I believe such an approach to be inadequate both in terms of Guyana’s intrinsic value to the U.S. and of the broader values our nation continues to uphold in a rapidly changing world.

On the international scene, Guyana will be a small but prickly thorn in our side as it becomes more and more integrated into the machinery of LDC and Third World groupings such as the Non-Aligned Movement. Thanks largely to the charisma and talent of Foreign Minister Ramphal, Guyana now ranks as a spokesman/leader for the Third World in several organizations. In fact Guyana owes its election to the UN Security Council for the 1975–76 term both to the projection of its image as an active participant in world and regional bodies and to the personal qualities of Ramphal and Burnham. With Ramphal virtually certain to assume the post of Secretary General of the Commonwealth Nations by mid-1975, there is no one approaching his stature available as a replacement and Guyana will have lost an important, perhaps decisive, element in holding onto its present status among the LDCs. Although Guyana may therefore carry less weight in determining LDC positions in international forums, when the chips are down it will vote consistently with the “automatic majority.” Moreover its seat on the Security Council will insure that Guyana is the target of heavy blandishments and pressures from the radical LDCs.

Rather than abandon the field, we should continue patiently to advocate our points of view, and encourage a frank exposition by Guyana of its viewpoint, regarding issues in the UN and other international organizations. We can perhaps marginally improve receptivity to our case by assuming a favorable disposition toward reasonable Guyanese applications for loans from the multilateral agencies (IBRD and IBD principally). Consistent with this approach is our recommended handling of bilateral assistance. But we should be content primarily with keeping open our channels of communication and with demonstrating that we can be pragmatic in adapting to new realities on the international front.

In economic affairs, Guyana’s status is neutral from the standpoint of our interest. In terms of the global food crisis, Guyana’s relative success in self-sustainment, added to its modest export of sugar and rice, are supportive of U.S. objectives. In the long run, Guyana will probably not become a major food exporter, and indeed its own economic viability is not assured. Guyana’s achievement of self-sustaining growth will depend largely on the wisdom of its investment of newly-found external capital resources. In terms of international trade, the steady push toward GOG control of imports and of export marketing favors other state-trading countries, and the market is too small to warrant special effort by U.S. traders. Our target must be realistic; if we can convince Guyana of the long-term advantages of consistency in supplying sugar to the U.S. market, there will be a prima facie case for Guyana to allow U.S. exports a fair share of the Guyana market.

The case for U.S. exports will be somewhat stronger, and our overall posture somewhat firmer, if we show continued responsiveness to Guyana’s economic and social development objectives. This is one sector where Guyana and the U.S. are in solid agreement, i.e., on concentrating development resources in expanding food production and improving the quality of life in the agrarian sector. The question for policy decision is “how,” and this question is addressed in our only major issue analysis. The option we recommend, phasing out bilateral loans and grants after FY 1976, takes into account both the intrinsic value of what can be accomplished in the bilateral context as well as the broader values of our relationship with small “Third-Worldly” LDCs like Guyana. The steps we recommend are not irrevocable, and could be re-evaluated if our assumption regarding alternate sources of assistance proves incorrect.

On the domestic Guyanese front, the bugaboo of a takeover by the PPP under Cheddi Jagan and the conversion of Guyana into a hostile Soviet-oriented satellite has receded even further into the realm of the improbable. Forbes Burnham has consolidated his hold on power more impregnably than ever, reducing both Jagan and the Black Power elements on the Left to near impotence.

As Burnham and the PNC enter their second decade of government, they are free to focus on how they will exercise power. The emerging political shape of the future Guyana is that of a de facto one-party state, increasingly authoritarian, arbitrary and hostile to criticism, real or imagined. Socialist development, with economic power concentrated in state corporations and state controls, will take on the guise of an ideology. Burnham envisages the PNC, disciplined by a rigid Code of Conduct adopted in December 1974, as forming a committed cadre of Socialists who will remake the Guyanese into an industrious and self-reliant people. Mandatory ideological indoctrination in the schools, quasi-compulsory National Service camps for youth, and a new Constitution based on supremacy of party over government will all be tools in this transformation.

In spite of his pervasive power, Burnham faces real obstacles in this endeavor to build a strongly regimented Socialist society with an undisciplined Caribbean people. He will have to contend not only with the apathy of the general populace and the alienation of the East Indian majority, but also with lethargy and corruption among his own supporters produced by ten years of enjoying the benefits of power. Burnham himself is to some extent a victim of this erosive process. He is less in tune with the rank and file and more inclined to arrogance. Thus, while Burnham can be expected to continue in power well beyond the time frame of this CASP, the ultimate fate of his drive is in doubt.

Whatever the outcome, the thrust of Burnham’s effort is bound to create discomfort for the U.S. Whether in further undermining of respect for individual rights and freedoms, or in propagandizing a state-model embodying fundamental principles antithetical to those of the U.S., Guyana will pose a minor dilemma for the U.S. On the one hand its small size, difficult social and economic problems, superficial adherence to democratic processes, and rational developmental goals, all can be counted on to evoke sympathy and support among LDCs and even in some DC quarters. At the same time, its authoritarian tendencies, increasing regimentation of the society and dogmatic denunciation of “capitalist imperialism” will provoke critical comment, particularly in the United States.

Burnham is acutely aware of what USG support meant to him in earlier, more difficult, years. Subsequent events, including the Venezuelan border dispute flare-up and the Reynolds case, have left him with the impression that USG actions are likely to be based on interests not congruent with his aims for Guyana. From this perception to that of the USG “conspiring” against him is an almost instinctive step for Burnham, with a lifetime spent in political infighting.

Thus, our approach to dealing with Burnham should emphasize openness and frankness, but studiously limit our actions and reactions to matters which touch our interests directly and significantly.

I have examined the adequacy of current and proposed staffing and funding levels of U.S. agencies operating in Guyana. I find both staff and funds adequate to pursue the strategy outlined in this CASP. I call attention to the proposed reductions in AID staff (2 American and 2 FSL by FY 1977), which I believe are consonant with the recommended phase-out of bilateral assistance after FY 1976.

[Omitted here is the body of the paper.]

Max V. Krebs
Ambassador

1. Summary: Krebs reported that the settlement between Guyana and Reynolds had resolved the only major issue in U.S.-Guyanese relations. Noting that Burnham’s poli-cies could cause the United States some discomfort, Krebs recommended a low U.S. profile and the maintenance of open channels of communication with the Guyanese Government.

   Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P750039–1385. Secret; Noforn. Transmitted as an enclosure to airgram A–28 from Georgetown, February 20, 1975. In the body of the CASP, the Embassy recommended a phase-out of bilateral economic assistance to Guyana. All brackets are in the original except those indicating text omitted by the editors. In telegram 75029 to Georgetown, April 3, the Department reported on a preliminary review of the CASP, noting that some readers believed that it might be premature to terminate assistance. (Ibid., D750118–0147) In telegrams 530 and 535 from Georgetown, April 15 and 16, Krebs repeated his recommendation, noting that further aid was unlikely to affect Guyana’s open tilt toward Communist nations and that the Guyanese Government had not shown any interest in receiving further U.S. aid. (Both ibid., D750131–0804 and D750133–0366) The approved CASP endorsed a phase-out of aid, with some qualifications. (Telegram 256 from Georgetown, Februrary 6, 1976; ibid., D760046–0526)