14. Telegram 47899 From the Department of State to All American Republic Diplomatic Posts1
47899. Subject: The Conference of Tlatelolco—An Appraisal.
1. This message is an appraisal of the Conference of Foreign Ministers held at Tlatelolco in Mexico City from February 20–23. It is provided [Page 50] for your background and guidance in discussing the meeting with host country leaders; it also requests reporting and recommendations to assist the USG to follow-through on the meeting.
2. Summary
The Tlatelolco Conference marked a significant shift in U.S. policy toward Latin America. The U.S. used the meeting to invite the other nations of the Americas to join in an effort to revive the special relationship between the U.S. and Latin America and to reshape that special relationship to make it a larger force in world affairs. The reaction of the Latin Americans was also significant. Latin American regionalism, as exemplified by the Latins’ bloc approach during the preparations for the meeting, was reaffirmed at the conference. Latin regionalism appears to be here to stay, although that need not necessarily confound the special relationship the U.S. seeks. Perhaps the most significant outcome of the meeting was the beginning of a new mood of confidence among the Latins in the sincerity of U.S. intentions and a sense of excitement regarding the future of U.S.-Latin American relations. This new atmosphere was engendered by the Secretary’s frankness and directness, as well as his personal engagement in addressing underlying Latin concerns. The process begun at Tlatelolco may thus ultimately produce the new relationship which the Secretary envisaged in his speech. Much will depend on how the U.S. follows through, although obviously the inner dynamics of political forces in each country will also shape the outcome. Posts are requested to report on reactions to the conference among host country leaders and public and to make recommendations regarding U.S. strategy and tactics in upcoming inter-American meetings (IDB, the Atlanta MFM, the OASGA).
3. U.S. Objectives
The Policy Context of the U.S. Approach to the Meeting—
In preparing for the conference, the U.S. was faced with a fundamental question: should the trend away from a special relationship with Latin America which inadvertently or not had characterized the previous four years be continued, or should the United States attempt to revive the special relationship? The decision, which evolved from numerous policy discussions conducted by the Secretary, was that the U.S. should attempt to restore a special relationship with Latin America and the Caribbean, although on a new footing. This decision was dictated by the choice of several closely related policy objectives: (1) to avoid having a large number of the other nations of the hemisphere identify their interests strongly with those of the Third World, as some had already begun to do, (2) conversely to gain allies on global issues, especially those involving multilateral diplomacy, and (3) to improve the global chances for cooperative solutions to the problems posed by economic interdependence by making progress in this hemisphere.
[Page 51]4. The Character of the New Special Relationship
The special relationship between the U.S. and Latin America which is envisaged would be new in several respects: (A) Latin America and the Caribbean inevitably will continue to interact more intensely with other regions than in the past; therefore, if the U.S. and Latin America are to combine forces on certain global issues, there will have to be much greater consultation and coordination between the U.S. and the other countries of the region than formerly; (B) although the U.S. by virtue of its greater wealth and power would continue to have a special obligation to aid in Latin American development, a wholly nonreciprocal relationship is no longer sustainable given domestic U.S. political realities; therefore there will have to be some political commitment on the Latin side to make an effort to sustain the relationship’s special character; (C) a major implication of increased global interdependence, particularly in economic relations, is that the U.S. cannot isolate its policies in the region from the policies it must, as a global power, conduct on the world scene; therefore its special relationship with Latin America must on a number of issues be integrated with its global policies. This cuts both ways: for example, our efforts to help the Latin Americans increase their access to developed country markets must largely be realized in the MTN context. At the same time, we will attempt to shape our negotiating positions for the MTN after close consultation with the Latin Americans and with their interests, as well as ours, in mind.
5. U.S. Strategy Going Into the Conference
Our strategy for articulating the new special relationship was outlined by the Secretary in his opening speech at Tlatelolco. It consists of four parts:
(A) A vigorous attempt to settle outstanding disputes (the Panama principles; the Peru investment settlement; for the future, an interim fisheries agreement with Peru and Ecuador);
(B) Efforts to avoid or mitigate future disputes: the major U.S. initiative in this regard was to propose the creation of a fact-finding body to be used in the case of future investment disputes. If a mutually satisfactory mechanism were established, the Secretary promised to consult with Congress regarding the need for the Gonzales-Hickenlooper amendments. The Secretary also proposed that the question of investor-host country behavior be discussed in an inter-American forum;
(C) Coordination on global issues: as a means of increasing the participation and weight of Latin America and the Caribbean in world affairs and because many of the regions’ development aspirations can only be realized in a global context (MTN, monetary reform), the United States proposed close consultation and, if possible, coordination [Page 52] on many levels—ministerial, policy planning, technical, bilateral, regional, and multilateral;
(D) Regional development: U.S. proposals for a new approach to the technology question, our commitment to give favorable consideration to Latin American requests under prospective U.S. generalized tariff preference legislation, our offer to share research and know-how to meet the energy crisis, U.S. proposals for a number of studies relating to resource transfer, all were designed to address Latin American concerns regarding their development needs. In addition, the United States committed itself to an earnest effort to reach agreement regarding new principles for inter-American cooperation, such as integral development and collective economic security.
