153. Telegram 4627 From the Embassy in El Salvador to the Department of State1
4627. Subject: Conversation with President Molina About Honduras/El Salvador Problems and Other Matters.
[1.] Summary: Molina hoped Honduras can be prevailed upon, with our help, to extend negotiations past Salvadoran elections next March. Presidents may meet early next week to seek substantive as [Page 443] well as procedural solutions. He reciprocated our expression of friendship and goodwill and rationalized his purchase of combat aircraft from Israel while registering mild concern over possible additional U.S. sales to Honduras. He briefly reviewed the development and reform aspirations of his centrist, nationalist and capitalist regime. We expressed our interest in being helpful to maintain the best possible atmosphere conducive to the two disputants settling their problems by themselves.
2. This morning (Dec 13) Lazar and I called on President Molina who had with him FonMin Borgonovo and Dr. Ortiz Mancia. Lazar opened conversation with reiteration of expression of unaltered and constant friendship and goodwill of USG toward GOES and Salvadoran people.
3. Pres. Molina immediately broached Honduras/El Salvador problem as follows:
(A) Both he and Hopez Arellano were sincerely seeking a solution to the problem. He considered Lopez to be sensible and well-intentioned and he recognized that Lopez had certain domestic problems, including military factionalism, which encumbered his ability to reach compromise on the border question. GOES was concerned that internal Honduran pressures might force GOH into breaking off negotiations on December 15. GOES desired to keep the door open beyond that date out of concern that a rupture would gravely deteriorate situation between the two countries and constitute a severe setback to possibility of solution of the problem. They were bothered by signs such as the recent Honduran complaint to OAS Committee about alleged border incidents but again tended to attribute this to Lopez’s internal problems.
(B) The negotiations in Mexico were at a standstill at the moment since the Hondurans were insisting on resumption of the discussion of the specifics of a border settlement; and the Salvadorans were insisting on the establishment of an agenda for the final week of talks in accordance with prescribed procedures. Neither side had raised the subject of a possible final declaration to sum up the negotiations and provide a basis for their continuation in the future. In order to get the two sides to reach an accommodation on further negotiations, the Mexican Foreign Office had scheduled a luncheon today to enable the negotiators to explore possibilities.
(C) Generals Somoza and Arana have not been able to arrange a meeting for themselves with Molina and Lopez Arellano primarily because of Arana’s postoperative condition. However Gen. Somoza would be passing through San Salvador at noon today on his way to Mexico and Molina would explore with him the possibility of an early meeting of chiefs of state to focus on the problem as soon as Arana’s [Page 444] condition permitted. He thought this might be possibly early next week.
(D) The immediate problem to be solved was that of preventing the negotiations from terminating definitively Dec 15. The GOES preferred to have the negotiations suspended and resumed after the Easter holiday because it felt that the atmosphere would not be conducive to positive achievements during the early months of 1974 when the election campaign would be taking place in El Salvador. If suspension were not acceptable to the Hondurans, the GOES was amenable to some sort of an arrangement to commit both sides to extend the talks beyond Dec 15 and keep them going past the March 1974 election. He expressed the hope that the United States would prevail on the Hondurans to continue negotiations beyond Dec 15 through either a suspension or continuation to enable both sides to conclude them after Easter 1974.
4. Pres. Molina also raised the subject of combat aircraft acquisition and again explained his motives for procurement from Israel in the same terms that he had previously revealed to me on November 29. He again cited his meeting with the other Central American leaders in Chiquimula in which he had explained to them why he was procuring from Israel and had given them assurances that no threat was intended to any of his neighbors. He alleged that they all agreed that each government must decide for itself what it needed to meet its security responsibilities. He mentioned that Lopez, particularly, had understood this and had expressed his intention to acquire additional A–37s from the U.S. He expressed his awareness of U.S. interest in a balanced and coordinated combat aircraft acquisition program in Central America and regretted that our inability to accommodate Salvador’s needs caused him to go to Israel for airplanes. He evinced some concern over the possibility of additional U.S. combat aircraft sales to Honduras.
