Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part 1, Documents on Mexico; Central America; and the Caribbean, 1973–1976

276. National Intelligence Estimate 85–73¹

Washington, November 1, 1973.

[Omitted here is a title page and a map of Latin America.]

CONTENTS

	Page
PRÉCIS	1
THE ESTIMATE	4
I. THE STATE OF THE REVOLUTION	4
The Economy	4
The Style and Structure of Leadership	5
The Export of Revolution	5
II. THE LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP	6
The Changing Climate	6
The Ending of Cuba’s Isolation	7
Castro’s Shifting Tactics	8
III. THE MOSCOW CONNECTION	9
The Tie That Binds	9
The Soviet Military Presence	9
IV. CASTRO’S COURSE: CONSTRAINTS AND OPPORTUNITIES	10
V. THE OUTLOOK	12
VI. IMPLICATIONS OF VARIOUS UNITED STATES COURSES OF ACTION	13
ANNEX A: CUBAN INVOLVEMENT WITH GUERRILLA GROUPS IN LATIN AMERICA	19
ANNEX B: SOVIET ECONOMIC AND MILITARY INTERESTS IN CUBA	23

CUBA AND ITS LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP

PRÉCIS

Key developments affecting the policies of the Castro regime in recent years include:

—A drop in revolutionary ardor and a more realistic attitude toward problems at home and abroad.

—Increased dependence on Soviet assistance and policy guidance.

—Improved relations with Latin America.

Soviet-Cuban ties over the next few years will be characterized by:

—Castro’s disinterest in a general accord with the U.S., and his perception of no alternative to heavy dependence on the USSR.

—Efforts by the Soviets to step up the frequency and, over time, the size of their naval deployments to the region.

—Soviet concern about provoking a strong U.S. reaction and, thus, the likely avoidance of such actions as establishing a base for ballistic missile submarines.

Castro’s relations with Latin America will be characterized by:

—Disinclination to undertake any broad program of support for guerrillas and terrorists, in part because of poor prospects for success.

—Emphasis instead on building bridges to established governments showing independence of U.S. influence.

—Continued attraction to the principle of violent revolution and selective support for the few insurgent groups which may demonstrate an ability to operate successfully on their own.

—Regard for Chile as a special case, with assistance to extremists who attempt to resist the military junta.

Over the next several years, Castro’s course in Latin America will be shaped by important constraints as well as opportunities:

—The larger and more influential Latin American countries, except for Brazil and Chile, will have diplomatic ties with Cuba by the end of 1974.

—There will be some growth of Cuban influence in regional councils and with certain Latin American governments seeking to establish anti-U.S. or independent positions, particularly on economic issues.

—Castro’s dependence on the USSR, Cuba’s small size and large domestic problems, and the drive for regional influence by the major Latin American countries will nonetheless serve as formidable constraints on Cuba’s activities against U.S. interests in the hemisphere.

The extent to which Havana—and Moscow—would still be able to turn local situations to their advantage will depend in good measure on the kinds of policies the U.S. pursues toward Cuba and the region. Section VI of the Estimate examines the likely implications of a range of illustrative U.S. courses of action:

—Course A: Take a Tougher Stance involves stepped-up pressures on certain Latin American and West European governments and on Japan to maintain Cuba’s isolation. While this course would please anti-Castro elements in various Latin American countries and strengthen their determination to oppose him, it would stimulate Castro himself to expand rather than contract his efforts to turn the region against the U.S. In the end, the repercussions of such a U.S. policy change would tend to widen the gulf between the U.S. and Latin America and possibly also stiffen Soviet support for Castro.

—Course B: Hold Essentially to Present Posture would continue U.S. resistance to Latin moves to lift OAS sanctions, and it would make Castro work hard for any gains at U.S. expense. But the U.S. would have to be prepared to move toward acceptance of the collapse of sanctions after the fact. Castro would still pursue various anti-U.S. activities in the hemisphere. If presently required punitive actions were undertaken by the U.S. against countries lifting sanctions, negative reactions from affected governments would give him additional opportunities to spread his anti-U.S. line. In any case, U.S. assistance to threatened smaller countries and actions by the major countries in their own interests would work to limit Castro’s success.

—Course C: Take Some Steps to Ease Relations involves U.S. participation in a phaseout of OAS sanctions and a decision to scale down the economic denial program, while exploring possibilities for ad hoc accommodations with Cuba as a basis for working out practical improvements in U.S.-Cuban relations. Castro would be prompted to move quickly to expand Cuba’s political role in the region; but over time, he would be checked by a variety of factors, especially those noted above, i.e., Castro’s dependence on the USSR, Cuba’s small size and large domestic problems, and the drive for regional influence by the major Latin American countries.

—Course D: Move Forthwith to Normalize Relations involves abandonment of efforts to contain Castro’s role in the hemisphere and generous inducements for Cuba to accept rapprochement with the U.S. Reactions to a turnabout in U.S. policy of this magnitude would produce formidable problems, including strains in U.S. relations with certain anti-Castro governments in Latin America. Furthermore, this course would be unlikely either to induce a cooperative attitude on Castro’s part or to stem Cuban and Soviet anti-U.S. activities in the hemisphere.

[Omitted here are the body of the estimate and Annexes A and B.]

1. Summary: This estimate analyzed the improving relations between Cuba and Latin America and outlined possible courses of action.

   Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Subject Files, National Intelligence Estimates, Withdrawals, Box 362, Folder 2. Secret. All brackets are in the original except those indicating text omitted by the editors. According to a note on the cover sheet, the Central Intelligence Agency, the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, the NSA, the AEC, and the Department of the Treasury participated in the preparation of this estimate. All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in the Estimate except the representative of the FBI, who abstained because the subject was outside of his jurisdiction. This Estimate superseded Special National Intelligence Estimate 85–71. Page references in the Table of Contents reflects pagination in the original.