Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–5, Part 2, Documents on North Africa, 1969–1972

71. Telegram 373 From the Embassy in Libya to the Department of State¹ ²

Tripoli, February 24, 1971, 1147Z

Subj:

• Tour d’Horizon With Qadhafi: F–5’s

1. I had hour and three-quarter session with Qadhafi February 23 at Aziziyah barracks. Kikhya and Marthinsen only others present. Qadhafi turned up in casual sport attire and was relaxed and cordial throughout meeting. Following are highlights: memcon being pouched.

2. After I made presentation based on points included State 4025 (excluding paras 3 and 4, which intervening events have muted somewhat), Qadhafi responded at some length.

3. He said there are no real issues outstanding between USG and LARG except Arab-Israel dispute. Personalities change but policies of states continue and US policy continues to be one of total commitment to Israelis. Continuation of this policy will harm US interests, including relations with Arab countries. Referring to my remarks about US disappointment that relations did not improve as result Wheelus evacuation, etc., Qadhafi said young inexperienced army officers who succeeded to power after revolution were optimistic when USAF evacuated base that good bilateral relationshiip would develop. But US has not recognized that LAR part of Arab nation and cannot isolate itself, as monarchy tried to do, from reality of unity of Arabs. No arab government can do so he asserted, and US must recognize this fact. In this context, it is contradiction for US to aspire to good relations with Arabs, because US relationship with Israel, enemy of the Arab nation, precludes this. He asked what is reason for this special US relationship with Israel: He could see no historical, geographical, religious or other rational basis for it. Thus, he must conclude, USG doesn’t like Arabs: “Why does US hate Arabs?” he asked. He said that he learned in Cairo and elsewhere that other Arab leaders agree that sole problem they have with USG is American commitment to Israel. “We fear US will lose us because of this commitment.

4. Qadhafi talked about role of USSR and communism in area. “We are against communism but with Russian” he said, “because the USSR helps the Arabs.” He went on to add “we both, as Muslims and Christians—people of the book: Abhor atheistic communism. But on political grounds Arab must be friends to the USSR which befriends them and cannot be with a (Christian) West which befriends Israel.

5. Qadhafi also raised two specific matters of concern to him. He indicated that he has several intelligence reports that CIA is plotting against revolutionary regime. He then went on to say that for a while after evacuation LARG had ordered its “official” newspaper Al-Thawra and Libyan radio to cease attacks on USG. However this ban had been lifted in view us pro-Israeli policy. Moreover, unwarranted attacks and criticism of LARG and LARG personalities, including Qadhafi himself, appear in US media. He cited recent Time magazine article, several repots in New York Times—“we seek our rights” re oil, Qadhafi commented, “we are not irresponsible”—and article in National Review. These indicate American writers motivated by hatred and blindness vis-a-vis LARG.

6. Aims of LARG policy have been clear since September revolution, Qadhafi said. These are (a) true non-alignment, including obtaining arms from East and West, refusing Soviet presence despite acquisition Soviet arms, and denying naval visits requested by USSR just as US requests for visits would be denied, (b) enmity towards our enemy, (c) friendship towards our friends, and (d) elimination and probibition of foreign bases. “We thought USG would encourage this policy,” he said, “we are non-aligned, we seek our rights, we are friends to our friends: there is no reason for US to resent us.”

7. I responded covering the same points Qadhafi had addressed. Our talk I said was proof that the basic problem between us is the Arab-Israeli dispute. I welcomed the chance to discuss it and hoped for more frank exchanges with him and other LARG officials on this subject. Every nation decides its policy in the light of its national interests and US policy is to do all in its power to seek just, honorable, and peaceful settlement in ME dispute since peace in area is in our interests. USG understands widespread desire for Arab unity, sees parallels with American historical experience and sympathizes with goal of union based on desires of peoples.

8. US admires LARG’s policy of non-alignment which, noted, has been reflected both in words and deeds. There, is no hatred or resentment towards Arabs in general, towards any other Arab regime, or towards the LARG. The US has millions of citizens of Arab origin; it wants only friendship of all peoples in the area. Regarding Libya, I said, the USG recognized that there were weaknesses in the pre-revolutionary society and understands the LARG’s desires for economic development and a better life. I reminded Qadhafi that our offers to help achieve these desires remain open. Though he did not respond specifically to my suggestion that US could help now in certain development fields, Qadhafi, unlike Jallud, did not reject the concept out of hand. On contrary, he evinced keen interest when I described success Tunis had achieved through use improved wheat seeds developed by US. Qadhafi, like Jallud, in final analysis, has strong pragmatic streak.

