Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–9, Part 1, Documents on North Africa, 1973–1976

54. Intelligence Report No. 578 Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research¹

Washington, September 1, 1976.

Qadhafi: THE INCREASED THREAT

Summary

The evidence of Libyan involvement in several areas of the Middle East and Africa—especially Lebanon, Sudan, Egypt, Tunisia, and Uganda—has increased markedly in recent months.

Qadhafi’s activities demonstrate a new capability to go beyond isolated subversive or terrorist acts. The scope of Libyan support for Palestinian/leftist forces in Lebanon and the preparation of the coup attempt against Numayri suggest that the Libyan leader is no longer a fringe actor. With considerable wealth and military supplies at his disposal, Qadhafi is now in a position to exert a significant destabilizing influence on the course of events in the Middle East and Africa.

Qadhafi’s position within Libya has deteriorated sharply within the past year. He is weak among the business and professional classes and has alienated the eastern Cyrenaica region, the major city of which is Benghazi. In the army there is general agreement that the Libyan patrimony is being spent lavishly in foolish foreign adventures.

In addition, Qadhafi’s Arab and African neighbors are increasingly concerned over the growing Libyan threat to their internal security. Sadat has the capability to support a serious attempt to overthrow the Libyan regime, and he is furious about recent Libyan hijacking and bombings within Egypt. It is increasingly likely that the Egyptians may decide to move against Qadhafi.

Qadhafi’s Objectives

Qadhafi is a complex Arab politician and a man of contradictions (devil and angel, as Sadat has said). A Bedouin, Qadhafi came to power without the softening influence of a transitional generation in contact with the modern world. His outlook remains essentially tribal, tempered only by four years at a military academy. As a Bedouin, he was an outsider in Libyan society, and he retains the essentially confrontational outsider’s view of the world.

Qadhafi fancies himself an intellectual, but while his verbal skills are high, his cultural and educational base is extremely thin. Although only 34 years old, Qadhafi has been in power for seven years. A practiced demagogue and a true believer in his naive Nasserist creed, he is a dangerous modern example of Carlyle’s “terrible simplifiers.”

Qadhafi’s refusal to accept the established international order makes him a force for instability in the world. His political style seems to be based on an instinct to outbid his opponents in extremism. Typically his methods run heavily to subversion and terrorism.

With fanatical zeal, considerable political skill, and $7 billion of yearly oil revenues, Qadhafi pursues the goal of Arab unity in a radicalized Arab world, both as an end in itself and as a necessary precondition for the destruction of the Israeli state. In addition, as a good Nasserist and Third Worlder, he has given high priority to extending Tripoli’s influence in Africa, propagating the Islamic faith, and promoting revolutionary programs and regimes among Third World countries.

In the case of neighboring states to the south, particularly Chad and Niger, Tripoli has expansionist ambitions. With other African states in which a Muslim population is present, the Libyans believe they have a religious duty to promote Muslim political influence. Qadhafi was an important factor in bullying African states into breaking diplomatic relations with Israel, and his regime continues to demand (with some success) that its African relations take a radical, pro-Arab line at international meetings and at the UN.

Recent Libyan Activism

In the aftermath of the October war, Qadhafi found himself isolated and unpopular in the Arab world. He had sharply criticized the limited aims of Egypt and Syria during the war and then denounced their efforts to negotiate interim agreements with Israel. Qadhafi evidently decided in late 1973-early 1974 to build up Libya’s independent subversive and interventionist capabilities. After unsuccessful attempts to buy arms from the US, Libya signed a $730 million arms deal with the Soviets in the spring of 1974. This equipment, which far exceeds Libya’s needs or capability to maintain or operate, is for use in continuing hostilities with Israel and in support of such “progressive” causes as the Polisario Front and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman. In the process, it increases Qadhafi’s leverage in the Middle East and Africa.

Since late 1975, Libyan-sponsored operations—long in the works— have demonstrated the seriousness of Libya’s capability to use its large financial resources and military equipment to influence the course of events in the Middle East and Africa in fundamental ways. This spring, there was a spate of subversive activity designed against each of Libya’s neighbors (except for Algeria and Mali). In February and March, Qadhafi struck out at Tunisia and Egypt, which had been harboring his opponents and broadcasting anti-Qadhafi propaganda. In three maladroit operations, his commandos were caught, tried, and convicted in efforts to kidnap and/or assassinate his nominal Foreign Minister (in Rome), his former Planning Minister (in Cairo), and the Tunisian Prime Minister. Also in March and April, the Presidents of Niger and Chad accused Qadhafi of materially supporting abortive coup attempts against them.

