Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XLII, Vietnam: The Kissinger-Le Duc Tho Negotiations

40. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Paris, December 12, 1972, 3:07–7:35 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• Le Duc Tho, Special Adviser to DRV Delegation to the Paris Conference on Vietnam
• Xuan Thuy, Minister, Chief DRV Delegate to Paris Conference on Vietnam
• Nguyen Co Thach, Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs
• Phan Hien, Delegation Member
• Luu Van Loi, Delegation Member
• Trinh Ngoc Thai, Delegation Member
• Tran Quang Co, Delegation Member
• Pham The Dong, Notetaker
• Nguyen Dinh Phuong, Interpreter
• Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• Ambassador William Sullivan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
• Ambassador William Porter, Chief of US Delegation to Paris Conference on Vietnam
• Winston Lord, NSC Staff
• John D. Negroponte, NSC Staff
• David A. Engel, NSC Staff, Interpreter
• Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff
• Miss Irene G. Derus, Notetaker

[The meeting began at 3:07 p.m. with the usual greeting and light conversation as follows:]

Dr. Kissinger: . . . I must go home this evening.

Le Duc Tho: I, too, am going home. On Thursday.

Dr. Kissinger: On Thursday. Can I give you a ride on my airplane? We would make quite a sensation at the airport if we left together. And you could enforce your schedule.

Le Duc Tho: Let me speak now, Mr. Special Adviser.

Dr. Kissinger: Please.

Le Duc Tho: Today we are facing two very great problems: First the question of the DMZ, second the question of signing of the agreement. We have made very great effort aimed at concluding the problem, settling the problem. But if we settle this problem, then we will have to ask from you something for another problem. This problem does not appear in the agreement.

Dr. Kissinger: Which problem?

Le Duc Tho: The question of signing of the agreement. And my proposal yesterday becomes now obsolete.

I have just received instructions from my government, and I meet your requirement on the DMZ as follows: “South and North Vietnam shall respect the demilitarized zone on either side of the Provisional Military Demarcation Line; South and North Vietnam shall promptly start negotiations toward the reestablishment of normal relations in various fields. Among the questions to be negotiated are the modalities of crossing the Provisional Military Demarcation Line.” [He hands over copy at Tab A.]

Dr. Kissinger: “Civil?” Excuse me.

Le Duc Tho: “The modalities of movement across the Provisional Military Demarcation Line.” This is what you proposed the other day. So I have responded to your requirement regarding the DMZ. In responding to you on this subject, we have responded to an important concern of yours and concern of the Saigon Administration, too. So you should respond to our requirement and have the agreement signed by the two parties and then by the four parties. If the four parties sign the agreement, this will reflect the reality of the Paris Conference over the past four years. So since now we are ending the war, if the two parties will sign the agreement and the four parties will sign the agreement, too, they will create a close relationship among the parties in implementing the agreement. We have taken into account of your concern with regard to the Saigon Administration; you should also take into account of our concern with regard to the PRG.

This is the instructions I have received from my government and I would like to convey them to you.

If we can conclude the negotiations today it is the best; but otherwise I am not in a position, of myself, to settle the question. If we don’t conclude our work today then I have to return to Hanoi and to exchange with our people in Hanoi, and then I will exchange with you through messages, if we don’t settle today. There is no other way, because I am not in authority to solve the problem. Because if we exchange our views with my government through messages it is very difficult and it takes a long distance, too. This is a reality. It is no other way. This is the message I have received from my government. We have informed you.

Dr. Kissinger: May I ask—are you finished, Mr. Special Adviser?

Le Duc Tho: I have finished.

Dr. Kissinger: Did the Minister report to you that Ambassador Sullivan is of the view that you have the biggest buffalo herd in North Vietnam? [Laughter]

Le Duc Tho: Now you have a great number of horses yourself! [Laughter] Both of us; one have buffalo and one have horses.

Dr. Kissinger: Of almost capitalistic proportions, the Special Adviser’s herd of buffalo.

Le Duc Tho: Naturally I should tell you that it is a great effort of ours, because the question of the DMZ is an important question for us. We can see that in the agreement this question is the greatest one newly added to the agreement. So we have taken into account your views.

Dr. Kissinger: Before—May I ask the Special Adviser what does he mean by four-party signing of a two-party document?

Le Duc Tho: What I mean is that one document is signed by the two parties; another copy of the document is signed by the four Foreign Ministers at the same time. The two copies are similar to one another.

Dr. Kissinger: Identical.

Le Duc Tho: Identical. In October you tell me that the four parties will sign and the two parties will sign the identical documents.

Dr. Kissinger: I don’t remember that I ever said the four parties will sign.

Le Duc Tho: You told me in October but it was always suggestions. I think that this question does not create any difficulties for you.

Dr. Kissinger: Only impossibilities!

Le Duc Tho: Because everything responded to you remain in the agreement, and with regard to the Saigon people you are the . . .

Dr. Kissinger: Impossible. We will get to that in a minute. I first want to—see, this is what makes negotiating with the Special Adviser so interesting. We think we settle one issue; we finally understand it; then the next morning he declares it obsolete and then comes another proposal. That way we don’t get overconfident.

Le Duc Tho: But as I told you, my personal views become obsolete because of the instructions I have received from my government. If I solve the question of the DMZ to you I have agreed to you on my own, but because of my government’s stand we have one day break to receive instructions. You know I am in a very difficult position.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, we are both in a very difficult position. The Special Adviser has also learned—in his previous incarnations he always had full powers, but he is learning that by throwing his government at me he can withdraw the thing three times, and then he lets his government withdraw it three times, so that he can sell it 6 times instead of the usual three.

Le Duc Tho: Let me explain this to you. I was fully authorized, or I have full authority, to settle with you on the basis of the instructions of my government, but on the basis that we have continuously a number of days of discussion and then here I exchange views with Minister Xuan Thuy and I will settle the problem with you. But precisely because I had full authority that time, this time I no longer have full authority, and there are questions I have to ask for instructions. There are problems on which I myself have agreed with you but my government disagreed to that, and I had to exchange views to and fro with my government.

Dr. Kissinger: I know the experience.

Le Duc Tho: This is a fact, Mr. Special Adviser. You have the same experience?

Dr. Kissinger: Oh, yes, I have the same experience. But now on the four-party signing, they are to sign with their titles the same document?

Le Duc Tho: Right.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, then it is almost a four-party document.

Le Duc Tho: This is what I am proposing.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but this is what I have told you for weeks presents impossible difficulty for us.

Le Duc Tho: You are always presenting difficulties. When the question of the DMZ arise, you said that this question is most difficult for you, and then when we have solved this difficulty you say there is another difficulty.

Dr. Kissinger: We have not solved that difficulty. That isn’t settled yet. I am just trying to get the signing straight. Yesterday the Special Adviser made a proposal on the signing which I think would work.

Le Duc Tho: But my government has just requested that the agreement be signed by two parties and by the four parties. I have no other way to solve the problem. I have to follow the instructions.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, I am afraid this will have to be something on which we exchange messages, because I am in no position to agree with this.

Le Duc Tho: Agreed.

Dr. Kissinger: When is Mr. Special Adviser going home?

Le Duc Tho: If we conclude today then it is possible that I will return home the day after tomorrow.

Dr. Kissinger: And if we don’t conclude today?

Le Duc Tho: If you agree to that, then we will conclude today and I have to report. If you don’t agree to that, we don’t conclude to that and I have to leave for home. It is because I do not have authority to solve this question on my own.

Dr. Kissinger: So either way you leave on Thursday?

Le Duc Tho: Thursday. Yes, Thursday.

Dr. Kissinger: Now let me say a word.

Le Duc Tho: It will take me four or five days to reach Hanoi. I am not so close as you are. Then I will meet with my government and one or two days later I will reply to you, because this is the instruction from my government I received. If we can’t solve that way, then I have to return home to exchange views with my government. Therefore, yesterday I told you settlement or no settlement I have to go home, but it is better if we can conclude and then I can go home, because otherwise it will take some time to send your message.

