Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–9, Part 2, Documents on the Middle East Region, 1973–1976

112. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, June 6, 1974, 4–6:40 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Saudi-US Security Cooperation Meeting

PARTICIPANTS

• Saudi Arabian Side

  • Second Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior—His Royal Highness Prince Fahd bin Abd al-Aziz al Saud
  • Saudi Arabian Ambassador—Ibrahim Al-Sowayel
  • Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs—Muhammad Mas’ud
  • Director of Public Security Forces—General Muhammad al Tayib al Tayib al Tunisi
  • Director General of Civilian Defense—General Faiz al Awfi
  • Chief, Military Operations—General Ali al Kabbani
  • Director General of Frontier Forces—General Abdullah al Shaikh
  • Deputy Commander of Saudi Air Force—Brigadier Akram Khoja
  • Saudi Arabian Military Attaché—Colonel Sulaiman Shubaily
  • Legal Advisor—Dr. Ghazi Al-Gosaibi

• United States Side

  • Department of Defense

    • Secretary of Defense—James R. Schlesinger
    • Deputy Secretary of Defense—William P. Clements, Jr.
    • Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff—Admiral Thomas H. Moorer
    • Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)—Robert Ellsworth
    • Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary (ISA)—Amos A. Jordan
    • Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)—James H. Noyes
    • Military Assistant to the Secretary—Major General John A. Wickham, Jr.
    • Military Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense—Rear Admiral Kenneth M. Carr
    • Deputy Director, Near East, South Asia Region (ISA)—Glenn E. Blitgen
    • Country Director for Saudi Arabia (ISA)—Edward W. Schaefer
    • Defense Security Assistance Agency, Directorate for Sales Negotiations—Fred Thieberger
    • Security Assistance (ISA)—Colonel Thomas Kelly
    • Military Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense—Lieutenant Colonel Peter M. Dawkins
    • US Interpreter for 7 June Security Meeting—Captain Stephen Franke, USA

  • Department of State and Others

    • Deputy Director for Politico-Military Affairs—Thomas Stern
    • American Ambassador to Saudi Arabia—James E. Akins
    • National Security Council (White House)—Harold Saunders
    • National Intelligence Officer—Samuel Hoskinson
    • American Embassy, Jidda, Saudi Arabia—Raymond Close
    • NEA Notetaker—Morris Draper
    • Interpreter, American Embassy, Jidda—Isa Sabbagh

1. SecDef’s Opening Remarks

SecDef welcomed HRH Prince Fahd and his party noting the long term Saudi-US relationship and that we would go forward on the basis of the broad spirit of cooperation established by Secretary Kissinger. There would be two aspects of our cooperation, the one concerning the broader strategic situation in the Middle East and the other having to do with forces, doctrine, training and hardware needed to strengthen the armed forces of Saudi Arabia.

2. HRH’s Opening Remarks

HRH Prince Fahd replied that Saudi Arabia is turning to a friend to help fill its needs for the strengthening of its armed forces. Saudi Arabia seeks to strengthen its forces for defensive purposes, not for aggression, while bearing in mind that a power which cannot defend itself effectively will not be taken very seriously. For Saudi Arabia to be better-equipped to defend itself will be to our mutual advantage. Saudi Arabia would not have sought to strengthen its forces if the Soviets had not looked for advantage in our area, taking advantage of certain “open doors and windows” as has been evidenced in the Soviets’ showering arms upon the PDRY and Iraq. Our pursuit of the expensive goal of arming our armed forces is an indication of our recognition of our needs. The Soviets have supplied modern weapons, tanks and over 300 aircraft to Iraq and have completely rearmed six divisions.

