Office of the Historian

72. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1 2

Washington, March 18, 1971

SUBJECT:

  • F–5 Aircraft for Libya

One of the issues that has been hanging around for a long time may come to a point of decision in the next month. I believe the decision is self-evident, but I do want to acquaint you with the issue.

Prior to the Nixon Administration and prior to the Libyan coup, the US had entered into a contract selling a small number of F–5 aircraft to Libya. Ten were delivered long ago and eight remain to be delivered under the contract. Delivery of the final eight has been withheld because of the political situation in Libya and the present government’s position toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. Also, the rationale for our involving ourselves with the Libyan air force—our retention of Wheelus airbase ended with our departure from Wheelus.

I personally cannot conceive how we could defend sending any combat aircraft to Libya under the present circumstances. Therefore, I see it as a foregone conclusion that we will not go through with this contract.

Ambassador Palmer, however, will be back here on consultation next month, attempting to persuade Secretary Rogers to go ahead with the sale. His rationale is that we need to maintain some line to this Libyan government.

My answer to that is that this Libyan government is not going to like us no matter what we do.

I assume you agree.

[Page 2]

Attachment

Note From Richard Kennedy of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, March 19, 1971

HAK:
I sympathize with Hal’s view but (1) the F–5’s can’t do any significant harm in the Arab-Israeli contest, (2) if we don’t sell them the French or the Russians will and (3) there may be a way we could use them to loosen up the aid talks (and here we have a real economic interest).

Obviously there would be domestic criticism unless a good aid settlement emerges.

RTK
  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 739, Country Files, Africa, Libya, Vol. II. Secret. Sent for action. Although Richard Kennedy registered his dissent in an attached memorandum, Kissinger initialed his agreement on March 30.↩
  2. Saunders recommended against the sale of F–5s to Libya, arguing that the Libyan Government would be unfriendly no matter what Washington did.↩