178. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State1
2919. Subject: Hawks for Jordan. For Atherton from Ambassador Porter. Ref: Jidda 2878.
Following is report of my conversation with Crown Prince Fahd on April 20.
1. Fahd seated me. Anani, Royal Protocol translator, sat on a straight-backed chair in front of the two of us and thus began a conversation which emphasized even more strongly than usual Saudi confidence in the United States.
2. Fahd looked at my briefcase, smiled and began to speak. He had been informed of the nature of the subject I wished to discuss. He spoke at length about Saudi policy toward the US, which he declared is unchanged and unchangeable despite the machinations of certain people who are opposed to such a friendship. He did not mention Israelis or Zionists. It is clear that this refrain has been carefully orchestrated, so often do I hear it, but I have seen or heard nothing to make me doubt that they mean it.
[Page 592]3. I allowed, in my own thinking, twenty minutes for amenities of this kind, but I needed almost twice that period. He seemed to be testing my patience. He and Anani exchanged glances; Fahd’s eyes occasionally reflected amusement, as Anani strung out the translations. I enjoyed this by-play, smiled and acknowledged warmly each of his comments and compliments. Coffee, two sugared teas, and coffee again before the break came. I had waited almost forty minutes before he mentioned the Secretary’s name, which provided the opening I needed. I remarked then, before he could exercise once more his royal prerogative of controlling the conversation, that I had requested the audience in order to convey a message from his friend, and I would like to present it. He smiled, he knew the preliminaries were over. He pulled his robe around him, and Anani sat up straight. They both displayed their readiness for serious discussion.
4. Fahd urged me to speak. I had followed Knabenshue’s precept: “Don’t hurry them,” he told me one day after he had successfully achieved the protection of several hundred people in Baghdad in 1941, “urinate before you begin, remember they are as anxious as you are, don’t blurt out anything in your eagerness, smile and express appreciation, and when you are ready pick up a word or a name to arrive at discussion of your business.” He and Wadsworth and Murray and Satterthwaite were great teachers, but that was an age when experience was usually revered as more important than mere authority.
5. I gave Fahd the essence of the Secretary’s message, which was well constituted and for which I thank you. I reminded him of the history of this matter since I took it in hand, omitting mention of our previous evasions and imprecisions concerning prices, and appealing to him on the basis of fundamental US and Saudi Arabian interests. I recited Hussein’s warm expression to the Secretary of appreciation of Saudi generosity, his desire for a US missile system, his dismay at Rifai’s press comments, and stressed Jordan’s need, in our view, for an adequate air defense system.
6. Fahd said resentfully that Hussein’s statements were similar to Rifai’s. I clarified the matter for him, saying Hussein had indicated belief that the project appeared no longer feasible (“blown”), but that Rifai had been more specific in mentioning Saudi shortcomings.
7. To my satisfaction, Fahd said the Saudis liked and respected Hussein and regretted this difference between them. He then launched into a very harsh denunciation of Rifai. [17 lines not declassified] He said he would give me a list of Saudi contributions to the Jordanians over the years. “We have been very generous,” he insisted, “but we don’t even know where the money went.”
8. I said I really didn’t want his list. I would have to give him ours in return, but the exchange would merely prove that Saudis and we [Page 593] are even more alike than we realize. (I’m not sure I got the point across, though he laughed.) I said it is not Rifai or Hussein who are paramount in our thinking. The Secretary has his eye on the main objective which is and must remain, whatever our difficulties with Rifai, to keep Russian material and military teams out of Jordanian territory. We are thinking of Saudi and American interests, and I repeated our conviction that Jordan has a real need for an adequate air defense. He (Fahd) is known as a man of vision, and I was sure he would see the need for us to do this job together regardless of distractions.
9. I then went through the process we would like them to approve, that is phase A (14 Hawk batteries and 100 vulcans), leaving accessories, maintenance service, etc., for phase B where we would take an active role not now possible because of our agreement with Congress. Whatever Rifai’s policy or intentions might be, could we give him or anyone who thinks like him a victory? (Fahd did not like that thought at all.) If he and his Government agree, we would coordinate an approach to Hussein on 14 Hawk batteries and 100 Vulcans as a first stage and as the Saudi contribution. We would tell Hussein that as his best friends we are convinced that he should accept.
