Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972

79. Telegram 7754 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State¹ ²

Rawalpindi, October 1, 1970, 1005Z

Subj:

• Military Supply-GOP Informed

Ref:

• State 160440

1. I called at 1000 hours local time October 1 on additional Foreign Secretary M.A. Alvie and Defense Secretary Ghias Uddin Ahmed to convey message reftel. I had decided seek meeting with Alvie (senior MFA officer present) upon learning that Foreign Secretary Sultan Khan would not be back in town for couple more days. In accordance my provisional understanding with Sultan before he left for Nepal: I had informed Alvie that matter to be discussed was also of interest to DefSec. Alvie thereupon asked me meet him at DefsSc’s office. Meeting was shifted to DefSec’s home as result closing GOP offices October 1 out of respect for Nasser.

2. I apologized for asking for meeting when GOP offices closed down. Said I knew they had been waiting for word to proceed on our military supply decision. We had notified GOI last night (local time here) and wished to insure that first word reached GOP from us directly and officially.

3. I said Executive Branch had informed Congress on Sept. 29 of President Nixon’s decision to offer sell certain items of military equipment on cash basis to Pakistan, as one-time exception to present policy. This was first practicable opportunity to inform Congress this subject in view of numerous difficult problems involving the Congress of which GOP was aware. We had been deeply appreciative of importance GOP attached to getting on with implementation of President Nixon’s decision as conveyed by Ambassador Farland to President Yahya on June 20.

4. Yesterday, I said, we had informed the GOI on President’s decision in general terms, as Ambassador Farland had told Yahya we would.

5. On return from his present trip to Europe, I said President Nixon intends convey sales offer formally by letter to Yahya. Letter will be presented by Ambassador Farland on his return to Pakistan in latter part of October. Meanwhile, I said, in the interest of moving ahead expeditiously with planning, we were prepared to begin confidential discussion with appropriate persons in GOP. Discussion would concern details of sales offer such as type and quantities of materiel and alternatives available (e.g. type of fighter aircraft and maritime patrol sources of APCs), specifications, cost estimates and terms of sales. US Defense rep will have primary responsibility on US side under my guidance (and Ambassador’s guidance after his return) for working out procurement arrangements with Pak counterparts. I said we desired strongly to avoid publicity of any kind on this subject. We urged GOP to maintain confidence in interest of military security as well as for political reasons. I added that, if leaks should nevertheless occur, we would wish consult immediately with GOP regarding press handling.

6. After quietly absorbing above and expressing immediate pleasure, Alvie and DefSec said they would not be surprised if the info were leaked by GOI, to be followed by strong Indian press reaction. Both agreed that GOP understood our interest in keeping matter secret and did not anticipate any serious problem with Pakistani press. If there should be Indian press leak, GOP would keep silent, neither confirm nor deny, and consult with us. I said we had also urged on GOI the need to withhold publicity and our desire to consult with it on handling if matter should become public knowledge.

7. DefSec asked what we had told Indians about nature of our decision. I said GOI had been told that equipment being offered to Pakistan consists of a few aircraft, largely replacements for previously supplied US aircraft and some armored transport vehicles. DefSec said he had no problem with that message to GOI.

8. DefSec said GOP had financial problems and would need some accommodation regarding qte terms of sales unqte. He asked whether these sales would fall under limited credit facilities which Pakistan has enjoyed for certain types of (non-lethal) equipment. I replied that our present offer of sale, as Ambassador had told Yahya last June, was on cash basis. DefSec wondered whether terms would be similar to those now available for “cash” purchases of lethal spares. I replied that would have to be determined in course discussions between our military reps on details of sales offer.

9. Defsec asked whether Conte-Long provisions would apply to current sales offer. I said it was my understanding that future of Conte-Long was uncertain. I understood provision had been eliminated from version of appropriations bill passed by one house but that action still required by second house. Said I could not predict what final action would be, but appreciated Pak concern and we would be consulting with them as situation clarified.

10. In interest of rapid action DefSec said he would be talking in next couple days with Army Chief Hamid, Air CINC Rahim and Navy CINC Muzaffar Hasan about our offer. He will ask them to nominate representatives who, together with major general Inamul Haq (MinDef Director General of Defense Procurement), will form Pak team for discussion with US Def rep. He asked that latter call him early next week to arrange first meeting with Pak military reps.

11. As meeting closed, both Alvie and DefSec reiteriated pleasure that we had now found it possible move forward on President’s decision conveyed to GOP last June. I said I shared their hope that we could make rapid progress in working out details. (In latter connection we would appreciate early receipt of separate messages concerning various items in package as referred to in para. 2D reftel).

Sober

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK. Secret; Priority; Exdis. The reference to Conte–Long provisions in the telegram is a reference to the Conte–Long amendment to the Foreign Assistance and Related Appropriations Act of 1968. The amendment, adopted as section 119 of the appropriations act on January 2, 1968, directed the President to withhold economic assistance in an amount equivalent to the amount spent by any underdeveloped country other than Greece, Turkey, Iran, Israel, the Republic of China, the Philippines, and Korea for the purchase of sophisticated weapons systems. (PL–90–249; 81 Stat. 936)
2. Deputy Chief of Mission Sidney Sober reported on his meeting with Foreign Secretary Alvie and Defense Secretary Ahmed to discuss the U.S. offer to sell military equipment to Pakistan.