53. Telegram 10936 From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State1
10936. Eyes Only for Secretary Kissinger. Dept repeat Eyes Only General Scowcroft (White House) and Secretary Rumsfeld (DOD). Subject: GOE Intentions Toward Libya.
Summary. Qadhafi’s role in Sudanese coup attempt. His suspected collusion with USSR in activities directed at Egypt and other states [Page 135] friendly to Egypt, and his use of terrorism inside Egypt have now convinced Sadat that Qadhafi is not a “harmless clown” but a dangerous “lunatic” and that he must be eliminated. The most striking public indicators of this change in Sadat’s attitude are the massing of some 10,000 troops on Libya’s border and an unrestrained anti-Qadhafi (but not anti-Libyan) media campaign. An examination of Egyptian options leads us to believe that some direct GOE action may take place when a propitious moment presents itself. The most effective option would be to engineer Qadhafi’s assassination or an RCC coup since, in GOE view, Qadhafi enjoys little military or popular support. If GOE’s intelligence assets inside Libya do not make this possible, we think direct military action would be considered, in response to next Qadhafi outrage, real or manufactured. This would be an agonizing decision for Sadat and he would have to be assured that Soviets would not react militarily and that he had full backing of his officer corps. If he decided to move militarily, we think he would do so massively in order to avoid getting entrapped in a prolonged conflict a la Yemen or Lebanon. Other possible options probably being considered that could be employed alone or in conjunction with direct military attack or subversion probably include setting up of Libyan Government-in-exile and an even more strident propaganda campaign. Saudi support for direct action has been or would be sought before Sadat decides on a course of action. He might also wish US assurance that it would act to counter possible Soviet reaction. On other hand, Sadat probably believes elimination of Qadhafi would be widely approved both in West and among most states in region. End Summary.
1. Progressive deterioration of GOE-Libyan relations since about January 1976 has reached point where GOE policy makers may be contemplating action to overthrow Qadhafi. In this cable, we examine reasons for this change in GOE’s heretofore relatively tolerant policy toward Qadhafi; review Egyptian capabilities and options; and attempt to assess GOE intentions.
2. Change in GOE thinking, since the October War, Sadat has written off Qadhafi as irrevocably hostile to any constructive approach to ME peace settlement. When assassination squads targeted on GOE notables were first dispatched from Tripoli last summer, GOE concluded Qadhafi had also become an irrevocable and potentially dangerous enemy of the Sadat regime. Nevertheless, until early 1976, we do not believe there was any GOE plan to oust him. If there was, it proceeded at a leisurely pace. The reasons for this relatively relaxed GOE attitude were, we believe, as follows:
A. Qadhafi was not perceived as a potent threat either to Egypt’s foreign policy or domestic security. He was a “clown.”
[Page 136]B. Sadat valued his reputation as a non-interferer in Arab domestic affairs, a reputation he has painstakingly fostered and which he believes made the October War Arab alliance possible. Nasser’s interventionist tactics, now proudly inherited by Qadhafi, are, Sadat believed, strategically counterproductive.
C. Egyptian intelligence until recently (Tripoli 992) assessed Qadhafi’s situation internally and externally as bad, but believed civilian opposition powerless and military dissidents closely and effectively surveilled. Probability of a genuine internal coup was consequently remote.
3. In last few months, however, we have been told at high levels that Qadhafi must go, and that GOE “will get him.” There are supporting indications that Egyptian planning to speed his ouster are being accelerated. Several reasons for this change in GOE thinking can be adduced:
A. Bolder Libyan Subversion. While August 8 bomb attack in Cairo was only latest in series of Libyan terrorist actions and assassination plots, fact that it took place in central Cairo and was clearly directed at Egyptians rather than Libyan exiles have caused outpouring of public and official indignation (Sadat expressed his personal anger in no uncertain terms to Ambassador August 10). Suddenly, GOE is faced with apparently bolder Libyan terrorism of a kind which is notoriously difficult to prevent. LARG is now seen to be concrete threat to Egyptian national security. The “clown” is now seen as a dangerous “lunatic.”
B. Subversion in Sudan. GOE officials, including Sadat, are convinced that Libya alone is not capable of having mounted such a well-organized and logistically complicated coup attempt. They strongly suspect Soviet involvement, at minimum in the planning, and Sadat said as much in Egypt’s August 11 message to Arab League members (Cairo 10844). Furthermore, in Egyptian eyes, coup attempt was directed as much at Egypt as Sudan, given Numayri’s strong support for Sadat and strategic importance of Sudan to Egypt. Speed with which GOE has concluded joint defense agreement with Sudan, and inclusion of Saudi Arabia in the informal tripartite entente, reflect seriousness of GOE concern. Egyptians have stressed to Saudis threat that Soviet-Qadhafi collusion pose for stability of region, including Egypt.
