339. Telegram 2496 From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State1
2496. Subject: President Balaguer, the Dominican Military, and Politics. Ref: SD 2479.
1. During conversation described reftel, the topic turned to the Dominican military. I mentioned that conventional wisdom in town had it that no one could govern the Dominican Republic without the consent of the military. If that were the case, I continued, the character of the men (professionalism, honesty, political outlook) holding key military positions in 1978 would have a direct bearing upon the types of candidates that might succeed him, assuming that he still intended this to be his last term. The President replied that first I could be certain that this [Page 901] was his last time around and second that he did not agree with the conventional wisdom. He explained that he found the military a rather stupid lot and fearful of the responsibility and complexity of governing the Dominican Republic. The real obstacle to progress, he continued, was what he said in some Latin countries were called “the oligarchy” but which he preferred to characterize as the “reactionary rich.” This group had both brains and economic power and used and corrupted the military, and on some occasions the Church, to preserve their wealth and promote their selfish ends. They were dangerous and had to be dealt with patiently and skillfully, he added—confrontation could result in serious disturbances throughout the country for these rich were very resourceful. Progress under these circumstances was necessarily slow but he was determined to push forward wherever and whenever he saw the opportunity for large-scale social reform and improvement. He cited the agrarian reform program as an example of how reform could be accomplished without ripping the social fabric, although he acknowledged that much remained yet to be done to realize fully the agrarian reform program.
2. Balaguer continued that he intended to strive for a political situation over the next four years in which the moderate Left and Right were isolated from their respective extremes. The mistake of the moderate Left during the last election, he said, was to have united with the extreme Left (read MPD). The extreme Left was incorrigible and the moderates would do well to dissassociate themselves from the extremists. He seemed hopeful that he could accomplish this. Splitting the moderate from the reactionary Right was a tougher problem, he thought, but that too needed doing.
3. With regard to possible turmoil over a candidate elected in 1978 who was unacceptable to the reactionary rich, Balaguer said that he would not expect an immediate reaction. If the 1962 election of Bosch were any guide, the powerful economic groups would accept the election results without furor and then go quietly to work on the military and others to undermine the elected President and eventually overthrow him. He noted wryly that in Bosch’s case it had taken about six or seven months.
4. Comment: Balaguer knows his countrymen and the local political scene as few Presidents have known theirs. Yet I wonder whether he is completely correct in his classical analysis of the military (and Church) as the handmaidens of entrenched economic power. While it is true that the Dominican military are not an impressive group intellectually (which must try the patience of an intellectual President) and most of the senior group have it rather cozy with little else to do than [Page 902] enrich themselves, some of them seem power-hungry and could conceivably move on their own.
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Summary: Hurwitch reported on a conversation with Balaguer on the role of the military in Dominican politics.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Country Files, Box 783, Latin America, Dominican Republic, Vol. 1. Secret; Exdis. In telegram 2479 from Santo Domingo, June 19, the Embassy noted that the President “appeared his usual unruffled and gracious self” during the conversation and listed the subjects discussed in the meeting. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D740160–0734)
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