365. Telegram 1606 From the Embassy in Guyana to the Department of State1
1606. Subject: Sugar Quota Problem: Talk with Prime Minister. Ref: Georgetown 1599.
Summary: Prime Minister Burnham and majority his Cabinet apparently convinced that U.S. action to reduce drastically West Indies sugar quota for 1974 was politically motivated punitive move in retribution for area’s rapprochement with Cuba and aggressive implementation of non-aligned foreign policy. To this extent, they considered Oct 20 New Nation editorial accurate as to facts. I attempted forcefully to convince Burnham otherwise. He said I had succeeded. End summary.
1. Took occasion to seek encounter with Prime Minister Burnham at close of ceremonial opening of Parliament today (Monday, Oct 2 [29?]) in order ask him whether October 20 New Nation editorial reflected position of his govt. He said he had not been aware of editorial before its publication and considered it probably a bit unfortunate, but he nevertheless assumed it correctly reflected the facts, that is that reduction of West Indies sugar quota was politically motivated punitive move by USG.
2. I exploded and talked probably more bluntly to Burnham than on any other occasion in the four years I have been dealing with him. Told him this was utter nonsense, that he should know better and so on. Reminding him I had gone over U.S. Sugar Act with Acting Prime Minister during his absence in effort disprove such nonsensical allegations, I reviewed it again, emphasizing non-discretionary nature of Section 202 D4 and fact that West Indies had failed meet commitments to [Page 947] U.S. through own choice. Purpose of Act, I went on, was to assure U.S. a given supply of sugar each year from reliable sources. For this we traditionally paid premium prices. This year, no matter how justifiable West Indies might consider priority given UK market, fact was he had been left with shortage of 180,000 tons (I did not attempt to explain the reallocation of short falls).
3. Burnham seemed genuinely taken aback by strength of my reaction to his statement. He asked about Nicaragua, saying he understood that country had sold sugar to Cuba and had not been penalized. This had led him to assumption that allegations that West Indies political rapproachement with Cuba had caused cut in its quota were correct. I said I knew nothing about possible Nicaraguan sales to Cuba and did not recall that country having been mentioned in rash of distorted accounts of how West Indies being penalized. I was aware of certain allegations concerning Bolivia and Peru and was attempting to obtain clarification. These cases seemed to have involved failure notify USG of anticipated shortfalls as required, where discretion is authorized by law, but not sales to third countries while failing meet commitments to U.S., where there is no discretionary authority to waive prescribed penalties. I would explain it in more detail to FonMin Ramphal as soon as possible.
4. I stressed that USG did not operate in the way Prime Minister seemed to assume, challenged his belief in the conspiratorial theory of history and told him he could not have it both ways. Friendship and cooperation is two-way street. We offer both, but do get tired of having our motives impugned as in New Nation editorial in question. Publication of such views hardly helpful to anyone.
5. Burnham backed away, said I had convinced him reduction in quota was neither political move nor punitive action and promised to make this clear to “his people.” He reiterated that he had mistakenly assumed the worst and said he appreciated the clarification. Maybe so.
6. That Burnham took this conversation seriously (it took place in corner of vacated Parliament Hall) evidenced by fact he waved off three reminders that President and Mrs. Chung and members of Cabinet were awaiting him for tea.
7. Prior to sitting of Parliament, I had asked Minister of State in office of Prime Minister Christopher Nascimento if New Nation editorial reflected policy of the government. He said he had not read it. I urged him to do so and let me know his reaction. Later in day he phoned me at home to say that while some of language was perhaps unfortunate and while New Nation editor operated with considerable autonomy and not always the best of judgment, the views expressed in a general sense did reflect the thinking of the majority of the Cabinet. In other words the weight of opinion in the Cabinet was that the sharp reduction in [Page 948] U.S. sugar quota for 1974 was politically motivated punitive action in retribution for the area’s rapprochment with Cuba and signs of independence in foreign affairs in general. As has everyone else involved, Nascimento cited alleged nonenforcement of punitive provisions of Sugar Act in cases of other Latin American countries which had failed meet U.S. quota commitments as confirmation that U.S. discriminating against West Indies on political grounds.