Dr. Kissinger: Let me turn to the issue of the DMZ. Now the text which we gave you on Saturday as a possible compromise text is a different text from the one you accepted. So the only text that has even been considered in Washington has been the possible compromise text which I gave you on Saturday. That is one on which I could conceivably send a message this afternoon to Washington. But that is not the text you are giving me.

Le Duc Tho: Your previous proposal was changed afterward by you too. Your previous proposal is like this sentence.

Dr. Kissinger: But that one was rejected. I changed it under instructions.

Le Duc Tho: For the time being, sir, I have no authority to change the sentence I have given you.

Dr. Kissinger: You see, this one, I think I would have to send a message, but I could get probably an answer before the end of the afternoon. And particularly our concern is with civil movement.

Le Duc Tho: We maintain the sentence that you had given us previously.

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Special Adviser, this is like our saying I maintain the sentence you have given us previously. The sentence I gave you on Saturday was the . . .

Le Duc Tho: [Interrupts] Naturally you have the right to change your sentence. But accepted or not, it belongs to me. I do not complain that you have changed your sentence.

Dr. Kissinger: The point, Mr. Special Adviser, is quite different. The only sentence you had before you legitimately was the sentence I gave you Saturday. You cannot pick any proposal I may have made over the last six months and say “I now accept this proposal.”

Le Duc Tho: I agree to what you had said previously. But now it is our stand. You can propose something else but we maintain our stand.

Dr. Kissinger: The only thing—you can propose anything you like. You have the right to do that, but the only thing you cannot do is to say you have accepted our proposal when we have withdrawn it and made another one.

Le Duc Tho: We can now say that this is our proposal.

Dr. Kissinger: That is all right. That I understand. Now to that let me say the following. What concerns us—I have a few obsessions, as you know: the Ho Chi Minh Trail, the DMZ, Madame Binh. I don’t want to wake up one morning and read in the newspaper that the Minister, whose good relationship with Madame Binh has been established at Avenue Kleber, had made an agreement with her that the 325th Division can move across the DMZ in the pursuit of carrying out modalities of movement across the DMZ.

Le Duc Tho: Let us discuss on this question. The question you are raising is another one.

Dr. Kissinger: This is why I like the word “civil movement” or “movement of people”.

Le Duc Tho: You see here is a sentence that the two South Vietnamese parties will meet and will discuss and consult on the normal relations on various fields, and among the questions to be discussed there are the questions of the modalities for movement across the DMZ. I read it to you.

Dr. Kissinger: But the thing that haunts me, Mr. Special Adviser . . . Go ahead, read it to me.

Le Duc Tho: “South and North Vietnam shall promptly start negotiations toward the reestablishment of normal relations in various fields. Among the questions to be negotiated are the modalities of movement across the Provisional Military Demarcation Line.”

Dr. Kissinger: But movement by who?

Le Duc Tho: Let me finish.

Dr. Kissinger: Buffalos can move unimpeded. [Laughter]

Le Duc Tho: Except a steel buffalo! [Laughter]

Dr. Kissinger: I have to tell the Special Adviser something that shows how cautious the State Department is. We write an annual report for the President on foreign policy and there is always one section in that report about general humane international problems. So we wrote in there, “Animals do not recognize national boundaries”. So we sent it to the State Department for comment. And the State Department operates on the principle that you shouldn’t make unnecessary enemies, so they edited this sentence and they said “Some animals do not recognize national boundaries.”

Le Duc Tho: But the State Department lives on words, words and terms.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, our concern—go ahead, I interrupted you. Were you finished, Mr. Special Adviser?

Le Duc Tho: Because I have said that some of the questions to be negotiated by the two parties are the modalities for movement across the Provisional Military Demarcation Line. Therefore, on the agenda of the subjects to be discussed by the two parties, North and South Vietnam, probably the question of military movement never arise.

Dr. Kissinger: But looking at the record, it is at least conceivable, particularly since your demobilized soldiers can go anywhere they want to—they may all want to go where it is warm. Bringing their tanks with them. [Tho laughs] Because they are so used to them.

Le Duc Tho: You are recalling historical facts but we have also historical facts to recall. Article 7 of the Agreement stipulated that neither party shall accept the introduction of troops, armaments, weapons and war materials.

Dr. Kissinger: Then why do you object adding the word “civil” before “movement”? Because if you accept “civil” I can accept the sentence.

Le Duc Tho: We maintain the sentence. No change.

Dr. Kissinger: I like my persuasive argument. My arguments are very persuasive: the Special Adviser listens and then he says he maintains his sentence.

Le Duc Tho: Because if you put “civil” it does not mean people, the movement of the people, but there are also boats and so on. Naturally I don’t mean here troops to move across but I mean persons and human being, boats and so forth.

Dr. Kissinger: Are you making a distinction between persons and human beings? Then use “non-military movement”; that excludes boats. If you say “non-military” you can take boats.

Le Duc Tho: This sentence does not mean that the movement of troops, armaments, war materials and ammunition are permitted, because Article 7 of the Agreement prohibits such movement already.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, then why don’t you say, “except that prohibited by Article 7”?

Le Duc Tho: Your formulation makes it complicated. The modalities will be discussed by the two parties, North and South Vietnam.

Dr. Kissinger: Who are the two parties—the Minister and Madam Binh?

Le Duc Tho: The two zones, North and South Vietnam.

Dr. Kissinger: But who participates in the meeting?

Le Duc Tho: The two zones will participate in the meeting. In every chapter they say North and South Vietnam, not this chapter.

Mr. Negroponte [to Mr. Kissinger]: He said three parties.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, I think we will have to communicate with each other on this subject, and also on the signing.

Well then, how shall we proceed on the remainder? Should we get as much done as possible on other matters?

Le Duc Tho: There are questions in the text of the agreement that the two parties still disagree.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Le Duc Tho: And there are also some understandings that have not been agreed to between Minister Xuan Thuy and Ambassador Sullivan.

Dr. Kissinger: We yielded on every point this morning. In fact we were thinking of having a meeting without you this afternoon, Mr. Special Adviser. Yes, let us do the text first and then let us discuss the unilateral statements on which there is no agreement yet.

[Mr. Loi changes places with Mr. Hien at Tho’s left.]

You have a new saboteur here now.

Xuan Thuy: He has participated in the discussions of these points.

Le Duc Tho: But you are the commander of the saboteurs.

Dr. Kissinger: According to my saboteurs we have no problems until we come to Article 8(c). Do we agree on that? We now have a title that is as long as paragraph (a). [Tho laughs] Only your saboteur and mine will understand it.

[Pointing to Mr. Thach who is coaching Mr. Loi]: No, no, Mr. Vice Minister. No, no, there are two others for the text. That is their turn. The expert saboteur for the substance you are.

All right. The title then we agree on, is that correct? Let me just read it—“The Return of Captured Military Personnel and Foreign Civilians and Captured and Detained Vietnamese Civilian Personnel.”

Le Duc Tho: Yes.

Mr. Kissinger: And we agree on that and on 8(a). Just so that we are sure we understand each other, you wanted to say “the return of captured military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties,” and we agree to that, but we want to make sure we have a mutual understanding that “the parties” include everyone associated with the parties.

Le Duc Tho: We agree.

Dr. Kissinger: All right then. We have “of the parties” in 8(b). That is all agreed. You wanted to say “the question of the return of civilian military personnel captured and detained.” You wanted “of the return of”.

Le Duc Tho: The two parties will discuss and settle the problem and after the settlement they will return.

Dr. Kissinger: That is right. Yes, I accept. So the sentence will now read “the question of the return of”. The only thing that is required is to put the word “civil” before “movement” in Article 15 of the DMZ. [Tho laughs] That is a reasonable exchange. You get three words for one. [Laughter]

Le Duc Tho: You are trading horses.

Dr. Kissinger: This is very difficult with the Special Adviser.

Well, your drafters tried to sneak something into the text which we had not accepted, namely “two” rather than “three”.

