Office of the Historian

105. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1 2

Washington, June 8, 1970

SUBJECT:

  • Summary of Conversation between Prime Minister Laraki and the President

Since I presume you were the only one on our side present with the President and Prime Minister, I would appreciate it if you could glance over the attached draft telegram as a summary of the conversation.

Recommendation: That you authorize clearance of the attached telegram if it looks accurate.

[Page 2]

Attachment

Draft Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco

Washington, June 5, 1970

SUBJ:

  • Summary of Conversation between Dr. Laraki and President Nixon
1.
The Prime Minister said King Hasson thought the recent appeal from President Nasser was a positive element in the Middle East situation. He does not believe that direct negotiations are possible in the present circumstances. Rather, a settlement would have to be reached through indirect or secret negotiation. Morocco is seriously concerned about the decline of US influence in the Mediterranean and the Near East. If no solution is found to the present conflict the whole area will increasingly drift away from Western influence and the USSR will correspondingly increase its influence. Morocco believes that in view of Israel’s air and technical superiority any additional [Page 3] delivery of arms would aggravate the situation seriously. The US must use its influence to bring Israel to accept the overall solution proposed by the UN Security Council.
2.
The Prime Minister advised President Nixon that if he had any suggestion with respect to working out a solution together he would be glad to convey it to His Majesty. However, if additional arms deliveries are made, then nothing could be worked out.
3.
President Nixon said our position with respect to Israel continues to be one of great restraint. He said the US stood by the principle of Israel’s right to exist and that Israel’s position in relation to its neighbors should not be weakened. The US is concerned about the introduction of Soviet pilots into the UAR.
4.
The President said that discussions were being held with Israel, with the Russians, and also at the Four-Power Conferences, to arrive at a just [Page 4] and balanced solution. Our conversations with the Russians have been quite unsuccessful. The President also stated that our policy towards the Middle East is still under review, that there are frequent meetings on the Middle East, and that there would be one next week. It could be that nothing dramatic would come out of the meeting. He appreciated today’s thoughtful and constructive conversation.

END

  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 740, Country Files, Africa, Morocco, Vol. I. Secret; Exdis. Sent for action. Saunders wrote the following postscript: “The angle to be especially considered is whether in this form this summary could be given to Laraki for his record since he was alone and did not take detailed notes. H.S.” Kissinger eliminated the last sentence in paragraph 3 and substituted the word “just” for “favorable” in the first sentence of paragraph 4. With these changes, Kissinger approved the summary, and agreed that it could be passed on to Laraki. On June 5, Laraki also had urged Secretary Rogers to consider seriously Nasser’s peace appeal as a step towards easing the worsening Middle East situation. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL MOR-US)↩
  2. Saunders forwarded for Kissinger’s approval a summary of the June 4 conversation between Foreign Minister Ahmed Laraki and President Nixon.↩