Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–9, Part 2, Documents on the Middle East Region, 1973–1976

118. Information Memorandum From the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Jordan) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Clements)¹

Washington, October 5, 1974.

SUBJECT

• Status Report on DOD Actions as Regards Arabia and YAR

(S) Saudi Arabia

a. DOD Surveys. Following State/DOD approval of the DOD survey reports of the Saudi Armed Forces, the reports were presented to MOD Prince Sultan by Ambassador Akins on 23 September.

b. Outstanding FMS Cases. Ambassador Akins reported in a 24 September message that SAG is discouraged with the apparent slowness of the US to respond to Saudi defense needs and that we risk losing our pre-eminent position in the defense field in Saudi Arabia to France, the UK and others anxious to serve Saudi Arabia (Tab A). Shortly thereafter Sec Def asked that a status report be prepared on outstanding FMS cases. In response to these instructions, a memorandum to Sec Def is now in coordination which will provide an update on some of the more troublesome sales cases for Saudi Arabia and provide suggestions for expediting action on a few others as a means of demonstrating US interest. A paper enumerating DOD actions to speed up FMS cases for Saudi Arabia (Tab B) was sent to State (PM) on 1 October and a copy given to Ambassador Akins when he called on Bob Ellsworth the following day (below).

(C) During their visit to Washington in June 1974, Prince Fahd and his party requested that action be taken to expedite 40 FMS cases for Saudi Arabia. In summary, their status is as follows:

(1) 8 have been completed; a few were completed as far back as one and two years. (Includes 1,000 sub-machine guns shipped 12 September.)

(2) Army has taken action to expedite 16 others; shipments will be made on these cases in 30 to 90 days. (Includes 200 3.5 inch rocket launchers, 100 81mm mortars, some ammunition, 25 tank trucks and miscellaneous items).

(3) There are 9 cases open for repair parts. An 03 priority has been assigned to Saudi Arabia since Fahd’s visit. (The Department of the Army states this priority is equal to or better than about 30% of all US Army units in Europe.) Deliveries range for the most part from the 1st quarter of FY 75 to the 3rd quarter of FY 75.

(4) One case for 200 M825 ¼ ton trucks is ready for shipment but is awaiting Saudi payment. Army states that the Saudis have been advised repeatedly that funds are required.

(5) One case for various kinds of ammunition was issued in April 1973 but not accepted until March 1975; advance payments were not received until June. As a result the data was no longer valid and a revised offer to reflect latest cost and availability was dispatched on 28 September; the cost will increase from $3.3 million to $5.1 million. This case probably will continue to be troublesome.

(6) One case for battery chargers was signed in September 1973 but Saudi funds were not deposited until 28 June, nine months later. Thus, procurement action was delayed and delivery is now scheduled for the first quarter of FY 76.

(7) Four cases have principal items scheduled for delivery after 31 December 1974. Diversions from US stocks or other FMS programs would be required in order to expedite deliveries (recommended diversions being forwarded to Sec Def 7–8 October).

c. Akins Visit. Ambassador Akins called on Bob Ellsworth on 2 October. ISA pressed Akins for details about Saudi complaints but he had little to offer in specifics. Akins had just seen Embassy Jidda’s message reporting Prince Fahd’s concern at the USG’s slowness in responding to Saudi arms needs and his allegations that this lack of responsiveness by the US was causing the Army to grumble (Tab C). Akins was glad to receive a copy of our paper citing DOD actions to speed up deliveries (Tab B) and said that he would use it in talking with Prince Fahd in London on his way back to Saudi Arabia. Akins would try to get to the bottom of Fahd’s concerns.

d. Security Commission Meeting. Bob Ellsworth will be in Saudi Arabia for Security Commission Meetings, 9–11 November. A DOD Specialist Team is scheduled to arrive in-country about 25 October prepared to discuss the status of outstanding FMS cases, any problems in on-going programs and future plans based on agreed points in the DOD survey recommendations of the Saudi Armed Forces. The modernization program will be the center piece of discussions in Saudi Arabia.