In the past four months, Qadhafi has been active in the following areas:

Lebanon. Qadhafi has supported elements of both Lebanese leftists (Jumblatt and newer groups like the Lebanese Arab Army) and Palestinian groups in Lebanon. He has subsidized those groups whose current activities coincided with his views, and withheld supplies when he was displeased. Libya probably has contributed at least $50 million–$100 million to leftist and Palestinian Rejectionist forces in Lebanon in the past year. Until a few months ago, Qadhafi funneled the bulk of these supplies through Syria and Asad.

During April and May, Qadhafi was busy trying to build a rejectionist front of Algeria, Libya, Syria, and Iraq (plus the Palestinians), and his Prime Minister, Major Jalloud, was dispatched to whip together the necessary support for opening a “new front” on Israel’s northern border. This dream collapsed when Syria, at odds with Iraq and in the midst of increased fighting against the Palestinians, effectively declined to join the new rejectionist front.

Jalloud was once again sent to the area, this time in an attempt to keep the Syrians from emasculating the Palestinian forces and to develop a “cease-fire.” Approximately 200 Libyans were sent to Lebanon as part of the Arab League peacekeeping force. While the evidence is not conclusive, it appears that Qadhafi is critical of the role played by Jalloud, claiming that he failed to be firm with the Syrians and needed to push the Palestinian demands harder.

Libya has clearly exacerbated the Lebanese crisis by providing money and arms to the leftists/Palestinians, thereby increasing their ability to continue fighting the Syrian/Christian forces. Following the change in Syria’s position, that country could no longer be used to deliver Soviet equipment going to the leftists/Palestinians. In addition to its own support, Libya may have become the conduit for transshipping Moscow’s arms into Lebanon. Since the leftists/Palestinians have other sources of financial and material support, the Libyan input may not have been a decisive factor in prolonging the war. On the other hand, Libya is the party least likely to abandon the leftists/Palestinians or to put pressure on them to compromise on vital issues, and Libyan support must have played a major role in stiffening their will to resist an accommodation.

Sudan. In early July, a major Libyan-backed coup attempt was made against the Numayri regime. The Libyans provided arms, money, and coordination to disparate groups totalling several hundred Sudanese exiles and others, who gathered in Libya and Eritrea to prepare for the attack. The effort probably took a year or more to prepare and was an uncharacteristically smooth operation.

According to the senior Egyptian diplomat in Tripoli, Qadhafi has long been adamant that he would topple Numayri, no matter how many attempts it took (this may have been the third). This source claims that Qadhafi has never forgiven Numayri’s refusal in 1973 to allow Libyan planes and troops to proceed to Uganda to assist Amin.

Qadhafi’s latest attempt came close to success. The outcome was very much in doubt until a key unit rallied to the regime. A major factor seems to have been the coup’s initial setback in failing to kill or capture Numayri at Khartoum airport, though he only narrowly escaped assassination.

Egypt. Qadhafi has intensified his efforts to overthrow, or at least destabilize, the Sadat regime in recent months in response to Cairo’s propaganda campaign utilizing former Libyan Planning Minister Muhayshi, who defected a year ago. In June, in a repetition of the unsuccessful operation in March, Libyan assassination and subversion teams were arrested in Cairo.

There was a dramatic increase in Libyan operations against Egypt during August, including the following:

—the bombing of a government building in the heart of Cairo on August 8. Egyptian security found that the saboteur who planted the two bombs was an Egyptian citizen who had been recruited and paid by Libyan intelligence while working in Libya.

—the bombing of a passenger train in Alexandria on August 14, killing 8 persons and injuring 51. While lacking positive proof, Egyptian officials assume from the type of explosive used that it was a Libyan-sponsored incident.

—the attempted hijacking of an internal Egypt Air flight from Cairo to Luxor on August 23, foiled by an effective rescue operation by Egyptian special forces. Egypt insists that the attempt was plotted by Libya and identified the three hijackers as two Palestinians and an Egyptian, all members of a Libyan sabotage operation.

—the arrest by Libyan officials on August 24 of two Egyptian security men aboard a chartered Egypt Air flight from Cairo to Tripoli, denounced by the Egyptians as an “act of air piracy.”