Why is Iraq making itself so strong? Obviously this is not being done to stand up to Iran; this would not be rational, so its purposes are against Saudi Arabia and other states of the peninsula. There is a serious intent to squeeze Saudi Arabia in a pincers movement from the north and from the south; “people who don’t wish us well want Saudi Arabia engaged by Iraq on the one hand and the PDRY on the other in order to force Saudi Arabia to turn in two directions at once.” HRH cited the example in March 1973 of Iraq’s pressure on Kuwait while the PDRY struck at a Saudi Arabian border post on the southern border. HRH expressed concern about Saudi vulnerability to enemy air attack in the south because of limited, inadequate air defense in the area.

3. Modernization of Saudi Forces

HRH went on to say that these are the reasons why Saudi Arabia seeks to strengthen its armed forces with US help. We fully realize this cannot happen overnight, but given US good will, based on what we have already been told, we see no permanent obstacle to our goal.

HRH continued that in view of the need to develop technical expertise, training is necessary. Saudi Arabia wanted as many of its officers as possible to come to the US for training. Hardware can be purchased anywhere, but what is important is the US desire to help Saudi Arabia. Cash is not the problem. There is a great difference between one who says “Here are the arms—pay me,” and one who wants us to plan wisely, giving evidence of heartfelt concern. It is most important that stability continue in the area. It would be bad for all if an imbalance were to develop. The Saudi Arabian Government must protect its people. The emphasis must be on the coordination of planning together on the concept of a program to assist Saudi Arabia—a “partnership.” HRH emphasized the human element of training; also technical expertise, not just hardware but help in coordinating Saudi plans; training in Saudi Arabia and training in the US; experts as necessary in Saudi Arabia. An example of what he would like to see happen in this respect is provided by Iran, which could not have modernized its forces so effectively without US help. He has the strong conviction that what has been done for Iran can be done for Saudi Arabia. Both can work for peace and stability in the region. We need to improve our units quickly. “In concluding my remarks, I would like to say that we regard these meetings as talks between friends in which we open our hearts; they are not negotiations between adversaries, but discussions between friends.”

SecDef observed that HRH’s words were words of wisdom and well-chosen, and that the prospects which he outlined represent a vision which we share. For our part it is an obligation, but it is more than an obligation; it is a pleasant duty as well. HRH has presented a strategic view which we share, involving not only Saudi Arabia but all the Persian Gulf area. With respect to the Soviet Union we recognize that it has both a material national interest and a missionary thrust on behalf of the communist structure. For this reason the US feels it must maintain a strategic balance both worldwide and regionally in the area. The Soviets must feel that there are no regions which they can penetrate, no plums. There must be a regional balance in every part of the world. This is most fundamental in the Middle East.

To maintain the balance, we need recourse to the human spirit; that is, the will and determination to which HRH has referred. The human spirit has preeminence and where harmony prevails and the spirit of mutual cooperation exists, all things are possible.

HRH said that training and doctrine were more important than hardware.

SecDef stated that we are prepared to train large numbers of Saudi personnel here and in Saudi Arabia as fits Saudi desires. SecDef noted that HRH spoke of the preeminence of training over mere hardware in providing assistance. We share that concept. HRH appropriately states that there should be a plan and notion of how to use the hardware and men trained to use that hardware. In assisting the Saudi Arabian Government, the USG wishes to treat Saudi resources with exactly the same care as we would our own. Such assistance should be cost-effective and suitable to Saudi needs. We are prepared, therefore, to treat hardware as something that will follow development of a strategic concept which treats the long term needs of Saudi Arabia. But first, we must have a plan and we must complete the advisory report. HRH has spoken with words of great eloquence and wisdom and we are prepared to enter into a comradely relationship in which the human relationship is effective and suitable from the standpoint of our two governments. SecDef then invited Deputy Secretary Clements to comment.

