Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972

80. Telegram 7805 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State¹ ²

Rawalpindi, October 5, 1970, 1110Z

Subj:

• Arms for Pakistan

Ref:

• Rawalpindi 7789

1. During my meeting with him October 5 on his plans to attend UN commemorative session (septel), President Yahya Khan said he had been briefed on my discussions on arms issue with GOP reps in last several days. He said particularly he had been given report by FonSec of my discussion with latter October 4 (reftel). Yahya said he was pleased that our military reps could now get down to specific discussions.

2. He then immediately recalled concern he had expressed to Ambassador Farland last June and again in September over problem Pakistan faces in paying for any items it wishes purchase. He said again that USG knows better than he how difficult Pakistan’s financial situation is. Yahya said he hoped most sincerely that USG would find ways to make proposed sales feasible even within cash-payment framework. He agreed that financing problem would be largely affected by Pakistan’s choice of alternatives, e.g., for used as against new equipment. He remarked that US had large “surplus” stocks and that we should be able provide substantial concessions on prices therefor. He expressed hope that our negotiators will also be given authority to come up with concessions on timing of payments.

3. Yahya said he and his government would face very difficult situation if it turns out that Pakistan is unable to pay for US equipment which it requires and desires and which USG has offered to sell. He affirmed GOP’s interest in maintaining secrecy on our sales offer, adding that it was particularly important at least until it was clear whether actual sales would be worked out.

4. I assured Yahya that Ambassador had reported Yahya’s concern over financial problem, and that USG was indeed aware of this problem. I said I would again report Yahya’s concern. Discussion this subject concluded as we agreed our military reps should get on promptly with their discussions.

Sober

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK. Secret; Priority; Exdis.
2. Pakistani President Yahya indicated that Pakistan would have difficulty financing the military sales being authorized and asked for alternative purchase plans.