The objective of the meeting is to establish a policy framework for
future CBW programs which will be
consistent with both national security and arms control objectives.
Because the subject of CBW is highly
complex, it will be possible during the meeting to address only the key
issues. Your decisions on these issues, however, will provide the policy
direction for the groups of sub-issues.
You need to read only your talking points and the “Issues for Decision”
paper. Additional background material is enclosed in a separate
background book.
1. Policy on Biological Weapons
2. Policy on Chemical Weapons
3. Policy on Tear Gas and our Position Toward the
Geneva Protocol
4. Policy on Authorization for Use of Tear Gas and
Herbicides
Attachment
Washington, undated
ISSUES FOR DECISION
There are four principal policy issues for decision. Each major issue
subsumes an additional number of specific questions.
I. POLICY ON BIOLOGICAL WARFARE (BW)
There are two questions to be decided.
A. What should be the nature and scope of U.S.
policy on biological warfare? There are four options:
- 1.
- Retain a Full Capability Including Both Lethal and
Incapacitating Biological Weapons.
- 2.
- Retain a Capability for Incapacitating Weapons Only.
- 3.
- Research and Development Program Only, but for both Offensive and Defensive Purposes.
- 4.
- Research and Development Program for Defensive Purposes Only
and to Protect against Technological surprise.
- — Some argue that we should retain a full BW capability because (1) a
lethal BW capability helps deter BW attack and gives us
another strategic option; (2) because it would take
considerable time to reconstitute stockpiles and
delivery means; and (3) because biological incapacitants—the only effective
incapacitating capability we maintain—could be useful in
military operations such as amphibious invasion.
- — Others argue that we should maintain a research and
development program only because (1) our nuclear
deterrent serves to deter strategic use of lethal BW; (2) the control and
effectiveness of BW
weapons are uncertain as are the deterrent or
retaliatory value of incapacitants; (3) though they
could possibly be useful in a “first-use” situation,
such use could risk escalation and would be considered
by most nations to be contrary to the international law;
and (4) a research and development program would protect
against technological surprise.
All agencies, except the Joint Chiefs, support Option 4.
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Recommendation: That you approve Option 4,
(research and development for defensive purposes) to include only
enough offensive research and development to protect against
technological surprise.
B. Should the U.S. support the U.K. Draft
Convention for the Prohibition of Biological Warfare? There
are three options:
- 1.
- Defer any decision.
- 2.
- Associate in principle
only.
- 3.
- Do not support.
- — If our BW policy
is to concentrate on research and development for
defensive purposes (Option 4) we can support the
Convention. Under any other policy we would have to
oppose it or seek major modifications. The
Convention provides for no on-site verification, but
relies on procedures for investigation of treaty
violations by agencies under UN auspices. Also, its relation to other
CBW arms control
proposals is unclear. No one argues that we should
agree to the Convention as it stands.
- — Some argue that we should associate in principle
(1) to evidence our willingness to consider
limitations on biological warfare, particularly if
we maintain a research and development program only,
and (2) because we could gain political benefits
without tying our hands until questions such as
scope of the Convention and suitable verification
procedures were resolved.
- — Others contend that there is no urgency to
consider the Convention and that any association
with it might weaken our opposition to unverifiable
provisions in other arms control proposals.
Recommendation: That you approve Option 2
(Association in Principle) subject to the satisfactory resolution of
such questions as verification procedures and the relation of the
U.K. Draft Convention to other arms control measures.
II. CHEMICAL WARFARE (CW) POLICY ISSUES
There are three basic issues.
A. Should we maintain a lethal chemical
capability and if so where and at what level should we maintain
stocks? There are two options:
[Page 6]
- 1.
- Maintain lethal chemical stockpiles for deterrence or
retaliation:
- a.
- In the U.S. only.
- b.
- In the U.S. and overseas.
- 2.
- Rely on Research and Development only.
