Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part 1, Documents on Mexico; Central America; and the Caribbean, 1973–1976

27. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rogers) and the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lord) to Secretary of State Kissinger¹

Washington, January 14, 1975.

Why Has The New Dialogue Soured?

This memorandum addresses several questions you posed at last Thursday’s staff meeting. It reflects views aired at last week’s Latin American Mission Chiefs Conference.

Has the New Dialogue Soured?

Not yet, but it is beginning to “turn.” Whether it will go sour depends on the outcome of the BA meeting.

What Is Wrong?

To take the analogy further, the problem is old wine in new bottles. The New Dialogue was new largely because it involved Henry Kissinger. But many of the issues were old.

The significance of this is that—

(1) The New Dialogue was a risky venture from the outset.

—Like all the earlier U.S. initiatives, it aroused some expectations which could not be met, at least in the short term. The New Dialogue was launched by a unique Secretary of State, one who had just assumed office fresh from enormous foreign policy triumphs. You asked the Latin Americans to tell you what was wrong with U.S. policy. They had fantasies that you would work some special magic to set wrongs aright. Culturally predisposed to believe in heroic leaders, the Latin Americans did not understand that in our political system foreign policy issues increasingly involve a process—usually lengthy—of negotiation and compromise between two branches and two parties. Because their expectations had been aroused and deflated several times in the past two decades, the current crisis of confidence may have come somewhat more quickly than we might have expected. The cycle, in other words, may be getting shorter.

—The operational format of the New Dialogue actually invites confrontation in some ways. It calls on the Latin Americans to formulate general, lowest-common-denominator group positions to present with one voice to us; it does not lend itself to the give-and-take of practical discussions, or the development of implementing steps, or the manipulation of conflicting Latin interests.

—We and the Latin Americans approached the New Dialogue with different premises. We sought new common enterprises, building on our past associations; the Latin Americans have numerous preconditions which must be met before they can be expected to respond—if then.

—Finally, the political support for a renewed U.S.–Latin American “special relationship” was limited. For the Latin Americans, their identity crisis (are they “allies,” a special “bloc” or part of the “Third World?”) led them to reject “community” with the United States—even though they would like to see the United States act as if one existed. And in the United States, concern with domestic problems and other international priorities has made it difficult to develop a convincing rationale for a genuinely “special effort” to strengthen relations with Latin America.

(2) These initial handicaps were obscured and muted by the excitement of Henry Kissinger’s involvement in the dialogue. The euphoria has begun to wear off, pari passu with the Latin Americans’ growing belief that we are not being responsive to their demands:

—The U.S. attempts to work out what we see as balanced compromises in the Working Groups (on Science and Technology and on Multinational Corporations) is seen by the Latins as foot-dragging: if we really want to be responsive, they reason, we would simply do what they have asked us to do—for example, commit U.S. industry to a massive, free transfer of technological secrets.

—Quite apart from its failure to resolve the OAS-Cuba issue, the losing majority feels that Quito demonstrated continuing U.S. indifference and lack of responsiveness.

—We seem to them to be going backward on the single, most important economic issue for the Latin Americans—trade. The countervailing duty actions of last summer against Argentina, Brazil and Colombia called into question our commitment to reduce, rather than raise, trade barriers. This skepticism has blossomed into outrage with the passage of the Trade Act. The TRA, ballyhooed since 1969 as a major step forward in U.S. willingness to deal with Latin American economic needs, turns out to have retaliatory proscriptions that reawaken the frustration created by the restrictive legislation of the past decade. Specifically, Latin Americans ask of what possible use the New Dialogue or the “special relationship” can be if they continue supplying us with petroleum during the Arab embargo, only to have Congress treat them as if they were Arabs, while the Executive shows them even less attention.

—And in the midst of these disappointments, the CIA revelations have called into question the sincerity of your commitment to non-intervention in the internal politics of Latin America.

What Should We Do?

The situation is not irretrievable. Responsiveness to even a few of the more important Latin American concerns can offset much of the current malaise. The Buenos Aires meeting can be made a success.

Analysis and recommendations on these matters are contained in Rogers’ memorandum to you of January 2 (copy attached). Tab B of that memorandum presents a concrete action program for the Buenos Aires meeting itself.

Between now and your Latin American trip, several preparatory actions are essential:

—a well-publicized effort to obtain more flexibility in the Trade Bill;

—a decision on some of the other items in the January 2 package.

And your trip will help achieve a better, more balanced understanding with key actors about realistic goals for the Buenos Aires meeting.

1. Summary: This memorandum analyzed Latin American frustration with the New Dialogue.

   Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, Entry 5403, Lot 78D217, Box 14, Briefing Memoranda, 1975, Folder 6. Confidential. Drafted by Bloomfield, Lewis, and Einaudi on January 14. The January 2 memorandum from Rogers to Kissinger and its tabs are not attached and not found. At the January 10 staff meeting, Kissinger asked “how in a period of six months what was considered a promising new approach [the New Dialogue] is turning into a bone of contention.” (Ibid., Transcripts of Kissinger Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, Entry 5177, Lot 78D443, Box 2) The Kissinger trip to Latin America mentioned in the closing lines of this memorandum was scheduled for mid-February but was postponed due to developments in the Middle East. (Telegram 23922 from the Department to Buenos Aires; Ibid., Central Foreign Policy File, P830106–2733)