Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XLII, Vietnam: The Kissinger-Le Duc Tho Negotiations

38. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Paris, December 11, 1972, 3:10–7:15 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• Le Duc Tho, Special Advisor to DRV Delegation to the Paris Conference on Vietnam
• Xuan Thuy, Minister, Chief DRV Delegate to Paris Conference on Vietnam
• Nguyen Co Thach, Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs
• Phan Hien, Delegation Member
• Luu Van Loi, Delegation Member
• Trinh Ngoc Thai, Delegation Member
• Tran Quang Co, Delegation Member
• Pham The Dong, Notetaker
• Nguyen Dinh Phuong, Interpreter
• Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• Ambassador William Sullivan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
• Ambassador William Porter, Chief of US Delegation to Paris Conference on Vietnam
• Winston Lord, NSC Staff
• John D. Negroponte, NSC Staff
• David A. Engel, NSC Staff, Interpreter
• Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff
• Mrs. Mary Stifflemire, notetaker

Dr. Kissinger: Shall we try to conclude without the Special Advisor?

Xuan Thuy: But I am afraid that with me present here and now Mr. Porter with your side, it will become a Kleber session now.

Ambassador Porter: Let us hope not.

[Le Duc Tho enters.]

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Special Advisor, we just settled Chapter V, so we can review the text now. [Laughter]

Le Duc Tho: Mr. Advisor, let me speak a few words.

Dr. Kissinger: Please.

Le Duc Tho: After all our discussions now there is only one question left to us. But it is a harsh question. I have sent a message reporting to our government about our talks here but we have not yet received the instructions from my government. I don’t know how it will be, the views of my government. So only tomorrow morning we will receive the answer from my government. Because I am not in a position to go directly to Hanoi, I sent the message yesterday, and I will receive the answer from Hanoi tomorrow. So I propose that I will discuss with you on that question tomorrow afternoon. Therefore today I would like to propose we shall discuss on a number of questions.

First the question of the manner to sign the agreement.

Second, I would like to propose to discuss or to exchange views on our private understandings. By so doing we can save time pending the outstanding questions. I propose to meet again tomorrow in the afternoon.

Your communications are very rapid but we are in a slower way. And even we use wireless, it take time too. So we can’t help it.

Dr. Kissinger: Let me say a few words, Mr. Special Advisor. You and we have negotiated and you and I have communicated for 3½ years, nearly 4 years now, and our two countries have been at war for over a decade. We have come very close to an agreement and therefore I believe you will permit me to speak very frankly with you. [Tho nods.]

And I would like to talk to you in terms of the objective reality of Washington.

I must tell you in all frankness that there is now a mood of really extraordinary impatience and growing irritation in Washington. We thought that the agreement could be concluded fairly rapidly, and we have now been talking here for over a week, the longest I have ever been away from Washington. When we met last week, on Monday morning in Choisy, I told you that the Vice President would be prepared to leave Wednesday evening. Since then he has been standing by in Washington without a regular schedule from day to day waiting for word from me. Even now he is waiting for a phone call from me to see whether we have settled the agreement, in which case he would have left within a matter of six hours. We have kept General Haig in Washington for this purpose.

So now I have to delay it again, and as I told you on Saturday, I must in all circumstances return to Washington tomorrow night. Moreover, we had always assumed that a trip by me to Hanoi would be part of the procedure for concluding the agreement. Now, unless the Vice President leaves tomorrow night, since I can’t leave until he has returned from Saigon, it will be impossible to do this until well after Christmas.

So this feeling, I must say again, is exacerbated by the fact that what is holding us up now is an attempt to change something which we thought had been agreed to last week and which we too have communicated to our people. Two weeks ago. So the President, who has made a very great effort last week, putting aside considerations of pride and dignity in order to bring about a rapid conclusion, now finds himself in the position where he is being asked not only to demonstrate that he could get no additional phrase but that he had to do away with the phrase—or to deprive it of all meaning—that he had already used in order to bring about acquiescence to this agreement.

So you must understand the situation in Washington. I am not debating it. But there is the belief now that we have done everything, that we have run very great risks in our relations with our allies and that we have shown the maximum of good will. I am not debating it: I am reporting to you what my colleagues think. So here we are, one sentence away from peace, and I know it is a question for you but it had been agreed to once. In all of these agreements there are many painful sentences in this agreement for us, and without some understanding it will not be possible to make peace. So I think we should put ourselves in a position where we keep in mind that I will be leaving tomorrow night and where we should complete what can be completed by then.

There is the question of signing—I agree to discuss it. There is the question of understandings. There were some issues raised yesterday that came up in the discussions of the experts on the text. I think we could discuss that. I don’t think they are big questions but I think we should solve them. And there is the question of the protocols, the issues that we need to solve in principle. The understandings and the text we have to settle in detail before I leave; the protocols we have to have some discussion in principle.

[Tho laughs and points to Sullivan and Porter.]

And then let me explain, however, the problem of Ambassador Sullivan. Let me tell you really what now becomes the only feasible schedule. I must know fairly early in our session tomorrow whether we have an agreement or not. On this assumption, the Vice President would leave tomorrow night. If he leaves tomorrow night he cannot be back before Thursday night. That means that I cannot leave before Friday night or Saturday night. And since I cannot take a trip to go only to Hanoi and must stop in other places instead to have an excuse for being in the area, that means I would be in Hanoi either Tuesday and Wednesday of next week or Wednesday and Thursday of next week. The latest I can return to Washington is Friday, but I should be back Thursday.

This is the only way we can get the procedure completed before the holiday. Otherwise we would have to put everything back until afterwards or cancel my trip. On this schedule the signature would be in Paris on the 27th or 28th.

So this is the concrete situation in which we now find ourselves. We already find the situation with which you are familiar and in which the South Vietnamese President is making a speech tomorrow, which certainly could have been avoided had we settled more rapidly. But this is the situation in which we find ourselves. I am not debating it, Mr. Special Advisor, I am informing you of the facts as they are in Washington. And therefore we should get as much done today as we can.

Now Ambassador Sullivan can stay here for a day or two after—he can stay Wednesday—but he should come back so that he can leave with me on my trip. And if I leave on Friday I must return by Thursday evening.

And now if you forgive me let me send a message to Washington saying that we will not conclude today.

Le Duc Tho: Please.

[Dr. Kissinger leaves the room for about five minutes to speak with Colonel Guay.]

Dr. Kissinger: I can tell you one thing, Mr. Special Advisor, the Vice President may have a serious attitude after this week but I cannot guarantee his good will.

Le Duc Tho: Let me speak now.

Dr. Kissinger: Please.

Le Duc Tho: Like you, I myself want a peaceful settlement and an early settlement. Therefore we have made many great efforts. However there are the objective situations. It is my intention to discuss this question with you today but because of our conditions of communication how can I do that? Therefore I have to postpone it until tomorrow. And we are now facing a very great question and very difficult question.

Dr. Kissinger [interrupting]: Excuse me, I want to do one thing. I want to make sure that they interrupt General Haig no matter what else he does so that he can receive the message. Our secretaries are very tough. [Dr. Kissinger leaves the room again for about three minutes, then returns.]

Excuse me, Mr. Special Advisor, I don’t want to be impertinent but I wanted to be sure the message went back correctly.

Le Duc Tho: Never mind. It is no matter.

Dr. Kissinger: Now there will be no more interruptions.

Le Duc Tho: Therefore tomorrow at our meeting both sides should make a great effort, then we can arrive at a settlement. But it may happen that we can’t reach a settlement tomorrow. It will be the best if we can settle tomorrow. But if there are differences between us tomorrow, then how can we settle the problem then?