- — Some argue that we need lethal chemicals (1) to
deter chemical attack, and (2) as a retaliatory option
between a conventional response (which might be
inadequate) and escalation to nuclear response. They
also argue (1) that unilateral elimination of this
capability would give up a valuable bargaining counter
in arms control discussions and, (2) that so long as we
maintain our declaratory policy of “no-first-use” the
international political costs of retaining the
capability are not excessive. They contend that stocks
should be maintained overseas (particularly in Germany)
to assure the capability for timely response and
because, were they to be removed, attempts to replace
them in a crisis could be both difficult and
provocative. The JCS
also believe that existing stocks of mustard gas should
be retained until improved agents are developed because
they represent a large portion of existing casualty
producing chemical stocks.
- — Others argue that (1) our tactical nuclear
capability makes lethal chemicals unnecessary as a
deterrent, and (2) that existence of the chemical
capability may encourage chemical attack because the
threshold of response appears lower to the enemy. They
believe that an offensive and defensive research and
development program would guard against technological
surprise and the improvement of defensive measures could
lessen the likelihood of chemical attack because of
inevitable enemy uncertainty about the true extent of
our CW capabilities. They
contend that, in any event, we should not retain stocks
overseas because (1) existing stocks are too small for
an adequate response and to increase them would cause
political problems with our allies; (2) needed chemical
support to theaters of operation can be provided from
the United States quickly; and (3) continued presence of
these stocks, particularly in Germany, could become a
source of friction. They argue further that mustard gas
is far less effective than our other
[Page 7]
chemical weapons and that
its destruction would yield political benefit. The
Secretary of Defense favors destruction of mustard
gas.
Recommendation: That you approve retention
of a lethal chemical capability and retention of the stocks in
Germany (Option 1-b). That you also approve the Secretary of
Defense’s recommendation to destroy or detoxify the stocks of
mustard gas, but in a phased manner to assure an adequate capability
while the development of safer weapons is in progress.
B. Should the U.S. “no first-use” policy on
lethal chemicals apply also to incapacitating chemicals?
Two options:
- 1.
- Affirm that the U.S. policy of “no first-use” applies also
to incapacitants.
- 2.
- Exclude incapacitants from a “no first-use” policy.
- — All agencies support our declaratory policy of
“no first-use” for lethal chemicals but there are
differing views as to whether it should apply to
incapacitants. The incapacitant we now have is not
an operationally effective agent because of its
uncertain effects, but research is continuing with
some promise of development.
- — The proponents of including incapacitants in the
policy argue that (1) their deterrent or retaliatory
value is questionable, and their principal utility
would be in a “first-use” situation against an
unprotected enemy; and (2) that most nations would
see such use contrary to the Geneva Protocol,
international law and past expressions of U.S.
policy. They argue also that first-use could lead to
escalation to lethal chemicals, and loosen
international constraints on chemical
warfare.
- — The opponents argue that an effective agent, if
developed, could give military advantage in a
variety of situations with fewer casualties and
might be accepted internationally as more “humane”
than other weapons.
- — The JCS position
is uncertain but they probably favor retaining a
“first-use” option. The Secretary of Defense may,
and all other agencies will, support including
incapacitants in our no “first-use” policy.
Recommendation: That you approve a “no
first-use” policy for incapacitants with the understanding that this
does not
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preclude
continued research and development toward an effective agent.
III. THE USE OF TEAR GAS AND/OR HERBICIDES AND
THE GENEVA PROTOCOL
The United States signed the Geneva Protocol in 1925 but has not
ratified it. The Protocol in effect bans the first-use of chemical
and biological weapons but the question as to whether tear gas and
herbicides are included under this ban is unresolved within the
bureaucracy. Our policy as to future use of tear gas and herbicides
may affect when and how we ratify the Protocol if we want to do so.
There are two questions to be decided.
- A.
-
Should we maintain the option for
unrestricted use of tear gas in war in Vietnam and in
the future or adopt a more limited policy? There
are three options:
- 1.
-
Unrestricted use to give
us full military advantage when and if we want
it.
- 2.
-
Limited use.
- 3.
-
No use in war except for
riot control.
- — The proponents of unrestricted use argue
that, used with conventional weapons in Vietnam,
tear gas has been effective in limiting U.S.
casualties and in restricting enemy mobility.
Moreover, we should not forego the advantages it
affords us now, nor should we foreclose our
options for the future. They contend that
limitation on its use would also cast doubt on the
legality of our practices in Vietnam.
