47. Journal Entry by the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission
(Seaborg)1
2
Washington, March 18, 1970
[Omitted here is material on other issues.]
[Page 2]
At 3:30 p.m. I met with Ambassador Dobrynin in the presence of Dr. Harry
Smyth, Ward P. Allen (Department of
State), Myron Kratzer and Julie
Rubin. I told him that the reason for the meeting was to discuss the
NPT and means of insuring its
success. Attached is a talking paper covering the points I discussed
with him. I also gave him a copy of the paper which covered the main
points of the discussion. Smyth,
Allen, Kratzer and I all
emphasized the importance of coming to an agreement on this matter with
the Soviet Union before April 1, because if we do not work together we
will not be successful in our common objective.
[Omitted here is material on other issues.]
[Page 3]
Attachment
Washington, March 6, 1970
PROPOSED TALKING POINTS FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH
AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN
- 1.
- The US has valued the close
cooperation with the USSR that
brought the NPT into effect. We
sincerely hope this collaboration will continue so as to assure
the effective implementation of the Treaty.
- 2.
- The question of how the IAEA
should organize itself to discharge its safeguard
responsibilities as called for by Article III of the NPT recently was the subject of
discussion by the IAEA’s Board
of Governors in February. Specifically, the Board considered a
draft resolution calling for the establishment of a committee to
consider the form and content of the necessary safeguard
agreements. The US decided to co-sponsor this resolution after
extensive negotiations with the UK, during which we succeeded in obtaining
agreement to a number of improvements on the very points of
concern to the Soviet Union. We were convinced that further
changes would be unacceptable to a number of Board members, and
that a majority Board members favored its adoption.
- 3.
- In deference to a request of the Soviet Governor, the Board
agreed to defer the question of establishing a committee until a
special IAEA meeting on April
1. The USSR requested
additional time to formulate its views on the proposal.
Accordingly, we wish to use
[Page 4]
the time between now and the April 1
meeting to allay Soviet concerns on the resolution, since
further delay or disagreement could seriously set back the steps
necessary for widespread adherence to and effective
implementation of the NPT.
- 4.
- We would hope to demonstrate to the USSR in these consultations that there is a close
identity of objectives between the USSR and the US on
how the IAEA should discharge
its NPT responsibilities. If we
have had any differences with the USSR, they have been primarily tactical in
nature.
- 5.
- First, like the USSR, we wish
to see the IAEA placed in a
position to begin its safeguard negotiations with NPT adherents as soon as possible
bearing in mind the time scale for negotiations specified in the
Treaty itself.
- 6.
- Second, like the USSR, we
have a strong interest in seeing the IAEA maintain a fully effective and credible
safeguards system. Therefore, we would be strongly opposed to
any efforts to cut back on the effectiveness of the Agency’s
safeguards system or subject that system to protracted review
and revision prior to the initiation of the negotiations called
for by the Treaty. It is our basic position that the IAEA safeguards document
INFCIRC/66 is sufficiently flexible to permit the negotiation of
the safeguard agreements called for by the NPT and we shall be prepared to
defend this position in Vienna.
[Page 5]
While some efforts towards revising the
system undoubtedly will be made in Vienna, we believe we can
resist them if we have the support of the USSR and other countries.
- 7.
- Third, and most importantly, we believe that the US and the USSR both wish to encourage acceptance of the
NPT by a number of key
industrialized countries, including Japan, the FRG, Australia, Italy, etc.
- 8.
- Events over the past year and at the February Board meeting
have indicated that several key non-nuclear weapon states wish
to have the opportunity to discuss, in some forum, the types of
IAEA safeguard provisions
that may apply to them. Certain key non-nuclear weapon states
are specifically withholding their ratification of the NPT until the terms of the IAEA safeguard agree cents are
clarified under conditions that permit them to express their
views on the subject.
- 9.