As far as we are concerned, we have made and will continue to make efforts to settle the problem. But the question that is in our face now is under discussion with you. This is my personal view, because as I told you the other day my government disagreed with my view on this question. Therefore I have to reopen the discussion with you. Therefore I have to report to my government to see whether my government would accept my views. This is the situation. It does not mean that I have agreed with you then I do not want to settle with you. As you see, in the text of the agreement we have agreed to, I have not changed any word in it. But so, once we have agreed, we don’t ask for any change. But when the question is under discussion, you can ask for some changes, you can ask for some amendments, and I can do that too. This is the way we are conducting the negotiations, and the question is under discussion now.

Actually there is only one question left now. Of course we should make an effort to reach a settlement. Of course it is not because of that question that it will prolong the war. It is not for that question that we will continue the war. This is a fact.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, Mr. Special Advisor, I understand the problem and it is a problem that all negotiators face at some point. In fact there were a number of points on which you withdrew an agreement you had made last week and on which we did come to an understanding. On issues such as Article 1. I am not criticizing you, I am just saying . . .

Le Duc Tho: This is because of the instruction of my government.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand that. We made a great effort on an article that is very painful to us, as a sign of really very great good will. But look at our situation. Because we too have communicated things to our people. And if the war continues it will not be just because of this one sentence but because both sides have made an accumulation of moves where anything else just goes beyond the limit. The Special Advisor used the example of a glass that bursts, about two weeks ago, when you put one degree more heat in it than it can stand. It isn’t the last degree that does it; it is the accumulation of all the things that have gone before.

Le Duc Tho: Of course.

Dr. Kissinger: And if you look at our minimum necessities, you will see that this is almost the only sentence that remains of what we started out with. We have gone to great lengths to avoid any reference to your troops, any reference to territory, any reference to any of the things which you consider a question of principle. But if now this sentence becomes deprived of all meaning, then it will not be one sentence but a total picture that makes it always—that may lead to the end of the negotiations. And then we will have, as I have pointed out to the Special Advisor, to face the reality that however the war then ends it will be with a different kind of negotiation.

I was just going to suggest that whenever you are ready we should go to the agenda you are going to discuss.

Le Duc Tho: Let me add a sentence.

Dr. Kissinger: Well.

Le Duc Tho: Each side’s requirements has its limits. You have your limits, we have ours. We cannot go beyond this limit even though we want it. Therefore both sides should realize the other side’s limit, to settle the problem. Let us now go into the problem.

Dr. Kissinger: I see the Vice Minister is at it again. [Laughter]

Le Duc Tho: You have given us a paper in which there is your proposal how to sign the agreement. We have carefully considered this question. We think that your proposal on the way to sign the agreement is not adequate. We have agreed to the agreement. If the four governments will sign the agreement separately, then the agreement will have no value—that is to say, the two parties will sign the agreement, the two other parties will issue notes of adherence. So this way our signing the agreement in my view have no binding power to force the parties to strictly implement the agreement. It may happen that one of the two parties will issue a statement in one way and the other party will issue a statement in another. Even it may happen that one party may reserve some of the provisions of the agreement. So this way of signing will not insure the strict implementation of the agreement by all the four parties.

Therefore I propose to you, Mr. Advisor, and as you said previously that the two parties will sign the agreement, then all the four parties will sign the agreement. This will insure the correct implementation of the agreement by all the parties, and there is some binding power to it with regard to the parties.

As I expounded to you in October, I think that this way is the best way to sign the agreement, that is to say that the agreement would be signed by two parties then all the four parties will sign in the same text of the agreement. And I agree with you that the agreement should be signed by the Foreign Ministers.

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Special Advisor, without any doubt you will occupy the best minds in our Foreign Office on this new point of theology which you have raised. [Tho laughs.]

As I understood it, Mr. Special Advisor, in October you were thinking only of a two-party signature. There was no question whatsoever of anyone else signing it at that time. If one reads your document that you submitted to me in October it went into effect upon signature of the two parties.

Le Duc Tho: In fact when I gave you the document, the document was to be signed by the two parties. But the situation has new elements now because Mr. Nguyen Van Thieu is now energetically opposing the agreement. He stated that if he wouldn’t sign the agreement he would not implement it.

If now Mr. Thieu issues a separate statement he might reserve some articles. So I think that if all the four parties will sign the agreement it will show the seriousness of the parties, and the agreement will bind the four parties in implementing it. Moreover, at the Kleber sessions there are representatives of the four parties, so if all the four parties will sign the agreement it is something logical.

Dr. Kissinger: But as we have often discussed, Mr. Special Advisor, I think we can all think up many things that are logical. The question is whether at this late stage we should introduce new elements. Under your old formula, in effect, either of the two South Vietnamese parties could have avoided responsibility for the agreement by simply claiming that it did not agree, and you and we would have signed it and it would have been an extremely difficult situation.

What we are proposing now is what we would consider two identical letters of adherence and in which obviously no provisions could be reserved.

Le Duc Tho: In my view, the agreement has reflected the obligations of all the four parties, and moreover it is not a difficult question, the question of procedure to sign the agreement or any legal question to sign the agreement. I think that after the two parties will have signed the agreement all the four parties will sign the agreement.

Dr. Kissinger: But why?

Le Duc Tho: Because if the two other parties will issue a note of adherence it will belittle their responsibility toward the agreement, and it might happen that one of the two South Vietnamese parties, the Saigon Administration or the PRG, may claim that they will not implement some of the provisions because the agreements are only signed by the US and the DRV. Although they have given their acceptance of the provisions of the agreement. Previously Mr. Special Advisor has raised the question of the agreement being signed by all the four parties. I think it is a good idea.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but when we discussed the matter in October this issue was never raised by the Special Advisor, and I am certain for a very good reason. And because he knew very well that a rapid signature would not be possible under those circumstances and that we would repeat once again the months of discussion that were involved in deciding on the shape of the table. So the Special Advisor is raising not just a procedural point but a very important new point. And there is no possibility of any legal lack in the procedure which we have proposed.

Le Duc Tho: Because in fact there are four belligerent parties in Vietnam now and it would be good if all the four parties were to sign the agreement. Moreover I don’t find any difficulty in this question. Moreover the agreement has been agreed to by the Saigon Administration on your side and by the PRG on our side. [Ambassador Sullivan and Dr. Kissinger confer.] And for the time being the Saigon Administration is opposing the agreement, and if there is no binding power for the implementation of the agreement then the agreement would be threatened with violation. Therefore the agreement before it is being signed have already the root, the embryo of disagreements. Moreover, my proposal on the way of signing the agreement shows our seriousness in implementing the agreement.

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Special Advisor, there has been a consistent pattern in the last ten days, of issues that could have been settled very rapidly if the two sides were interested only in the substance. But your side wants to use each substantive provision for political warfare against the Saigon government. This is turning into a great impossibility for us. We told you we will sign a reasonable agreement even if Saigon disagrees with us, and it can be no secret of the fact that Saigon is disagreeing with us. But if you keep hammering on your requirements in such a way that we can only draw the conclusion that it is only an indirect way of overthrowing the Saigon government, then we will not be able to do it. Because we will not be able to sign an instrument that history will judge was only a way to give you your objective. We have always said we will give both sides a reasonable point, but now we are already being asked to convince our ally of signing a difficult agreement and being asked to undergo what they consider a humiliation.

The proposal you made in October took account of this, and provided no safeguard whatsoever for one party not joining, simply disregarding it. Our proposal provides a perfect legal guarantee of the fact that the agreement must be implemented. Thus I consider this the introduction again of a major substantive new point and, on this basis, we will never conclude. It will be totally impossible to conclude.

I also must say in all candor one other thing, Mr. Special Advisor. Since the end of October we have been unusually restrained. We have not answered any of the charges that have been made against us. We have not given our side of these discussions at all. We did it because we did not want to encourage the opponents of the agreement into thinking that they could sabotage it. And we did it to show our good faith towards you. Therefore we have let you dominate the discussions with your version. If we settle, this will all have been worthwhile, and no one will care who spoke to Mr. Randal of the Herald Tribune last. [They laugh.] I know we are not speaking to him. But sooner or later we will be forced to give our side of the story and then everything will become hopelessly difficult.

