163. Telegram 2302 From the Embassy in El Salvador to the Department of State1
2302. Subj: President Molina Struggles for Survival as Consequence of Arrest of His Army Chief of Staff. Ref: San Salvador 2301.
1. Summary. President Molina telephoned me late last night to ask me to convey to highest USG officials his chagrin over the arrest of Col. Rodriguez in New York and his dismay that the USGov had not brought this matter to his attention at some earlier stage. He was also greatly disturbed by the sensationalist U.S. media treatment. In his view, the close, cordial and cooperative USG–GOES relationship merited greater trust, confidence and discretion than we had exhibited in dealing with this matter. He was alarmed about the repercussion of the incident on the extremely delicate internal political situation, particularly its distressing impact on the Salvadoran military institution and [Page 468] its destabilizing effect on his administration. He was also concerned that it would serve to undermine the negotiations to normalize relationships with Honduras. His views served to confirm our previous assessment that Molina is confronting the greatest crisis of his administration and the uncertainty of whether he will be able to survive. End summary.
2. President Molina telephoned me around 11:00 p.m last night to share his views on the crisis which has resulted from the arrest in New York of his Armed Forces Chief of Staff Col. M.A. Rodriguez and to ask me to convey to the highest appropriate Departmental authority his chagrin over the incident and his dismay over two aspects of it:
A) That we, as a friendly government, had not brought Rodriguez’s complicity to his attention at some earlier point in the investigation of the alleged conspiracy. He was disturbed that we had not taken him into our confidence and that we had not raised it with him when we were first aware that a questionable export license application had been filed.
B) The sensationalist treatment in the U.S. media, apparently with USG collaboration, e.g., the U.S. Attorney’s unusual Sunday morning press conference. He also mentioned the harmful impact of U.S. television coverage which he said depicted Rodriguez as the worst type of criminal delinquent.
3. Molina wanted us to know that he very much regretted that one of his highest military officers had become embroiled in scandalous affair, but that he equally regretted the way it had transpired in the hands of USG officials. His reaction was colored by his feeling that he and his administration had always dealt with the USG and its officials as friend-to-friend, closely, frankly and in full trust and confidence. He personally maintained the highest regard and friendship for the U.S. as leader of the democratic world and advocated collaboration with us on wide range interests. As such, he would have expected us to have exercised greater restraint, discretion and responsibility in dealing with the case. It was not his intention or desire to protect Rodriguez or absolve him if he was guilty. He will have to take his just deserts. As his friend and military classmate and colleague of many years, Molina was greatly pained by it all. He will be going through the ordeal on receiving Rodriguez’s wife and son May 19. But this is a minor consideration and his overriding concern about this incident is its repercussions on:
A) The very delicate internal political situation. The military institution is very upset by this great blow to its morale and prestige at a moment when it is already exercised over the competition to select a 1977 Presidential candidate and seized with the issue of determining its [Page 469] position on the initiation of the first project in the controversial Agrarian Transformation Program (ISTA).
B) The political opposition is moving swiftly to exploit the Rodriguez case fully through propaganda and otherwise to further destabilize the situation by depicting the regime in the worst light.
4. Molina considers that his position as national leader and his task of having to explain the Rodriguez case to his own military have been made difficult and complicated by the troublesome aspects cited in paragraph 2. The severe crisis he has to confront with its uncertain outcome carries the potential of dire consequences that he thought would serve neither Salvadoran nor U.S. best interests.
5. I explained to Molina that the Department had received the license application only a few days prior to the May 15 arrest, that it couldn’t have received more than preliminary, working level attention and certainly had not moved to higher levels of authority. Further, I assured him that the Department had not been aware of the conspiracy or police action and was not apprised until after the arrest occurred and it received notification from the Justice Department on the afternoon of May 16. With regard to the Honduras negotiations, I told Molina that following the Ryan-Bertrand conversation on May 17, the Department had instructed Embassy Tegucigalpa to lend its good offices in reassuring the GOH that Rodriguez’s alleged involvement in the fraudulent arms transaction was unrelated to the normalization negotiations and did not represent bad faith on the part of the GOES in those negotiations. I promised to telephone Amb. Ryan on May 18 to pass on his views.
6. Comment. The circumstances, mood and substance of what Molina conveyed to me serves to confirm the assessment in San Salvador 2301. It was apparent from his remarks that the impact of this incident has been severe and the consequences dire. That Molina is confronting the gravest crisis of his administration was evident in his words as was his uncertainty as to the outcome. Furthermore, this incident has engendered considerable perplexity about and resentment toward the USG among some Salvadoran military officers as was evident in Molina’s words and confirmed to us by our contacts with the Salvadoran Armed Forces.
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Summary: The Embassy reported on a political crisis faced by President Molina after Salvadoran Army Chief of Staff, Manuel Alfonso Rodríguez, was arrested in New York on charges of conspiracy to sell firearms to criminal figures in the United States.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760194–0532. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to Guatemala, Managua, San José, Tegucigalpa, and USCINCSO. In telegram 2303 from San Salvador, May 20, the Embassy added the following passage to be inserted in paragraph 3 of telegram 2302: “C) The difficult negotiations with Honduras. These may be prejudiced by the Rodriguez case. The U.S. press is already suggesting that this is so and fanning the fires of mistrust; and this is being echoed by the Central American media.” (Ibid., D760195–1059) In telegram 2301 from San Salvador, May 18, the Embassy reported that Rodríguez’s arrest for “conspiring to sell ten thousand machine guns to the American underworld hit San Salvador, the GOES, and the military officers corps with dramatic and perhaps devastating effect.” (Ibid., D760192–1045)
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