Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–5, Part 2, Documents on North Africa, 1969–1972

66. Memorandum for the Record¹ ²

Washington, August 19, 1970

SUBJECT:

• Minutes of the Meeting [text not declassified] 18 August 1970

PRESENT:

• Mr. Kissinger, Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Packard, Mr. Johnson, Admiral Moorer, and Mr. Helms.
• Ambassador Joseph Palmer, Ambassador C. Robert Moore, and Mr. John Anderton were present for Item 1.
• Mr. William Wells was present for Items 2 through 5.
• Mr. Cord Meyer and Mr. Wymberley Coerr were present for the entire meeting.

1. Libya—Result of Ambassador Palmer’s Visit

a. The session on Libya opened with a tour d’horizon on that country by Ambassador Joseph Palmer, who was on a TDY trip to Washington. Among the factors he cited were the following:

(1) The young regime (oldest 28 and youngest 24) seems to be solidly established.

(2) The anti-foreign devil thrust has begun to diminish.

(3) The motivation of any future nationalization of oil is essentially a desire to control their own resources. Envisoned cutbacks of oil production are really for conservation—to spin out the estimated 18-year life of the oil supply. The Libyans are insistent on obtaining the same resource data as the oil companies would have for the United States. The companies in question have not been especially forthcoming.

(4) On the other hand:

(a) There is some lessening of suspicion of Americans.

(b) A negotiated settlement on the posted price of oil remains a possibility.

(c) One of the greatest opportunities of the U.S. is in post-aid technical assistance; the Libyans want and appreciate our technological prowess.See Special Minutes for Additional Items

(d) Most of the Libyan students seeking education outside the Arab world will come to the United States. (Here, the Chairman interposed a serious question: Since 1968, far-left, anti-American forces have concentrated on foreign students—others in the USA tend to ignore them and there is a very good chance that radical activists will emerge from this American exposure who will work against all U.S. interests. The irony was cited of students from lesser developed countries returning from Moscow somewhat disillusioned with Marxism but returning from the USA well fired up to challenge the existing order. The Chairman mentioned Mobutu, who no longer wanted to risk sending Congolese students to the States. Mr. Kissinger said that this question transcended [text not declassified] but attention should be paid.)

(e) The Soviet arms deal (following bickerings with British and French) was a straight cash arms deal without Soviet technical personnel being involved thus far.

b. In regard to Option 1-A, the Ambassador made himself clear:

(1) [text not declassified]

(2) [text not declassified]

(3) [text not declassified], he was in favor of:

(a) encouraging good relations with the regime;

(b) improving ties with Morocco and Tunisia;

(c) [text not declassified]

(d) [text not declassified]

(e) [text not declassified]

(f) [text not declassified]

c. There was a lengthy exchange on [text not declassified]
d. [text not declassified]
e. In summing up, Ambassador Palmer requested a period of time in which to work [text not declassified] Once more it became apparent that procedures are actually subservient to personalities and that, in most instances, individuals will work out their own problems.

[text not declassified]

Attachment

Status Report

July 7, 1970

SUBJECT :

• Status Report on [text not declassified] Action: Libya—June 1970

[text not declassified] directed that Libyan developments be reviewed periodically at approximately three-month intervals. The short term outlook for Libya, the actions taken in support of Option 1-A (see attachment for elaboration of this Option) and the nature of additional [text not declassified] activity which might be taken to influence the Libyan Arab Republic Government (LARG) are outlined below for further [text not declassified] consideration.

I. SHORT TERM OUTLOOK FOR U.S. INTERESTS IN LIBYA

In an up-dating of the December 1969 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 36.5–69, prepared on 6 May 1970, the Office of National Estimates concluded that the earlier assessment which stated that “the main interests of the U.S. are not endangered by the new government in Libya” remained valid but conceded that “there are, however, many potential problem spots in U.S.-Libyan relations.” Ambassador Palmer, reporting in a message to the Department of State on 8 June 1970, concluded: “On balance, we see no hard evidence at this time that the Libyan Government (LARG) intends a precipitate early break in relations, except as it may see its options foreclosed by some development in the Middle East area or our Middle East policy.”

In spite of these cautiously optimistic judgments, the public posture of the Libyan Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) has been increasingly hostile to U.S. interests in Libya; the Egyptian presence in Libya has grown, and the Libyans have taken modest steps to expand their relations with the USSR. While maintaining a rather inflexible position in negotiations with the oil companies on posted prices, the LARG has harassed Occidental Petroleum and Amoseas by decreeing sharp cutbacks in production and blocked exports on liquified natural gas from Esso’s newly completed plant. Steps have been taken toward closer coordination of policies with the UAR and Sudan, and UAR military forces and training facilities in Libya have reportedly been augmented. Partially as a bargaining tactic with the U.S. oil companies, the LARG flirted with the Soviet Union by sending its Minister of Petroleum to Moscow and welcoming a Soviet geological survey team in Libya shortly thereafter.

In none of these areas has there been a significant development that dramatically alters the situation that existed in February 1970 when the [text not declassified] approved Option 1-A. Events in the Middle East during this period have, however, produced a further erosion in the U.S. position. The policies of the Libyan regime vis-à-vis the United States will be significantly influenced by the course of the Middle East crisis surrounding the Arab-Israel war and the Palestine problem. For example, a decision to sell Phantoms to Israel, or a decision not to deliver those F–5’s for which the LARG has contracted, will have an important impact on U.S.-Libya relations.

[Omitted here are specific actions taken in support of Option No. 1-A.]

1. Source: National Security Council Files, Nixon Intelligence Files, Libya. Secret; Eyes Only.
2. This meeting discussed Libya and examined certain aspects of Option 1A.