C. Subversion in North Africa. Qadhafi’s use of arms to support Polisario (through Algeria) against Morocco and recent Libyan threats against Tunisia, both of which are close to Sadat, has angered him and impress upon GOE the clear and present nature of the Qadhafi threat.
D. Soviet Role in Libya. Soviet presence and arms build-up have long troubled GOE and Sadat has said publicly that rumored $12 billion worth of Soviet arms for Libya far beyond its needs. MinWar Ga[Page 137]masy has stated privately that the one condition that would prompt Egypt to move militarily against Libya would be establishment of Soviet base there (Cairo 6411). Continuing arms deliveries, belief that Soviets were involved in Sudan coup attempt, and, most importantly, Sadat’s conviction that Soviets’ ultimate objective is to oust him have given greater immediacy to GOE concern as evidenced by Egyptian military concentrations on the western border over past six weeks.
E. The time is right—the GOE has for some time been in touch with RCC members inside and outside of Libya. Two of them, Muhayshi and Al-Huni, have, in fact, been given asylum in Cairo. Utilizing their assets in Libya, mainly the large number of Egyptian nationals employed there, GOE has tried to keep close tabs on Qadhafi’s popularity. It has sought, through its propaganda machine and broadcasts by former RCC member Muhayshi, further to discredit Qadhafi. Rightly or wrongly, it is persuaded that Qadhafi’s position has been seriously eroded and that most of his significant RCC colleagues (except Jallud) oppose him. If something is to be done about Qadhafi, the GOE may well have concluded that this is the time to do so.
4. GOE has detailed evidence of Libyan hand in Sudan affair and Cairo bomb attack and has exploited these incidents to stir up public indignation to new pitch. Editorial writers, acting under high-level guidance, have for first time said that Egyptian patience is exhausted and Qadhafi must go. Only note of restraint in press campaign is that Egypt will not resort to Qadhafi’s methods in order to spare Libyan people (Cairo 10651). All writers have made clear distinction between “lunatic ruler” and Libyan people. Anti-Qadhafi campaign has reached stage where public now expects some counter action, and majority of Egyptians almost certainly feel it justified and even necessary in Egypt’s own interest. In fact, if GOE fails to take some action to curtail Qadhafi, it risks a lessening of confidence and respect among its own people, as well as others in Arab world (an Arab “paper tiger”).
5. Egyptian Capabilities.
A. Military. Senior Egyptian officials scoff at indigenous Libyan military capabilities, but are aware of Soviet, Yugoslav, Bulgarian and Pakistani advisors. Egypt has recently established a western area command at Mursa Matruh. Forces under this command are 2–3 brigades of armor and mechanized forces, some commando forces, air defense forces including SAM–2, SAM–3, and SAM–6 air defense units, two squadrons of MIG–21s, MI–8 helo detachment and an engineer group. The total force now located in the Egyptian western desert is probably in excess of 10,000 troops. This force is much stronger than required to defend against any type of military action from Libya. It is clearly strong enough to make a demonstration in force or execute a limited type of attack into Libya. However, with reinforcement from the armor [Page 138] divisions of additional tanks and APCs and the necessary logistical train, we estimate the force could cross the desert to Tripoli in five days, provided Libya obtains no significant outside support and Egyptians don’t stop to engage in major battles. The most serious opposition would probably be from the air force attacking the Egyptian columns; and near Tripoli it might be expected that the Libyans would establish a series of defensive positions. Presumably the Egyptians, should they elect to attack Tripoli, would start the attack with a major air strike thereby knocking out much of the Libyan Air Force. Under optimum conditions, we believe a military victory could be achieved in about seven days by a determined armor attack to the west supported by airborne commando and/or amphibious forces landing in Tripoli area.
B. Subversive. Egyptian civilian security officials claim to have few assets inside Libya to use against Qadhafi personally, given tight security and loyal troops with which he surrounds himself. However, GOE military intelligence must have extensive information on Libyan officers, many of whom they trained, and presumably maintained contact with some of them. Nature of GOE contact with Libyan military is not known by us, but if it is sufficient to mount an assassination attempt or an internal military coup against Qadhafi, this would appear to be most attractive option with least risk. While there are still an estimated 250,000 Egyptians in Libya, they are mainly workers and at best can be used for some intelligence gathering. Egypt has the capability to mount commando-type raids on Libyan installations or to engage in bomb attacks, but since these would not get at Qadhafi personally—and would risk strengthening him with Libyan people—they are unlikely to be effective. Furthermore, any such subversive actions would require a reversal of a major tenet of Sadat’s Arab policy, which has been based on achievement of Arab unity against Israel through persuasion and non-interference in other’s internal affairs.