Tunisia. Libya and Tunisia halted their propaganda war in late April as the result of Mauritanian mediation. The Tunisians were upset in June, when Qadhafi inaugurated a new airbase 19 miles from their border with a speech bragging of Libyan ability to reach all of North Africa by air. Later the same month, the Tunisians claimed that they discovered, among Tunisians being expelled from Libya, as many as 100 who had been recruited and trained by Qadhafi in his commando camps. The Libyans were reported to have made contact this spring with the Italian Mafia to assist in anti-Tunisian efforts. In the aftermath of the Sudan coup attempt, the Tunisians’ anxiety rose. Intelligence reports of Libyan plans for a coup attempt against Bourguiba and/or sabotage plans for late July–early August led the Tunisians to seek and receive demonstrations of military support from the US, France, and Egypt.

It is doubtful that Libya would mount a military attack on Tunisia while its attention is focused on its border with Egypt. Although a coup attempt cannot be ruled out, it is more likely (and certainly easier) that Libyan efforts will continue to be in the nature of sabotage or terrorism.

Uganda. Qadhafi has rushed to support Idi Amin, a fellow Muslim and close ally, in the latter’s current confrontation with Kenya. There are unconfirmed claims by Kenya that Libya sent 20 Mirages to Uganda. Tripoli did send radar equipment and may have sent some troops—Libyan or Palestinian—to serve as Amin’s personal bodyguards. Libya has also agreed to supply Uganda with oil, though it would have great difficulty in airlifting even 10 percent of Uganda’s needs—and that over intervening states which would not be likely to give overflight permission.

Other African States. There are reliable reports that the Libyan military has gotten bogged down in conflicts with the Muslim rebels in that part of northern Chad which Qadhafi has attempted to take over and administer for the past several years. Money and now materials reportedly have gone in the last two months through Mozambique for guerrilla operations against Rhodesia, and via Tanzania for operations against South Africa. In Tripoli the representatives of several African states, including Rwanda, Burundi, and Nigeria, have recently expressed growing concern about Libyan intentions in southern Africa which they consider dangerous to the stability of the area and to the regimes that they represent.

Other African states which are experiencing an influx of Libyan diplomats have indicated to US officials their concern over the possible Libyan use of their embassies for subversive activities. These are all developments which have been in the making for some time, and they reflect Qadhafi’s determination to increase his political status as a Third World leader and, in some cases, to see installed more compliant leaders, Muslim groups, or a more progressive leadership. In the case of Kenya, according to a well-placed source, the Libyans are currently engaged in full-scale planning to overturn the present Kenyan Government in favor of one more sympathetic to Libyan aims.

Terrorism and the Palestinians. Libya has for several years been training guerrillas from the PFLP and other Palestinian groups and from other Arab countries as well as its own personnel to execute terrorist operations. It has also provided funds and the use of its diplomatic facilities (e.g., passports, communications, pouch) to support these operations. The Libyan Embassy in Brussels issued the weapons for the operation last December against OPEC oil ministers, and it provides the logistical support for terrorist operations in Europe.

Qadhafi has supported the use of terrorism as part of the war against Israel. While his reputation for maintaining a broad terrorist network probably overstates his capability, he may have allocated $100 million to Black September and $40 million to other Palestinian groups involved in terrorism, such as the PFLP. There has been a past pattern of Libyan support for terrorist operations directed at Israeli aircraft and passengers, including the attacks at Athens in August 1973 and Rome in December 1973. Although the reports of direct Libyan involvement in the Uganda hijacking in July are not fully confirmed, the participation of the Carlos and PFLP networks, as well as the plane’s landing in Libya, strongly indicate that there was Libyan involvement. More recently, the Libyans were apparently involved in the August 11 attempted hijacking of an El Al airliner at Istanbul airport.

Qadhafi has probably taken non-Libyans from his commando training camps to mount several ad hoc operations, such as those the Tunisians have complained of. His use of Libyan commandos in his three kidnap/assassination attempts in March backfired and exposed him to ridicule. Future terrorist missions—especially the hijackings—will probably use the group of international professional terrorists who carried out the operation against OPEC headquarters. (Carlos himself is believed to have established his terrorist base in Libya in December 1975 following the OPEC kidnapping.)