BG Hill, Chief, US Military Training Mission, will be in DOD for consultation 7–11 October. The primary purpose of his visit is to discuss arrangements for the meeting of the Specialist Team and the agenda (which USMTM has proposed) for its work. Emphasis will be placed on discussion of how best to approach the implementation of the DOD surveys.

e. Arms for YAR. On 5 September Embassy Jidda cabled a list of equipment which SAG is now committed to purchase for the YAR and hopefully from the US. With certain exceptions, we have approved sale of these items. The Services have provided price and availability data which is being pouched to Embassies Jidda and Sanaa. We are reviewing the P&A data (almost all of the lead times are relatively long) for possible diversions. Prince Sultan said that he appreciated the USG’s rapid and forthcoming response to this Saudi request, that he wanted letters of offer as soon as possible and, in the meantime, would stall off French offers to sell arms. The letters of offer are in preparation.

f. Civil Infrastructure. At present the Secretary of the Army is reviewing a recommendation prepared by the US Army Corps of Engineers that, in response to the Saudi request, it expand its role in Saudi Arabia to assist the Saudis in developing its civil infrastructure. ISA will review the recommendations following Secretary Callaway’s decision.

g. F–5 Deliveries. After the Greek rejection of our request to refuel new F–5’s being ferried to Iran and Saudi Arabia, USAF arranged to transport them via C–5A. Additional cost was not great (one C–5 can carry 8 F–5’s), and we have a small excess capacity at present. The only alternative would be to try to have Saudis and Iranians pressure GOG into changing its mind—both we and State felt that this was not likely to be successful and we also considered it would be useful to demonstrate our ability to do without a Greek stopover.

h. Peace Hawk IV. Before the Royal Saudi Air Force Survey was undertaken, the Saudis had indicated their desire to purchase additional F–5’s beginning in CY 76. A formal request had not been made, however, pending receipt of the survey report. In order to make it possible for deliveries to begin in CY 76, USAF, under a short time constraint, prepared a letter of offer covering only long lead items to protect delivery of 30 F–5E aircraft in CY 76. The letter of offer was refused on the grounds that it did not provide the technical data justifying the purchase of long lead time items. MODA wants a letter of offer covering the total proposed buy (for 60 aircraft). This is in preparation on an expedited basis.

i. Saudi Air Defense Team. A Saudi Air Defense Team is in the US (7–17 October) for briefings and to observe static displays and demonstrations of short range air defense equipment with emphasis on CHAPARRAL and VULCAN.

YAR

a. Saudi and Jordanian Survey Teams. A Saudi survey team recently in the YAR presented its report to MODA Prince Sultan on 30 September. Sultan told our Charge in Jidda that the report was very positive and practical and that when approved by the King, he would review it with USMTM Chief, BG Hill. Sultan wants to get the YAR committed to a binding one-time deal. The Jordanians, who have been providing advisory assistance, will be sending a military mission to prepare a comprehensive plan for rebuilding the YAR Armed Forces. It is not clear whether there has been coordination between the Saudis and Jordanians as regards these surveys.

b. US Survey Team. The USG requires an assessment of Yemen’s military requirements in order to evaluate Saudi and YAR requests to purchase military equipment and ammunition of US origin. To this end, the USG in early September offered to send a small DOD survey team to the YAR and this offer has been accepted. Plans are being made for the survey team, which will operate under the auspices and staff supervision of the DOD Middle East Task Group (METG), to arrive in the YAR during the week of 21 October and to remain there for a period not to exceed two weeks. It will be headed by Col. William A. Fifer who has just completed a three-year tour as Defense Attaché in Saudi Arabia and was also accredited to the YAR as a non-resident Attaché during the last year of his tour. In addition to validating equipment requests, the US survey will put the USG in a far better position to comment authoritatively on the survey recommendations of the Saudis and Jordanians.

c. US Shipment of Arms. A shipment of arms (including machine guns, mortars, 106mm rifles and ammunition) originally valued at $2.8 million and funded by Abu Dhabi is en route to YAR. A recent price rise affecting the 106mm ammunition will require that the YAR obtain additional funding. Mr. Sisco requested in a letter to you that the price rise for the ammunition be reviewed. However, he has been informed in a letter from LTG Fish that it will not be possible to revoke the price rise. We are informing Yemen of this development and the need for them to pay approximately $471,000 over and above the $2.8 million already paid.

Tab A

Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to Secretary of Defense Schlesinger

Jidda, September 24, 1972, 0515Z.

5563. Subject: Expediting Action on Matters Relating to Saudi Arabia.

Summary: The Saudi Government is discouraged with the apparent slowness of the US to respond to Saudi defense needs, and we urge the establishment immediately of a mechanism within DOD to expedite matters relating to Saudi Arabia, as well as quick action on providing arms to the Yemen Arab Republic. Should we fail to become more responsive, we risk losing our preeminent position here to France, the UK and others anxious to serve Saudi Arabia.

1. During recent months it has become apparent that the leadership of Saudi Arabia is becoming discouraged with what it sees as a lack of responsiveness, enthusiasm and efficiency on the part of the United States in meeting Saudi Arabia’s defense needs. It is also evident that the Saudi leadership respects and trusts the United States, prefers US equipment and training over that of the United Kingdom and France, but has had to turn to those nations—which are eager to be accommodating—because the United States has been unable or unwilling to produce.

