324. Memorandum From Helmut
Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the
President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1
2
Washington, June 18, 1971
SUBJECT: Memo to the President on Soviet-Five Power Conference
You asked Gerard Smith for a
memorandum commenting on the Soviet proposal for a Five Power
Conference. He finds it “serious” and worth taking seriously. He wants
to consult with the British and French and suggests we thoroughly
explore the issues before making a definitive reply.
Obviously, we should think about the best way to handle the Soviet
proposal since, whatever else its purpose, it is patently designed to
put us in a bind.
— On the one hand, we cannot oppose “disarmament,” no matter how
unrealistic and absurd the Soviet proposals may be.
— On the other hand, the Soviets are presumably banking on a Chinese
rejection, which they will use to isolate Peking as much as possible on
the “Peace” issue.
— We can end up in the role of “colluding” with the Soviets to put
pressure on China.
Your memorandum to the President (1) points out this aspect, (2) requests
authorization for a preliminary analysis of different ways of handling
the Soviet proposal and the issues it raises, and (3) includes interim
guidance, taking a positive stand on the idea of a conference, if all
other powers agree.
RECOMMENDATION
- 1.
- That you forward the memorandum to the President (Tab A).
- 2.
- That you sign the NSSM (Tab A of
the President’s memo).
It seems fairly obvious that we are undergoing a barrage of disarmament
proposals, as outlined by Brezhnev on March 30. Some of his list, reduction [Page 2] of budgets, worldwide
disarmament conferences, nuclear free zones, are yet to come. The point
is that we should give some thought to organizing (presumably under the Verification Panel?) whatever
work will need to be done. For example, Brezhnev’s naval limitations
proposal should be studied not only in the Indian Ocean but for the
Mediterranean, Cuba, etc.
While the Soviet list is for the most part window dressing, it should be
recalled that in previous periods the Soviets have usually wound up
claiming credit for their shopping list, and, at some point, prosecuting
us for our failure to reply or take them seriously.
In any case, it might be worth having the entire Soviet list reviewed in
order to select those which we might respond to, or originate.
[Page 3]
Tab A
Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency (Smith) to President Nixon
Washington, June 16, 1971
Subject:
- Soviet Note of June 15th re Five-Power Nuclear
Conference
The Soviet proposal to convene at the earliest time a conference of
the five nuclear weapons nations is a follow up on the Brezhnev March 30th speech
statement: “We are for nuclear disarmament by all states which have
nuclear weapons and for convening to this end a conference of the
five nuclear powers.”
The tenor of the Soviet note is serious and I think it should be
taken seriously. At least the USSR
should not be left with an exclusive role as “organizer” of
disarmament negotiations.
It is probably safe to assume that there is an element of
anti-Chinese content in the Soviet initiative and this should be
kept in mind in any examination of the five-power conference
idea.
It presents opportunities as well as difficulties for us.
Because of the complexities of the problems involved, comprehensive
questions of nuclear disarmament do not seem ripe for solution and
it should not be expected that a conference would result in a
comprehensive disarmament agreement.
[Page 4]
The proposed conference would be aimed at nuclear disarmament
measures, comprehensive as well as partial. You will recall that
declared Soviet policy favors on-site inspection for measures of
actual disarmament. A conference would afford opportunity to explore
the degree of present Soviet willingness to submit to such
inspection.
The asymmetries of the nuclear positions of the five parties,
especially those of China and France vis-à-vis the United States and
the USSR, do not bode well for any
major disarmament agreement emerging from such a conference—but some
progress on arms control measures might be possible.
As long as progress is being made on a bilateral basis in SALT and possibly a multilateral basis
in Geneva, we should be extremely careful about setting up what
might be a competing forum which could prejudice existing efforts.
On this score, after the Brezhnev speech I was advised in Vienna that the
five-power conference would be in no way inconsistent with SALT, and Amb. Leonard was advised in Geneva that
it would not prejudice CCD
efforts.
The concept of engaging the Chinese People’s Republic in disarmament
negotiations is a significant part of current thinking about
possible evolution of Chinese-American relations. This Soviet
initiative could be the occasion for a US inquiry at Warsaw as to any Chinese interest in such
a conference.
A five-power conference could have some positive effect on efforts to
implement non-proliferation policy.
A comprehensive nuclear test ban, on which you recently directed that
a policy review be carried out, is a likely topic. Brezhnev has referred more than
once, in recent weeks, to elimination of nuclear testing as a Soviet
objective, but the prospect is not bright for much French or Chinese
interest in a test ban at this time.
[Page 5]
At SALT in the discussion of a
subsidiary agreement to control risks of accidental war, the Soviets
proposed a clause looking to the accession by other nuclear powers
to a Soviet-American accident agreement. A five-power conference
might usefully get into this range of problems (including
communication link question).
The Soviet note says: “… it has not yet become possible to turn back
the process of stockpiling increasingly destructive means of mass
annihilation …” On this score the existing US Geneva proposal for a cut-off on fissionable
material production for weapons purposes is directly pertinent.
It is almost certain that at such a conference the question of
non-use of nuclear weapons would arise. It should not be ruled out
that some “non-use” formula could be in our interest. At several
times in the past we have proposed qualified “non-use” formulas,
e.g.: in 195.7 “Each party assumes an obligation not to use nuclear
weapons if an armed attack has not placed the party in a situation
of individual or-collective self-defense.”
The above is a sampling of the type of considerations that I think
should be thoroughly explored before any definitive reaction is
given to the Soviet initiative. In the interim, I think the United
States position should be one of willingness to give serious
consideration to the Soviet proposal.
Early consultation with the UK and
France is needed, regardless of what the eventual US position maybe.
A copy of this memorandum has been sent to the Secretary of
State.