C. Political. Libyan exiles in Egypt, notably former RCC members Umar Muhayshi and Abdul Munim al-Huni, provide potential leaders for an anti-Qadhafi political movement around which a government-in-exile could be created to operate either from Egypt or put into place quickly in Libya. GOE is convinced there are many anti-Qadhafi military and civilian elements in Libya that would rally around such an anti-Qadhafi movement if it had a chance of success. GOE could also step up full scale anti-Qadhafi propaganda campaign in the media and open one in international organizations. However, such Egyptian campaigns (e.g., Lebanon) have been markedly unsuccessful by themselves. We would, however, expect such a campaign to precede more substantial actions that may be contemplated. We could already be witnessing the beginning of this campaign.
[Page 139]6. Options.
A. Military. Even with current forces in the western desert, Egypt has a valid military option. Barring outside intervention, it could, with reinforcements, successfully mount a full scale attack as far as Tripoli under favorable conditions. Favorable conditions would include minimal Libyan Army resistance, which might result if Libyans convinced sole purpose of invasion would be to replace Qadhafi with a new Libyan Government. However, unless Qadhafi supplies GOE with plausible justification for massive military action (which Egyptians might try to provoke), it is difficult to envisage Egypt undertaking overt aggression. A factor favoring the military option is that the military forces of likely Qadhafi supporters are fully engaged elsewhere (Algeria with Morocco, Syria with Iraq in Lebanon and with each other). Libya, it would appear, could count on little concrete military support from radical Arabs who perceive that their own regimes would be endangered by Qadhafi’s disappearance. There are at least two major factors which argue against the strictly military option: reaction of the USSR and attitude of Egyptian military.
(1) USSR. With its dwindling assets in the Arab world, Soviets have attempted to exploit relationship with Qadhafi for their own designs and we assume they would do everything feasible to assist Qadhafi in international forums and with propaganda. Egyptians, however, seem to believe Soviets would not react militarily. The presence of approximately 500 Soviet military technicians in Libya who could be caught up in fighting is something GOE must consider. At minimum, we would expect GOE to feel out US about our reaction before taking direct military action that risks a Soviet military reaction.
(2) Attitude of Egyptian Military. Given the suspected degradation of Egypt’s military preparedness and unanimous belief that Egypt’s principal enemy is Israel, Sadat would want to be very certain that any military action had full backing of his officer corps. We have already received one report of a few officers grumbling over being stationed on western as opposed to eastern front. Current anti-Qadhafi press campaign could well be aimed at convincing military (as well as public) that adequate justification already exists. The stridency of GOE reaction to future Qadhafi actions should be an important indicator of GOE intentions. Until very recently, GOE has maintained that its troop concentrations in the west are strictly for defensive purposes in response to confirmed Libyan build up near border. However, lead story in Cairo’s major daily August 13, reporting reinforcement of Egyptian forces on the western and northwestern border, goes further. Troops are there “to protect Egypt’s border and prevent saboteurs from infiltrating,” but military spokesman warned Egypt will prepare for whatever measures necessary to protect Egypt and its people, and “also protect Libya and [Page 140] Libyan people.” Qadhafi was alleged to be recruiting and training saboteurs in number of bases near the border. “Experts from a big power” (read Soviets) have been planning these operations and providing arms. Number of Libyan leaders allegedly “reject” Qadhafi policy. This is first public hint that Egyptian forces have a responsibility to protect Libyans from Qadhafi (and by implication from Soviets). Sadat interview with Kuwaiti Al-Siyasa published August 14 quotes him as saying “Qadhafi will not escape from my hand.” (Septel)
B. Limited Military Action. In reaction to a Libyan border incursion, real or manufactured, GOE could undertake limited military action by seizing a part of eastern Libya. This would enable it to test the reaction of the Libyan Army and people, the USSR, and its own forces. If, as GOE would hope, it led to weakening of Qadhafi through army desertions or popular demonstrations, and USSR could somehow be checked, then stage would be set for examination of further options. This option entails limited military risk, but danger of long drawn out involvement without decisive result during which radical Arab and international opinion would be brought to bear on Egypt. Given result of Syria’s partial intervention in Lebanon, it unlikely to be attractive to GOE.
Another possibility is an airborne raid on Tripoli of brigade size designed to destroy Qadhafi and his government and avoiding possible large scale battle on the border. This would, however, probably require neutralization of air defenses along the route and assumes relatively light opposition in Tripoli.
C. Political Option. GOE could set up government-in-exile headed by Muhayshi and Al-Huni and launch full scale propaganda campaign, combined with flow of Saudi funds to potential dissidents inside Libya, to encourage Libyan Army to move. There is reason to believe that formation of government-in-exile was contemplated by Egypt last May but was rejected (Cairo 7652), probably because it was thought premature and would alert Qadhafi to take draconian action against potential dissidents. Now, however, GOE may believe time is ripe for government-in-exile. This option would entail least risk of all, but alone we think it unlikely to be effective against a regime such as Qadhafi’s and GOE has probably come to same conclusion.
