Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XLII, Vietnam: The Kissinger-Le Duc Tho Negotiations

34. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Paris, December 6, 1972, 10:40 a.m.–3:50 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• Le Duc Tho, Special Advisor to DRV Delegation to the Paris Conference on Vietnam
• Xuan Thuy, Minister, Chief DRV Delegate to Paris Conference on Vietnam
• Nguyen Co Thach, Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs
• Phan Hien, Delegation Member
• Luu Van Loi, Delegation Member
• Trinh Ngoc Thai, Delegation Member
• Nguyen Dinh Phuong, Interpreter
• [Four Notetakers]
• Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• M/Gen. Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• Ambassador William Sullivan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
• Winston Lord, NSC Staff
• John D. Negroponte, NSC Staff
• David A. Engel, NSC Staff, Interpreter
• Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff
• Mrs. Mary Stifflemire, Notetaker

Dr. Kissinger: [Referring to the wall mirror behind him] We have it set up so that you can read our papers. But you will catch pneumonia because you have the windows behind you. When this light blinks, Mr. Special Advisor, it means you are being too mean to me.

We are delighted, Mr. Special Advisor, to welcome you and your colleagues here and we hope that we make a big advance towards peace.

Le Duc Tho: If such reasons are your intention it is our intention to.

Dr. Kissinger: I wonder whether the Special Advisor would like to start the meeting.

Le Duc Tho: I leave the floor to you first. Because you will open up the way.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, before I do, Mr. Special Advisor, could I ask you a few questions about the presentation the other day? [Tho nods yes.] At the last meeting you read to us your proposal on Article 8 and we were not sure we understood it. There was some dispute among my colleagues and me just what you proposed. Could you read again exactly what language you were mentioning?

Le Duc Tho: Let me read this Article:

Article 8(c): “The return of captured military personnel of the parties shall be carried out simultaneously with and completed on the same day as the withdrawal of troops mentioned in Article 5 of this agreement. The parties shall exchange complete lists of the above-mentioned military personnel on the day of the signing of this agreement.”

Article 8(b): “The return of captured foreign civilian personnel of the parties shall also be completed within 60 days of the signing of this agreement. The parties shall exchange complete lists of the above-mentioned civilian personnel on the day of the signing of this agreement.”

These two provisions are similar to yours but we separated to make it clear.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Le Duc Tho: The third provision, 8(c). This is the important provision. This is how we would like to formulate it:

8(c): “The two South Vietnamese parties shall return the Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and detained in South Vietnam covered by Article 21(b) of the July 20, 1954 Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam. That is, they shall return all those who have taken part in any form in the armed and political struggle between the parties and for that reason have been arrested and detained during the war by one side or the other. The two South Vietnamese parties will complete the return in a spirit of national reconciliation and concord, with a view to ending hatred and enmity in order to ease suffering and reunite families. The two South Vietnamese parties will complete the return of the civilian personnel within 60 days of the signing of this agreement. The two South Vietnamese parties will exchange complete lists of Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and detained in South Vietnam on the day of the signing of this agreement.”

Article 8(d) is the same as your former Article 8(b). No change.

Dr. Kissinger: Article 8(d).

Interpreter: Is the same as the former 8(b).

Le Duc Tho: So the disposition of the provisions there is no problem at all.

Dr. Kissinger: Could you read the whole article again, just so I can have it in my mind? In English is fine. I don’t have to hear it in Vietnamese. I miss the nuances in Vietnamese.

Mr. Phuong: Article 8(a): “The return of captured military personnel of the parties will be carried out simultaneously with and completed on the same day as the troop withdrawal mentioned in Article 5. The parties will exchange complete lists of the above-mentioned captured military personnel on the date of the signing of this agreement.

“(b) The return of captured foreign civilian personnel of the parties will also be completed within 60 days of the signing of this agreement. The parties will exchange complete lists of the above-mentioned civilian personnel on the date of the signing of this agreement.