4. DepSecDef’s Welcome

DepSecDef expressed his delight at having Prince Fahd and his party in the United States and recalled his relationships with members of Prince Fahd’s family who understand the sense of partnership very well. We would like to consider the Saudi-US relationship in that spirit; it is just another word for mutual interest. SecDef interjected, “mutual interest and affection.” DepSecDef said he agreed completely with HRH and the Secretary that good training is at the heart of the problem and basic to the strengthening of the Saudi Armed Forces. As SecDef had already told the Saudis, the determination of training in the US or in Saudi Arabia, or both, is up to the Saudi Arabian Government. We are well aware that in some instances, the Saudi Arabian Government may wish to send personnel here; in other cases to train in Saudi Arabia; we are agreeable to this. The key words here are Saudi self-sufficiency; the sooner this is reached the better we like it. (NOTE: HRH signaled his approval of this remark by giving the thumbs-up sign.) But it should be done in the context of good planning.

5. Training

HRH expressed pleasure at hearing these comments and confirmed the need for sound planning. As regards training to build strong forces, the two methods must be combined, training in the US and to have military technical institutes in Saudi Arabia. DepSecDef agreed that both means should be used. HRH observed that Saudi Arabia must depend on US schools while its own are being developed and that there are many levels of training. DepSecDef said he understood but observed that we can train many Saudis in-country right now. HRH noted that the DOD survey team is at work. This is excellent but a plan and a strategy should be developed and what is required; then do the training. So why shouldn’t Saudis come to the US? DepSecDef said he was sure we could do both but that programs should not be delayed. The first plan should be ready by early fall—September or October. HRH said this was very good, very practical. DepSecDef commented that SecDef had made clear that we will make available to HRH our views concerning the whole area—Iraq, South Yemen, Ethiopia.

6. Saudi Preference for Government-to-Government Arrangements

DepSecDef said it was a very important point to know whether the Saudis preferred Government-to-Government arrangements or to deal directly with contractors and invited HRH’s comments. HRH said he was pleased the subject had been raised—that he had intended to raise it himself. Saudi Arabia preferred Government-to-Government arrangements. It is the best path to follow; when companies get into the act they must look to their material gain as their number one consideration. This is not the approach of the USG. HRH said US military advisors were more conscientious and effective than contract civilians.

DepSecDef noted that as a partnership, this is a much better arrangement and we could avoid many difficulties on this basis. HRH said this was preferred by King Faisal, MODA Prince Sultan and himself. He was very pleased we have agreed on the need for sound planning, and that SAG will look more to the US as the source of modern weapons and equipment.

HRH then referred to the survey team in Saudi Arabia and said that while the team is doing the study, it would be useful to bring along Saudi experts to the US to continue discussions here.

7. Internal Security Training

HRH then said he wanted to raise a new subject—very important! He said Saudi Arabia needed support for internal security elements, particularly the Frontier and Coastal Defense forces. All civil defense elements also need rebuilding and reequipping. It would be appreciated if the team could include these elements in its study. The Saudis would prefer that the study be all-encompassing. SecDef stated that the US will deal with the internal security matters very carefully and provide help from appropriate sources.

(NOTE: During HRH’s visit to Washington this request was discussed with USAID officials by Generals Tunisi, al Awfi and al Sheikh. The request is now being studied by USAID.)

SecDef also expressed our concern regarding the stability of Saudi Arabia’s neighbors. In the former Trucial States he noted, for example, that happily they were developing with stability following the departure of the British. We are aware, too, of the Saudis’ concern, a concern we share, regarding the insurrectionary movements in Oman. We commend the Saudis for their vigorous attention to that problem which is in their interest. HRH said that if he seemed to emphasize internal security, “our brethern in the Gulf have sought our help. So if our men are trained in security, then we can provide such assistance to our brethren in the Gulf in the conviction that we Saudi Arabians have no territorial ambitions.”

DepSecDef said it was important that we mention this among us. It is most important that the Gulf States look to Saudi Arabia and not across the Gulf to Iran. HRH agreed emphatically. DepSecDef said it was most important that Prince Fahd declare himself in this regard, because we feel it is not in Saudi interest for the Gulf States to look across the Gulf. HRH replied that he agreed 100 percent and that he was sure that Saudi neighbors in the Gulf would agree 100 percent. “This is because they are at ease with us, a natural and logical situation.”

