Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part 1, Documents on Mexico; Central America; and the Caribbean, 1973–1976

108. Special National Intelligence Estimate 83.4–73¹

Washington, January 12, 1973.

[Omitted here is a title page, a table of contents, and a map of Costa Rica.]

OUTLOOK FOR STABILITY IN COSTA RICA

Note

This Special Estimate, on the threats to Costa Rican political stability over the next two years or so, was requested by the Department of State.

Conclusions

A. Over the past couple of years the local political pot in Costa Rica has been kept boiling by the highly personalistic and contentious style of administration of President Figueres. The activities both of domestic Communists and rightwing zealots and of their foreign supporters have contributed to the tension and uncertainty. The campaign for the February 1974 election is already underway and is likely to add its own unsettling ingredients. Nonetheless, Costa Rica is strongly committed to the peaceful, democratic processes which have sustained it through periods of political upset. We expect that the elections will take place in this tradition, and that a president representing one of the centrist political groups will succeed to office.

B. We do not discount the chance of a quixotic tilt at the established order by small groups of political extremists. Any such attempt at antigovernment subversion or violence would almost certainly be condemned by the public and countered by the security forces. The existence of a number of “private armies” also raises the possibility of a larger action against the government by rightwing forces. But we believe there is little likelihood of such a development, except under extreme conditions; i.e., a major national crisis in which the established moderate leadership of the country is discredited. In short, we see no serious threat to Costa Rica’s stability or democratic political system.

THE ESTIMATE

I. Factors in Costa Rican Stability

1. Costa Rica is the most stable, socially egalitarian, and politically democratic country in Central America, and perhaps in all of Latin America. These achievements reflect in good part its distinctive history. During the colonial period it was isolated from the centers of Spanish political power and devoid of easily exploitable natural resources. The sparse Indian population was all but eliminated, and the salubrious climate and lack of mineral wealth discouraged the importation of slave labor. The society that evolved was composed mostly of industrious, independent European landholders. After independence, first coffee and then banana estates produced a number of family fortunes, but the aristocratic leisure class did not emerge in a dominant position in Costa Rica as it did in most other countries of Central and South America.

2. The Costa Rican political system came to reflect the values of its relatively homogeneous and democratically inclined populace. From its first free and honest election in 1889, Costa Rica has made steady economic and social progress under constitutional, representative governments. The public has supported a major national investment in public and social institutions; the result has been relatively efficient public administration and high standards of education, medical care, and other social services.

3. The Costa Rican economy is basically sound. The per capita gross national product of $550 is the highest in Central America and has been expanding over the past decade at a steady if unspectacular pace. Because of the relatively high level of social services and the fairly even distribution of personal income, the population of just under two million has been spared the extreme poverty that afflicts large numbers in neighboring Republics.

4. Yet rapid population growth² and budgetary difficulties have placed strains on the country’s ability to maintain the high level of social services. The annual rate of economic growth fell from 7–8 percent during 1965–1970, to 4–5 percent during 1971–1972. This decline reflected in part financial problems under the incumbent government. Balance-of-payments strains have arisen from these financial difficulties, as well as from depressed world market conditions for bananas and coffee and the current disorganization of the Central American Common Market. Nevertheless, the Costa Ricans have begun some minor corrective measures and are planning a comprehensive stabilization program. Over time the prospects for some recovery towards the higher growth rates of past years are good, though the economy will continue to be subject to periodic strains caused by fluctuating world market conditions for its agricultural exports.

5. Costa Rica is strongly committed to peaceful political processes which have been interrupted only once in recent times. In 1948 the personalistic party of Rafael Calderón Guardia, which had ruled for the previous two terms, refused to accept its electoral defeat by Otilio Ulate, the candidate of a coalition of opposition parties. José Figueres, an anti-Calderonist merchant and farmer, led a successful armed revolt. He then headed a transitional junta that enacted a new Constitution before Ulate began his four year term in 1949. Every election since this short but bloody civil war has pitted Figueres’s political organization against a coalition dominated by the Calderonists. The electorate has alternated the Presidency between these two forces, though Figueres’s National Liberation Party (PLN), has held a legislative majority for most of the period.

6. The electorate’s voting habits reflect the strong pull of the center in Costa Rica and work to discourage political extremism. The two moderate groupings, the center-left PLN and the more conservative anti-PLN, consistently command over 90 percent of the popular vote. The repeated peaceful transfer of power to the opposition, in turn, serves to perpetuate the sturdy “two-party” system.