Le Duc Tho: The reason I propose two months is that when reading the chapter our people will see that for other categories of prisoners they will be released within two months, and for Vietnamese they will be released only within three months. Therefore it is discrimination between the military personnel and the Vietnamese civilian personnel. This discrepancy will make them think. Moreover this question will be discussed and settled by the two South Vietnamese parties. Moreover this is a humanitarian question. If they will [not] be returned and they will be detained for one month or more, this will create unnecessary suffering for these people.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but we had already agreed on this, and that was considered a very essential element in the agreement, for two reasons: One, to separate the issue of South Vietnamese civilian detainees from the issue of American prisoners, as I explained to you at the time. And secondly, to permit the necessary time for a process which is inevitably related to other parts of the agreement, in practice. This was already agreed to in October, and I think the Special Adviser withdrew his objections to this paragraph for at least five different concessions this week. [Tho laughs]

Le Duc Tho: You refer to the linking of American prisoners with Vietnamese civilian detainees. I have told you there is no such link because the chapter is divided into different paragraphs (a), (b) and (c).

Dr. Kissinger: Does Madame Binh know this?

Le Duc Tho: And as a matter of fact I have agreed with you on this question. As a matter of fact I have agreed with you on that question, but the reason why I propose two months now is because this is a question we are having in our heart. We are attached to it.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, I am in no position to accept it.

Le Duc Tho: Let us go to another page of the agreement.

Dr. Kissinger: All right. What is your next problem? Oh, Article 12(b). Yes, I got it. We propose simply to say “the implementation of this agreement,” because all the obligations are stated in the agreement.

[At this point, Mr. Engel tells Dr. Kissinger that the group is being photographed through the window.]

Somebody tells me that somebody is filming through the window. It is all right with me, but I want the Special Adviser to brush his hair. [Mr. Thach gets up to close the curtain.] I saw the microphone in this light was becoming visible. [Pointing to the recorder]: This is for Madame Binh but there is one for the French Communist Party. Now we have still not settled the translation of “promote”. I like the word “khuyen khich”. I think it catches the meaning exactly. I have studied it very carefully.

Le Duc Tho: You like the word “khuyen khich” but I like the word “don doc”. And in our draft of October 8 we use this word “don doc”. There is nothing to be worried about this word because all operation is by consultation and unanimity. [Laughter]

Dr. Kissinger: All the North Vietnamese people like it.

Le Duc Tho: You see the task of this Council has been greatly reduced by your proposal. If now you wanted to deprive this paragraph of the word “don doc”, it is tantamount to the dissolution of the Council and let the Council sit idle.

Dr. Kissinger: “Khuyen khich” gives it plenty to do on the principle of unanimity. It can encourage. And you gave us the English text on October 8, you didn’t hand me a Vietnamese text, and the English text says “promote”.

Le Duc Tho: We, in our Vietnamese text, we use the word “don doc”.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but that was a secret from us. You can say you could give us an English text of one thing and then say it’s the translation of a famous Vietnamese poem and then we are obliged to accept your Vietnamese text.

Le Duc Tho: Regarding this chapter we can say that we have made the greatest efforts to meet your requirements. So we should have this Vietnamese words. We have them to our people.

Dr. Kissinger: We can try “khuyen doc”.

Le Duc Tho: No meaning at all!

Dr. Kissinger: It shows good will. How about “don khich”? 50% for each. Well, let us reserve this now. As for the tasks, its task is the “implementation of this agreement”.

Le Duc Tho: “And the attached protocols,” because the protocols will be signed by the parties too.

Dr. Kissinger: So far we haven’t even got the agreement signed by any parties.

Le Duc Tho: We put it in advance then, and after, when the protocol is agreed to, it will be signed.

Dr. Kissinger: We haven’t yet had the privilege of reading your protocols. Will we see them today?

Le Duc Tho: I will give you later—soon.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, “free lunch tomorrow”. [Laughter] We took out of this sentence—it is a classic example of the Special Adviser’s method of giving with one hand and taking back with the other—we took out of this sentence on the duties of the Council “the maintenance of the ceasefire”. Then the Special Adviser puts back in the protocols, which deals with the ceasefire, so we are right back to where we started. So there would be no point whatever in keeping these.

Le Duc Tho: We think that the implementation of the agreement in itself means to maintain the ceasefire and the preservation of peace. Therefore we dropped these two sentences because the fact of implementing the agreement means to maintain. This is a fact. We would like to add “the attached protocols”, to make it clearer only, and as a matter of fact the parties will implement the agreement and the protocols and the parties will sign this document.

Dr. Kissinger: The Special Adviser is too optimistic.

Le Duc Tho: So you are pessimistic now?

Dr. Kissinger: At this moment we don’t have an agreement.

Le Duc Tho: But although we have not reached an agreement, are you pessimist?

Dr. Kissinger: I am becoming somewhat more pessimistic, yes. When I came here on November 20 I was certain we would have the agreement signed by today. I thought it would be signed December 10.

Le Duc Tho: But it is your own thinking because you have raised so many problems. How could we solve all of them in two days? But if we had kept to the old agreement then everything would have been done by now and long since.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but the old agreement—we have explained that problem so often, and pretty soon we will be forced to do it publicly if we keep getting attacked.

Le Duc Tho: You claim that we have been prolonging the negotiations and prolonging the agreement, but it is not true. Then I have to reply to you.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, what in fact have we settled here now? We have settled Article 8(c). No, we haven’t settled that yet. We have added the word “the return of”. Let us come back to this. This morning we agreed on the word “their military effectives”.

Le Duc Tho: I agree.

Dr. Kissinger: All right, that is agreed. And then in the last sentence—it is not the biggest question of which history informs us—we said “The two South Vietnamese parties will do their utmost to accomplish the foregoing steps” and then I look back and there are no steps, so I want to say “the two South Vietnamese parties will . . . accomplish this”. It has no profound significance. What steps? I don’t care. I will leave “the following steps”. As a sign of good will.

Le Duc Tho: This makes no difference for me. I can show good will to you.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, nobody’s going to beat this buffalo. Well then in English it’s better “to accomplish this”.

Le Duc Tho: No problem.

Dr. Kissinger: If the Special Adviser can’t find a double meaning in it, then it can’t have it.

Article 14. [To Mr. Engel]: What is the trouble here?

Well, the question here is that we want to say what the obligation of South Vietnam is, and in English this only makes sense if it is expressed in the future. [Both sides confer.]

Ambassador Porter has requested to be transferred back to Avenue Kleber. [Laughter] Okay. Well, I agree. We will keep “will” in English and you will have your translation. We will give you three “wills” for the word “civil”, and you accept it?

Le Duc Tho: It is an outstanding question.

Dr. Kissinger: The Special Adviser meant “civil” is an outstanding question?

Le Duc Tho: Yes, an outstanding question.

Dr. Kissinger: I thought maybe you had received your instructions.

Le Duc Tho: We have shown a great deal of good will but you have not settled.

Ambassador Sullivan: We have shown “will” and not good will!

Le Duc Tho: Because Ambassador Sullivan always creates new words.

Dr. Kissinger: It is that 325th Division.

Article 16. No problem.

Article 15. Now I remember that the Special Adviser at least six times sold me the proposition that the PRG should be mentioned only in the Preamble and not in the text and we had agreed to that. That was agreed upon. The only reason it stayed in Chapter VI was . . .

Le Duc Tho: I agree to delete.

Dr. Kissinger: Thank you. After only 60 seconds of struggle. [Tho laughs] Good, I appreciate it. Now you want the Four-Party Commission dissolved in 60 days. Our only concern is the problem of missing in action.

Le Duc Tho: You see, the Four-Party Joint Military Commission will be performing important tasks and among these tasks the task of finding out information about the missing in action, this is only small one as compared to the other tasks. Therefore after 60 days all the other tasks have been fulfilled. It should be dissolved. It cannot be needed because of the question of persons missing in action, because we can find out another way of finding out these people missing in action. Because on the pretext of people missing in action you can keep this Joint Commission 50 years.

Dr. Kissinger: If we can put something in the protocol that takes care of this problem we will agree to 60 days. We have no desire to prolong the Four-Party Commission and I am sure we can find a satisfactory solution to this. It is not a question of principle.

Le Duc Tho: Agreed. So we can put in this paragraph that “the Four-Party Joint Commission will end its activities within 60 days.”

