179. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State1
3076. Subject: Jordan Air Defense. For Assistant Secretary Atherton from Ambassador. Ref: Jidda 3060.
1. Subsequent to dispatch of reftel, I received more telephone calls from MFA asking if I would go to airport to greet Crown Prince Hassan as he departed from Jidda and “have a few words with him while I passed through the line.” I replied in both cases that it would not be suitable for me to say to him in a line of well-wishers what I had on my mind, and that I needed a private appointment of at least fifteen minutes duration. Apparently the FonOff was in direct communication with Prince Saud. Finally, Protocol Chief Sonbol telephoned and said that they had arranged an appointment with the Crown Prince at the residence of the Governor of Mecca here in Jidda for three o’clock and they would be waiting for me there. I accepted.
2. I was ushered into a private room where I was soon joined by Crown Prince Hassan. You are well aware of his attractive physical appearance and his polite manner of expression. I said I wished I had met him before, and I told him of my trips from Jerusalem to Amman to visit his grandfather a few years ago. As it was already three o’clock, the scheduled time for his departure for Medina, I took up with him the matter which I said I know must have arisen during his conversations with Prince Fahd and others in the Saudi Government, and that was the matter of the missile defense system for Jordan. I recounted details of our efforts on this subject, and he indicated as I went along his knowledge of this or that aspect of our exchanges with the Saudis and the nature of the difficulties they had described to me. I told him that we consider that these difficulties were of a nature that should and [Page 596] could be removed. More important than difficulties and distractions, whatever their nature, was the need for him to impress upon his royal brother that ideas we had heard expressed about “turning to the Soviets” would do Jordan irreparable harm if they were implemented.
3. Hassan began speaking rapidly in a very low voice, in effect reviewing matters since his brother’s trip to Washington from which he had returned to Jordan disappointed because of our lack of clarity on the subject of the missile program. I made him aware of the fact that there were limitations on our ability to speak when his brother was in Washington, just as there are now, because we have not had an answer from the Saudis to certain alternative proposals which we had presented with a view to getting the program started. He indicated awareness of the nature of our proposals and added that his brother the King was averse to a “truncated” program. I commented that there was nothing truncated about it, that our proposals would get the program started, and would eventually over a reasonable period of time see Jordan equipped with an adequate air defense system. I said that we had carried to the Saudis his brother’s assurance of appreciation for their generosity and his desire to have an American missile system for Jordan which would be funded in part by a Saudi contribution. The material initially ordered would not be available until late in 1977 or 1978, and by that time we would have developed our ideas with respect to the second stage, much of which could not be used in any case until the basic equipment was in place. Here again he said his brother did not want vague assurances about a large part of the program, adding that some other formula should be devised.
4. I asked what he had said to the Saudis on the general subject of air defense in view of the apparent lack of agreement on the dimensions of the Saudi contribution.
5. Hassan said he had suggested to Prince Fahd that the latter come to Amman to see King Hussein with a letter which would state the Saudi commitment to an adequate Jordan defense system in specific terms. Fahd had replied, according to Hassan, that he would be glad to come, but that he would have nothing to say. It was difficult evoking a clarification of the meaning of Fahd’s statement from Hassan, who can be quite evasive in beautiful English, but I concluded that Fahd meant he would have nothing to say until the contradictions contained in the letter from King Hussein, which arrived three days after my last talk with Fahd, had been satisfactorily explained. I said that Prince Fahd would probably find it difficult to go to Amman or anywhere else, in view of the publicity this subject had been given, without a direct Jordanian gesture along the lines the King had authorized us to convey. The King’s oral sentiments expressed to us had unfortunately been adversely affected by the arrival of the letter and by press comment which wounded Saudi sensitivities. [2 lines not declassified]
[Page 597]6. I asked Hassan what kind of formula would suit King Hussein in view of his objections to a program of “two stages.” Hassan said that he had asked Fahd to assume a moral commitment within a regional framework in which Jordan’s defense requirements would be taken care of. He said Fahd agreed to consider this. I asked if some phraseology such as “a continuing program to insure an adequate air defense system for Jordan” would sound better to the King, and he said he thought it would.
7. Then he reverted to the need for Fahd to come and see the King. I said if this matter were ever arranged, there might well be some kind of meeting somewhere, but of course I could not speak for the Saudis in such matters at all. He said Fahd was hoping to see me and would I mention this to him. I said I could mention anything, but it seemed to me that first things should come first, and that the Jordanians should deal with the problems created for the Saudis by the letter they had received and by press comment that seemed to originate from official sources.
8. As we were getting nowhere, I again took up the line that it was absolutely urgent to convey to his brother the great harm that would be done to Jordan and to all of us if moves are made which would bring the Soviets and their material into Jordanian territory. He then spoke of the April 30 date which would end everything, and I made it clear that I did not accept that concept, adding that King Hussein should not think we are going to let go on this one. We will keep at it from every angle in an effort to ward off the damage that would otherwise be done to our relations with Jordan. He then said that we have to bear in mind that the King would go to Syria on May 2 (can you judge significance of that date?). I said it is not the matter of his going there, which is serious, but he should be extremely careful about what he says and does there because of the effect it will have on all of us. This was the end of our exchange.
9. I would judge that nothing has been concluded on subject between Saudis and Jordanians. I will see Fahd or Saud as soon as possible, probably Monday, and in meantime we will brief Saudis on essence of foregoing.
10. Dept pass to other addresses at its discretion.
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Summary: The Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs arranged for Porter to meet with Jordanian Crown Prince Hassan at the end of the latter’s visit to Jidda. Hassan indicated that King Hussein believed the U.S. air defense deal to be unworkable; Porter insisted otherwise.
Source: National Archives, RG 84, Jidda Embassy Files: Lot 79F80, DEF 12–5 Jordan January–April. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Porter; cleared by Horan; approved by Porter. Repeated Immediate to Amman. Telegram 3060 from Jidda is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760161–0093. Porter requested further guidance in telegram 3085 from Jidda, April 30, surmising that “Saudi leaders are torn by our warnings and their fears of Soviet influence in Jordan, by Jordanian tactics, and by their pride which impels them to resist what they consider to be a mixture of pressure and arrogance.” (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for the Middle East and South Asia, Box 30, Saudi Arabia–State Department Telegrams, To SecState-Nodis (11), 4/76)
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