Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–5, Part 2, Documents on North Africa, 1969–1972

67. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to the Deputy Director for Plans of the Central Intelligence Agency (Karamessines)¹ ²

Washington, August 20, 1970

Dear Tom:

Because of the amount of detail involved, just for your background [text not declassified] I am sending to you the attached draft of a memorandum addressed from me to you on Libyan Option 1(a), which was the basis of discussion of this matter by Ambassador Palmer and myself last Tuesday.

Sincerely,

U. Alexis Johnson

Tab A

Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to the Deputy Director for Plans of the Central Intelligence Agency (Karamessines)

Washington, undated

SUBJECT:

• Libya—[text not declassified] Option 1(a)

We have given considerable thought within the Department to Option 1(a) and come to the following conclusions.

General Considerations

1. The regime is solidly in power.

2. Its intense suspicion of all foreigners and its massive surveillance of foreign missions greatly restrict foreign maneuverability.

3. Any actions which heighten its suspicion of foreign interests can only increase the danger to those interests.

4. The activism and impetuosity of the regime will be blunted only through a doing and learning process. In the absence of these factors, outsiders have little if any capability to guide, cajole, force or trap the regime into different courses.

5. Although the regime has taken a number of steps against our interests, it would be a mistake to interpret all such steps as anti-American. If Swiss companies were producing 88% of Libya’s oil, the LARG would undoubtedly still be doing just what it is now to obtain a greater return from and more control over the industry.

6. We have had some influence over the LARG through traditional diplomacy: (a) the phase-out of Wheelus has lowered LARG suspicions; (b) the rate of expulsions has greatly diminished; (c) anti-US propaganda has lessened somewhat; (d) the LARG has resisted temptations so far to accuse us of being involved in plotting; (e) we undoubtedly have more frank and useful dialogue with LARG than any other Western power, with the exception of the French.

7. The bulk of our economic interests in Libya are still intact.

8. The LARG wants continued access to our science and technology. It has welcomed several initiatives we have taken in this field and has made some itself. It has recently decided to send almost all of its overseas students to the United States.

9. We are still in business with the only radical Arab State with which we have diplomatic relations.

Against this background, I have the following specific comments on Option 1(a):

A. [text not declassified]

1. [text not declassified]

2. [text not declassified]

3. [text not declassified]

B. [text not declassified]

1. [text not declassified]

2. [text not declassified]

C. [text not declassified]

1. [text not declassified]

[1 page not declassified]

4. [text not declassified]

5. [text not declassified]

6. [text not declassified]

7. [text not declassified]

8. [text not declassified]

We would welcome your reactions to the foregoing considerations and your views on further actions that might be undertaken in this regard.

1. Source: National Security Council Files, Nixon Intelligence Files, Libya. Secret.
2. Johnson sent a memorandum presenting the Department’s views on Option 1A following consultation with Ambassador Joseph Palmer.