2. Last June while meeting with DOD officials in the United States, Prince Fahd, the Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Interior and probably de facto successor to King Faisal, raised this point as a matter of serious concern to Saudi Arabia. More recently, in the context of Saudi military aid to the Yemen Arab Republic, Prince Fahd advised YAR President in early July that the YAR should seek armor equipment from the French and other military supplies and services from the British because of “slow American action in delivering military equipment.” Prince Sultan, the Minister of Defense and firm advocate of US military cooperation, commented early this month that he did not expect the US would be either willing or able to respond to recent YAR requests for military assistance with the same enthusiasm as the French are displaying.

3. The need for close US-Saudi relations is well known, as is the desirability both politically and economically of an active role for the United States in the development of Saudi Arabia. Because of the many years of amicable, mutually profitable dealings by Americans here, we have a head start on the many other nations, which are, in Prince Sultan’s words, “moving very fast” to improve their positions.

4. It is recognized that Saudi Arabia, with its decision-making processes centered on only a very few individuals, can act much more quickly than the United States, and I recognize that not all Saudi Arabia’s expectations may be reasonable. But the key point here is that the British and French are apparently capable of being responsive in Saudi terms. For example, in May 74, when the Ministry of Defense and aviation asked for information on availability and cost on short range air defense weapons by 11 June, both the French and British met the deadline. The United States offer did not come through until 7 July. By that time the Saudis were already involved in visits to Europe to view French and British equipment and tests. It now appears the Saudi army will buy the French Crotale missile, although the US Vulcan gun system may also still be considered. The DOD survey of the needs of Saudi armed forces is another example of seemingly unnecessary delays that have disappointed and discouraged the Saudis. The survey was begun in April and completed in June. It was originally promised to the Saudi government by mid-June, a date continually extended until it was finally released on 20 September 1974, leaving the Saudis only perhaps 30 days to study it before the Joint Security Commission meets in late October. If another example is needed, the question of new uniforms for the Saudi Army is a case in point. The latest information available here indicates it will require 18 months to two years to provide them. MODA had asked for them by late fall of this year, and despite the long delay apparently still wants to buy them from the United States, because of the prestige of the soldiers having uniforms “direct from the United States.” How long the Saudis will hold to such values in the face of our relative lack of responsiveness is subject to severe question.

5. I strongly urge that a mechanism be established within DOD to monitor and expedite matters pertaining to US security assistance to Saudi Arabia. We recommend the establishment of such a body as a key agenda item for Under Secretary Ellsworth during the conduct of his meetings in connection with the Joint Security Commission. I would suggest, however, that this action be instituted before he arrives, so that he can discuss it as a project already well under way. I believe this will show the Saudi Government that the United States is interested and working hard to be more responsive.

6. I also ask that action on the supplying of arms to the YAR be expedited and that a solid response, including the date of arrival of the US Mission, be forwarded as soon as possible, but well before the Joint Security Commission meets.

7. I wish to emphasize again that Saudi Arabia is a close ally of the United States but its leaders are increasingly aware of their power and their options to deal with any country they choose. They pay cash. If we are to maintain our position and gain the resultant benefits we must be more forthcoming and responsive. Otherwise, we risk losing the race and the prize to the French, the British and the others.

Akins

1. Summary: Jordan updated Clements on FMS sales to Saudi Arabia, expedited shipping of weapons to Saudi Arabia and the Yemen Arab Republic, the status of the F–5 Peace Hawk programs, and other matters related to the U.S.-Saudi security relationship.

   Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330–77–0054, Saudi Arabia, 1974 000.1–121. Secret. Attached at Tab A is telegram 5563 from Jidda, September 24. Attached but not published at Tabs B and C, respectively, are a memorandum entitled “Current DOD actions to speedup FMS Cases for Saudi Arabia,” and telegram 5736 from Jidda, October 12, relaying Prince Fahd’s request for expedited U.S. arms deliveries to Saudi Arabia. Atherton’s December 18 memorandum to Kissinger laid out the status of deliveries into 1977. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 208, Geopolitical File, Saudi Arabia, October 29, 1974–February 4, 1975) For the records of Fahd’s June 5–6 conversations with U.S. officials, see Documents 109–112. The Peace Hawk programs involved the sale of services and training of pilots and support personnel for the F–5 fighter to Saudi Arabia and were divided into phases, such as “Peace Hawk IV” or “Peace Hawk Phase V.” Each was a separate sale of equipment and services to Saudi Arabia.