- — The opponents contend that the advantages
in Vietnam may not accrue in other situations
where enemy defenses are more effective, or where
the enemy has an appreciable chemical capability
of his own. They argue also that most nations
consider the Geneva Protocol prohibits the use of
tear gas except for crowd control and that a
policy of “no use” or limited use for
“humanitarian” purposes would make it possible for
us to ratify the Geneva Protocol with less
difficulty than a policy of unrestricted use. No
agency, except possibly Arms Control and
Disarmament, proposes limitations on use in
Vietnam.
Recommendation: That you approve
continued unrestricted use of tear gas in Vietnam, but defer
decision as to future use.
- B.
-
Should the U.S. ratify the 1925 Geneva
Protocol and, if so, with what if any reservations or
interpretations?
The Geneva Protocol prohibits “use in war and asphyxiating, poisonous
and/or other gases… and Bacteriological Methods of Warfare”. The
position we can take toward ratification depends primarily on
whether we wish to continue our use of tear gas in Vietnam and to a
lesser extent on whether we wish to exclude incapacitating agents
from our “no first-use” policy.
If we were to forego the use of tear gas and apply the “no first-use”
policy to incapacitatants we could ratify the protocol without
reservation or interpretation.
If we want to exclude incapacitants from the “no first-use” policy,
ratification is all but out of the question since most parties to
the protocol would reject such a reservation.
If we wish to continue using tear gas we could ratify either with a
legal interpretation that the Protocol does not prohibit use of tear
gas or with a statement of understanding to this effect.
- — Proponents argue that ratification (1) would strengthen the
legal force of the Protocol and international restraints on
proliferation of BW and CW, (2) would be welcomed
internationally as a positive step reinforcing our past
statements, and (3) could enhance our position in any future
CBW arms control
negotiations.
- — Others argue that ratification would impose undesirable
legal inhibitions on our freedom to use these weapons first when
it might be in our interest to do so. Also, willingness to
accept limitation of tear gas would forego a weapon of proven
utility in Vietnam and cast doubt on the legality of use
there.
JCS probably oppose ratification and
at least would want to reserve incapacitating agents and tear gas
from the prohibitions of the Protocol. The Secretary of Defense may
support ratification as long as we keep our options open on the use
of tear gas. The Secretary of State favors ratification with a
statement of understanding (not a legal reservation) stating our
position on the use of tear gas.
Recommendation: That you approve
ratification without a legal (formal) reservation but with a
statement of our understanding that the provisions of the Protocol
do not prohibit use of tear gas in war.
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IV. AUTHORIZATION POLICY
The issue is whether the use of tear gas and herbicides in war, other
than in Vietnam, should require Presidential authorization as is the
case for all other chemical and biological weapons. Use of tear gas
and herbicides do not now require such authorization. There are
three options:
- 1.
- Require Presidential Authorization.
- 2.
- Delegate authority to the Secretary of Defense
- (a)
- for tear gas and herbicides or
- (b)
- for herbicides only
- 3.
- Require no prior authorization.
- — Those favoring Presidential authorization argue
that (1) the political implications of unrestricted
use of these weapons particularly tear gas and
anti-crop herbicides are grave, as demonstrated by
our experience in Vietnam. Furthermore, we should
not authorize future use until the situation in
which they would be employed is clear.
- — Others argue that these are non-lethal weapons
of proven utility and maximum flexibility for their
use should be retained. They contend that the
authority at minimum should be delegated to permit
planning and development of logistic support for
use. They contend that defoliants in particular
should require no prior authorization because they
are of proven benefit in reducing U.S. casualties
and criticism of their use has not been
great.
JCS probably prefer that no prior
authorization be required for the use of tear gas and herbicides.
The Secretary of Defense probably would prefer delegation of
authority to him. The Secretary of State may argue for a delegation
to the Secretary of Defense provided that decision to authorize use
would require his concurrence.
Recommendation: That you require
Presidential Authorization for the use of tear gas and anti-crop
herbicides (Option 1) and a delegation to the Secretary of Defense
to authorize use of defoliants.