HRH expressed his delight at what he had heard in the meeting and would convey it to the King. HRH said that when he left Saudi Arabia he had said that he would return with his pockets full of goodies. HRH then provided a list of sales cases, stating that he hoped that DOD would expedite the shipment of this equipment as soon as possible.

SecDef observed that DOD is prepared to discuss items of equipment including availability times. Equipment will be available when there are trained men to use it. HRH responded that naturally, Saudi Arabia does not want equipment to become scrap. We have a mutual conviction on how to go about it (strengthening of the armed forces). DepSecDef added that we must not procrastinate.

8. Cost Estimate Problems

SecDef noted that Ambassador Akins had written to him about one area of concern, the problem of estimating the cost of cases. He had put forth Prince Sultan’s views very strenuously indeed. To the extent that cost estimates contain erroneous data, DOD can take corrective steps. However, a problem beyond DOD control is that of inflation and the deterioration in the purchasing power of Western currencies. We feel it more painfully than the nations we are supplying. The general rise in prices is also reflected in Saudi Arabia’s exports, as well. We hope we can do better in estimating costs but until inflation abates, we request your patience and your understanding that these are beyond DOD control. SecDef requested that Prince Fahd convey these thoughts, to Prince Sultan who may then be more gentle. HRH indicated acceptance and appreciation of SecDef’s comments.

9. Regional Security

DepSecDef introduced certain regional aspects of Middle East security: Soviet influence in Somalia and developments in Ethiopia. As strategic concepts are developed for the region, these countries in adjacent areas have a major impact. Saudi Arabia can do more for them than can the US. Saudi Arabia has good relations with these countries and can help enormously. Today the Soviet impact in Somalia could well be greater than in Iraq. HRH said the Saudis would always welcome being advised of developments in the region and that His Majesty King Faisal would be particularly pleased. Of course, Saudi Arabia did not want to see problems in Somalia and wouldn’t “take it smiling” because of Somali relations with the Soviets. HRH recalled a visit to Somalia, a poor country, a few years ago and the Somali President’s visit to Saudi Arabia this year. HRH had discussed with him the problem of the growth of Communist influence there. As Somalia had become a member of the Arab League, this emboldened Saudi Arabia to discuss Communist influence in Somalia. He had told the President that this influence was harmful to all Arabs. Perhaps the US and Saudi Arabia could agree upon a rescue operation to pull Somalia out of the mire. DepSecDef stated that we would welcome this and that Ambassador Akins could continue discussion of this in Saudi Arabia.

SecDef then made the point that in this area it is even more important to have a plan in order to avoid an abortive effort. In developing the armed forces, if mistakes are made due to lack of planning it only costs money. But in such an area as was being discussed, mistakes would cost much more than money. HRH termed SecDef’s observation “absolutely correct.” Because of their closeness to the people of Somalia, the Saudis could perhaps wield influence, but only if supplied with material support. DepSecDef said he was pleased by Prince Fahd’s reply.

10. Bahrain

SecDef then invited Admiral Moorer to comment on Bahrain. Admiral Moorer said that he was impressed by HRH’s grasp of the strategic situation, noted the presence of our small naval force in the Gulf and his recent visit to Bahrain, and referred to notification received last fall that the use of facilities there would be terminated in line with existing agreements. He stated that the Emir had told him of the need for a regional concept and had referred to mutual interests with the United States. Admiral Moorer commented to HRH that we would appreciate his advice on what action we might take in order to continue to operate there. HRH replied that he will discuss this with the Emir personally and see what can be done. The Chairman expressed his appreciation and DepSecDef said he was sure that an approach by HRH would have a great influence on the Emir’s decision.