Dr. Kissinger: I will accept this now, with the understanding that we will work out an agreeable language in the protocol for the missing in action. [Tho nods yes.] We have no interest in prolonging it except for the missing in action.

Now, we settled (a) and (b).

Now earlier, Mr. Special Adviser, under 16(a) you wanted the civilian detainees under the Four-Power Commission but they are also under the Two-Power Joint Commission, and it doesn’t make any sense to have them under the Four-Power Commission because it is between the two South Vietnamese parties.

Le Duc Tho: The reason why we have put 8(c) in this sentence is because in the Four-Party Joint Commission there is the participation of the two South Vietnamese parties.

Dr. Kissinger: But it is also in the Two-Party Joint Commission. This is where it should be. The problems involving the two South Vietnamese parties alone are only in the Two-Party Commission. I mean, the distinction between the Two-Party and the Four-Party Commission is that the Four-Party Commission deals with those problems that concerns the four parties and the Two-Party Commission deals with those problems that concern the two parties. And the result of your proposal is to get us involved in a two-party matter.

Le Duc Tho: It is logical to put in the two Commissions, the Four-Party Joint Commission and the Two-Party Joint Commission, because in this Two-Party Joint Commission there are both the two South Vietnamese parties.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, then everything should be in the Four-Party Joint Commission. The distinction between the Two-Party and the Four-Party is that those issues in which the US and DRV are also involved are the issues that are in the Four-Party Commission.

Le Duc Tho: I agree to you then.

Dr. Kissinger: I knew you understood English. Ever since you read Harriman’s book!

So we will refer to 8(a) and (b) here, and 8(c) under the Two-Party. All right.

Article 17. We go back to our original understanding and just say “The two South Vietnamese parties” without naming them. It is the same as Article 16. It is the same problem as Article 16. We were in great shape until your assistants got involved. Maybe you and I and an interpreter should go into a separate room. [They confer.]

Le Duc Tho: I think that we would like to keep the two South Vietnamese parties, two names of the governments here, in this place.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, it doesn’t make any difference.

Le Duc Tho: This only place.

Dr. Kissinger: But to have them in the only place makes the whole issue then ridiculous that we have been talking about all week. For two weeks we have been discussing that they should be mentioned only in the Preamble.

Le Duc Tho: We will return to this question later.

Dr. Kissinger: If they are mentioned once, then everything we have agreed to is senseless.

Le Duc Tho: Let me think over it. Let us discuss other questions.

Dr. Kissinger: All right. I am reaching the point where I understand this chapter, Mr. Special Adviser. Do you?

Le Duc Tho: [Laughing] I scarcely remember this chapter.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, this then means that under Article 17 we include 8(b). You want to include 8(b) and 8(c) in the Two-Party Commission and we agree with you. That was your proposal. We accept your proposal.

Le Duc Tho: We like to mention only 8(c), not (b).

Dr. Kissinger: That is fine. All right. [Aside to Sullivan: What is the hooker in that?] No, you’re right—8(c) only. So now we come to Article 18. Now after the change we made, the International Commission should report to the two parties about Article 8(c), not to the four parties.

Le Duc Tho: I think that the International Commission should report to the four parties on the implementation of Article 8(a) and not (b), because 8(b) comes under the responsibility of the parties and not . . .

Dr. Kissinger: I can agree. Oh, wait a minute. (b) is missing in action. You don’t want the International Commission involved in the missing in action.

Le Duc Tho: Right, because this question of people missing in action is a question which will be prolonging for a long time.

Dr. Kissinger: Let us see what your protocol will be on this issue. We are interested in the fact, not the theory. If we can make a satisfactory bilateral arrangement we will consider it.

Le Duc Tho: Agreed.

Dr. Kissinger: I think, incidentally, our experts, after we are through, ought to look at it again to make sure we all agreed to the same thing. [Everyone laughs] I am developing a Vietnamese mind.

Le Duc Tho: We will carry it out this time only.

Dr. Kissinger: Not us—not you and I—our saboteurs!

Now Article 8(c) will be put back under Article 18(c)—supervision of Article 8(c). We are agreeing with you. And so will Article 13. Your professor of Canon Law here has developed a new theory of it.

Le Duc Tho: You said on December 4 that the Article 13 did not come under the International Commission, therefore we drop this.

Dr. Kissinger: No, no, no, no, that was something different. That was produced by the complexity of my language and the subtlety of your intellect. Let me explain. I had written into the text of Article 13 that it would be under international supervision, and then I considered that since no other article had that phrase it was unfair to put it into this article as a special phrase. And therefore I meant to say we drop the sentence “with respect to international supervision” which would single it out, but it should be under international supervision in that Chapter VI. It always was. In every previous draft it was mentioned in that chapter, including the October draft. In the October draft it was mentioned. I didn’t mean to take it out of Chapter VI. I just wanted to take the phrase out of Chapter IV particularly. It would not look discriminatory in that one paragraph.

Le Duc Tho: I agree to put it here.

Dr. Kissinger: Thank you. So now we are at my favorite chapter, Cambodia and Laos. We can discuss the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Has your assistant explained the problem of Cambodia and Laos to you? We want to say “shall respect” or “agree to respect”.

Le Duc Tho: We prefer to drop this because “shall” or “agree to” is not needed. Because if you put “shall”, the future, then one does not know when.

Dr. Kissinger: When it starts?

Le Duc Tho: Yes, in Vietnamese language future “shall” means not now, in the future.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, let us say “starting immediately they shall respect”.

Le Duc Tho: “The parties participating in the Paris Conference on Vietnam strictly respect . . .”

Dr. Kissinger: This creates the impression that everything that is now going on will be continued. In English, it means “must”.

Le Duc Tho: Because now we are respecting the 1954 Geneva Agreements and the 1962 Geneva Agreements. It means that we will, but we have been respecting these Agreements since 1954, since 1962.

Dr. Kissinger: Every time that the Special Adviser explains one of these provisions to me, my uneasiness about this agreement multiplies. How about the 316th Division that is running around in the Plaine des Jarres? Are they demobilized troops?

Mr. Phuong: Soldiers who have chosen to return to that Plaine.

Le Duc Tho: Because if you put the word “se” in Vietnamese it means—say, if there were such a sentence—“the parties will strictly respect the 1972 Geneva Agreements on Laos”.

Dr. Kissinger: There is no 1972 . . .

Le Duc Tho: But this is something not yet happened, futurity, you see. If so we can use the word “se”. We come to use the word “se”. Here is the futurity.

Dr. Kissinger: How about “must”? “Shall” is not future in English.

Mr. Phuong: Mr. Engel told me the other day and many times that it did not make a difference between “shall” and “will”.

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Engel is a Vietnamese expert. He knows nothing about English.

Le Duc Tho: We accept the Vietnamese word “se”.

Dr. Kissinger: The result will be that they will say it doesn’t go into effect until 1990. [Tho laughs]

Le Duc Tho: I agree and regarding the internal affairs of Cambodia and Laos, we can use the word “shall”.

Dr. Kissinger: “Shall”? “Should”?

Le Duc Tho: “Should”.

Dr. Kissinger: “Should” is fine.

Article 23: we haven’t agreement on the text yet, so there is no sense discussing it. Or we haven’t agreed yet on the form of signing, so there is no sense discussing it.

Le Duc Tho: The description of Article 13 in Article 18(c)—this is how we described it: “Article 13 regarding the agreements reached by the two South Vietnamese parties on the reduction of the military effectives of the two South Vietnamese parties and the demobilization of the troops being reduced.” I read again.

Dr. Kissinger: Give it to me again.

Mr. Phuong: “Article 13 regarding the agreements reached by the two South Vietnamese parties on the reduction of their military effectives and the demobilization of the troops being reduced.”

Dr. Kissinger: I think we should simply say “regarding the reduction of military effectives of the two South Vietnamese parties and the demobilization.” Because we don’t say in any other paragraph where the two parties are negotiating, about “agreements reached”. We don’t say it in Article 8(c). But the rest is all right, “regarding the reduction”.

I agree to everything else except “regarding the agreements reached”, because we are not saying it with respect to anything else. We do not say about 9(c), “about the agreements reached between the South Vietnamese parties about the return of detainees.”