6. U.S. Tactics at the Meeting
Our approach prior to and at Tlatelolco was to attempt to engender some new excitement regarding the future of U.S.-Latin American relations, a sense of newness and a perception of U.S. commitment that would not only revive flagging Latin American interest in cooperation with the United States, but would also begin to overcome the inertia and indifference among the American public and parts of the Congress regarding Latin America. This was why the Secretary’s speech contained both a conceptual framework for hemispheric relations, embodied in the word “community,” and specific proposals for cooperative action. It also explains why the United States attempted to get a final communiqué that would reflect a sense of commitment to a new relationship and would contain an action program. Beyond this, the Secretary’s statements at the meeting were frank, direct, and sympathetic, itself an earnest of our intention to take the Latins seriously.
7. The Latin American Response
Latin American regionalism—
On one level the Latin American response to U.S. overtures was disappointing; on another level, however, the response was enthusiastic.
On the formal level, the Latins seemed to reject the U.S. proposal for a new Western Hemisphere “community.” This was reflected in the statements of the Guyanese, Venezuelan and other Foreign Ministers which have been reported separately. This reaction to the United States’s use of the word “community” stemmed from suspicion that the United States was proposing that the incipient Latin American regional bloc which has taken shape since 1970 be disbanded in favor of a U.S.-led Western Hemisphere bloc. In addition, many of the Latins were worried about our references to “reciprocity” in the new relationship, fearing that reciprocity would give undue advantage to the United States in view of its greater bargaining power.
[Page 53]The Latins reaffirmed their intention to deal with us on many issues as a bloc and this was the theme of Calvani’s closing address to the conference.
Our preliminary view is that the Latins’ flare-up over the concept of “community” was largely because they were taken somewhat by surprise by the about-face in the U.S. attitude from one of seeming “neglect” to an apparent embrace. We do not, therefore, regard that reaction, or the Latins’ insistence on Latin unity, as constituting a rejection of U.S. proposals for greater consultation, coordination or even reciprocity.
The role of individual countries—
As usual at such multilateral meetings, those whose positions were most differentiated from that of the United States tended to dominate the debates, regardless of their size or power. At Tlatelolco, those nations most identified with the third world concept—Mexico, Guyana, Panama, and Peru—were the chief protagonists for the United States. As it happened, these four countries were placed on the seven-member committee to draft the final communiqué. Of these four, interestingly, Peru seemed the most willing to reach a true meeting of the minds with the United States.
The lack of weight and influence of some of the larger countries was notable. In this respect, Argentina and Colombia stand out. In the case of Argentina, this may have been to domestic political difficulties and uncertainties; for Colombia, comment may reflect the impending Presidential election.
Brazil’s actions at the conference were mostly unhelpful to the United States. Brazil appears to be playing a double game in which it wishes to have a strong positive bilateral relationship with the United States, while at the same time eschewing excessive inter-American multilateral cooperation. Its motives for the latter are probably that it sees its special relationship with the United States being swallowed up by inter-Americanism and also that, to the extent it can weaken the inter-American system and promote Latin American regionalism, it can hope to become more predominate in the area.
The Brazilian chairman of the drafting committee used his powers to abet the introduction of the more extreme Latin American demands, apparently in the hope that we would give up the fight and fall back to the short, noncommittal type of communiqué the Brazilians had been advocating all along. His efforts failed in the end.
8. Net Results
Our view is that the net result of the meeting was positive for the United States. The Secretary, by talking directly to Latin concerns, by showing a sincere desire for a new U.S. commitment and above all, by [Page 54] convincing them that they were now being taken seriously by the USG, evoked a new mood of optimism among all the participants. We have begun to break through the crust of suspicion, and in some cases, antagonism that has characterized our relations as they have played out in the inter-American system over the past several years. While the “we-they” aspect of our relationship is strong and likely to remain so, that need not be a bar to a more constructive hemispheric community—provided that there be some concrete results from the new U.S. commitment.
9. Follow-up Requested
(A) You should draw on the foregoing, as well as on the Secretary’s statements at the conference, which have been reported to you separately, in your discussions with host country leaders regarding U.S. intentions. It is particularly important that we allay fears that “community” is a code word for U.S. hegemony; in fact, we intend to play down the word “community” in accordance with the Secretary’s formal withdrawal of the word during the debates. We also need to explain that reciprocity does not mean an equivalent quid pro quo, but rather a willingness to take U.S. interests into account in general. We need to make it clearer to the Latins that our proposal for consultation and coordination on global issues holds out the best hope for realizing Latin American ambitions for more rapid development.
(B) You are requested to report all significant reactions to the meeting among government leaders, as well as opinion-makers and the public.
(C) We are particularly interested in host government plans for the April MFM. We would also welcome your views as to how we can give greater substance to the general thrust of the new U.S. commitment to Latin America. You should call to our attention opportunities for collaboration with your country or groups of countries which may not be apparent to us in Washington.
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Summary: The Department transmitted its appraisal of the Tlatelolco Conference of Foreign Ministers held in Mexico City in February, concluding that the meeting marked a significant shift in U.S.-Latin American relations.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]. Confidential. Repeated to USCINCSO for POLAD. Drafted by Bloomfield; cleared in draft by Bowdler, Szabo, and Einaudi, and approved by Kubisch.
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