Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–5, Part 2, Documents on North Africa, 1969–1972

104. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹ ²

Washington, June 3, 1970

SUBJECT:

• Your Talk with Moroccan Prime Minister Laraki—3:30 p. m. June 4

King Hassan is sending Prime Minister Laraki as a special emissary to discuss with you deterioration in the Mid-Eastern situation. This initiative results from President Nasser’s request that the King intervene personally with you to underscore the seriousness of Nasser’s peace appeal to you. Comparable emissaries have already been received by Prime Minister Wilson and President Pompidou. There is a strong element in this initiative of Hassan trying to preserve his own position in the Arab world as active for the Arab cause.

What He Will Say

He will probably bring a formal message from the King urging in a general way that you give special attention to the Middle East. If the pattern here follows that in London and Paris, this message will be relatively bland. But it is believed that Laraki has instructions to press orally the following points:

• —that further deterioration will lead to further Soviet and radical gains;
• —that the U.S. not deliver further arms to Israel;
• —that the U.S. press Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories;
• —that the U.S. press Israel to accept a political solution based on the UN Security Council resolution.
• —that the U.S. press Israel to accept a role for the Palestinians.

Laraki is personally Western-oriented, but he is strongly pro-Arab and strident on the Arab-Israeli question.

Your Objective

There are two reasons for your seeing Laraki:

• —to bolster further our relationship with Moroccan leadership and to encourage the notion that the U.S. will be responsive to moderate Arab voices and
• —to use this as a channel to other Arabs to convey the message that the U.S. is genuinely trying to help achieve a settlement.

The impression to be conveyed is that we are prepared to do what is necessary to help achieve a political settlement but we cannot do the job alone. Above all, we must be certain in our own minds that there is a will to peace on both sides. What we really need from Nasser is his unequivocal assurance that he is prepared to live and let live with Israel provided Israel withdraws to essentially pre-war borders and gives the Palestinians a fair deal.

Talking Points

• —You appreciate his coming. We are always eager to listen to our Arab friends. You regard King Hassan as one of our good friends.
• —You are deeply concerned about the situation in the Middle East and especially about the new Soviet role.
• —The U.S. has tried to work with the USSR for peace and limiting the arms race. But Moscow has not been constructive on either count. This has been especially true on the question of arms supply.
• —We do not support Israel unqualifiedly, but we are committed to its survival. Most of our diplomatic efforts in the past year were made against Israel’s wishes. We have subscribed to the principle (in the UN Resolution) that Israel should not gain territory as a result of the war provided its neighbors commit themselves in concrete ways to accept Israel and live at peace.
• —You have always felt strongly about the plight of the Palestinians and the necessity of a fair settlement for them if there is to be peace.
• —We take President Nasser’s May 1 speech seriously and will respond as soon as we are ready. What we have most needed from President Nasser all along has been unequivocal assurance that he is ready to live at peace with Israel and to commit himself to concrete measures for enforcing that peace. We are aware of his recent statements along these lines and would welcome any greater precision that might be possible.

Bilateral Issues

1. The Prime Minister may press for continued U.S. help with Morocco’s own air force (19 of 24 contracted F–5 aircraft have been delivered). In general, we are interested in assisting, but the $10 million planned for FY 1970 is unavailable until the Foreign Military Sales Act is freed.

2. King Hassan’s visit, originally scheduled for July, has been postponed at the King’s request because of the expected arrival of a baby. A date in December was offered, and he suggested early next year. [On the surface, this seems mainly a matter of finding a mutually possible time, although we have one report that suggests that the King may be wary of committing himself before he sees which way the U.S. will move on the Arab-Israeli problem.]

Prime Minister Laraki understands English but will speak through a French language interpreter. We assume he will be accompanied by Ambassador Osman.

Secretary Rogers’ memo is attached

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 740, Country Files, Africa, Morocco, Vol. I. Secret. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. The attached memorandum and talking points from Secretary Rogers are not printed. The summary of the President’s conversation with Laraki is printed as Document 106.
2. Kissinger provided the President with briefing material for his upcoming June 4 meeting with Foreign Minister Ahmed Laraki to discuss the Middle East crisis. In this memorandum, Kissinger presented possible requests by Laraki and underscored the need to bolster the U.S. relationship with Moroccan leadership and use the meeting as a forum for conveying to other Arab leaders the message that the United States was genuinely interested in assisting in a peace settlement.