Le Duc Tho: The reason why we have proposed this sentence is that the International Commission controls the implementation of the agreements reached by the two South Vietnamese on the question of reduction of military effectives and the demobilization, and not when the two South Vietnamese are discussing these questions. Because discussion comes under the sovereignty of the two South Vietnamese parties and the International Commission should not interfere in the discussions.

Dr. Kissinger: The International Commission does not interfere in the discussion. First of all the National Council does not establish this. It says the two parties agree. Secondly, the International Commission does not interfere in anything in the discussion; the International Commission is concerned with the implementation.

My associates think that your friend at the left [Mr. Loi] is the head of the Buffalo Traders’ Trade Union. I suggest he move to his usual seat.

Le Duc Tho: But the horse traders’ syndicate is very big. [Laughter] The sentence you propose to Article 13 has broad meaning. I cannot accept that.

Dr. Kissinger: No, I am accepting your sentence minus the word “the agreements”. I am saying “regarding the reduction of South Vietnamese”, or whatever you have there, for demobilization and the reduction of their effectives. They will be governed by Article 13 in this. The article does not confer any obligations. In fact we are ready to drop all the descriptions and just name the articles. Chapter VI is not an operational chapter. It only describes what article is under what Commission.

Le Duc Tho: We will leave this question to the experts, how to rewrite.

Dr. Kissinger: All right, and then the experts will bring it back to us. [Laughter] I think your associate on the left has many great qualities but he doesn’t know the word yes. What is the Vietnamese word for “yes”? Mr. Engel will teach you during the break.

This leaves us Article 12, and what to do about missing in action and the Four-Power Commission. We have tentatively agreed to dissolve the Four-Power Commission after 60 days providing your protocol gives us some assurance on the missing in action. And the same is true with respect to the competence of the International Commission. So I recommend we defer this until we’ve seen your protocols. With respect to Article 12, let me think about it during a break which I would like to propose. I am very attached to the word “khuyen khich.”

Le Duc Tho: I am attached to the word “don doc”.

Dr. Kissinger: How about flipping a coin? Shall we take a little break? We settled a lot of issues.

Le Duc Tho: But there are still many left.

Dr. Kissinger: Only the word “civil”.

Le Duc Tho: A great question. You have not responded to me. I have shown my good will.

[The meeting broke at 5:15 and resumed at 6:07 p.m.]

Dr. Kissinger: Well then, we shall leave the agreement to be worked over by the experts tomorrow and we will study the issue of missing in action in the light of the protocols you will give us. Have you given us the protocols, incidentally?

Has there been a shift of power in the DRV delegation? Our people always study the wall posters along the Kremlin and I think the Vice Minister’s wall poster has slipped back a little bit.

Xuan Thuy: These protocols: the ceasefire, the Four-Party Joint Commission and the Two-Party Joint Commission in one document; and another, the protocol on the Commission of International Control and Supervision. [Hands over Ceasefire Protocol at Tab B and ICCS Protocol at Tab C.]

Dr. Kissinger: I will bet the Special Adviser wrote them personally. [Tho nods no.] May I ask, has he read them? [Laughter]

Le Duc Tho: I gave full authority to Minister Xuan Thuy. [Laughter]

Dr. Kissinger: If the Minister did it, the DMZ is now running north-south instead of east-west, through the middle of Cambodia.

[Laughter]

Le Duc Tho: I have discussed the question with the Minister and other of my colleagues.

Xuan Thuy: As to drafting the document, I have not written any word. Only type-written!

We shall have a separate protocol on the captured and detained people and missing in action people—separate protocol.

Dr. Kissinger: Not captured and detained. Missing in action only.

Xuan Thuy: In one protocol, regarding 8(a) and 8(b).

Dr. Kissinger: Are all these nine points that you listed in the Republic of Vietnam? [Laughter. Tho nods yes.] Well, we will have to study this tonight. And we should have a discussion tomorrow of the principles of it. I agree with the suggestion of the Special Adviser that Ambassador Sullivan should stay here for some days and discuss it.

Xuan Thuy: You know in Laos there are a great many buffalos and even elephants.

Le Duc Tho: So you are now becoming elephant trader!

Xuan Thuy: And there is another protocol on the removal of mines.

Le Duc Tho: We paid attention to this question and you don’t. So I now complete the series of protocols.

Dr. Kissinger: Have you counted them? And numbered them? [Laughter] No, we have paid attention to it. We have as a matter of fact moved mine sweepers to Honolulu, and we intend to carry this out.

So I think we have gone as far with the text of the agreement as we can go today.

We will take care of Article 12(b) when we make the final adjustments. When the word “civil” is added to Article 15. [Tho laughs]

Le Duc Tho: This we cannot do.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, should we discuss the understandings then? What does the Special Adviser propose?

Le Duc Tho: Regarding the understandings, this morning Minister Xuan Thuy discussed these understandings with Ambassador Sullivan. Therefore I will leave Minister Xuan Thuy to express our views in this connection, because he discussed the matter with Ambassador Sullivan this morning.

There are the understandings on civilian personnel and detainees and on a number of other questions. If we have solved the question of American civilian personnel and the question of civilian detained as we have done in the agreement, it is because we want to have some understanding from your side. We think regarding the question of civilian personnel everything is agreed; it is the question the period of time only now. Minister Xuan Thuy will express our views.

Xuan Thuy: This morning we tabled a number of understandings and Ambassador Porter did the same—a number of understandings. We have agreed on the understandings with regard to the reconnaissance activities.

Dr. Kissinger: Can we just read it, to be sure we have it correctly?

Xuan Thuy: Only one word disagreed. Let me read it—“With respect to reconnaissance activities, the U.S. side confirms that with the coming into effect of the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam, reconnaissance activities against the territory of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam will cease completely and indefinitely.”

Ambassador Porter did not want to keep the word “indefinitely”. So I argued that since we have put in the agreement that cessation of hostilities is durable and without limit of time, therefore I think that we can put the word “indefinitely” here. The only one word we still disagree to.

Dr. Kissinger: All right, I agree to it. See, the Minister has a special way with me, Mr. Special Adviser. I am sure he is going to revise Chapter V for me. In every previous group of meetings we had, the Minister was assigned the job of breaking them off. He has a great speech for it. I have learned it by heart but I have never found the occasion to use it. The Special Adviser’s are very useful to me as I told you.

Xuan Thuy: Regarding Article 5, I will leave it to the two Special Advisers to discuss.

Dr. Kissinger: He is going to forget about it.

Xuan Thuy: Let me discuss only the understandings.

Dr. Kissinger: It isn’t Article 5. It is Chapter V. I like Article 5. I am very pleased with Article 5.

Xuan Thuy: Regarding the aircraft carriers, I propose to add “other U.S. warships” to the aircraft carriers. Secondly, instead of the “shores of North Vietnam” I would propose the “shores of Vietnam”. Let me read the understanding: “With respect to U.S. aircraft carriers and other warships, the U.S. side cannot accept any restrictions regarding the transit of aircraft carriers as was pointed out by Dr. Kissinger to Special Adviser Le Duc Tho on October 11, 1972. Thus the understanding on this question with respect to mentioning a distance of 300 nautical miles from the shores of Vietnam refers to the stationing of U.S. aircraft carriers and other warships.”

Dr. Kissinger: Well, we have to stick with the understanding we gave you. Because it runs counter to any concept of freedom of the seas. It is already a very special exception. And we also have no legal basis for making it Vietnam; we have a basis for making it North Vietnam. If you draw a circle, the difference isn’t all that great.

Xuan Thuy: This morning I expressed my views saying that Vietnam is more logical because it has been said before by you. As to the word “other warships . . .”

Dr. Kissinger: But the Special Adviser has often pointed out to me that I am capable of saying illogical things. So the mere fact that I may have said something would not yet prove it.

Xuan Thuy: I mention other warships because U.S. warships are now daily shelling the coast of Vietnam. And at the very beginning it is a fact that the U.S. warships, they cause the current war. Therefore if we put “other warships” or say put the word “Vietnam”, it will show all the better that the U.S. is not now threatening Vietnam, and the people of Vietnam will have more respect for you.

