Editorial Note
The Paris Peace Accords, formally known as the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam, were initialed by President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger and North Vietnamese Politburo Member and Special Adviser to the North Vietnamese Delegation Le Duc Tho on January 23, 1973, and formally signed by representatives of the United States, the Republic of Vietnam, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and the Provisional Revolutionary Government on January 27. The accords consist of an agreement, four attached protocols, and a number of understandings. The text of the agreement and protocols were released by the White House on January 24: see Department of State Bulletin, February 12, 1973, pp. 169–188.
The emergence of the understandings, which were negotiated and agreed to by Kissinger and Le Duc Tho, can be traced in the record of the negotiations included in this volume and in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume IX, Vietnam, October 1972–January 1973. That the understandings were meant to remain unpublished and unknown to the public is clear from an exchange between Kissinger and Le Duc Tho that took place on January 11. As the two came closer to agreement on the wording of various understandings, Kissinger asked: “What happens to these understandings? We shouldn’t publish them.” Le Duc Tho replied: “We shouldn’t publish them. And they should be respected, should be carried out, should be implemented by you. We see that the understandings are not signed agreements but we respect the understandings, and we both have obligation to correctly carry out the understanding.” Kissinger agreed: “That is right. That is my view also.” (See Document 45.)
A January 11 paper entitled “Understandings Associated with the Agreement” lists the status of nine such “Mutual Understandings:” 1) “Reconnaissance (Agreed; Confirmed Jan. 9);” 2) “Aircraft Carriers (DRV wants ‘Vietnam’ and ‘within 60 days’);” 3) “Prisoners/MIA of the Parties (Agreed; Confirmed Jan. 9);” 4) “Laos and Cambodia (New version);” 5) “Mutual Understanding on Cambodia (Handed over; not accepted) (New version);” 6) “Unconditional Return of U.S. Prisoners (Handed over) We may drop;” 7) “Formation of NCNRC (Handed over; DRV rejects linkage) They drop;” 8) “Vietnamese Civilian Detainees in South Vietnam (New version);” and 9) “U.S. Government Civilian Personnel in South Vietnam (Handed over) (New version).” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 109, Country Files, Far East, Vietnam Negotiations, Understandings)
[Page 1779]The final text of the understanding on reconnaissance reads: “With respect to reconnaissance activities, the U.S. side confirms that with the coming into effect of the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam, reconnaissance activities against the territory of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam will cease completely and indefinitely.” (See Document 43.)
The final text of the understanding on “Aircraft Carriers,” on [Page 1780] which an unknown hand wrote “Agreed & retyped 1/13/73” reads: “In view of the prolonged hostilities which are now brought to a close in Vietnam and in order to contribute to the relaxation of tensions between the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the U.S. side states its firm intention to station its aircraft carriers at least three hundred nautical miles from the coast of North Vietnam after the withdrawal of its armed forces from South Vietnam. This statement does not, of course, affect transit.” (Attached but not printed at Tab C, Document 47.)
The final text of the understanding on prisoners and missing in action of the parties reads: “It is understood between the United States and the DRV that the phrase ‘of the parties’ in Article 8 (a) and (b) of the Agreement covers all personnel of the parties and from any other country.” (See Document 43.)
The final text of the understanding on Laos reads: “1. In the private meeting of January 10, 1973, between the U.S. and the DRV, it was agreed that the period of one month following the signature of the Agreement, specified in the above exchange of messages with respect to a ceasefire in Laos, will be reduced to a period of no more than 15 days. In the private meeting of January 9, 1973, it was furthermore agreed that all U.S. military and civilian prisoners detained in Laos shall be released no later than 60 days following the signature of the Agreement. 2. Because of the rearrangement and renumbering of the articles of the Agreement, as agreed to between the U.S. and DRV on November 21, 1972, Article 15 referred to in the above-quoted exchange of messages is now Article 20 of the Agreement.” (“Understandings Associated with the Agreement,” January 11; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 109, Country Files, Far East, Vietnam Negotiations, Understandings) The “exchange of messages” refers to two messages: an October 21 message from the DRV government to the U.S. government and an October 22 message from the U.S. government to the DRV government (for the full text, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume IX, Vietnam, October 1972–January 1973, Document 51). The relevant portions of these messages are attached but not printed at Tab D, Document 45.
The final text of the understanding on “The Return of Vietnamese Civilian Personnel Captured and Detained in South Vietnam,” on which an unknown hand wrote “As agreed & retyped 1/13/73” reads: “The U.S. side reaffirms the statement of Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President of the United States, on October 17, 1972, that the United States will use its maximum influence to secure the return of Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and detained in South Vietnam. In the spirit of national reconciliation and concord between the two South Vietnamese parties, the U.S. will exert this influence to promote the return of the greater part of such detainees within sixty days of the signing of the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam and the return of all such detainees within ninety days as envisaged by the Agreement.” (Attached but not printed at Tab A, Document 47.)
The final text of the understanding on “Withdrawal of United States Civilian Personnel Working in the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam,” on which an unknown hand wrote “As agreed & retyped 1/13/73,” reads: “The United States affirms that it will withdraw from South Vietnam all its civilian personnel working in the armed forces of the Republic of Vietnam and not reintroduce them. The numbers of the above-mentioned civilian personnel will be reduced gradually. Their withdrawal will be completed within 12 months of the signing of the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam, and the majority of them will be withdrawn within 10 months of the signing of the Agreement. Pending their withdrawal from South Vietnam, none of the above-mentioned civilian personnel will participate in military operations or operational military training.” (Attached but not printed at Tab B, Document 47.)
In addition to the six quoted above, a number of other understandings were reached. Among them was an understanding concerning Articles 12, 16, and 18 of the agreement, which reads: “It is understood between the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam that the word ‘unanimity’ in Articles 12 (a), 16 (b) and 18 (f) of the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam and in the protocols to the Agreement means ‘unanimous decision.’” (See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume IX, Vietnam, October 1972–January 1973, Document 317.) An understanding on the “Relationship Between the International Commission of Control & Supervision and the International Conference,” on which an unknown hand wrote “As agreed 1/23/73,” reads: “Nothing in the Protocol to The Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam concerning the International Commission of Control and Supervision shall prejudice Articles 18 (b), 18 (c) and 18 (h) of the Agreement with respect to arrangements the International Conference is to make for the relationship between the International Commission and the International Conference.” (Attached but not printed at Tab H, Document 48.)