11. Soviet Strategy

HRH then asked SecDef for enlightenment on Soviet strategy in the area. SecDef said that the reopening of the Suez Canal would have great impact and symbolic value for Egypt, a sister Arab state. It would provide a greater income for Egypt and restore an asset so closely associated with Egyptian pride. There is no question that it has the disadvantage of allowing the Soviet fleet to move rapidly from the Black Sea to the Indian Ocean. It would shorten the Soviet line of communications from 10,000 miles to 2,000. While the presence and demonstration of Soviet power will likely be a source of psychological pressure at least, we hope it will not constitute more than psychological pressure on the area nations. For this reason we have requested funds from Congress for a facility at Diego Garcia, not because we wish to station forces there but so that if the Soviets enhanced their presence, we could enhance our presence and neutralize Soviet influence or pressure which could become severe. DepSecDef said he trusted Prince Fahd agreed with this. HRH said he not only agreed but thinks it is necessary.

SecDef then said that, in addition, there is a possibility of movement of Soviet forces into the area. There was such concern on 16 and 17 October during the local conflict of which we were so painfully aware. Aspects of that rivalry are happily reduced, but we must not have armed forces present. SecDef then observed that if they “enter your tent”—if he might use that expression—they will never depart. HRH replied that “we would sever that nose.” SecDef said he believed the Soviets would be most reluctant to enter without the invitation of an area nation, so we are most concerned about the orientation of Iraq. Those are the primary considerations. We do not see a general war. SecDef then introduced Mr. Hoskinson for further comments.

12. Mr. Hoskinson’s Strategic and Political Assessment

Mr. Hoskinson said that a special assessment has been prepared by the Intelligence Community in preparation for the visit. However, most of its conclusions have been reflected in the remarks of HRH, SecDef, DepSecDef, and Admiral Moorer. SecDef observed that this is flattering, but similarity does not mean that these conclusions are correct. Mr. Hoskinson said he would merely supplement the earlier statements. Regarding the Soviet role and threat in the region, the Soviets would one day like to control or deny the flow of energy resources to Europe and Japan. The USSR is not in a position to do so today but we must keep this potential threat in mind in assessing their activities in the coming years. SecDef made the observation that a worldwide balance of power is essential to containment all over the world. The US believes in the self-determination of nations, a view which is not shared by the USSR. Mr. Hoskinson said the Soviets will be particularly interested in strategic areas, in the choke points in the area. A good example today is the Soviet intelligence ship and two minesweepers operating in the Strait of Hormuz. This is the first time that the Soviets have moved an intelligence collector this close to the Gulf. As to the political situation in the Gulf itself, we are encouraged that the smaller states seem to have weathered the quote British withdrawal unquote fairly well. Saudi Arabia is in a better position to judge than we, but it seems to us that important changes could occur when the adaptability of these regimes is put to the test. Iraq poses the greatest potential threat in the Gulf, in the short run. At present the Iraqis seem to be preoccupied. There was the October War and the difficulties with the Kurds and the clashes with Iran. But it would not be surprising if they renew their threat to Kuwait, particularly against the two islands. Iraq continues to give arms support to dissident groups, as does the PDRY. Bahrain may become a problem as regards its capability of coping with emerging social changes. In many respects, this is the most worrisome situation in the area. As regards Oman: Oman receives special attention because of its strategic location and also, should Sultan Qabus’s efforts to modernize and put down the Dhofar Rebellion fail, this would have serious repercussions for both Saudi Arabia and the US. The British say the tide of war in Dhofar has turned and that the rebels will be pushed out in the eastern and central areas and largely in the west by the end of the year.