I have come honestly to every meeting believing that it would be our last day. [Tho laughs.] But we are now reaching a point where either I replace Ambassador Porter or I turn to other things. [Tho and Xuan Thuy laugh.] And what you are proposing now is adding weeks of negotiation. If all the other provisions were very brilliant it is something we could consider. But you are too tenacious a negotiator to have given us the opportunity to emerge out of this with a very brilliant agreement from our point of view.

Le Duc Tho: [laughing] You are more tenacious than I am.

Dr. Kissinger: Can we get that on a document like this and sign it so I can send it to Washington? [Laughter] Whatever little margin may theoretically exist, the Vice Minister is more than overcoming. Then we add the Minister’s specializations on the DMZ and the Ho Chi Minh Trail. [Laughter] That is a very unequal contract.

At any rate, what you are adding is weeks of complication. And that may be desirable, but we are running very close to the point now where we will have to consider what justifies continuing these negotiations.

Le Duc Tho: It is not my intention to raise any questions which make the negotiations difficult. You have made a proposal, we have made ours. And we have made a proposal that is in my view fair, reasonable and correct. Moreover in last October you have made the same suggestion that the agreement would be signed by two parties, then by all the parties. It is not my intention as you say that we wage political war against the Saigon Administration or even to overthrow it indirectly.

Dr. Kissinger: But you won’t resist it if it should come about as a result of it. [Laughter] If an accidental result of this agreement were to come about you would not believe that it was an unfortunate consequence!

Le Duc Tho: But this will never happen.

Dr. Kissinger: What?

Le Duc Tho: Because what you say that we want you to overthrow the Saigon Administration indirectly. It will never happen.

Dr. Kissinger: You want us to help you.

Le Duc Tho: You want to consolidate the Saigon Administration already.

Dr. Kissinger: I think, Mr. Special Advisor, we can of course return to the formula of last October, in which neither party adheres and then have a document whose legal significance will occupy students of international law for many years afterwards.

When you come to Harvard you might give a lecture on that subject.

Le Duc Tho [laughing]: I will yield the floor to you because I have no experience at all in this subject of signing agreement.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand your point, but I think it would make the signing very difficult. But I agree with you that the instrument of adherence should be word-for-word the same on both sides and that no reservations are permitted. And the reason, may I add, why this procedure—once we have a satisfactory agreement—is desirable also is because you and we can then proceed even if objections should be raised by any of the parties. It is our guarantee of giving the schedule we are discussing an inevitability.

Le Duc Tho: But, as you say, if one of the four parties will not implement the agreement then what value will remain to the agreement if even we both sign it?

Dr. Kissinger: In that case you and we must have a serious discussion. That is a subject I wanted to discuss with you after we had agreed on the document. If I come to Hanoi to initial an agreement it will be with the intention of seeing it implemented. If we agree tomorrow, we are prepared to proceed to the signature regardless of consequences.

Le Duc Tho: It is my intention if now we come to an agreement, if the Saigon Administration agreed to it, if the PRG agreed to it, all the four parties agreed to the agreement, then if all the parties will sign the agreement it will be all the better because there will be a binding power to the parties who sign the agreement and it will guarantee the implementation of the agreement. Moreover we have had experience of Geneva in 1954: Some of the participants signed the agreement; some others did not sign the agreement and issued a unilateral statement, or made a statement unilaterally or refused to sign the agreement and that did complicate things. If now Mr. Advisor, if you don’t have any views on my proposal now, please think it over.

Dr. Kissinger: Oh, I have views. They are negative. [Tho laughs]

May I ask the Special Advisor this question? I am assuming these signatures are with the titles. [Tho confers with Thach.]

Le Duc Tho: Yes, the title, the functions of the signatories. But you, yourself, Mr. Advisor, you suggested the idea to me last October, and I find it very good idea and I agree to it.

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Special Advisor, you know what the problem is and why you proposed what you did in October, which was the right way of proceeding rapidly. At that time the DRV side was prepared to sign an instrument whose legal significance was practically nil, because if either of the other two parties had decided it did not concur, the mere fact that we signed a document which said they had concurred had no legal force whatsoever. You know that very well. If I sign an agreement and say “the United States with the concurrence of the Government of the People’s Republic of Outer Mongolia,” and make 50 provisions in this agreement, and then the Government of Outer Mongolia says they never have heard of me—which is hard to conceive but not impossible—then they are in no way bound to abide by this agreement. [Tho laughs]

Le Duc Tho: This was my proposal in October. At that time there was difficulty, but since now throughout our negotiations here the text of the agreement are known to the Saigon people, are known to the PRG. They have discussed it, they have agreed to it, and if now all the four parties sign the agreement it will be better for the agreement.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand that it has certain advantages, particularly for some of the objectives I mentioned to the Special Advisor. But if we want to move rapidly to a conclusion, if the Saigon Government will not sign this document you have no agreement. If the Saigon Government gives you an instrument of adherence in which they adhere to every provision of this document, and if it is attached to this agreement as an integral part of this agreement, and if the PRG does the same and it is attached to the agreement as an integral part of the agreement, then you have a perfectly legal document. And that is one way—the only way—we can consider meeting the schedule we have given to you here. And it goes further than what you asked from us in October.

And it isn’t a good argument to say that in October the Saigon Government would have been bound, because they hadn’t read the agreement, but now that they have read the agreement it requires a more formal instrument of adherence. I think that is an argument you might wish to reconsider. It is an interesting theory of international law that a document which a party has not read requires a less binding signature than a document which it has read.

Le Duc Tho: I think it is more convenient and no difficulty at all if now the agreement is agreed to by all the parties, by the Saigon Administration, by the PRG, then all the four parties will sign the agreement. There is no difficulty. It is well known that there are four concerned parties involved in the war in Vietnam. It is a natural thing that all the four parties will sign the agreement.

Moreover, the signing of an agreement does not mean that one side or one party recognizes the other. If now there is an agreement signed by the four parties it will save a great deal of paper. Your way of signing will increase the amount of paper used.

Dr. Kissinger: That is right, and I think we have a moral obligation therefore to supply the extra paper that is required. [Laughter] And I am prepared to make an understanding with the Special Advisor on that point.

Mr. Special Advisor, let us look at the reality. I have given you a procedure that we thought about very seriously, that if we agree to tomorrow will inevitably lead to a signature, and which forces any party which wishes not to carry it out to dissociate itself from it in a substantive manner. If now we follow your suggestion we will have added a major procedural issue to what is already a major substantive problem.

We have moreover agreed to mention the PRG in the Preamble, and we have the impression, which may be incorrect, that when Madame Binh submits her letter of adherence it will not be in the most modest formulation that is conceivable.

So this combination then would bring about, as I say, a clear schedule, a certain conclusion, and we agree that no reservations can be permitted as to any substantive issue. And any party that failed to submit a letter of adherence would be running a considerable risk. Now that is the reality.

Le Duc Tho: Let me ask you this question, Mr. Advisor. If you propose this way of signing the agreement, what about the protocols? The protocols should be signed by all the four parties because the protocols deal with very concrete questions. If one party does not sign the protocols, how would we implement it?

Dr. Kissinger: Ambassador Sullivan has told me that he has reviewed the protocols in such a way as to remove that difficulty.

Le Duc Tho: What do you mean by that? It is not clear to me yet.

Dr. Kissinger: As I understand it, my interest in the supervisory machinery is about equal to that of the Special Advisor. And if since he has promised me he will personally take me to the Ho Chi Minh Trail I no longer need an inspection post there to give me an excuse. [Laughter]

So, Bill, do you want to explain why you think this protocol fixes the problem? I am asking Ambassador Sullivan to explain.