7. Costa Ricans have become confident enough in the strength and durability of the political center to be tolerant of the small dissident elements at either end of the spectrum. Extremists—some of them political adventurers and some of them committed ideologues—have in general responded to the democratic atmosphere in which they operate by pursuing their goals in a nonviolent way.

8. The openness of the society and widespread citizen interest in political and other public affairs also lend support to the traditional pattern of political behavior on the part both of orthodox political activists and of fringe groups. Accessability to political leaders, even including the President, is remarkably free and provides a fairly continuous exchange of views between the electorate and public officials. Little political news or gossip eludes the irrepressible (if sometimes irresponsible) corps of newspaper and radio-television journalists; thus, partisan confidences and even conspiracies rarely escape exposure.

9. Finally, the ballast of Costa Rica’s political equilibrium is the population’s deep-rooted determination to preserve the distinctive national character. The Costa Ricans are sensitive to developments abroad and concerned that the problems that afflict other countries might at some point be visited upon them. Thus, while they are tolerant of outré ideas and conduct, they typically close ranks against any threat to their way of life.

II. Current Problems

10. “Pepe” Figueres, generally considered the architect of Costa Rica’s present-day institutions and stability, now is regarded by some of his countrymen as a distinct threat to them. Figueres served as President from 1953–1958 and began a second, four-year term in May 1970.³ The outstanding figure in contemporary Costa Rican folklore, Figueres evokes strong responses from others; loyalty or antipathy to him tends to be fierce [10 lines not declassified]. Indeed, his present administration has been a time of intense and protracted political agitation, and Figueres himself as an object of controversy nearly overwhelms the substantive policy issues he raises.

11. Figueres’s controversial policies range from efforts to make Costa Rica a tax haven for international investors of dubious integrity to favored treatment for the local Communist Party and promotion of the establishment of a Soviet mission. The heat of the debate over these issues has caused some skittish Costa Ricans to fear that the political bitterness will lead the country into a period of violence. Even among less alarmed citizens, confidence in the future has suffered somewhat from the general climate of tension and uncertainty. General concern has arisen about the seeming disarray of the party system, about the weakening of governmental institutions by Figueres’s free-wheeling administration of office, and about corruption. But the areas of greatest concern are the activities of Communist and anti-Communist extremists, the fear that the new Soviet Embassy will subvert Costa Rica and use it as a base of operations against neighboring countries, and rumored foreign-sponsored invasions.

The Communist Issue

12. The Communist Party (Popular Vanguard Party, PVP), though constitutionally proscribed, has traditionally operated fairly openly and with little success in Costa Rica. But the Party seems to many Costa Ricans to be enjoying a new privileged position under the Figueres government. An upturn in the Communists’ political fortune in fact began under the previous administration when they allied with an insignificant but legally registered far-leftist party and were able to run candidates on its ticket for the 1970 election. In this way the Secretary General of the PVP, Manuel Mora, gained an assembly seat. The Party has since made some minor inroads into municipal councils in a few towns. It has also had some success in organized labor, which in Costa Rica is a small, weak movement with little political potential at least over the short term. The Communist front party received only one percent of the presidential ballots and seven percent of the legislative vote in the 1970 election. Since then the PVP has conducted a reasonably successful recruitment drive. It now claims a membership of more than 5,000; we estimate there are about 1,500 active, dues-paying members, which is nearly double the number in 1969–1970.

13. Concern about the Communists, particularly amongst Costa Rican rightists, was raised to new heights by Figueres’s determination to open diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. If any single issue has dominated the Figueres administration, it is that of the Soviet presence. Figueres claims that he is helping the U.S. in its policy of building East-West bridges in the new era of negotiation, and at the same time constructing a valuable Soviet market for Costa Rica’s surplus coffee. As the government’s negotiations with the Soviets proceeded during early 1971, anti-Communist organizations launched a high-powered propaganda campaign that appeared for a while to have forced Figueres to back down. But on 29 November 1971 the government finally accredited the first two Soviet diplomats. As of the end of 1972, the Soviet mission numbered 13 officers, 8 in the Embassy and 5 in the commercial mission.⁴

14. The Soviets probably view their diplomatic entry into Central America as a modest triumph for their policy of expanding their presence in Latin America generally. They are acutely aware of the local opposition to their presence and of the hostility with which they are regarded in neighboring countries, and their first interest is to promote good will so as to dispel local fears. The Soviets may in time engage in some low-level political action in Costa Rica and in Central America, but they almost certainly will be anxious to avoid costly or risky operations. They probably discern few possibilities for the Communist parties in the region to make major political gains any time soon. They are likely to concentrate on building their respectability and influence and, over time, try to take advantage of opportunities to chip away at the strong U.S. position in the area.