9. Returning to question of US role in the ME dispute, I pointed out that while our policy has been consistent, important differences in approach have emerged recently. I cited President Nixon’s statement that US is neither pro-Arab nor pro-Israel, but rather is pro-peace, and stressed that goal of US policy is achievement of just, permanent peace. iI emphasized that present administration is moving actively in quest for peace. GUAR has given USG a chance to prove it means what it says. I suggested LARG should give us same chance.

10. Responding to Qadhafi’s specific complaints, I denied categorically that CIA plotting against regime. I cited false documents, such as infamous forged message re Rabat Summit, which ex-Fon Min Bwaysir knew about, as example of how those unfriendly to US attempt to discredit us with other nations. I went on to remind Qadhafi that there is no official newspaper in US and that American press is completely free. Thus, press may be ill-informed or may print irresponsible items such as National Review article which I pointed out speaks to and for only a small segment of US population.

11. Qadhafi took up the “plot” issue again briefly and volunterred view that any coup in LAR would likely mean takeover by extreme rightists. After population’s exposure to “republican regime” people would react and rightists would be thrown out by “more extreme leftist” counter coup, and so forth, a process, he said, from which no one would benefit. I said that we agreed wholeheartedly and that he could be sure we would not become so involved.

12. Qadhafi turned to question arms supplies to parties. He asked if USG would sell Phantoms to any Arab country. Observing that his question very hypothetical, I said USG would consider such a request in the context of the balance of power in the area. US is concerned, I said, to maintain the balance in order to foster a peaceful settlement. Qadhafi objected that US arms supplies to Israel since 1967 have permitted the Israelis to retain territories seized through aggression. I replied that US arms shipments to Israel, made reluctantly and in a limited manner, were necessary to safeguard the balance of power which threatened by massive Soviet arms supply, avoid further fighting, and permit the achievement of a peaceful solution to the problem. But, Qadhafi argued, the Arabs have a right to expel the aggressor and to liberate their occupied territories. I responded that US seeks same goal of restoring Arab territory; we seek this objective in context of peace.

13. Qadhafi asked about procuring sidewinders for F–5’s and field artillery for LARA. I told him that Congress has prohibited sales of Sidewinders to African states because missiles are very costly and we wish to avoid sophisticated arms race in continent which desparately needs resources for economic development. Qadhafi took this philosophically and acknowledged wisdom of such restraints. Re purchase of 170 mm guns, I said prospects are not bright because of FMS limitations and fact such equipment not available commercially. Qadhafi somewhat scornfully observed that the US always says “no” to such arms requests while the USSR is ready to respond affirmatively; same problem faced Nasser and as result he was “pushed” to cooperate with USSR. “We may be pushed” same way,” he said. “We need field artillery—either the US 170 mm’s or the Russian 130 mm’s.” If necessary LAR will purchase guns from Russians. Qadhafi did not answer when I asked him how many 170 mm guns the LARG requires, but when I remarked on the differences between the approaches of the US and the USSR to such questions, he smiled and acknowledged “that’s a problem of a democracy.” I asked him whether he thought Soviet readiness to provide arms was primarily because of their concern for Arab interests or to further their own wider interests. He shrugged and said Soviets might be motivated by “friendship” or “perhaps by desire to annoy United States.”

14. It would appear that Kikhya contrary to my earlier impression (Tripoli 185) had not gotten the message about the relationship of my talk with Qadhafi to the F–5 decision, since at the end of our meeting he had not raised the subject. In an effort draw him out, I remarked that no decision has as yet been made by the USG and asked if LARG is still interested in the planes. Qadhafi appeared surprised that there was any doubt in my mind and quickly responded “yes” and asked if there were any news. I said that I would undertake to get a firm response soon.

15. Our comments and recommendations will follow in septels.

Palmer

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 LIBYA. Secret; Priority; Exdis. It was repeated to Benghazi. In the referenced telegram 4025 to Tripoli, January 9, the Department had advised that the “consensus is that fulfillment [of the F–5] contract difficult justify in terms current Libyan posture toward Middle East peace initiative, their present attitude toward US and US interests in Libya, and generally poor prospects for any marked improvement.” Paragraph 3 dealt with expulsions of American citizens from Libya and paragraph 4 with the petroleum negotiations. (Ibid., DEF 12–5 LIBYA) In telegram 185 from Tripoli, January 26, Palmer discussed the F–5s with MUFA Undersecretary Kikhya. (Ibid.) In a subsequent comment, telegram 381 from Tripoli, February 24, Palmer wrote that there was “nothing new” in Qadhafi’s emphasis on the U.S.-Israeli relationship, but that he was struck by the Libyan leader’s commitment to non-alignment, his pragmatism, and the cordiality of his reception. (Ibid.)
2. Prime Minister Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi assured the Ambassador that there were no outstanding issues between Libya and the United States apart from the Arab-Israel dispute.