The Increased Libyan Threat. Qadhafi’s brand of interventionist foreign policy goes back virtually to the beginning of his regime in 1969. As the result of the careful development of commando training camps and terrorist/subversive links, he is now able to pull off more ambitious and dangerous operations. His activities during the past several months demonstrate a new capability to go beyond isolated subversive or terrorist acts—the difference between a hijacking and a coup attempt. In particular, the scope of Libyan support for Palestinian/leftist forces in Lebanon and the preparation and coordination of the coup attempt against Numayri suggest that Qadhafi is no longer a fringe actor. With considerable wealth and military supplies at his disposal, Qadhafi is now in a position to exert a significant and destabilizing influence on the course of events in the Middle East and Africa.

Sources of Opposition to Qadhafi

Qadhafi’s position within Libya has deteriorated sharply in the past year. Dissatisfaction with his dictatorial ways has always been rife in his own Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), and in August 1975 he cracked down on a conspiracy to unseat him. Only four RCC members are still actively in the government, while his nominal Foreign Minister and several Ambassadors remain in self-imposed exile and several others have actively engaged in plotting against him. Qadhafi is weak among the business and professional classes and has alienated the eastern Cyrenaica region, the major city of which is Benghazi.

Precise information about the loyalty of the army is lacking. The younger members are probably less critical of Qadhafi, and they are members of the socio-economic group that has benefitted markedly from the regime’s economic development programs. There is, however, general criticism among both old and young officers of the amounts being spent for foreign adventurism. Qadhafi, in turn, has come to have sufficient doubts about his military officers’ loyalty that he has found it necessary to entrust key positions in the army and security apparatus to tribal relatives who owe him strict personal allegiance.

Despite growing criticism of Qadhafi within Libya and his increasing isolation from his present and former colleagues among the RCC and the larger Free Officers movement, there is no sign of any organized opposition to him. He is well guarded and has obviously taken precautions against coup attempts. Because of his own security system and the lack of viable leadership alternatives, it is doubtful that internal forces are strong enough by themselves to remove Qadhafi. It is more likely that foreign agents, especially Egyptians, would hope to utilize some of these forces to stage a coup.

In addition to his domestic opponents, Qadhafi’s Arab and African neighbors are increasingly concerned over the growing Libyan threat to their internal security. That threat, particularly after the Libyan role in the attempted coup against Numayri, now appears to have become more urgent to a number of Arab leaders who have the capability to support serious attempts to overthrow the Libyan regime with a combined application of internal and external pressures. It is increasingly likely that they may decide to exercise that power.

Among the external forces perceiving a threat from Qadhafi, Egypt is especially well placed and equipped to make a move against him, or, short of that, to contain his foreign adventures. Shocked by the near success of the coup attempt against Numayri and infuriated by the recent Libyan-sponsored hijacking and bombings within Egypt, Sadat has vowed to bring the Qadhafi regime down. Egypt has moved 20,000–30,000 troops with naval and air support into combat-ready positions near the Libyan border.

This buildup of Egyptian forces appears to be designed to encourage internal opposition against Qadhafi. If this proves insufficient to cause Qadhafi’s downfall, Sadat appears prepared to use whatever military force is necessary, although he probably favors a limited military operation.

In sum, Qadhafi faces serious opposition internally, and he must fear the possibility that one or more of his hostile neighbors will somehow try to exploit this. The lack of viable leadership alternatives within Libya, plus Qadhafi’s own security system, has thus far prevented his internal opposition from successfully moving against him, but it is increasingly likely that foreign agents, especially Egyptians, may stage a coup.

While he remains, however, Qadhafi can be expected to continue his interventionist operations. The series of recent setbacks in the Arab world may impel him to even more desperate foreign adventures. In Lebanon, for example, if the Palestinians fail to reach an accommodation with Damascus, Qadhafi may well bolster their sagging forces with a new supply of deadlier weapons. With his military option blocked by Egypt and Tunisia, it is probable that Qadhafi will depend mainly on his terrorist and subversive capabilities to attack his foreign opponents.

1. Summary: This report summarized Qadhafi’s increased involvement in the Middle East and Africa, and the growing concern of his Arab and African neighbors over the Libyan threat to their internal security.

   Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, National Security Council Operations Staff for the Middle East and South Asia Affairs, Box 18, Libya (4). Secret; Noforn; Nocontract. Drafted by John R. Damis in INR/RNA/NE; and approved by Director of the Office of Research and Analysis for Near East and South Asia Philip H. Stoddard.