81. Telegram 965 From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State 1 2
Subject:
- March 25 Co-Chairmen Meeting
Summary: Roshchin said Smith’s comments on seabed being reported fully to Moscow and he indicated hope basis for US-Soviet agreement would emerge. He suggested US present counter-draft to Article I. Smith said he believed it necessary agree first on what agreement would ban; otherwise issues such as verification would be hopelessly complicated. End summary.
At March 25 Co-Chairmen meeting Smith said he had instructions begin private talks with SovDel to reduce areas of disagreement. He thought there no point in discussing questions like verification or geographic jurisdiction until it was settled what treaty would ban. Smith said that Soviet draft would prevent warships from anchoring outside a 12-mile zone and asked whether USSR itself could accept such a restriction. Roshchin agreed this would be difficult for Soviet Navy: but pointed out that conventional weapons which could be used for offensive purposes should be covered. He also agreed treaty should not ban military communication which shared facilities on seabed with civilian uses. Roshchin said Soviets prepared discuss what would be banned and would welcome counter-draft of Article I from US. Roshchin said he [Page 2] understood we would wish to consult with our allies, just as Soviets would want to consult theirs, but believed best procedure to obtain agreement was to follow NPT example of Co-Chairmen agreement, presentation and discussion in ENDC, and later presentation at UNGA. He recognized it unlikely we could reach agreement during current ENDC session, but considered it essential to have agreement at summer session in order to present 24th UNGA with concrete ENDC arms control measure.
Smith replied he would explore possibilities for next steps when he returned to Washington but hope US and Soviet dels in Geneva would continue efforts narrow differences.
Soviets raised question about geographic coverage. Smith replied we were thinking more in terms of first two approaches mentioned in this speech. Roshchin said isobath limit would raise questions about continental shelf and run into competing national claims. Soviet draft deliberately worded to avoid thorny continental shelf problem. Grinevsky added that Soviets did not wish to prejudge results of a future Law of Sea conference through provisions of a seabeds arms control measure.
Smith asked whether Soviets envisaged their draft as exending ban to Sea of Azov and Caspian Sea. Roshchin replied that ban would apply to all open seas, such as Mediterranean and Black Seas, but would not apply to Caspian Sea, which is closed except to USSR and Iran. By same analogy ban would not apply to Great Lakes, which matter for US-Canadian decision.
On verification issue Smith said we envisaged approach similar to outer space treaty. If ban covered other than weapons of mass destruction inspection of facilities of all naval powers would be involved. It would be possible to get some degree of satisfaction through national verification of a seabeds measure if delivery vehicles for nuclear and mass destruction weapons were what one was looking for. But it inconceivable how we would go about verifying other miltary activities on seabed—if our objective is to have realistic agreement. Roshchin noted this was interesting point and again suggested US submit counter-draft on Article I.
[Page 3]During luncheon which preceded meeting, Soviets complained about attacks against ENDC and Co-Chairmen at UNGA. Some of same countries which used to harangue US and USSR about easing East-West tensions complain about cooperation of US and USSR in arms control field. Roshchin indicated he did not know how to resolve this problem other than to make ENDC as effective forum as possible. For this reason he hoped we could develop concrete measure before 24th UNGA. His delegation would stand ready discuss matters with ours on same basis which successfully produced complicated NPT project. Smith responded that Fisher would be coming over soon and of course Gleysteen would be available at any time.
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 366, Subject Files, Non-Proliferation Treaty through March 1969. Secret; Limdis; Priority. It was repeated to Moscow, USUN, and USNATO. Sonnenfeldt forwarded the telegram to Kissinger under a covering note noting “that things seem to be moving quite fast on this” and “we may find ourselves in the midst of a real negotiation on a treaty on the basis, so far, of telegraphic instructions rather than an NSC decision.” (Ibid.)↩
- The telegram reported on the March 25 Co-Chairmen meeting in which Smith and Roshchin of the Soviet Union discussed progress toward a seabed arms treaty.↩