15. Many Costa Ricans have been particularly suspicious of the relationship between President Figueres on the one hand and the PVP’s Mora and the Soviet Embassy on the other. Their meetings apparently relate principally to various money-making schemes, [1½ lines not declassified] though they probably include some discussion of political matters as well. Some conspiratorial-minded opponents of Figueres, willing and even eager to believe the worst, have conjectured that his long record as an outspoken anti-Communist constituted a strategem to put him “in place” to promote the Communist cause at the proper time. We do not believe that Figueres’s dealings with the Communists represent any “sell-out” on his part of basic Costa Rican interests. Rather they are indicative of his proclivity for opportunistic financial scheming with anyone who can help him cope with his chronic indebtedness. He continues to meet with Mora, who is a long-time personal friend, but his only known political actions in support of the Communists—promotion of a Soviet presence and of legalization of the PVP—are consistent with his long-held views.⁵

16. The institutional checks and balances in the Costa Rican system have operated to limit what Figueres could do to help the Communists even as President. As a key example, Figueres has been unable to persuade the legislature, dominated by his own PLN, to erase the constitutional prohibition of the Communist Party. Furthermore, Figueres’s promises of a vigorous and lucrative trade relationship between the Soviets and Costa Rica have not been fulfilled. Soviet goods have not been competitive in Costa Rica’s open system of bidding, and only small amounts of vodka and other consumer goods have been sold. The Soviets have made known their displeasure with the one-way direction of the trade arrangement and, now that they have their Embassy, are hedging on further contracts for coffee until Costa Rica reciprocates with a greater volume of purchases. Finally, Figueres’s power and influence will drop off rapidly when he steps down from the Presidency, and many in his own party, as well as those in the more conservative parties, oppose him on the Communist issue.

The Rightists

17. The mere fact of the Soviet presence has provided a new raison d’être for the local anti-Communist activists. Some of these have already engaged in minor harassing action against the Soviets. Others have made an effort to mobilize a political force to unseat the politicians responsible for the Soviet presence, either via the ballot box or in some less orthodox way. [4 lines not declassified] In general, the rapidly anti-Figueres, anti-Communist groups are more likely than any groups on the far Left to use violence in pursuit of their cause.

18. The Communist issue has brought to public notice a rightwing zealot, Jorge González Martén. A millionaire and for a while a U.S. citizen, González waged a successful court battle in 1972 to regain legal standing as a Costa Rican eligible for the Presidency. This effort and González’s introduction of a political propaganda blitz, U.S.-style, won quick fame for him as an up-and-coming personality and for his minuscule, stridently anti-Communist, National Independent Party. He has attracted the support of several wealthy Costa Rican businessmen interested in backing a staunchly conservative anti-PLN figure for the Presidency. He apparently has also gained a measure of support from some U.S. businessmen in Costa Rica. González’s political appeal is on the wane now that the more moderate opposition politicians have taken to the hustings, but his glib and urgent presentation of a looming Communist takeover in Costa Rica has contributed to the local concern about political polarization.

19. In plotting a coup, the extreme Right might seek support from several paramilitary groups or “private armies” that are a fixture on the Costa Rican scene. These loose organizations are accepted by the populace as a hedge against the need for an armed force (there is no national army) and, as a holdover from the war of 1948. The members of these groups come from a wide variety of social and political elements and include respected businessmen, politicians, and farmers, as well as smugglers and adventurers. While most of the groups do not identify themselves first and foremost as anti-Communist, they would not be uncomfortable with that description, and under certain circumstances some groups might be attracted to the alarmist themes of anti-Communist activists.

20. There may have been as many as a dozen “private armies” at various times since the 1948 conflict, and remnants of most of them probably remain. Some could probably count on the support of only 10 to 15 persons. The Free Costa Rica Movement, a rightwing businessmen’s group, is larger and would be able to raise a militia of a hundred or so persons. The single largest group is the security arm of the center-left PLN, which could count on several hundred stalwarts; but few if any of these would support a rightwing coup.