Amb. Sullivan: We have had our legal experts make a revision which would make it possible for the two parties, that is to say the United States and the DRV, to sign instruments with respect to the protocols that could be similarly adhered to by the South Vietnamese parties to bring them into effect the same way as the agreements would be brought into effect.

Dr. Kissinger: Speaking very candidly, Mr. Special Advisor, I do not fully share the Special Advisor’s optimism about the spirit of conciliation and concord that will predominate in South Vietnam after the signing of the agreement. But the question we now have is—this political contest which will inevitably start after the agreement is signed—should it be conducted as an aspect of our negotiations, or should we finish our negotiations and let the political contest start that is inevitably going to result? But if it turns out that the Special Advisor is right, and there will be a spirit of reconciliation and concord without hatred, for the first time in 20 years in South Vietnam, then it does not make any difference. But the main thing now is whether the two South Vietnamese parties should be permitted to engage in this endless struggle as an aspect of our negotiations and thereby make them never-ending.

Does this tape recorder pick up the whispering between me and Ambassador Porter? If so, we have to clean up the language.

Amb. Porter: I don’t think so.

Le Duc Tho: It is our intention to have the agreement signed by the four parties. It is also our policy to achieve national reconciliation and national concord. Of course there are a few people, a number of elements who are warlike people—bellicose people, but as to the overwhelming part of the Vietnam people it stands for national union and national reconciliation and concord. As to the signing of the agreement, that is another question; it is another, the question of national reconciliation and concord.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, I think, Mr. Special Advisor . . .

Le Duc Tho: Let me speak a few words more about the protocol.

Dr. Kissinger: About the protocol? Please.

Le Duc Tho: The protocol will deal with many many concrete questions. For instance, the question in the protocol regarding the formation of the Four-Party Joint Military Commission. Is it possible that we both only sign the protocol and the two South Vietnamese parties will only adhere to the protocol? [Laughter] It is not logical, this.

Dr. Kissinger: And of course we could also spend the 60 days of the existence of that Four-Party Commission debating who is to sign it. That is the other alternative. [Tho laughs]

Le Duc Tho: Although the life of the Four-Party Joint Commission is 60 days, it has its legal value too.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, what does the Special Advisor propose we do? Because I don’t think this question is soluble.

Le Duc Tho: So I propose a little break now, and after the break we shall shift to the other questions. It is a way out too. [Laughter]

Dr. Kissinger: If we are still here on Christmas Day, may I invite the Special Advisor to dinner at the American Embassy? [Laughter] After Mass, because I don’t want to interrupt his observance of it. [Laughter]

Has the Minister read all my notes yet, or should I hold them up against the mirror a little more? [Laughter]

[There was a break lasting from 4:55 to 5:15 p.m. During the break Le Duc Tho sent in a proposal to end the day’s meeting at 6:00 p.m.]

Le Duc Tho: Yesterday I discussed with Mr. Advisor the question of the civilian personnel working in the armed forces of the Republic of Vietnam. We have made an effort not to write this question into the agreement, on the basis that there would be an understanding that you will withdraw all American or civilian personnel of the United States and other foreign countries aligned with the United States and the Republic of Vietnam within a certain period. You propose a period of 15 months after the ceasefire; we propose a period of 6 months. When the United States forces withdraw from South Vietnam these civilian personnel working in the army of the Republic of Vietnam should be withdrawn too. We are taking into account of your view; we have proposed the period of six months. You said also that pending withdrawal no civilian personnel of the United States or other foreign countries allied with the United States and the Republic of Vietnam will participate in military operations or operational military training.

Let us now exchange views on the period for the withdrawal of such civilian personnel. I think that the period we proposed is a reasonable one. As to the period you propose, it is too long.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, I have explained to the Special Advisor why we think that the period we propose is reasonable. It is nine months shorter than any of our experts tell us is feasible. It represents a serious effort. You are under no restrictions at all with respect to foreign advisors.

Le Duc Tho: The question is different for the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. It is a sovereign country. It is a different case for the DRV. The DRV is a sovereign country. We can receive foreign experts in it. As to South Vietnam it is different. You come there now and after the end of the war you would withdraw from South Vietnam; all American personnel should be withdrawn. It is something reasonable. We have discussed this. And moreover this withdrawal of American forces has been written in the agreement and we have been discussing this question with you for a long time already. Now taking into account of your view, we have proposed a period. As to the period you proposed, we think it is too long and unacceptable to us. You should realize that this period you propose is something illogical.

Dr. Kissinger: There is a rather weird aspect to our discussions here. We have a provision in the agreement. There was some discussion about personnel in military branches, as the record shows, and it was dropped. We specified precisely in the agreement in October what personnel had to be withdrawn and what personnel did not have to be withdrawn.

Le Duc Tho: Now what I want to discuss with you is the period of withdrawal. We agreed that there are categories of personnel that have to withdraw within 60 days. There are categories that can remain for some time.

Dr. Kissinger: What I am trying to tell you is that—I tried to tell you for weeks; I explained it very explicitly Friday—we have to go to Saigon to try to bring about rapid adherence to the agreement. We have scaled down our demands to the absolute minimum, and every session begins with you adding some additional demands of your own which change, weaken what we had already achieved in October. So the objective result is that we will have to go to Saigon with this. With respect to the signing it is worse than in October; with respect to civilian personnel it is worse. And then you are asking the President of the U.S. to go before the American public and say, “I have made a reasonable agreement. If necessary I will settle it alone, I will go against our ally and I will say why we have had to concede five other points.”

It is illogical; it is against reality. And then we think we have it down to one point and think we are going to settle this point, two or three other proposals are added. I am become, quite honestly, extraordinarily pessimistic. And we will have a great propaganda battle and then Ambassador Porter and the Minister can shout at each other for months. It won’t change reality. I thought we were in sight of an agreement and we would get it done here today, and yet we have spent much of the afternoon doing things which I know we cannot convince people of.

The six months is impossible, 15 months is really impossible; all our experts tell us it takes 24 months. After then there will be restrictions put on that no other government has to accept.

On the issue of sovereignty, that is in dispute and it shouldn’t have to be settled here. We of course recognize the sovereignty of Saigon.

Le Duc Tho: I disagree with you when you say that my way of negotiating is something extraordinary. The agreement has been agreed to and you have raised many new questions. It is not I who did that. You added more demands and not I. We only maintained what has been agreed to between us. You propose a way to sign the agreement; I propose another one. Why do you say that my way of negotiating is something peculiar? If you disagree to my proposal, please put forth another one, and we shall discuss.

Regarding the civilian personnel you propose 15 months; I propose 6 months after the ceasefire, and you say this way of doing it is something extraordinary. The long discussions we have had are because of the many questions you have raised. You should realize that we have made very great effort to come to the agreement, to the solution we proposed.

Dr. Kissinger: I must tell you, Mr. Special Advisor, I am no longer so sure that the negotiations here are designed to produce an agreement. Since my press conference on October 26 you have known exactly what we would propose. In every communication to you we have repeated it, and the changes, most of them, really are of not very major significance. I thought when we came here the first time that we could settle in a very brief period, and that was our intention. I thought this time certainly we would settle in two days. And we had made all of our arrangements on the assumption that the Vice President would leave last Wednesday, and after that events would have unfolded inevitably—in fact I gave you a schedule—and after that events would have had an inevitable evolution.

Now then if we review our discussions you will find that at the beginning of every session over the last week I have withdrawn particular proposals. And yet on your side there has been a constant series of pressures on one or two neuralgic points which you have discovered. It is beyond the point whether it is reasonable or not. We are at a point now which is almost where our discussions are almost like those at Kleber, with all respect to Ambassador Porter and Minister Xuan Thuy.

If we want to settle rapidly we have to move rapidly. And we are not moving at all rapidly. We are repeating the same speeches at every session. So on Saturday I thought we were down to one problem, which we have now increased to three today. And given the record of having raised Article 5, I am waiting for Article 8(c) to be raised again. [Tho laughs]

Le Duc Tho: I will follow up with you Article 8(c) even after the signature of the agreement.