Dr. Kissinger: [Laughs] We appreciate the Minister’s thoughtfulness but we will give up that unilateral advantage. So I think, since it is a unilateral American undertaking, without reciprocity, I think we should stick with what we gave you. And of course the shelling of the Vietnamese coast will stop under the provisions of the ceasefire. And of course they will stay outside the territorial waters. Except for mine sweepers. [Vietnamese laugh] Incidentally, does your protocol for mine sweepers explain how American personnel can operate in North Vietnam while they are sweeping your mines? I mean, have you addressed that question?

Xuan Thuy: So we leave it aside.

Dr. Kissinger: Do you mean that you are dropping it?

Xuan Thuy: For the time being. We will come back to it. Now regarding the prisoners.

Dr. Kissinger: I really asked a serious question. You said you were doing a protocol on mine sweeping. You should make some provisions in that protocol for our American personnel to operate in North Vietnam while they are sweeping mines. Where they should live and how they get supplies, because it is a complex operation.

Xuan Thuy: I shall give you.

Dr. Kissinger: No, just make sure to include in there.

Xuan Thuy: Agreed. You haven given us four understandings regarding Cambodia and Laos and the return of prisoners, but I propose these questions be in one understanding only. Because the message of the Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Mr. Pham Van Dong on October 21 in reply to the U.S. President’s message of October 20 have dealt with these four questions.

Dr. Kissinger: Which four questions?

Xuan Thuy: The four papers you gave us this morning dealt with them.

Dr. Kissinger: That is right. We put them into two separate ones, by putting everything that dealt with Cambodia into one and everything that dealt with Laos into another. So that explains why we have a separate one on Cambodia and a separate one on Laos.

Now the two others, Mr. Minister. The one on the unconditional return of prisoners was covered with respect to Laos in exchanges between the President and the Prime Minister. But since Madame Binh’s press conference we have been concerned that she might not have been fully aware of the understanding between the Special Adviser and us, or not realized that paragraphs 8(a) and 8(b) stand by themselves. And therefore we want to make absolutely certain that this understanding applies throughout Indochina.

Xuan Thuy: Let me finish my ideas. In the message of Prime Minister Pham Van Dong on October 21st in reply to the October 20 message of the President of the United States, we have clearly spoken about all the questions regarding Laos and Cambodia and the return of American prisoners. Therefore we think that we had better excerpt all these paragraphs and add the first paragraph of the October 22 of the U.S. side.

Dr. Kissinger: Can you read me what it says?

Xuan Thuy: This first paragraph reads as follows: “The President notes with appreciation the message from the Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam which satisfies all his points with respect to Laos and Cambodia as well as U.S. prisoners.” In doing so, there will be only one paper. It is simple and adequate, and this such paper will have value because it excerpts the statements made by the leaders of the two states.

Dr. Kissinger: Let me understand. Because whenever the DRV side says something is logical and reasonable I am in trouble. [Laughter] What you propose is that we use the text—I think the Special Adviser and I are beginning to understand each other.

Xuan Thuy: So there is no trust at all, always distrust.

Dr. Kissinger: No, the Special Adviser and I understand each other. The trouble between us is not that we don’t understand each other; we understand each other only too well. [Laughter]

In the 16th century the Austrian King said he was in complete agreement with the King of France because they both wanted Milano. [Laughter]

Xuan Thuy: When there is too much understanding it is tantamount to no understanding at all. [Laughter]

Dr. Kissinger: After we make peace the Minister and I will take our act on a tour. We’ll go on the stage around the United States.

Xuan Thuy: But you are acting much more than I. But I understand your acting. [Laughter]

Dr. Kissinger: Now, do I understand correctly that you want to use the entire message of the President of October 20 relating to Laos and Cambodia, the reply of your Prime Minister, and then the reply to the Prime Minister of the President again? If you do, I agree with it.

Xuan Thuy: What I want and I think it is sufficient and adequate is to use excerpts of the message of Prime Minister Pham Van Dong and the first paragraph of the reply of President Nixon.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, I don’t think the Prime Minister’s reply makes any sense except in the context of what the President addressed to him first. Because the reply drafted for Prime Minister Pham Van Dong by the Special Adviser affirms statements which were made by the President.

We agree to your proposal of adding the sentence from the President’s final message, but then the President’s original message, your reply, and the President’s final message should all be put in the same document.

[At this point Tho got up to leave the room for a few minutes.]

Dr. Kissinger: [To Tho as he leaves] If I have to stay here the Special Adviser can’t leave for too long. This isn’t any easier on me.

Le Duc Tho: A short moment. We are closely linked to each other.

Dr. Kissinger: That is true.

Xuan Thuy: I agree to your way of doing.

Dr. Kissinger: Good. We will get it typed up over night then and we will compare the text tomorrow.

Now two other things in connection with this understanding, Mr. Minister. First you will undoubtedly want to change the date of December 30 for the release of prisoners from Laos. We don’t insist on it. [Laughter] But if we are here much longer we may have to change the year! [Laughter]

Xuan Thuy: But it was assumed that the agreement would be signed on October 31st.

Dr. Kissinger: As a sign of good will I am prepared to change the date.

Secondly, the Special Adviser has sold me on a number of occasions for ten different concessions a shorter ceasefire in Laos, and we have to put that in here as an amendment. The number of days we were envisaging was ten days.

Xuan Thuy: You mean ten days after the ceasefire in Vietnam.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, for the ceasefire in Laos—not for the prisoners. I have got the Minister completely confused.

Xuan Thuy: Previously it was proposed for one month. Now we put it to 20 days.

Dr. Kissinger: [Laughs] I was certain you would say 29 and then say split the difference. Well, it really doesn’t meet the basic point, which is at the time the first agreement was made there was no expectation that—the Laotian parties had just met and it was to be done in a very short time. Now there is no reason why there should be any lapse, and now I think with new delays coming up there is even less of a reason. [Tho returns at this point.]

Dr. Kissinger: See, as soon as the Special Adviser heard Laos he came rushing right back. He hadn’t sold that delay for a whole day.

Le Duc Tho: There should be a mutual understanding. We have put a definite period in connection with the Laos question. And it will need some time for our allies to prepare the ceasefire. We will discuss with them.

Dr. Kissinger: Now with the Special Adviser returning to Hanoi there is plenty opportunity for discussion.

Le Duc Tho: Yes, I will be discussing with them when I return.

Dr. Kissinger: Why don’t we say two weeks?

Le Duc Tho: You want an early ceasefire in Laos and you want prolonged withdrawal of American civilians. When I raise this question I am bargaining with you.

Dr. Kissinger: No, you owe us eight days yet from our withdrawal period in Article 3.

Le Duc Tho: If you want one week that is no problem. We can prolong one week but 15 months is too long. After we agree with our allies, it doesn’t mean that we want to delay the ceasefire. But it is some necessary time.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, I have been trying to tell the Special Adviser, with a total lack of success, that in addition to all the bargaining we are doing here it is important that this agreement start with an attitude of good will on both sides. After all our negotiations here, it is extremely difficult to explain to our people when there have been two meetings to prepare for a ceasefire that if there is any good will they should have any trouble implementing a ceasefire in Vietnam.

Le Duc Tho: You are always asking me to take into account of your desires, but you have not done the same toward our requirements. You want a very early ceasefire in Laos, but our concern is about the withdrawal of American civilian personnel. You have not responded to that. So in a fair way taking into account of each other’s concerns, you should pay attention to that. I resolved the question of Laos and Cambodia in October. There was not a spirit of mutual comprehension and reciprocity. If you meet our needs, we are always prepared to meet your needs too.

Dr. Kissinger: The Special Adviser is setting up one of his trades—six days for six months—in a small country for a vital country.

Le Duc Tho: No, the question of ceasefire in Laos is major question to you and the question of withdrawal of American civilian personnel is also a major question.

Dr. Kissinger: The question of a ceasefire in Laos, the difference of a few days in time, is not a major question for us. If there is no ceasefire in Laos we will just concentrate our whole remaining air force in Laos.

