87. Memorandum From the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Affairs (Ware) to Secretary of Defense Laird1
2
Washington, April 29, 1969
SUBJECT:
- Joint Talking Paper for SecDef and Chairman, JCS, for NSC Meeting, 30 April (NSSM 41 - Seabed Arms Control)
Attached Talking Paper and backup material is forwarded for your use at
the NSC meeting on Wednesday, 30 April.
The JCS views on this subject at TAB D
provide a good background on the principal issues. These views are fully
supported by ISA.
The recommended DOD view on inspection
represents a reversal in the Long-held view that an inspection provision
should be included in any arms control agreement. This reversal arises
from the impracticability of conducting any meaningful inspection in
this hostile environment beyond that possible under existing rights. You
should anticipate strenuous opposition on this issue from the Director,
ACDA, who desires an inspection
article because the Soviets included a reciprocal inspection provision
in their draft treaty on seabed arms control.
You will probably gain support for the DOD position that U.S. should begin negotiations on the
basis of a three-mile width for the band of exemption if you indicate a
willingness to reconsider this matter once the territorial sea problem
has been resolved. U.S. is separately negotiating for a 12-mile
territorial sea with transit rights through straits. Successful outcome
is very important to DOD.
No coordination is required on this issue at this time.
[Page 2]
Attachment
Talking Paper
Talking Paper for Secretary of Defense and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff (NSC Meeting of 30 April
1969)
SUBJECT: National Security Study
Memorandum 41—Treaty for Nuclear Arms Control of the Seabeds (U)
ISSUE: At Presidential direction, TAB B, a
study has been prepared on the issue of a treaty prohibiting the
emplacement or fixing of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass
destruction on the seabed.
BACKGROUND/DISCUSSION: The study at TAB A
has been submitted by the NSC Staff
after review by the NSC Review
Group. It consists of a basic paper, a draft treaty, and a list of
examples of weapons systems and activities which would be prohibited
or non-prohibited under the alternative formulations of Article I of
the treaty. The views of the OSD and
JCS were considered in the
preparation of this study. The following have been examined in the
study:
a. THE PROS AND CONS OF WHETHER OR NOT SUCH A TREATY IS IN THE
OVERALL INTERESTS OF THE US.
OSD–JCS VIEWS
No. Treaty is not in overall security interests of US at this time because:
- (1)
- Current lack of understanding of scientific and
technological aspects of future ocean activities, and their
relation to legal considerations, make it impossible to
envision now all of the ramifications which an arms control
agreement could impose upon the security interests of the
US.
- (2)
- Although it is premature to decide whether the US should emplace weapons on the
seabeds in order to maintain the necessary strategic nuclear
capability in the future, such a requirement is a
possibility. The primary consideration is not the question
of current programs, but they risk to possible future US strategic nuclear
programs.
- (3)
- National verification capabilities are inadequate to
insure compliance with such an agreement.
[Page 3]
b. THE PROS AND CONS OF ALTERNATIVE FORMULATIONS OF THE SPECIFIC
PROVISIONS OF SUCH A TREATY.
OSD–JCS VIEWS
- (1)
- If the decision is made to table a draft, TAB C sets forth the
recommended choices among the various a alternatives which would
be the least detrimental to security of US. The DOD
preferred formulations are set forth as Alternative 2 in each of
the operative paragraphs of the draft treaty (TAB A of the
study). These alternatives would set forth an initial US proposal which would prohibit the
emplacement or emplanting of fixed weapons of mass destruction
on the seabed, from a three-mile band adjacent to the coast of
any state, (DOD should indicate
a willingness to consider some other band width once the
territorial sea question is resolved), without an article on
inspection.
- (2)
- A principal consideration represented by these choices is the
DOD view that the US Government’s opening position on
these issues should be restrained and conservative instead of
attempting to accommodate to views previously expressed by the
Soviet Union. During negotiations, these restricted formulations
can be broadened by interpretive statements as required to
accommodate to points of view expressed by other states.
c. THE PROSPECTS FOR OBTAINING AGREEMENT ON THE VARIOUS FORMULATIONS
OF THE TREATY.
OSD–JCS VIEWS
This is considered to be a State Department judgment. If a decision
is made to table a draft treaty, then this section is a logical
analysis.
d. THE FACTORS AFFECTING THE TIMING OF OUR PROPOSING A SPECIFIC
TREATY DRAFT.
OSD–JCS VIEWS
If a decision is made to table a draft treaty, the OSD and JCS agree with the discussion in this section.
RECOMMENDATION
That the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff, support the foregoing views at the NSC meeting.
[Page 4]
[Page 5]
Attachment
Memorandum From the Vice Director of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (Reaves) to Secretary of Defense Laird
Washington, April 22, 1969
Subject: Treaty for Nuclear Arms Control of the Seabeds (U)
- 1.
- (C) The study directed under NSSM 41 on the issue of a treaty prohibiting the
emplacement or fixing of nuclear weapons or other weapons of
mass destruction on the seabed has been forwarded by the NSSM 41 Steering Committee to the
National Security Council Review Group for its consideration on
25 April 1969 and for National Security Council discussion on 30
April 1969. It is considered appropriate to provide the views of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this subject.
- 2.