Dr. Kissinger: I think at this rate, Mr. Special Advisor, we won’t have that embarrassment. Concretely, Mr. Special Advisor, how do you visualize the procedure? We have a whole series of unilateral understandings to discuss, which, if I am any judge . . . I mean some mutual understandings and some unilateral declarations which each side will no doubt make. They will take time. We have the DMZ point, about which you are to receive instructions. We have to have a preliminary discussion on protocols. We have to agree on a schedule, and I understand you want to close today’s session fairly early.

So then how? And I must leave tomorrow night, so are we really talking about bringing this to a conclusion, or what are we talking about? I will have stayed in Paris for over ten days. And occasionally we settle half a sentence in one day, and occasionally we fall back. So we start every meeting on our side thinking that this time we will conclude it.

But now I am beginning to wonder whether we are not running out of time, because I don’t see now physically how we are going to handle the work that remains to be done, and I will appreciate the Special Advisor’s suggestions. We will have one consolation, Mr. Special Advisor, nobody will ever come closer to agreement than we did without getting it. That is physically impossible.

Le Duc Tho: You have finished, Mr. Advisor?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Le Duc Tho: I disagree with you with regard to your evaluation of our negotiations. You said that our discussions are prolonged and because of I. I do not want to debate this question with you because I have expounded my views on many occasions. You say you want no dragging on of the negotiations, you want it to conclude. You maintain your stand regarding many questions, and we have our stand too regarding these questions, and you say that I am creating difficulties. So it is not true what you say. So when we responded to your requirement, then you say that we have achieved progress rapidly and it is some reasonableness shown, but when you do not respond to our proposal then you complain that we are dragging on the negotiations. You have your views on the way of signing the agreement. You maintain your view of the period for the withdrawal of civilian personnel. We have our view too on these questions. We should discuss these questions. If you maintain your views on these questions how can we progress rapidly?

Mr. Negroponte: Your demands are excessive.

Dr. Kissinger: What?

Mr. Negroponte: He said your views are excessive.

Le Duc Tho: Now there is an important question left. We are awaiting the instructions of my government. Tomorrow we shall discuss this. Pending this question we are proposing to discuss the understandings. You proposed this, to discuss the understandings. So if you have any understandings to make, please raise them and we will discuss it.

As to the schedule it is also our desire to keep to the schedule you have proposed and to reach good results.

Dr. Kissinger: But quite realistically, Mr. Special Advisor, on the schedule—and this is a fact—if the Vice President doesn’t leave tomorrow it will become nearly impossible. If he leaves after Wednesday it will become totally impossible, because I cannot leave for 48 hours until after he has returned, and the fact of the matter then is that it would run—I cannot be in Hanoi on Christmas. That would never be understood by our people. And I cannot go to Asia only to go to Hanoi. I must have some other stops. This is a fact. That doesn’t mean that it will be forever impossible. It means that we are now at the margin. Thirdly, I must return to Washington because I am already severely criticized for having extended my stay. That is another fact, and these are our physical realities that we are up against right now.

And therefore it is the nature of these agreements that in a war that has lasted this long and which has built up so much distrust that there will be many unsatisfactory elements in it for both parties. If one party wants exclusive satisfaction there will never be an agreement, and therefore what we now have to settle is whether we both want to accept the risks of peace or whether we have become so used to war that whatever the risks we would rather live with this than with the uncertain consequences of peace. That is the basic decision.

In October we settled many things quickly because we had a deadline. Now we don’t have such an explicit deadline, but it could happen that events will run away with us. That is what we are up against right now. And as I have pointed out before, the whole framework of this negotiation will be different because there will be new realities after this. This is where we are now.

We have some understandings. We want to discuss largely the understandings we have already had. They are in two parts: some mutual understandings and some unilateral statements of our position, for which you are not responsible but which we will give you only to avoid misconceptions later.

Le Duc Tho: Regarding the schedule, I agreed to the schedule you propose. Last time when you proposed your schedule I agreed to it. And since it began on last week you have proposed many schedules too. But no one has been kept. The October schedule was broken. [Kissinger laughs] Last week the schedule was broken too. When we met at the beginning of this week the schedule you proposed also cannot be kept too. When you propose a schedule I want to keep it because I want rapid progress. But we can’t progress and you complain that it is because of my negotiations. When you come here you raised many questions, and that is the cause of our slow advance. If now you review the negotiation, we have not changed any word in the agreement. Through our negotiations I have raised a number of questions but finally I have dropped them all.

So the main question regarding the schedule is that whether the questions we raised reflect our due consideration of bringing about an appropriate settlement or not. When the proposed solution is appropriate, sometime it needs only two or three days to come to a settlement. But when it is not appropriate then it will take a long time. So the discussions keep it beyond the schedule we have decided. We have got some experience about the schedule you have proposed. But when we reach basic agreement then the agreed basic text of the agreement will give us some idea of the schedule which will be kept. But since now the basic agreement is not reached yet, now I shift to discuss the understandings and we should discuss it to come to understand each other’s stands. This is my view regarding the schedules.

So I have raised the question of the signing of the agreement and the question of the period for the withdrawal of American civilian personnel. So our views still differ on these two questions.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but I would like to call the Special Advisor’s attention to the fact that both with respect to the signing and with respect to Article 5 we are prepared to maintain the original text.

And if we were to sum up . . . so I have explained to the Special Advisor often enough what it is that was needed, and it has now been reduced to very very modest proportions, and the changes in the text that now have been made are very insignificant. On the other hand the Special Advisor keeps introducing things that are very major changes in substance.

But even this is itself all really close to the point of being irrelevant. Because no doubt every day either of us can introduce something which he knows the other one won’t accept. It takes no great wisdom to protract these negotiations, just a certain debating skill. It does take some wisdom to end them.

Le Duc Tho: [Laughing] But your requirement is always too high. If it is moderate we will solve it immediately.

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Special Advisor, we have gone through this. You have withdrawn Article 5 three different times and you keep raising it again. It is no concession to get in an understanding what you had in an article if the practical consequence is the same. That’s no concession. Your contribution to today’s discussion—assuming the Vice President were to leave tomorrow—was that he should add to what is already very difficult the statement [to the South Vietnamese] that all civilians would leave in six months and thereby paralyze all sophisticated equipment, plus the course we had already agreed to on the signing must be changed to force you to an unacceptable relationship with the PRG. This is sure to make the Vice President’s task easier.

Le Duc Tho: We have taken into account your views, because at the end of the war you should withdraw completely all your forces, civilian personnel as well as military personnel working in military branches.

Dr. Kissinger: I know that Ambassador Porter as well as his successor and the Minister will have spirited and important discussions on this question.

Whatever may be said, the reality is that Article 5 as now written does not require what you are demanding. So it is no concession to us that you are giving us 6 months for something which had unlimited duration before. Nor was it a concession . . . On Saturday you said that if I made a big effort you would make a big effort. Then I withdrew our option to have Article 4 deleted; therefore you said your big effort is not to change Article 5. Now you want an understanding on what you were going to put into Article 5, having the same practical consequence. Perhaps I should reopen Article 1 and say let’s go back and say “All countries shall respect” and I will give you a private understanding that the U.S. will respect the integrity and so forth. And we can delete Article 4 and I will give you a private understanding about that too.

Le Duc Tho: Now regarding the question of civilian personnel, we agree to the former formula but since now you are introducing a great number of civilian personnel into South Vietnam, therefore I have to raise this question and therefore the question of the period for the withdrawal of the civilian personnel arises. You propose 15 months. I think that this period is too long. I propose 6 months. But you have not discussed it.

