Office of the Historian

84. National Security Study Memorandum 411 2

Washington, April 11, 1969

TO:

  • The Secretary of State
  • The Secretary of Defense
  • The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
  • The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
  • The Director of Central Intelligence
  • The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
  • The Science Adviser to the President

SUBJECT:

  • Treaty for Nuclear Arms Control of the Seabeds

The President has directed that a study be prepared on the issue of a treaty prohibiting the emplacement or fixing of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction on the seabeds.

The study should examine:—

a)
the pros and cons of whether such a treaty is in the overall U.S. interests;
b)
the pros and cons of the alternative formulations of the specific provisions of such a treaty;
c)
the prospects for obtaining agreement on the various formulations of the treaty; and
d)
the factors affecting the timing of our proposing a specific treaty draft.

The study should include complete drafts of the alternative formulations of the treaty considered in the study.

The study should be prepared by an Ad Hoc NSC Steering Committee, chaired by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, with representatives of the following: Secretary of State; Secretary of Defense; Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Director of Central Intelligence; Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; Science Adviser to the President.

The study should be forwarded to the NSC Review Group by April 18, 1969.

Henry A. Kissinger
  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, NSSMs (1–42). Confidential. Haig initialed the memorandum.↩
  2. The President directed that a report outlining both the positive and negative perspectives on the proposed plan to prohibit the use of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction on the seabeds. Specifically, Nixon wanted an analysis of all alternate suggestions and their feasibility, possible influential factors, and whether seabed arms control was in the best interest of the U.S.↩