Le Duc Tho: We understand that. But it’s the period we need—a reasonable period for the ceasefire in Laos to come about. What is your requirements now? For the ceasefire in Laos, on the question of the DMZ, the question of civilian personnel left behind in South Vietnam. But you do not respond to our requirements. I feel that it is unfair. In negotiations you have brought your necessities; we have ours.

Xuan Thuy: By the way, let me say about regarding the release of civilian personnel detained in South Vietnam under Article 8(c). This morning Ambassador Porter linked this question with the question of reduction of effectives, military effectives, and the question of demobilization of troops. I propose to delete this paragraph and to maintain what Dr. Kissinger said on October 17.

Dr. Kissinger: You cannot delete a unilateral American statement that describes our capability of exercising influence. But can we finish Laos and Cambodia first? We are not finished with the four . . .

Le Duc Tho: Last week I gave you a definite answer on this question.

Dr. Kissinger: On what question? What is the question?

Le Duc Tho: The question of 8(c). I have definitely answered to you as follows: I have answered to you in very explicit way that I agree to the redeployment of a number of symbolical forces in the northern part of South Vietnam on condition to redraft Article 8(c). But you did not agree to that, and afterward I accept to maintain Article 8(c) on the condition that you maintain the pledge you made on October 17 saying the civilians detained in South Vietnam will be released within two or three months. And actually if we accept to settle the question of 8(c) as it is now in the agreement in October, it is precisely because of the pledge you made in that month; otherwise we would not have accepted Article 8(c). This is the solution we have brought to this question at that moment. Now we maintain as it was.

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Special Adviser, first of all the only thing you have ever quoted was . . . We were talking about Laos and Cambodia. We haven’t even finished that yet. Then immediately 8(c) is raised again and Article 5. Now I know we have to discuss 8(c) and 5 once a day and make a concession for it once a day, but may I suggest that we defer our daily discussion of 8(c) and 5 until we have finished Laos and Cambodia? After which we can both make our speeches on 8(c) and 5.

Le Duc Tho: But actually we have made the concessions with regard to Article 8(c) and Article 5.

Dr. Kissinger: Chapter V, not Article 5.

Le Duc Tho: Chapter V I don’t remember the number or the chapter. So you are right when you said that if we agree to this agreement probably sometime—I don’t know whether you will remember the provision of the agreement.

Dr. Kissinger: I will never forget 8(c) or Article 5. Once the Special Adviser knew he was on to a good thing he didn’t let go. Everyday he touches this point and says “Does it hurt?” I say “yes”, then he punches it. Then he gets a reward for stopping.

So if I may make a suggestion, if the Minister and I could finish on Laos and Cambodia then the Special Adviser and I can have our daily brawl on 8(c) and 5. And then I will report to the President that as a sign of good will and serious attitude the Special Adviser for 24 hours promised to stop talking about it.

The Special Adviser will miss me when he is in Hanoi. With whom is he going to discuss Article 5?

Le Duc Tho: You will miss me. I will miss you, I agree.

Dr. Kissinger: We will exchange messages.

Xuan Thuy: We were really finished.

Dr. Kissinger: As a matter of fact, Mr. Special Adviser, . . .

Xuan Thuy: Regarding the question of Laos, there is only a question of the waiting period. I said 20 days.

Dr. Kissinger: 20 days you said, and I said 10. We may leave it unresolved.

Le Duc Tho: You will please try to solve the question of civilian personnel. We will solve this question for you very rapidly.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, sell two days for everything concerned. We get two hours, you get two days. On Friday the Special Adviser said he was settling Laos when we accepted Article 1. I didn’t realize that he was giving us only 10 days.

All right. Now we have to add a protocol to this Laos and Cambodia understanding to indicate that the articles have changed. A codicil: Article 15 to which it refers is now Article 20.

Xuan Thuy: I agree.

Le Duc Tho: Agreed. [Tho and Kissinger smile at each other.]

Dr. Kissinger: Is the Special Adviser going to the opera tonight?

Le Duc Tho: I am really tired. I wish to break at 7:30.

Dr. Kissinger: All right. We need, however, this statement on the unconditional release of prisoners. Unless this is in your protocol of prisoners. It is simply a reaffirmation of what was in our message to your Prime Minister.

Le Duc Tho: Please give us it.

Dr. Kissinger: We have given it to you. You have it.

Le Duc Tho: We will study it. We will not answer it immediately, this question.

Dr. Kissinger: You aren’t going to answer immediately. Yes, although this is nothing new. There hasn’t been any question from our point of view and it was in the message we sent to the Prime Minister on October 20.

Le Duc Tho: We cannot answer it now, this question.

Dr. Kissinger: Is there any question? I wasn’t aware of any question.

Le Duc Tho: We will consider the understanding. I will consider your statements.

Dr. Kissinger: We don’t consider that this is anything that needs to be negotiated.

Le Duc Tho: We have to study it.

Dr. Kissinger: Now then we handed you another.

Le Duc Tho: Because if it is not something to be negotiated why would you give it to us?

Dr. Kissinger: Simply to make sure there was no misunderstanding of our view. We gave it to you because of what Madame Binh said on Saturday . . .

Le Duc Tho: We will consider it.

Dr. Kissinger: . . . which was in complete contradiction to everything that has been said before.

Xuan Thuy: Because there is explicit provisions, Article 8(a) and (b). There is nothing to be added.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, if that is your understanding of it, that is fine.

Le Duc Tho: It is what we understand.

Dr. Kissinger: Does Madame Binh understand?

Le Duc Tho: But I have to proceed here.

Dr. Kissinger: I consider, when the agreement is signed, she cannot exercise the female prerogative of changing her mind.

Le Duc Tho: This lady may not be satisfied with your statement.

Shall we adjourn now and we will discuss tomorrow.

Dr. Kissinger: May I just—because the Minister is so well prepared for it—finish the one point about Cambodia? We told you three weeks ago, when we first met, that we would arrange that after the ceasefire in Vietnam takes effect the forces of the Lon Nol government will cease offensive operations. On a de facto basis, without an agreement. And we have given you an understanding, to use your influence to bring about the same thing.

Le Duc Tho: I told you on many occasions the Cambodia problem is a complicated one. In September and October. Therefore, we have made an understanding with you mentioned in the message of our Prime Minister to the President of the United States, and the President of the United States was satisfied with this understanding. So you want to complicate things.

Dr. Kissinger: We don’t want to complicate things. We want an end to military operations. That shouldn’t complicate things. If you genuinely want peace it should be easy to use your influence to stop military operations. I don’t see why that complicates things.

Le Duc Tho: It is what you think. But it is not so simple, and our ally is not so simple. I have told you this many times already. There is a difference between Laos and Cambodia. The Laotians and the Cambodians are both our allies but they have different views and their stands are different. It is not always that they understand the suggestions that we make to them. In Laos we have to discuss with them to come to an agreement with them and to propose things to them. Even in Laos there are questions they agree with us and there are others they disagree with us. The same for Cambodia. You should realize that.

I propose we adjourn. After the break I propose to you to remain and have dinner with us.

Dr. Kissinger: Tonight?

Le Duc Tho: We should have informed you in advance. But for me personally I would like to return home now for a rest. It is more appropriate if I remain here to keep you company. Please understand I need a rest.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand. The press will think you have left in anger.

Le Duc Tho: No, I will be smiling when I go out.

Dr. Kissinger: Good. Well our problem is that we have a lot of work to do on these protocols tonight. I wonder whether perhaps we should have dinner some other time. But we appreciate it very much. It is extremely courteous of you. Now I will postpone my departure, but I must leave late in the afternoon then tomorrow, and therefore I propose tomorrow we meet in the morning. What is convenient for you? Eleven?

Le Duc Tho: 10 o’clock.

Dr. Kissinger: 10 o’clock. It would be better?

Le Duc Tho: Shall we meet until two or three o’clock? Because I have to make my luggage because I will be leaving.

Dr. Kissinger: Let’s say until 3 o’clock. And at Neuilly? [They nod yes.] We will have lunch over there. But you leave Thursday.