10. I went again through our thoughts for the second stage. Then I brought out the Secretary’s line in his recent statement to Hussein that if he took steps leading to introduction of Russian material or personnel into Jordan, “it would lead to critical reexamination by the American public and the Congress of our traditional relationship with Jordan.” I read this passage twice. Its impact on him was clearly visible. Fahd said he [1½ lines not declassified] agreed with us and would take your message to King Khalid and would give us a reply within a week. I spent the next few minutes impressing him with the fact that time is very short.
11. Fahd then informed me that Jordan’s Crown Prince is due here on April 26. I said I had become aware of that for the first time today through the morning press. I asked if Rifai would accompany the Crown Prince. Fahd said he would not repeat not, adding that Shakir and one or two others would be with the Crown Prince. I inquired whether he had in mind to raise the subject of Hawks. He said he did not, but he could if it seemed desirable. [3 lines not declassified]
12. After some discussion, I reminded him of our offer to coordinate an approach to Hussein, if SAG desired, and if SAG approved our proposal, and I recommended that the Jordanian Crown Prince not be brought into the matter. It would be less likely to be complicated further, I said, if we and the Saudis make the recommendation for acceptance together or in parallel directly to Hussein.
13. Fahd then asked if we would be willing to give Hussein the idea that it would be advisable to change his Prime Minister. I said I [Page 594] thought it would be very unwise for us to make such a suggestion at any time and especially in connection with the problem we had been discussing. Such a move could boomerang and harm far more important interests. He agreed, [5½ lines not declassified].
14. This wound up conversation on Hawks. I then asked his permission to raise the question of Americans incarcerated at Tabuk. He had no objection, so, after giving him the background, I requested him to order their release. They had merely visited Jerusalem and had returned to their jobs in Saudi Arabia. Israeli stamps in their passports may have been the cause of their arrest (they were not). They had not been charged and have been held incommunicado for a week. God help Christian pilgrims, I said. Fahd assured me he would help them too by ordering their release at once. He asked that they be issued new passports if theirs contain Israeli stamps. He urged this, he said, so that they would not suffer further inconvenience moving around or out of the Kingdom. I thanked him for his helpfulness. I have since learned that he did effect their immediate release. They were in our Chancery in five hours.
15. Finally, the Crown Prince asked me to obtain an extension of time for SAG to arrange purchase of certain items for the Defense Ministry. I said I would so recommend, and that is the subject of a separate message which you have received.
16. Accompanying me on my departure, he said I need not repeat not ask for appointments, that I should “just come any time.” I said this was a great compliment, but I would use the privilege sparingly. The real compliment came when he said I make him think. He was being polite. I doubt very much that Fahd bin Abd al-Aziz needs anyone to do that.
17. I think this represents progress. I have no idea how or whether he will weave the Jordanian Crown Prince’s visit into the fabric, but he is entirely capable of inducing the King and Cabinet to make a gracious and generous gesture on that occasion. We will try to monitor developments and will inform you of anything of significance. In any case, I will contact him again as soon as one week has passed. Meanwhile, the less said in Jordan the better.
18. Department distribute in its discretion.
Summary: Porter reported on his April 20 meeting with Prince Fahd, at which he delivered Kissinger’s letter and presented U.S. concerns about the consequences of a Soviet-Jordanian air defense project.
Source National Archives, RG-84, Jidda Embassy Files: Lot 79F80, DEF 12-5 Jordan January–April. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Porter on April 21; cleared by Murphy; approved by Porter. Repeated Immediate to Amman. Telegram 2878 from Jidda, April 20, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760149–0315. Kissinger’s letter is Document 177. The Department approved Porter’s approach in telegram 99335 to Jidda, April 24. (National Archives, RG 84, Jidda Embassy Files: Lot 79F80, DEF 12–5 Jordan January–April) As reported in telegram 3008 from Jidda, April 26, a letter from King Hussein to Prince Fahd described the U.S. Hawk missile system for Jordan as “abrogated” and stated “that Jordanians would take Saudi $300 million contribution and use it wherever possible to obtain missile system.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840093–2064)
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