SecDef observed that one aspect of the problem in Oman was that outside parties are involved there, outsiders in the sense that they are outsiders to the area, that is the British and Iranians. The Sudan is prepared to provide military units in Oman. To the extent that Arab countries can provide such help it is better than foreign forces, such as British and Iranian. If the concept of multi-Arab support for Qabus has appeal and appeals to you, it may be desirable that Saudi Arabia express its support for that kind of approach. HRH replied that Saudi assistance to Oman is our duty and a necessity. This in itself does not obviate the need for sound coordination with Saudi Arabia and US aid at some time. This aid to Oman could be provided directly or through Saudi Arabia. What is important is that we help Oman. It would be excellent to have Arab nations help while US helps them. DepSecDef observed that in the interest of Saudi Arabia, it is better that there not be “overkill;” it would not be in Saudi interest to have a lot of foreign forces in Oman. HRH agreed.

DepSecDef then observed that these kinds of exchanges with Prince Fahd were very important to the Secretary, to himself and Admiral Moorer to understand the views of Saudi Arabia. HRH replied that the whole discussion was very useful and helpful. It was a discussion of friends among friends.

Mr. Hoskinson stated that despite the British estimate that the tide had turned in Dhofar, we think the insurgency is certainly not over, would be difficult to quell, and could take many years as we have learned from our experience. HRH agreed. Mr. Hoskinson said that Oman has an internal security problem in the northeastern part of the country as well. As regards the two Yemens, we are seriously concerned by the situation of the two Yemens. It would appear that the YAR, like Oman, cannot by itself fend off incursions from the PDRY, which is assisted by the Soviets. Mr. Hoskinson then said that he would like to make a point as regards regional cooperation in the Gulf and Red Sea areas. First, the relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran is of fundamental importance to the security of the area as a whole. All of us would be losers if Saudi relations with Iran were to degenerate into confrontation. SecDef interjected to say that we fervently share that point of view. Mr. Hoskinson said that Saudi Arabia and the US also share a strong interest in the Red Sea Basin area, as noted by Mr. Clements. Bab El Mandeb in the middle of the region will be of increasing importance, especially with the opening of the Suez Canal.

13. Relationship with Iran

HRH said this explanation of the strategic situation is commendable; however, I wish to comment on Iran. The Saudi relationship with Iran is an old and strong one. We fully realize that for all concerned, good relations must prevail between Iran and Saudi Arabia. We also realize that if Saudi Arabia had serious misunderstandings with Iran it would be bad. This is of interest to all of us here. SecDef said that we appreciated that very much. The Soviet interest in the straits is old. It goes back to the time of Peter the Great. We can take some comfort from the fact that they still have failed to achieve their objective after this long period. HRH said we hope they will continue to fail.

14. Concluding Comments

SecDef thanked Prince Fahd and his party for their time, noting that we had already imposed on them too long. SecDef referred to the US objectives of freedom and stability. As regards assistance to Saudi Arabia in developing its forces, we will provide training and we will provide equipment when it is needed—and in doing so we will be as careful with Saudi resources as if they were our own. HRH replied that what the Secretary had said is precisely the Saudi view and that it was doubly a pleasure to hear it from the Secretary himself. On a lighter side, SecDef referred to HRH’s mention of “goodies.” “Today these have been metaphysical goodies; tomorrow our staffs will discuss the materiel ones.” HRH replied he already had the feeling that his pockets, while not bursting, were full—“we have good promises from you.” DepSecDef said: “I have heard that His Majesty King Faisal prayed for Secretary Kissinger; I hope he will pray for us as well.”

HRH and his party then took their leave.

1. Summary: Schlesinger, Clements, Admiral Moorer, and other officials from the Department of Defense, along with officials of the Department of State and the NSC, met with Prince Fahd to discuss the Joint Commission on Security Cooperation, military sales, and strategy in the Gulf region.

   Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD Files: FRC 330–78–0011, Saudi Arabia, 092.112 1974. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Glenn E. Blitgen, Deputy Director, Near East and South Asia Region, International Security Affairs, Department of Defense, and Edward W. Schaefer, Country Director for Saudi Arabia, International Security Affairs, Department of Defense, approved by Ellsworth on July 9.