Le Duc Tho: Yes, Thursday. Thursday or not later than Friday. If we have to do it—3 o’clock, then I can make my luggage.

Dr. Kissinger: How many suits do you have? I want to know how many suits the Special Adviser is bringing.

Le Duc Tho: I have to discuss with Minister Xuan Thuy and other things before I leave.

Dr. Kissinger: Then let me ask one other question which we should decide today. What should we do about the Thursday session this week at Avenue Kleber? Do you think there should be one?

Xuan Thuy: I think that we should meet as usual because there are the other two parties.

Dr. Kissinger: Because one of them might want to table a new proposal, and then the Special Adviser might talk about 5 and Article 8(c) and they may have a different document. [Laughter] Well, if we meet, can we try to meet in a restrained way, now that friendship has been established between the Minister and the Ambassador?

Ambassador Porter: It always existed.

Dr. Kissinger: And the Ambassador will probably be busy on the protocols so he shall send his deputy. And my understanding is, Mr. Special Adviser, that after we both leave, Ambassador Sullivan will stay here for a while. And what is the Vice Minister going to do? Is he staying?

Le Duc Tho: He will remain and work on the protocols.

Dr. Kissinger: All right then, Ambassador Porter and Mr. Thach. I will leave tomorrow afternoon. Ambassador Porter and Sullivan will stay. Ambassador Sullivan may leave early next week or the weekend and then Ambassador Porter will carry on, but we have an expert here whom we should bring tomorrow—Mr. Aldrich. I propose that tomorrow we discuss the rest of the understandings and the issues of principle that are involved in the protocols and then the details can be worked out by the Minister, the Vice Minister, and the two Ambassadors. [Tho nods yes.] And I think our specialists should meet tomorrow morning to conform the texts one more time. I think they should meet at 10 o’clock and the rest of us meet in Neuilly. They can meet at 10:00 in a separate room in Neuilly. It is only a half-hour job. Just to make sure that what the Special Adviser and I agreed on today is reflected in the text.

Xuan Thuy: I propose that the experts will begin working earlier—at 9 o’clock.

Dr. Kissinger: A good idea.

Le Duc Tho: At Neuilly?

Dr. Kissinger: At Neuilly—9 o’clock. Very good and we meet say at 10:30. Is that agreeable, Mr. Special Adviser? But you still should smile when you leave.

Ambassador Sullivan: You have two more protocols.

Le Duc Tho: Tomorrow we will discuss the principles.

Dr. Kissinger: All right. Let us discuss the principles tomorrow. And of course we may settle the agreement itself tomorrow, but the Special Adviser has never read me the message he received.

[The meeting ended.]

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 865, For the President’s Files (Winston Lord)—China Trip/Vietnam Negotiations, Camp David Memcons, December 1972 [1 of 3]. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting took place at 108 Avenue du Général Leclerc in Gif-sur-Yvette. All brackets are in the original. The tabs are attached but not printed.

   It is clear from message traffic before the meeting that the North Vietnamese negotiators in Paris and the Politburo in Hanoi differed over how to proceed. A day or two before this meeting, Tho and Thuy informed Hanoi that if they presented Hanoi’s rigid approach to a draft on the demilitarized zone (DMZ) as instructed, the U.S. negotiators would reject it. In consequence, they continued, “it is possible that the talks may be suspended for a period of time and the war will continue. Even though they are not capable of protracting the war for an extended period, they will make massive concentrated attacks for a time and then request resumption of the talks. If we refuse to meet with them the war will continue and the U.S. will place the blame on us. If we announce the suspension of talks and the only remaining issue is the question of the demilitarized zone, it will be hard for us to explain our position. The public may mistakenly think that we do not want to respect the demilitarized zone and that we want to continue sending troops down into the South. If we agree to meet with them, we will be under pressure and if we simply deal with the issue of the demilitarized zone using the Politburo’s formula it will be very difficult for us to achieve acceptance of this formula, and we will also suffer additional losses in North Vietnam, losses that will have at least some effect on the situation in South Vietnam.”

   Tho and Thuy therefore recommended that Hanoi consider settling on the agreement as then negotiated: “We are not under any time pressure, but we need to recognize our opportunity. Right now the U.S. needs a settlement, but if we leave things too long we will miss this opportunity and then our pressure on them will have little effect, because everything has limits.”

   Hanoi refused to allow a more flexible response and directed Tho and Thuy to maintain the previous hard-line offer which Kissinger, as the negotiators expected, quickly rejected. (Luu and Nguyen, Le Duc Tho-Kissinger Negotiations in Paris [Cac Cuoc Thuong Luong Le Duc Tho-Kissinger Tai Paris], pp. 581–582; Vietnamese edition)

   Kissinger provided a narrative of the meeting for Haig and Nixon in Washington and then an interpretation of the events vis-à-vis the future. In a message to Haig, he wrote:

   “Hanoi has decided to play for time, either because of the public split between us and Saigon; or because they have a pipeline into the South Vietnamese and know about our exchanges; or because their leadership is divided and they are still making up their minds on whether to conclude the agreement. Their consistent pattern is to give us just enough each day to keep us going but nothing decisive which could conclude an agreement. On the other hand, they wish to insure that we have no solid pretext for taking tough actions. They keep matters low key to prevent a resumption of bombing. They could have settled in three hours any time these past few days if they wanted to, but they have deliberately avoided this. For every one of their semi-concessions they introduce a counter-demand. Thus their sentence on the DMZ, which in itself is unacceptable, was counterbalanced today by the withdrawal of their proposal for the signing procedure made yesterday. Moreover, the DMZ sentence, as you recognize, takes away the significance of the respect for the DMZ. I tried in innumerable ways to get the word ʻcivil’ included but they totally refused this. Thus what they offered after supposedly more than two days of communication with Hanoi was to move a still objectionable sentence further down in the text, and even here they link all the sentences by semicolons in the same paragraph.”

   Thus, he concluded: “We now find ourselves in an increasingly uncomfortable position. We have no leverage on Hanoi or Saigon, and we are becoming prisoners of both sides’ internecine conflicts. Our task clearly is to get some leverage on both of them.” To that end, he made the following recommendations:

   “—As soon as Tho has left Paris we should reseed the mines, as heavily as possible including of course north of the 20th parallel. This is desirable in any event because the longer the mines are in DRV ports the less likely they are to violate the agreement if it is finally concluded.

   “—We should take off all restrictions on bombing south of the 20th parallel and step up our attacks, particularly by B–52s.

   “—We should resume reconnaissance activities north of the 20th parallel immediately which would serve as a warning to Hanoi.

   “—We should plan a two or three day strike including B–52’s north of the 20th parallel for early next week. Please get plans. The power plants seem attractive.

   “—I would like you [Haig] to look at the bombing situation in southern Laos. Yesterday’s noon report mentioned the fact that infiltration was much heavier because the bombing in that area had fallen off.

   “It is essential that the military perform effectively for once in the above tasks. I would not resume daily bombing north of the 20th parallel at this point until we can discuss it.”

   Giving vent to his frustration with the North and South Vietnamese, Kissinger concluded his analysis with these words:

   “The North Vietnamese strategy seems to me to be as follows: they have reduced the issues to a point where a settlement can be reached with one exchange of telegrams. I do not think they will send this telegram, however, in the absence of strong pressures. These pressures in turn cannot really be applied now because of Thieu. If Thieu had adopted a common position with us we would have an excellent ground on which to stand now with North Vietnam’s insistence on maintaining troops in the South and total refusal to recognize any aspect of sovereignty for South Vietnam. What makes it intolerable is the inability to defend an agreement that Thieu attacks. Moreover his short-sighted device for preventing a settlement has deprived us of the pressure which could bring us a settlement. His offer of prolonged Christmas truce almost guarantees that Hanoi will wait on sending the telegram until the truce breaks down or Congress is heard from. This is why the visit with Thieu is now essential and I know no one else than Agnew who can possibly do it. The present course will guarantee that Congress will cut off the funds and that everything we have striven four years to avoid will be imposed on us. If this is to happen we are better off knowing it early on than to die the death of a thousand cuts.” (Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. IX, Vietnam, October 1972–January 1973, Document 163)