148. Telegram 4663 From the Embassy in Costa Rica to the Department of State1
4663. Subject: Change in Vesco Law on Horizon.
1. Summary: Mainly because the Vesco issue embarrasses the Oduber government and the PLN as the Presidential campaign approaches, the atmosphere is more propitious now than it has been for a year and a half for the Costa Rican Assembly to change the 1974 “Vesco” extradition law. Whether there would be a new law and what it would be are now being debated in the legislature. Some elements of the government and PLN may have in mind an strategy that would relieve them of the onus of the law while at the same time not exposing Vesco to any real risk. Such a strategy would impact negatively on the U.S. while making it possible for the GOCR and PLN to defend themselves against charges of protecting Vesco. These developments make it important that we be prepared to move expeditiously and on short notice with a well prepared extradition request. End summary.
2. Costa Rica’s National Assembly is debating changing the 1974 extradition law (“the Vesco law”). As result of a rules procedure vote September 14, the extradition law will receive first priority before all other new business (except emergency matters) in the current session of the assembly. This decision, according to knowledgeable legislative [Page 435] sources, has the support of the government and PLN. If this is so, it is the strongest indication ever that this time there will be action on the Vesco law.
3. There are two draft bills being discussed. They are:
A) The majority proposal, favored by government PLN deputies, which encompasses a new extradition law that eliminates some of the more egregious elements of the 1974 law that favor Vesco.
B) The minority proposal, calling simply for a return to the 1971 extradition law, which stated explicitly that extradition treaties, when they exist, govern all extradition matters.
4. Yet another possibility that has been mentioned in PLN is simple repeal of the Vesco law, leaving extradition matters to bilateral treaties where they exist, and to general legislation covering foreigners where treaties do not exist.
5. Opposition deputies, working with PLN Deputy Miguel Corrales Bolanos, the prime mover of the effort, have introduced a large number of motions that eliminate those parts of the majority proposal that favor Vesco. Embassy understands that if all these changes are accepted, Opposition deputies will join forces with Government Party to favor the new law.
6. Comment: The atmosphere for a change in the Vesco law, passed in the final days of the Figueres administration, is more propitious now than it has been in the past year and a half. Opposition leaders are encouraged. They claim that PLN leaders have assured them of government and party seriousness. However, they point out that the final proof of this determination will be in just what changes in majority draft law will be worked out, or if PLN will accept simple repeal with no new law.
7. There are political reasons that can be adduced to why different elements in the PLN and the government may want to move against the Vesco Law at this time:
A) The PLN and the Oduber government must deflate corruption as a political issue in the upcoming political campaign. The internal PLN candidate selection process has begun; the Presidential campaign begins in 1977. Corruption will be a prime issue; the Vesco law is one of the most visible proofs of government/party corruption. In particular, the Vesco law is a shackle to Luis Alberto Monge, the PLN pre-candidate who commands a good deal of support from the younger generation of PLN leaders in the National Assembly. Monge’s campaign is being waged on his own personal honesty and incorruptibility; he publicly states that he has no Vesco ties. The continuation of a Vesco law on the books—permitted by the PLN legislative contingent in which Monge enjoys considerable political support—could hurt his [Page 436] chances both in the PLN primary election, and in the campaign if he is the candidate. Removal of the law then, has now become a political necessity for the PLN. This same general reasoning, i.e. that the law is an embarrassment to the party during an election year, also affects the candidacy of the other PLN hopefuls, including For. Min. Gonzalo Facio.
B) Oduber does not fear Figueres politically as much as he did. Oduber now feels primacy in the Government Party after Figueres was thwarted by the PLN in the ex-President’s attempt to change the Constitution to permit him to run for President. The Vesco issue has always been one on which Oduber has trodden softly in part at least for fear of alienating Figueres and provoking a deep split in the PLN. (See 1976 Costa Rica CASP.) With Figueres’s recent political defeat, and his support of a candidate in the party (Facio) the fear of a Figueres formal split is greatly reduced. One factor affecting this is whether Figueres and Vesco have really split as reported. A more important consideration is whether or not there is an Oduber/Vesco relationship, and if there is, whether Oduber can afford to or would now be willing to act to the prejudice of Vesco.
C) Costa Ricans are disgusted with the image Vesco brings to the country. Costa Rican leaders are painfully aware that Vesco’s continued presence and the existence of the Vesco law bring disgrace to the country. This is especially so when Vesco makes sensational public declarations and when sordid Vesco-connected activities are revealed (e.g., recent press accounts concerning connection of Vesco name to Duke Hall murder case; Vesco’s avoiding taxes on high-powered launches; presence of foreign body guards in Vesco’s retinue). PLN members of the legislature have voiced such opinion to EmbOffs in recent weeks.
8. It is highly possible that at least some elements of the government/PLN have in mind a strategy that would relieve them of the onus of the Vesco law while at the same time not exposing Vesco to any real risk, this would hold especially if there is an Oduber/Vesco link. The strategy would involve amending the law to remove those features which are blatantly pro-Vesco but doing so only shortly before the date on which Vesco becomes eligible for Costa Rican citizenship. That short period (weeks, months) presumably would be insufficient for the USG to file an effective extradition request or take any action that might effectively delay the process of granting Costa Rican citizenship to Vesco.
9. A variation to the above would have Vesco departing the country, clandestinely, if necessary, upon amendment of the law and returning at a time when, with good legal assistance, he might successfully file for Costa Rican citizenship.
10. Such a strategy would, of course, impact negatively on the U.S. while making it possible for the GOCR/PLN to defend themselves [Page 437] against charges of protecting Vesco. In the circumstances it is important that we be prepared to move expeditiously and on short notice with a well-prepared extradition request. Failing this it would not be possible to persuade anybody here that the USG has been at all serious in this matter at any time.
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Summary: The Embassy reported that the Costa Rican legislature was considering proposals to amend or repeal the 1974 extradition law that served to protect Robert Vesco.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760364–0579. Confidential. In telegram 5195 from San José, October 29, the Embassy reported that a new extradition law to replace the 1974 legislation had passed on its first reading and was expected to receive definitive legislative approval during the week of November 1. (Ibid., D760404–0757) In telegram 5362 from San José, November 9, the Embassy commented on the newly passed extradition law, concluding that the “major legislative stumbling blocks to a successful Vesco legislation have been eliminated.” (Ibid., D760418–0230) According to telegram 5399 from San José, November 11, Oduber signed the new extradition law on November 9. (Ibid., D760420–1136)
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