But I propose now to leave this question aside. Now let me speak about the way of signing the agreement. Now I propose a new approach to this question. I think your proposal is not so logical. [Laughter]

Dr. Kissinger: Statistically it is impossible for me always to make illogical proposals. Once in awhile I have to be right. [Laughter]

Le Duc Tho: I propose now that the two parties will sign the agreement. But regarding the signing by the PRG and the Saigon Administration I disagree with your proposal. I propose the U.S. and the DRV will sign the agreement. But the PRG and the Saigon Administration will sign the same text of the agreement, but separately as you proposed before.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. [Confers with Amb. Sullivan.] I don’t understand. They sign the same document?

Minister Thach: Same terms.

Dr. Kissinger: But each signs it separately.

Le Duc Tho: The same agreed provisions. The same terms.

Amb. Porter: But the same text.

Le Duc Tho: Yes. The same agreement. But sign just like the document you and I sign. The difference is that they will sign separately.

Amb. Porter: So three copies of the same document, one for us and DRV, and one for Saigon and one for the PRG.

Le Duc Tho: But the same text.

Dr. Kissinger: Let me consider this until tomorrow. It has a possibility.

Le Duc Tho: So I have done my best to find out the formula, a way out for that. [Kissinger laughs]

You want the ceasefire to be observed in Laos very early and you want a slower withdrawal of your forces, the civilian personnel withdrawal.

Dr. Kissinger: Now just a minute, Mr. Special Advisor. Your ability to sell the same thing five times is unbelievable. [Tho laughs] You have withdrawn Article 5.

Le Duc Tho: You sell the same thing ten times.

Dr. Kissinger: I never get any price for it. Because as soon as I make a proposal the Special Advisor says Article 5. [Laughter] Then if in doubt he says Article 8(c). When he gets bored with that.

Le Duc Tho: Because they are two important provisions.

Dr. Kissinger: I am not debating with you their importance, Mr. Special Advisor, I am debating with you their finality. [Laughter] You have withdrawn your proposal on Article 5 innumerable times. In Washington they are beginning to think I am an idiot because every day I report the Special Advisor has made a new concession; he has restored Article 5 to its original form. Now they have forgotten what the original form was in Washington. [Laughter] It is for the course on philosophy that I may eventually teach. The Advisor is producing a great new set of reflections about the nature of reality.

Now let me make a serious point. I have never accused the Special Advisor of telling an untruth. Amazing, but I have never done it. I was often tempted. [Laughter] But the constant reiteration that we are reintroducing a substantial number of civilian personnel cannot be maintained and should not be repeated. I have told the Special Advisor, and I am willing to write it into the agreement: one, that civilian personnel cannot be increased beyond the level it had October 15; two, that civilian personnel cannot perform functions that were not performed on October 15; and I am telling the Special Advisor that we are prepared to have a gradual withdrawal. None of this was in the previous agreement. All of this is an improvement over the previous agreement.

Moreover the Special Advisor on a number of occasions withdrew Article 5 only to reintroduce it. I would like to remind him of what he said Saturday, that if we made an effort he would then do the same. We made an effort, and he has been generous enough to change a legal obligation to an understanding. That is not an effort at all.

Le Duc Tho: If we write it in the agreement then the reader of the agreement will know that you will leave behind a great number of civilian personnel. Therefore we do not want to have this provision written in the agreement and we would rather have an understanding with Mr. Special Advisor, and now we are discussing the period for the withdrawal of such American civilian personnel. So you proposed to write in the agreement a provision allegedly beneficial to us but actually unbeneficial to us. Because it acknowledged that the United States is leaving behind civilian personnel. Therefore if we write in the agreement we should write that the total withdrawal of civilian personnel, but if we adopt an understanding we should discuss the period for the withdrawal.

Dr. Kissinger: I am prepared to give you an understanding of what I have just said, but it is no concession.

Le Duc Tho: But your period is too long.

Dr. Kissinger: We are not even talking about a period. We are talking about the situation we face. Twice during the week you withdrew your proposal for changing Article 5. Since we are going to keep our understandings as well as our agreement, it doesn’t make any difference whether it is an understanding or an agreement. The obligation on us is the same. The practical consequence is that a provision which we had used in order to bring about acquiescence to the agreement will be changed in its character in such a way that it would worsen the original agreement, and in return for that to what can we point that is a concrete improvement for our allies?

In fact the practical result of all of this negotiation is that on the issue of very great concern to us you have no instructions; on the issue of very great concern . . . on the other issue, you are asking in the form of an understanding what we have innumerable times rejected as part of the agreement.

Le Duc Tho: On what question?

Dr. Kissinger: The civilian personnel.

Le Duc Tho: What you told me yesterday, now you change your mind. I disagree with that. We agreed to drop the question of Article 5 on the basis that you have an understanding with me on that question. You said that the civilian personnel will be gradually withdrawn and after 15 months they will be completely withdrawn.

Dr. Kissinger: That is right.

Le Duc Tho: The difference between us is now that you propose 15 months, and I proposed 6 months. We shall discuss this period.

Dr. Kissinger: And we will settle on 7 months, as a great concession to us! So when the negotiation is completed there will be . . .

Le Duc Tho: [Laughing] Half of the 15-month period is all right because your method can raise the double of the equal level.

Dr. Kissinger: I have to point out to the Special Advisor he still owes me 8 days from the troop withdrawal period. [Laughter]

Le Duc Tho: You used the example and called it horse trading. But actually it is not horse trading because in Vietnamese we say buffalo trading!

Dr. Kissinger: That is why the buffalo are nearly extinct in Vietnam. They died from boredom waiting around for the deal to be made. [Laughter]

Well, Mr. Special Advisor, this understanding in isolation from the other DMZ provision is almost impossible to arrive at.

Le Duc Tho: You put forward new conditions. Sullivan is undermining it! [Laughter]

Dr. Kissinger: I just know what is going to happen tomorrow. The Special Advisor is coming in and say, “I am going to make a big effort on the DMZ: I will change the word regulations to modalities if you will restore the original Article 8(c) and have an understanding that 10½ months means really 6 months in practice.”

Le Duc Tho: Actually the proposal I made regarding the DMZ the previous times and last time too I was criticized severely by my government.

Dr. Kissinger: The last time too?

Le Duc Tho: Very energetically.

Dr. Kissinger: For the proposal you made last time?

Le Duc Tho: The previous time and last time. On Saturday. It is the reason why I have to exchange my message with Hanoi. Therefore I cannot accept you today.

Dr. Kissinger: But Hanoi isn’t under the illusion that your moderation has so impressed us that we are going to accept it. Because I would hate to have you use up your influence in Hanoi on something that we will be forced to reject. [Tho laughs]

Le Duc Tho: It is up to you then.

Dr. Kissinger: Do I understand that the Special Advisor did not?

Le Duc Tho: I rejected your proposal and you have the right to reject mine.

Dr. Kissinger: Do I understand the communications between Paris and Hanoi concerns the request by the Special Advisor to get authorization for the proposal he has already made?

Le Duc Tho: It is not exactly true.

Dr. Kissinger: Because this way he can sell it to me twice. First the Special Advisor asks for a concession for his unauthorized proposal, and then he asks for another one for making it an authorized proposal.

Le Duc Tho: You have rejected my proposals twice, but I have rejected your proposals four times.

Dr. Kissinger: But Mr. Special Advisor, what you rejected was what you had accepted two weeks ago and what we had already communicated to our people.

Le Duc Tho: But that point has not been agreed. How can you communicate it?

Dr. Kissinger: It was agreed.

Le Duc Tho: This question was under discussion—not agreed to.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, so was the draft agreement before.

Le Duc Tho: But who has dropped the provisions in the agreement?

Dr. Kissinger: What do you propose concretely we do now? This is a very entertaining discussion and it is always a pleasure to engage in social talk.

Le Duc Tho: Going to specific questions, I will propose a few more understandings. This will apply to both sides. That we will both sides undertake to make the National Council of National Reconciliation be set up between the two South Vietnamese parties between three months. It is some positive effort from both sides.