D. Combined Military-Political Option. GOE could seize a portion of Libyan territory in reaction to next Qadhafi outrage and remain in territory long enough to test reaction inside Libya. At same time it could move government-in-exile to Libyan territory and set it up as rallying point for anti-Qadhafi forces. While such a move contains greater risk of failure and accusations from numerous quarters of direct interference in Libya’s internal affairs, it has the attraction of encouraging a Libyan movement with military force to demonstrate its seriousness. [Page 141] Unless it succeeds in toppling Qadhafi in first few days, however, it carries same danger of long involvement without decisive results.
E. Subversion. Since GOE’s target is Qadhafi and not Libyan people, nor even the army or security forces, subversive activities such as bombings and harassment could risk strengthening Qadhafi more than weakening him. Furthermore, they would undercut GOE line that clearly separates Libyan people from their “lunatic” ruler. While extent of GOE assets inside Libyan military are questionable, encouragement of assassination or military coup by RCC members would, if sufficient GOE capability exists, certainly be most painless ways to oust Qadhafi. If GOE has such a capability, the question is why hasn’t it made use of it earlier. A coup attempt, coupled with Egyptian military action to give courage and protection to perpetrators, would be an attractive option.
7. GOE Intentions. GOE has [for] some time been preparing contingency plans for actions against Libya, but until recently there were few indications that a decision to take direct action was near. Now some of those indications are present, notably the press campaign violently attacking Qadhafi and implicating Soviets and the angry reacton of Sadat and senior security officials to the August 8 bombings, we believe some GOE move is likely. Although GOE has publicly ignored Qadhafi’s threat to sever diplomatic relations on September 1, [it] is sending its new Ambassador to Tripoli in the next few days, and People’s Assembly Speaker Sayid Mar’i received new head of Libyan Relations Office Ambassador Aboul Qadir Ghoka August 12. All of these moves could be a ruse to reassure Qadhafi of continuing Egyptian passivity.
8. In all options outlined above, we think a key to Egyptian thinking must logically be the removal of Qadhafi either by arrest or assassination, preferably by a Libyan with revolutionary credentials. If this were to materialize, GOE thinks LARG would crumble. However, GOE capacity to mount either assassination or military coup is believed to be limited, and, even if it were to happen, it would probably have to be accompanied by Egyptian military-political action. Ideally, Egyptian armed forces would be invited to move in not just by Muhayshi and Al-Huni, but also by dissident RCC members and army officers now in place in Libya. Alternatively, Egyptians could move quickly to set up Al-Huni-Muhayshi “government” on Libyan territory from which they could appeal for massive Egyptian intervention. If Qadhafi was quickly disposed of, or is outside of Libya, GOE believes that it would face little opposition and a march to Tripoli would be unnecessary. If, however, coup failed, an all out military campaign as far as Tripoli would be required. In any case, we believe that if GOE decides on direct military action (and this is still a big if), it will do so on a massive scale with intention of finishing Qadhafi off within shortest possible time and enabling troops to withdraw quickly to eastern front. Libya will not be[Page 142]come Sadat’s Yemen or Lebanon. A major consideration for any serious anti-Libyan action will be the support of Saudi Arabia. While we know Qadhafi threat has been discussed at highest levels of two governments, we are not privy to their content.
9. Ideal timing for Egyptian move would be when Qadhafi is abroad since, in GOE view, there would then be little opposition to his removal. However, to best of our knowledge Qadhafi not attending NAC in Colombo and he rarely leaves Libya these days.
10. Other options open to GOE are considerably less attractive, because they are unlikely to succeed in the sole objective of Egyptian strategy which is to eliminate Qadhafi. Formation of a government-in-exile and propaganda campaigns are unlikely alone or together to be effective and limited military action risks international opprobrium and a drawn out involvement on, for the Egyptian military, the wrong front.
11. Implications for US. As in past, Sadat is likely to make his decision on the basis of Egypt’s strategic interests. The attraction of a friendly government in Libya and the elimination of Soviet presence there (given Sadat’s perception that it is a threat to him), as well as access to Libyan oil wealth, are powerful incentives pushing Sadat toward decisive action. If these goals could be achieved, it would be very much in US interests as well as those of Western Europe. Sadat surely knows this and probably hopes he can count on US to counteract Soviet moves.
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Summary: Eilts reported on Sadat’s growing concerns about Qadhafi, and the political and military options available to remove the Libyan leader from power.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country File for the Middle East and South Asia, Box 9, Egypt, State Department Telegrams, To SecState—Nodis (48), 8/14/76–8/28/76 (7). Secret; Priority; Nodis; Eyes Only.
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