5. Pres. Molina broadly sketched his concepts about the development needs of El Salvador. He cited the numerous serious social and economic problems plaguing the country and stated his determination to move ahead in efforts to resolve these problems in a multi-year reform and development program. He said that it was essential to undertake this task of fundamental change of conditions to prevent a major political eruption. He characterized his regime as centrist in political philosophy, nationalist in a positive sense (i.e., domestic rather than foreign solutions to problems) and progressively capitalist in economic orientation. He had praise for the younger leaders of the business world whom he considered to have the outlook to move the nation toward economic development with social justice.
6. Pres. Molina reciprocated our assurances of goodwill and friendship and stated his personal desire to maintain best possible liaison between his government and ours. He stated that he had felt a slight “coldness” [Page 445] in the past but that this had been overcome well before Ambassador Catto’s departure.
7. In answer to specific points above, we made following replies:
(A) With respect to Honduras/El Salvador problem we emphasized our belief that the only solution was an agreement freely arrived at between the two sides; that no solution imposed on either or both of the parties would be workable. We also pointed out that we enjoyed warm relations with both countries and did not wish to take sides between them. We expressed our willingness and indeed desire to be of assistance in working out a solution to this problem within the constraints expressed above, and pointed out that we had served informally as a channel of communications between the two, particularly in discounting rumors, and were willing to continue to do so. Molina accepted this. We expressed our opinion that both sides were negotiating in good faith but that neither side believed the other was; we added that this seemed to be clouding the Mexican talks and interfering with the dialogue that should be taking place. We stated that we were pleased to hear that contacts were continuing on the border and at a high level between Molina and Lopez. Finally we urged that any decision on what to do about the Mexican negotiations consider the over-riding importance of maintaining an air of calm and continuity and not give the appearance of a breakdown in the talks or a stalemate in negotiations. Leaving the meeting we asked Borgonovo whether any decision had been made on the issuance of a press statement from Mexico. He said this matter probably would be discussed today.
(B) With respect to combat aircraft, we reiterated our policy of evenhandedness. We stated we could not unilaterally assure a balance of forces in Central America; that each country had a right to determine its own needs and buy wherever it chose. However we intended to continue to make parallel, scrupulously equal offers to both Honduras and El Salvador and keep each side advised of what we were offering the other. We stated we had not offered any additional A–37s to Honduras.
(C) We expressed our strong desire to continue to cooperate with El Salvador’s development plans both directly through aid and indirectly through BID and IBRD.
(D) We urged Molina to work closely with the Embassy particularly in heading off any problems that might arise. He reciprocated the offer and said he was always available to us.
8. Comment: The meeting was cordial although Molina probably was disappointed. We suspect he was hoping for a more forthcoming response to his request, through Ortiz Mancia, for U.S. pressure on Honduras. We believe that any use by Honduras as a pressure point of Molina’s strongly felt need for a delay until after elections would be [Page 446] counter-productive, perhaps strongly so. On the other hand Lopez could make very good use of this by acceding to Molina’s wishes, perhaps at the next Chiefs of State meeting, as a token of good faith and understanding of Molina’s political problems. This would help to improve the negotiating climate which appears to have deteriorated. If Dept and Embassy Tegucigalpa agree this could be passed to Somoza, with request that he pass the suggestion on to Lopez though not, of course, mentioning that it comes from U.S. The form of any postponement obviously also would be important and should be geared to avoid the appearance of a breakdown or stalemate.
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Summary: During a conversation with President Molina on the dispute with Honduras, Director of Central American Affairs Lazar and Chargé Moskowitz expressed their interest in being helpful but noted that the two governments would need to settle their differences by themselves.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]. Confidential; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to Guatemala, Managua, Mexico, San José, Tegucigalpa, and USCINCSO. All brackets are in the original except “[1.]”, added for clarity.
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