Dr. Kissinger: It is a concession to us?

Le Duc Tho: Both sides will do efforts in this sense.

Dr. Kissinger: What other understandings?

Le Duc Tho: You will do it after and you will exert your efforts.

Dr. Kissinger: And have you any other understandings?

Le Duc Tho: Regarding the understanding regarding 8(c) I maintain your understanding I repeated to you in your message and there is an affirmation from President Nixon, but I propose two months for this release.

Dr. Kissinger: First of all there is no affirmation from the President of the understanding. The affirmation of the President concerned the two articles you had agreed with us. There was a separate part of the message in which all the understandings we considered operative were separately listed. So if you want to talk to me about the provisions of Article 8(c) do not mention the President again.

Moreover we don’t accept 60 days either.

Le Duc Tho: Regarding your engagement regarding 8(c) you made the engagement during your meeting with Minister Xuan Thuy. Precisely because of this understanding we accepted the Article 8(c).

Dr. Kissinger: We have two separate problems; one is a proposal I made to Minister Xuan Thuy and second is whether this was confirmed by the President. My answer is that there is no proper reading of the message that would lead one to the conclusion that it was confirmed by the President. But I have told the Special Advisor that in principle I am willing to have an understanding on this question along the lines of what he is saying, if he will just stop mentioning the President and will consider that in relation to all other understandings that may be arrived at. If we could ever stop debating and start writing realistic understandings, I think this is not an insoluble issue.

Le Duc Tho: On other questions I don’t mention President Nixon at all, but in the message sent by the President it was said that there are now two questions left; if we agree to these two questions then the text of the agreement may be considered to be complete. Therefore we agree to these two questions—regarding the replacement of armament and regarding the question of Article 8(c)—then President Nixon receives this message and he expressed his satisfaction about our acceptance of these two provisions and said that he was satisfied with our good will and the text of the agreement might be considered to be complete, so we assume that President Nixon agreed to the contents of the understanding.

Dr. Kissinger: Then in the second part of that message the President pointed out that here is the list of understandings that we are basing our actions on, and he sent you a whole list of understandings which he indicated were the totality of the understandings. But as I said, Mr. Special Advisor, we can keep this up indefinitely. It is a fascinating theological discussion. It will never get the agreement done but it is very interesting and very stimulating.

Le Duc Tho: You proposed yesterday at the meeting that we should discuss the understandings, so I raise the various understandings now. Some of them have been settled, some others are not yet settled. So we will discuss those understandings which are not settled.

Mr. Negroponte: The ones which are settled I will give you a list.

Dr. Kissinger: Did we settle anything this afternoon? Or previously?

Le Duc Tho: The understandings we have solved previously, I recall to you those understandings.

Dr. Kissinger: Like what?

Le Duc Tho: The question of 8(c). [Kissinger laughs] The question of reconnaissance activities over the DRV.

Dr. Kissinger: I agree with you. It is the greatest achievement of the two weeks of negotiations.

Le Duc Tho: The question of aircraft carriers.

Dr. Kissinger: Do you remember anything turning out to our benefit?

Le Duc Tho: I shall come to that later. I shall point out those understandings that you owe to me. The understanding we have with you regarding Laos and Cambodia I have sent to you in the message; we maintain as they were.

Dr. Kissinger: Except for the length of time for the armistice.

Le Duc Tho: We will come to that later.

Dr. Kissinger: All we have to do for that is give up Articles 5, 8(c), 20 and . . .

Le Duc Tho: We shall finish, go through, all the understandings we have reached previously. That is a new proposal you are raising now.

Dr. Kissinger: To which the Special Advisor has agreed about three times in the last week.

Le Duc Tho: The previous understandings we have agreed to you in a message. We will also like that Mr. Advisor give us an understanding on the question of the U.S. contribution to the healing of the wounds of war. Just like we gave you our understanding regarding Laos and Cambodia. It is something you owe to me.

Dr. Kissinger: We will make an utmost effort. That is just what your understanding is.

Ambassador Porter just said he did not know what he missed. I said we don’t get any more settled than he does with the Minister but we are having a better time in not settling it. But that is because there are no ladies present.

Amb. Porter: It is better than Kleber.

Dr. Kissinger: The reason is that it is an all-male party.

Xuan Thuy: But we have more time to speak at Kleber.

Ambassador Porter: I agree.

Le Duc Tho: So I will also recall that in September 1972 we raised the question of massacre of the military personnel and civilian personnel of the PRG by the Saigon Administration, and you promised that you will use your influence to put an end to these killings. So I recall this promise from you.

Now regarding Laos, your proposal to shorten this period for the ceasefire, we are prepared to fix an explicit period after the end of the war in Vietnam. But you should give us other understandings beside the previous understanding you have given us. So we will have an understanding to shorten this period.

Dr. Kissinger: Like what? Like give me a hint? Like the resignation of President Nixon? [Laughter] Can he be inaugurated first?

Le Duc Tho: It is your own affair.

Dr. Kissinger: Like the establishment of a government of national concord in Washington of three equal segments? [Vietnamese laugh] What understanding does the Special Advisor have in mind?

Le Duc Tho: I recall only the understandings that you have come to with us previously: the understanding on the U.S. contribution to healing the wounds of war, the understanding on the question of 8(c)—the previous understanding. The new one I would like to propose is that the two parties, the U.S. and the DRV, undertake to use influence so that the National Council for National Reconciliation and Concord be established in South Vietnam within three months after the signing of the agreement. It is for our mutual interest that South Vietnam maintain lasting peace. And we should insure the good holding of the two-party conference.

Dr. Kissinger: You and us? You are threatening me again.

Le Duc Tho: The two-parties conference for which we both have responsibility.

Dr. Kissinger: Because I am afraid I thought the Special Advisor was threatening me with another meeting. How about an understanding the two sides use their influence that demobilization occur within three months? If you are willing to do this we are willing to do the understanding on the national reconciliation conference.

Le Duc Tho: It is a very new proposal of yours.

Dr. Kissinger: Yours is a new proposal too.

Le Duc Tho: The agreement has not been explicitly written regarding the demobilization of troops.

Dr. Kissinger: But that shouldn’t prevent us from having an understanding. Because the reason we said “as soon as possible” was because we thought it should be in two months. The reason we said “as soon as possible” is because we did not want you to raise it for three months. Well, it is of course true, Mr. Special Advisor, that all of your proposals are familiar to you and new to us and all of mine are familiar to me and new to you. It is in the nature of things.

Le Duc Tho: Because we are going in reverse the same direction.

Dr. Kissinger: That is an objective fact.

Le Duc Tho: And the objective facts sometimes they are soluble, sometimes they are not.

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Special Advisor, this is a very charming conversation, but no understanding means anything unless we can reduce it to some language.

On the reconnaissance activities, on the aircraft carriers, on Laos and Cambodia, I think we are in general agreement with you. And the easiest way to handle the Laos and Cambodia understandings is to use the two messages that were exchanged, our message to you and your reply to us, that is, to use the authentic texts rather than write a new one. And that is the fairest way of putting it, to say what we said to you and what you said to us.

With respect to the amount, we have explained to you that we can only give you a rough estimate because it requires Congressional action. But we are prepared to discuss with you the general order of magnitude and of the direction in which we will make an effort. And I can assure you that this is also of course a problem that we are prepared to discuss in some detail when we go to Hanoi.

But let me make the following concrete proposal. Could I suggest, since we will not have the time to do it on tomorrow afternoon, that Ambassador Porter and Ambassador Sullivan meet with Minister Xuan Thuy and the Vice Minister tomorrow morning to go over the understandings that you want and the understandings that we propose and see whether the language is acceptable to both sides? Because I absolutely must leave tomorrow evening and there will be no way if we go into anything like this tomorrow afternoon, there will be no possible way of settling it. And if we are not going to settle it at least let us not do it because we were not dealing with it in a serious way.