21. Another amplification of the danger from rightist extremists could develop from their connections outside the country. Stories of impending foreign invasions, arms landings, and outside funding of local subversives have abounded over the past two years. In several instances a kernel or two of truth lies behind the stories. The specific lines of friendships, enmities, family and business ties, and the other forms of intercourse among the Central Americans defy unraveling, but one general aspect is a penchant for meddling in each others’ domestic politics. [4 lines not declassified] Legitimate Costa Rican politicians, too, have approached foreign Embassies and businessmen to solicit support and funds.

22. Outside meddling, however, rarely exceeds the talking point before being exposed by rumor, by investigative journalism, or by government leak. The Costa Rican public’s invariable censure considerably weakens the impact of foreign interference. Although rumor and minor conspiracies have added to the sense of political insecurity within Costa Rica, we believe there now is no real danger to the government from this kind of activity. Indeed, President Figueres has effectively turned invasion scares to his own end, using the “threat” to expand temporarily his base of sympathy and support.

III. Outlook

23. Although recent issues and events in Costa Rica have raised tensions, we believe that controversy will remain within the bounds of the country’s sound institutional structures. The debate over the Communist issue has been particularly potent in energizing small extremist groups. But over the short run there appears to be very little chance that any group—Left or Right—will be able to undertake action on a scale to threaten the government seriously.

24. On the Left, the PVP, even under the present favorable conditions, has demonstrated little potential to rise beyond the minor party status it has held for decades. There are a few leftist extremists in and out of the party who preach violence, but they are for the most part identified and isolated. The leadership and bulk of the PVP have traditionally pursued the vía pacífica, a penchant at present reinforced by Soviet diplomatic requirements.

25. On the Right, the several continually conspiring small groups possess little strength on their own. We do not dismiss the possibility that a small number of rightist fanatics might launch some kind of coup attempt. However, we see almost no chance that such an effort would prove to be anything other than quixotic. The Civil Guard and other police forces, with public support, would be able to counter it.⁶ The existence of “private armies” raises the possibility of a larger action against the government. We believe, however, that such an attempt would be very unlikely except in the extreme circumstances of some dramatic nationwide crisis in which the established moderate leadership was discredited (akin to the effort to steal the election in 1948).

26. We doubt that the traditional center-oriented political system—i.e., PLN vs. anti-PLN coalition—will fall apart, despite various expressions of concern. The sense of “new politics” in Costa Rica apparently grows out of the realization that the end of Figueres’s term will mean the end of the era dominated by such leaders as Figueres, Ulate, and Calderón. The large number of minor parties seeking registration for the next election also promotes the perception of political realignment. But recognition of the basic strength of the PLN behind its likely nominee, party stalwart Daniel Oduber, and the hope that the electorate will hold to its practice of voting for the “outs” will probably in the end serve as imperatives toward unity for most of the anti-PLN forces. These groups have already begun to consider favorably the bid for support by the respected conservative presidential candidate Fernando Trejos Escalante, who is likely to bring back to the center most of the early support garnered by González Martén’s far rightist party.

27. In short, despite the tension and uncertainty, we expect the 1974 election to take place normally and to return still another moderate (and likely less frenetic) administration committed to preserve Costa Rica’s democratic tradition.

1. Summary: The estimate assessed the threat posed to Costa Rican political stability by the activities of domestic Communists and Rightists and concluded that despite rising tensions the country remained committed to its democratic political tradition.

   Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 361, Subject Files, National Intelligence Estimates. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. All brackets are in the original except those indicating original footnotes, text that remains classified or that was omitted by the editors.

2. The annual rate of growth reached nearly 4 percent in the early 1960s, but since has declined to 2.8 percent. [Footnote in the original.]
3. Figueres was ineligible to run for the presidency until eight years after his first term. He chose to wait an extra four years, partly in order to square off against an old rival, Mario Echandi, whose presidency from 1958–1962 made him ineligible until 1970. Figueres is barred from standing again for the Presidency by a 1969 constitutional change limiting subsequently elected Presidents to a single term. [Footnote in the original.]
4. As a comparison, the British Embassy in San José has four officers; the U.S. mission contains about 30 members, including Embassy and AID officers. [Footnote in the original.]
5. Ironically, Mora’s dealings with Figueres have caused dissension within the PVP, where some critics accuse the party chief of a “sell-out” to the establishment [2 lines not declassified]. [Footnote in the original.]
6. While the 2,500-man Civil Guard, with the assistance of other small police forces, is competent to meet this kind of low-level threat, it could not cope effectively with widespread outbreaks of violence. [Footnote in the original.]