361. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Karamessines), to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1
SUBJECT
- Interim Report on 1973 Guyanese Election Developments
1. On 12 December 1972 the 40 Committee decided that it was not in the United States’s interests to provide covert financial support to Prime Minister Forbes Burnham during the 1973 Guyanese elections. As an integral part of this decision it was agreed that CIA would continue to monitor election developments, any changes in Burnham’s avowed intentions to recognize Cuba and his intent to nationalize the Reynolds Aluminum holdings in Guyana. It was anticipated that such collection activities would enable the United States to review the situation in Guyana periodically and determine if the decision not to assist Burnham remained valid.
2. The key developments in Guyana since 12 December 1972 can be identified as follows:
a. On 6 December 1972, Burnham revealed to his confidants that he had no intention of taking any further action against United States-owned bauxite interests in Guyana until after the 1973 Guyanese elections. Burnham explained this decision by saying that the pressure which had been placed on him by the U.S. Government concerning this topic was greater than he could withstand.
b. On 8 December 1972, the Government of Guyana, along with the Governments of Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica and Barbados, recognized the Government of Cuba.
c. In mid-January 1973, NIEH Kung Cheng, Chargé d’Affaires of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) Embassy in Guyana, informed Kenneth King, Guyanese Minister for Economic Development, that China was willing to assist Burnham economically during the 1973 election. This assistance was to amount to 500,000 pounds sterling ($1,175,000 @ $2.35 to one pound sterling) which was to be siphoned off from the total aid package alloted by the PRC to Guyana for economic [Page 936] assistance. In short, the Chinese said Burnham could use these funds for special projects of his choosing outside of the context of the original Chinese/Guyanese agreement. After Burnham was briefed by his Minister concerning the Chinese offer, he issued instructions that Guyana was to conclude an amended agreement with the Chinese to cover this new development. In addition, Burnham expressed his warm appreciation to the Chinese for their offer. A high level member of Burnham’s government who furnished this data to CIA was disturbed by Burnham’s acceptance of the Chinese offer and felt that, by virtue of the favor, the PRC would eventually be able to attain a significant level of influence in Guyana.
3. [3 lines not declassified] an assessment of what action Guyana’s East Indian population might take if they were faced with a fraudulent election in which Burnham was reelected. The agent left Guyana in January 1973 and reported the following:
a. The overwhelming majority of the East Indians would continue to vote along ethnic lines, casting their votes for Cheddi Jagan even though they may not agree with Jagan’s political ideology.
b. The East Indians see little chance of Jagan winning the 1973 election.
c. Although it is conceded by the majority of the East Indian population that Burnham will win the 1973 election by fraudulent means, the East Indians are unlikely to rebel. Cheddi Jagan told the agent that there were several “hot-headed” activists on his staff, but he confided to the agent that he could not see a serious threat of violence breaking out in Guyana during the next five years.
4. It is our conclusion that to date there has been no change in Burnham’s basic attitude or the political situation in Guyana which would warrant a recommendation that the 40 Committee reconsider its previous decision not to furnish Burnham with covert electoral support. The U.S. Ambassador to Guyana, Mr. Spencer King, shares this view. We will however monitor the PRC’s level of financial aid to Burnham and if it appears that such support will give China either unique leverage or influence with the Government of Guyana we will report this promptly so that the 40 Committee can reconsider its previous decision.
5. The electoral situation in Guyana remains fluid for no firm date has been set for the 1973 elections. The current indications point, however, to an election in June 1973. CIA collection requirements continue to focus on this lack of a firm election date. In addition, the collection effort is geared to identifying trends which might indicate that Cheddi Jagan could pull off an electoral upset. If such a trend is detected, it will be brought promptly to the 40 Committee’s attention.
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Summary: The CIA assessed the political situation in Guyana and concluded there was no need to reconsider the 40 Committee’s December 1972 decision to terminate covert electoral support for Burnham’s government.
Source: National Security Council, Nixon Intelligence Files, Subject Files A–I, Guyana, 23 May 1969–6 February 1973. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. All brackets are in the original except those indicating text that remains classified. A copy was sent to Meyer. For background on the decision to terminate covert assistance to Burnham, see Documents 376 and 379 in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–10, Documents on American Republics, 1969–1972.
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