We don’t mean to exclude you, Mr. Special Advisor, but I don’t know whether Ambassador Porter’s nerves after a year with the Minister are up to that challenge. [Vietnamese laugh]

Amb. Porter: During my time with the Minister I can say that my health has improved.

Dr. Kissinger: That is because he avoids most meetings now. And then if there are two or three issues of substance left, the Special Advisor and I can solve them in the afternoon. [They nod yes] May I make one other suggestion? There are a few unresolved issues on the text of the agreement. May I suggest that our experts get together again tomorrow and finish those and reduce—I think many of them can be solved by the experts, and then you and I can just concentrate on the two or three that involve political issues. I would suggest that a different group—two groups just to save time. Do you agree? So we have two groups of experts meeting in the morning.

Le Duc Tho: I agree.

Dr. Kissinger: All right then. We would be delighted to invite the two ministers to come to our residence, if they wanted to meet there, and we would send our experts to wherever you want them to come.

Le Duc Tho: This working method is logical I believe.

Dr. Kissinger: And each will bring one or two people.

Le Duc Tho: I agree that tomorrow morning Minister Xuan Thuy, Ambassador Porter, Mr. Sullivan and Minister Thach will meet to discuss the understandings. They will meet in the morning, here.

Dr. Kissinger: Here, or on Rue Faubourg St. Honore?

Le Duc Tho: It is more convenient here.

Dr. Kissinger: All right, we meet here.

Le Duc Tho: As to the experts they will use the habitual place. And then we will have the whole session here in the afternoon.

Dr. Kissinger: At 3 o’clock.

Le Duc Tho: 3 o’clock.

Dr. Kissinger: Shall the Special Advisor and I go to a museum together?

Le Duc Tho: At Gif-sur-Yvette.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Le Duc Tho: So tomorrow, in order to come to a settlement, both sides should make a great effort. Because we have done great efforts. But there are two possibilities, whether we will reach a settlement or we will not reach a settlement. We will have a further discussion, you and I will have further discussions, on the question of the period of the withdrawal of civilian personnel and the question of ceasefire in Laos. Or shall we leave the two questions for the Ambassadors and the Ministers? Leave them for a parallel discussion?

Dr. Kissinger: And what they cannot settle in the morning you and I will discuss in the afternoon. But may I suggest that they should begin with easy understandings, with the agreed ones, but then go to the others.

And really I must leave tomorrow night, so I promise not to make my usual speeches tomorrow if we are going to work seriously to an agreement.

Le Duc Tho: I will make an effort. If we come to a settlement you will return to Washington and I will go back home too. If we don’t come to a settlement you will return to Washington and I will return to Hanoi too.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. And this time if we come to a settlement there can be no interruption to the schedule from our side. It may be 24 hours. Because we have made the firm decision to proceed.

Now one other matter; we have to get the protocols. We have to get some discussion on the protocols. Could you bring the protocols in the morning? Your protocols? Because I have to read them before I leave.

Le Duc Tho: We will make an effort and we will endeavor to give you the protocols tomorrow. We are working . . . it is rather slow.

Dr. Kissinger: We will not be able to sign the agreement or even to initial it until we are sure this machinery will really go into action. And I think, if we are to make peace, after all the effort that has gone into it, we should not act like buffalo traders to the very end. We should make a generous move at some point and get it finished. Because after a certain point it will become important that the mood and the atmosphere with which the agreement is concluded not be one in which every party believes the other one always tricked it.

Le Duc Tho: Whether it is the buffalo trading or horse trading, it is up to you! [Laughter]

Dr. Kissinger: Already the Special Advisor is starting in the generous spirit I always associate with him.

Ten o’clock for the experts, and we will tell the press that there will be a full meeting in the afternoon and two expert groups meeting in the morning. They will find out anyway.

Le Duc Tho: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: Is that agreeable?

Le Duc Tho: Agreeable.

Dr. Kissinger: We have an interpreter problem. We have only one interpreter and he will be needed on the meeting on the text, so if you would bring the interpreter to the meeting with the Ministers here. And we will be prepared to serve lunch to the Ministers here so that you don’t have to go back to Choisy unless you want to. Oh, you have to go to Gif in the afternoon. We will be prepared to serve lunch here. I suggest the Special Advisor and I go to Notre Dame together in the morning!

Le Duc Tho: It is the first time Ambassador Porter and Minister Xuan Thuy have meal together.

Dr. Kissinger: First time.

Le Duc Tho: It is an event indeed.

Amb. Porter: I am sure we will never forget it.

Dr. Kissinger: And the survivor can write the text of the agreement. [Laughter]

[The meeting ended at 7:15 p.m.]

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 865, For the President’s Files (Winston Lord)—China Trip/Vietnam Negotiations, Camp David Memcons, December 1972 [2 of 3]. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting took place at 31 Boulevard de la Saussaye, Neuilly-sur-Seine. All brackets are in the original.

   Kissinger, reporting to the President via a message to Haig, who was in Washington, characterized the day’s proceedings as being “composed of equal parts of insolence, guile, and stalling by the North Vietnamese.” His appraisal of what might happen next and his recommendation of what he should do was as follows:

   “It is not impossible that we could conclude the agreement tomorrow, but nothing in their behavior suggests any urgency and much in their manner suggests cock-sure insolence. They could, of course, be without instructions, and may in any event want to play with us until the last minute. The amount of work left for tomorrow is staggering and could make for a sloppy conclusion, which is precisely one of their favorite tactics. I believe in any event that I should return home tomorrow night.”

   He added:

   “All of this may prove academic, however, since we must face other facts. It is obvious that an agreement was easily achievable on any day since last Thursday. Hanoi may well have concluded that we have been outmaneuvered and dare not continue the war because of domestic and international expectations. They may believe that Saigon and we have hopelessly split and that the imminence of Christmas makes it impossible for us to renew bombing the North. If this is the case we will face a decision of major magnitude. I believe a total collapse by us now would make an agreement unenforceable. The President must also understand that an agreement at this point and under conditions that led to the collapse of South Vietnam would have grave consequences for his historic position later.”

   Kissinger concluded: “No matter what happens tomorrow I will not repeat not break off the negotiations but rather we could take the line that the two sides are close enough to continue work through diplomatic channels.” (Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. IX, Vietnam, October 1972–January 1973, Document 156)

   Later that evening, Haig replied for the President:

   “The President considers that if Hanoi remains unmanageably intransigent that in any event we should not break off the talks in a formal sense. Rather, we should recess, informing them that we believe that this past week’s discussions suggest that both sides should take some time for consultations and to reconsider the gravity of the situation.

   You are returning to Washington and will be prepared to meet with them again after Christmas or before if they believe it would be constructive. We would then reseed the mines and resume military activity at an intensified pre-October pace. (You should decide whether to tell this to Tho or not.)”

   Haig then summed up:

   “I believe the President is perfectly amenable to your returning home on Tuesday [December 12] if in your judgment there is no hope of a settlement or if we would risk fundamentally our ability to ultimately achieve a workable settlement as a result of your staying longer. On the other hand, he is very clear that if you obtain sufficient movement tomorrow to indicate that a day or two more labor will resolve the matter, you should extend your stay.”

   At the same time, Haig observed: “I am absolutely convinced that the President is fully aware of the seriousness of the situation and, especially, the difficulties which we have faced at the negotiating table. He is fully prepared to react strongly and to weather through a continuing intransigent position by Hanoi.” To drive home this point, Haig told Kissinger that the President had “just called again and urged that we reseed the mines tomorrow and be prepared to move immediately with around-the-clock bombing of the Hanoi area. I told him we should definitely hold on this until after tomorrow’s session and until you return. Based on the foregoing, I am convinced that there is absolutely no problem here with respect to our strategy and what must be done if it is forced upon us.” (Ibid., Document 158)