- (TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff
have reexamined the issue of a seabed arms control treaty and
have again concluded that the question of an arms control regime
to be applied to the seabeds is complex and requires full
awareness of the technological and scientific features of this
environment. Due to the current lack of understanding of many of
the scientific and technical aspects of future ocean activities
and their relationship to legal considerations, it is impossible
to envision now all the ramifications which an arms control
regime could impose upon the security interests of the United
States. While it is premature to decide whether the United
States should emplace weapons on the seabeds in order to
maintain the necessary strategic nuclear capability in the
future, such a requirement is a possibility. It is not a
question of current programs but the risks to possible future
US strategic nuclear programs
that must be the primary consideration. Further, national
verification capabilities as set forth in Special National
Intelligence Estimate (SNIE)
11-12-68, subject: “Emplacement of Weapons of Mass Destruction
on the Seabed,” are considered inadequate to insure compliance
with a seabed arms control agreement. Finally, the fact that the
Soviets have a land deployment advantage vis-à-vis the United
States and a relatively limited access to the deep oceans makes
a seabed arms control agreement clearly advantageous to the
USSR. For these reasons,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that such a treaty is not now
in the overall security interest of the United States and, in
fact, would bear a potential for grave harm.
- 3.
- (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff are aware that National Security
Council (NSC) consideration of
the problem might result in a Presidential decision to table a
draft treaty in order to counter the Soviet tactical advantage
gained by their tabling of a draft treaty in the Eighteen-Nation
Disarmament Committee (ENDC).
In recognition of this possibility and considering the many
uncertainties of a treaty for this environment, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff believe that the following formulations would probably
be least detrimental to the security of the United States:
ARTICLE I
Each state party to this treaty undertakes not to emplant or
emplace fixed nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass
destruction and their associated fixed launching platforms
on, within, or beneath the seabed and ocean floor beyond a
narrow band as defined in Article II of this treaty adjacent
to the coast of any state.
ARTICLE II
For purposes of this treaty, the outer limit of the narrow
band referred to in Article I shall be measured from
NORMAL2 base
lines drawn in the manner specified in the Convention on
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone for drawing SUCH2 base lines from
which the outer limit of the territorial sea is measured.
The width of the narrow band shall be three miles.
ARTICLE III
There should be no inspection article.
- 4.
- (S) Regarding the zone of application, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff believe that in the event a decision is made to support a
boundary formulation other than that outlined in Article II of
paragraph 3, above, such an article should not be tabled at the
current session of the ENDC. To
do so could complicate and prejudice other ongoing law of the
sea discussions.
- 5.
- (U) The rationale for the above views is-contained in the
Appendix hereto.
- 6.
- (U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff request the opportunity to
comment on the instructions to the ENDC delegation.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
K.L. Reaves
Major General, USA
Vice Director,
Joint Staff
[Page 8]
Appendix
RATIONALE IN SUPPORT OF JCS VIEWS
1. ARTICLE I
- a.
-
Prohibition of fixed weapons and fixed
launching platforms. Holding open the option to deploy
mobile submersible systems would permit the United States to
take advantage of its technological lead and offset the Soviet
land deployment advantage. If a decision is made for an
inspection article (Article III), restricting the treaty to
fixed weapons would remove a significant uncertainty with
respect to verification. Moreover, in view of the lack of
knowledge of the seabeds, a cautious evolutionary approach is
appropriate.
- b.
-
Zone of Application. The band-to-band
formulation would preserve the option of emplacing weapons
within the band of other nations should it be in our mutual
interest. It would also avoid the problem of special procedures
for inspection of suspected violations try states occurring in
the territorial seas of other states.
2. ARTICLE II
- a.
-
Method of measuring the base line.
With regard to determination of the base line from which the
width of the zone of application is measured, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff believe the method of using the sinuosities of the
coast (normal base line) is the most advantageous to the United
States. In any event, any treaty formulation must not permit the
USSR, or other adversaries,
to gain an advantage in a seabed area by permitting the
deployment of weapons or installations in specific waters
claimed by them. For example, the USSR interpretation of the Convention on the
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone and other principles of
international law would permit them to use wide seabed areas
such as the Sea of Okhotsk.
- b.
-
Width of Band. The 3-mile limit is
consistent with the present US
public position on the width of the territorial seas. Use of
this figure at this time will not have an adverse affect on
other law of the sea negotiations. It is recognized that the
3-mile limit will be extremely difficult to negotiate, but it
will test the Soviet resolve to have a treaty. In any event, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff believe it is premature to discuss the
12-mile limit in connection with arms control negotiations
before settling the question of transit rights and territorial
seas. To do so would extend implicit recognition to the validity
of the 12-mile territorial sea without achieving a concomitant
right of navigation through and over straits. When negotiations
on the territorial seas have been concluded to the satisfaction
of the United States, and as the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament
Committee discussions on the seabed proceed, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff would wish to reevaluate the most favorable outer boundary
for an arms control agreement on the seabed from a national
defense point of view.
3. ARTICLE III (INSPECTION)
The major problems in verifying compliance with this treaty would be
to detect and locate suspected devices and installations in order to
permit inspection. The right to inspect does not help in this
regard. Present international aw permits some inspection, such as
X-raying, measuring emanations, and photographing. However, it does
not permit dismantling or physical interference. Accordingly, a
logical interpretation of the inspection Article is that it adds the
right to dismantle suspected devices or installations. The United
states now has more military and commercial installations on the
seabed than any other nation.
[Page 10]
At the present time, it is believed that the
Soviets have little or nothing for the United States to “inspect.”
If and when they do, and these devices are detected and identified,
but not “inspected,” the US
Government would be able to withdraw from the treaty without
compromising its source of intelligence. In view of our limited
national capability to locate devices, the right of such inspection,
as a practical matter, would not materially enhance our verification
capabilities. Not having “inspection” rights in a treaty would
better permit the United States to avoid the possibility of being
pressured to reveal the locations and purposes of all underwater
installations and devices. As a consequence, the right of
“inspection” would do more harm to US
interests than could be gained by the United States “inspecting”
suspected violations.