- It also seems clear that the IAEA Director General requires guidance from the
Board on the character of the agreements to be negotiated in
connection with the NPT.
Establishment of a safeguards committee as proposed by the
UK is thus essential to
enable the IAEA to promptly get
on with the task of implementing the Treaty. It is essential in
our view that the April 1 meeting of the Board accept the UK/US
resolution in substantially its current form and we would hope
this step could be taken with USSR suppor
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(or at least, without their objection.)
- 10.
- At the same time, we wish to emphasize that we agree with the
USSR that the proposed
committee’s deliberations should be well focused, should be
handled as a matter of urgency, and should evolve in a fashion
that will not lead to any erosion of the effectiveness of the
IAEA safeguards
system.
- 11.
- We believe the UK/US draft resolution provides a
desirable focus since it emphasizes that the principal matter to
be discussed will be the provisions to be included in the
various agreements to be negotiated in connection with the
Treaty. We are convinced that efforts to establish terms of
reference any more restrictive than those now proposed In the
UK resolution would not be
negotiable with others, would be interpreted as an effort on our
part to muzzle the debate and would be unrealistic since those
who wish to discuss various aspects of safeguards will find a
way to do so in any event. We plan as noted to stand firm in
opposition to any time-consuming review and revision of the
Agency safeguards document as a precondition to negotiating the
necessary agreements since we believe this is neither necessary
nor desirable.
- 12.
- However, we agree with the comments made by the Soviet
delegation in Vienna that the committee should complete its
deliberations as soon as possible and hence we favor the
inclusion within the UK/US resolution of a target date for
the completion of the committee’s first report. We believe this
first report should be
[Page 7]
submitted to the Board within the 180 day period for the
initiation of negotiations specified in Article III of the
NPT. We also would look with
favor, on what we understand to be Soviet idea, that one or more
special Board meetings should be convened starting in the late
summer or fall of 1970 if this serves to help expedite
matters.
- 13.
- We also understand that one of the Soviet concerns is that the
UK resolution might delay the
ability of a state, party to the NPT, to promptly negotiate with the IAEA even though that state is
ready and willing to do so. Finland is one such example. We wish
to emphasize that we do not regard the UK/US resolution in
any way precluding the IAEA
from negotiating, on an ad hoc basis, a safeguards agreement
with Finland or any other country that is now prepared to
proceed.
- 14.
- The UK resolution would have
the proposed committee consider agreements to be negotiated with
individual states, the agreements to be negotiated with regional
grouping such as Euratom, and the agreements that would be
designed to implement the UK/US voluntary
safeguard offers. We have been informed that the USSR is opposed
to including the US and UK offers within the committee’s
terms of reference. We strongly believe that it would be
contrary to our mutual interests in having a strong NPT to do anything which creates
doubt that the US offer will be
effectively implemented. Application of IAEA safeguards in the US will result in substantial inconvenience to us,
and is not a decision which we took lightly. Moreover,
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while we would of
course welcome parallel Soviet action in any degrees the US offer was never intended to place
the Soviet Union under any pressure to put its own peaceful
facilities under safeguards, and no suggestion to this effect
was made at the time of US offer.
The US offer was based on
conclusion that industrial nations especially West Germany would
not accept safeguards unless their competitors especially the
US and the UK did so. Thus, US offer was in interest of and
essential to NPT.
- 15.
- The US also believes its offer
will be a key factor in maintaining the effectiveness of the
IAEA system. This is so
since we intend to stress the point that we are prepared to
accept IAEA safeguards system
as set forth in document INFCIRC/66.
- 16.
- In conclusion, we are ready to join with the Soviets to take
the necessary steps to assure that the committee conduct its
deliberations on a prompt and well-focused basis concentrating
on the illustrative provisions that might be included in the
various agreements. We believe that our common objectives will
be seriously impaired if the USSR opposes the UK/US resolution or
refrains from participating constructively in the committee’s
deliberations.