8. I again reviewed nondiscretionary nature of Section 202 D4 for Nascimento’s benefit, pointed out that decision to meet commitments to UK rather than to U.S. created self-generated problem and pleaded ignorance on exactly what had happened with respect to Bolivia, Peru and Nicaragua, which are Latin American countries credited with benefiting from “selective non-enforcement.” I did give him same explanation I gave to Burnham. When I stressed that opinions such as those expressed by New Nation hardly gave encouragement to those in Washington who were attempting, at considerable cost in time and effort, to assist West Indies, Nascimento said no one here aware of such efforts. General assumption was that West Indies had no quota for 1974, period. I commented that Guyana’s Embassy in Washington obviously not doing its job and that Frank Noel, PermSec in MinTrade, who had attended technical talks in Washington last week was well aware of facts.
9. Nascimento professed be pleased I had raised issue with Prime Minister and said he would try to “spread the word” as I had given it to him. I doubt we can count on much help from this quarter, however, since he is among those close to the Prime Minister who would be predisposed assume nefarious motives on part of USG.
10. Comment: A. Dept should not be overly surprised by this interpretation of drastic reduction in quota for 1974 as political punishment for rapproachement with Cuba and non-alignment. This Embassy noted from the start that this would be the case and other posts in the area have recorded similar views. What is rational, reasonable and justifiable in Washington is not always seen in same light in country such as this, especially when we do not set record straight on distortions and misinformation. Furthermore, there is a certain feeling of guilt which predisposes many here to assume that U.S. must be displeased with recent developments. Consequently, anything the U.S. does which goes against local interests tends be interpreted as calculated punitive action.
B. It is fairly evident that Dpty Prime Minister Ptolemy Reid did not report our earlier conversation to Burnham, or did so incompletely, and that latter since his return has been listening to his more radical advisers, of which he has all too many. Coming on top of his exposure to Third World African leaders, such an interpretation of U.S. motives [Page 949] would have seemed logical to him. It is disappointing, however, that sugar producers, such as Bookers’s George Bishop, and his own technical people, such as Frank Noel, did not succeed in convincing him otherwise.
C. In any event, no question but what public airing of such views can do no one any good. Hopefully, things may quiet down a bit now.
D. Shall follow up with FonMin Ramphal, to whom Burnham listens and who is one of few more moderate influences around Prime Minister these days. His prolonged absence unfortunate in this context.
11. Action requested. That information requested in reftel be augmented by data on Nicaraguan sales. Did Nicaragua sell sugar to Cuba in 1973? Did Nicaragua fail to meet its quota commitments to U.S.? In either case, was Nicaragua penalized in any way?
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Summary: In a conversation with Burnham, Ambassador King forcefully denied that the U.S. Government’s decision to reduce the West Indian sugar quota was a politically motivated punitive measure.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Bridgetown, Kingston, and Port of Spain. All brackets are in the original except “[29?]”, added for clarity. In Document 439, the Department reported on Shlaudeman’s assurances to Caribbean Ambassadors that the U.S. Government would examine ways of ameliorating the effects of a reduction in the region’s sugar quotas. On October 27, the Department informed the Embassy that in an October 18 meeting, West Indian officials had informed their U.S. counterparts that they were fully aware the reduction in the sugar quota was a technical, not a political, issue. (Telegram 212526 to Georgetown, October 27; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]) In telegram 1599 from Georgetown, October 29, the Embassy requested information on previous cases in which Latin American nations had not fulfilled their sugar quotas. (Ibid.) No reply from the Department has been found. On November 8, Ramphal stated to King that he thought the reduction in the sugar quota was not politically motivated. (Telegram 1661 from Georgetown, November 9; ibid.)
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