“(c) The two South Vietnamese parties will return the Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and detained in South Vietnam covered in accordance with Article 21(b) of the July 20, 1954 Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam. That is, they will return all those who have taken part under any form in the armed and political struggle between the parties and for that reason have been arrested and detained during the war by one side or the other. The two South Vietnamese parties will do so in a spirit of national reconciliation and concord with a view to ending hatred and enmity in order to ease suffering and reunite families. The two South Vietnamese parties will complete the return of the above-mentioned civilian personnel within 60 days of the signing of this agreement. The two South Vietnamese parties will exchange complete lists of Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and detained in South Vietnam on the date of the signing of this agreement.

“(d) The parties will help each other to gather information about the military personnel of the parties and civilian personnel of the parties missing in action, determine the location and take care of the graves of them so as to facilitate the exhumation and repatriation of the remains and to take any other such necessary measures as required to gather information about those still considered missing in action.”

Dr. Kissinger: There was some dispute in my group because some people thought you were dropping Article 8(c) altogether. It was my view that this was highly improbable. Because you did not actually read it last time.

Now let me ask you why you think those are not linked to each other.

Le Duc Tho: On what points?

Dr. Kissinger: You said to us last time that you were taking account of our views that they should not be linked together. The mere fact that they are in separate paragraphs does not mean they are not linked together.

Le Duc Tho: I have separated these into two different provisions to make it clearer, but if you would like to merge it into one single provision and say the return of captured military personnel and foreign civilian personnel of the parties it is all right.

Dr. Kissinger: As a concession?

Le Duc Tho: I have separated these.

Dr. Kissinger: But is it your idea that separating the provisions of a chapter means that they are not linked to each other?

Le Duc Tho: My intention is only to make it clearer to separate the captured military personnel from the captured foreign civilian personnel.

Dr. Kissinger: And also from the captured Vietnamese personnel. But is it not true—I am trying to understand—if there is any holdup in the release of one of these categories it will affect the release of the other categories?

Le Duc Tho: If we can reach agreement, then the return of captured military personnel of the parties, of captured foreign civilian personnel of the parties, and the return by the two South Vietnamese parties of captured Vietnamese civilian personnel—if agreement is reached the return of these categories will be carried out in the same time period.

Dr. Kissinger: And if there is any delay in one, will it affect the others?

Le Duc Tho: Because there is South Vietnam and North Vietnam. Therefore the return of the prisoners in South Vietnam, military personnel in South Vietnam, may affect the return of military personnel. [Mr. Thach corrects him.] In North Vietnam there is no effect at all. The military personnel captured in North Vietnam will be released without being affected by the return of other categories. But in South Vietnam there are two parties; the return of prisoners detained by one party affect the return of prisoners by the other party in South Vietnam.

Dr. Kissinger: Let me understand this. My mind doesn’t work as fast as Vietnamese minds.

Le Duc Tho: [Laughs] You are complimenting.

Dr. Kissinger: My colleagues don’t laugh. They believe it. The Special Advisor thinks if my mind worked as fast we would have settled two years ago.

You are saying each category is balanced against each other in that category. In other words the military personnel is balanced against military personnel, the foreign personnel balanced against foreign personnel and the civilian personnel balanced against civilian personnel—but if there is a hitch on one category it doesn’t affect the others.

Le Duc Tho: For North Vietnam, as I told you, it will be definitely released, the prisoners. As for South Vietnam all the categories of prisoners should be released or returned in the same period of 60 days. If one side retained one of these categories the other side may retain some category. But I am convinced that if we reach an agreement and all the parties respect the agreement, then all prisoners would be released. What I am afraid is that after the agreement one side will violate the agreement and then the other side will—there is some trouble.

Dr. Kissinger: That is what I am afraid of, and that is why I want to understand what the consequences are.

Le Duc Tho: As I told you, once we have signed the agreement we will honor strictly the agreement. You will realize that. When we signed the 1954 Geneva Agreements with the French, after the signing of the agreement not one, not a single French prisoner, was retained in Vietnam. And probably you recall that there were at that time nearly 20,000 French prisoners. But on the contrary, the French at that time liquidated a number of our prisoners in their hands. This is a fact.

Dr. Kissinger: It still doesn’t answer the question. I have no doubt, I am not questioning your willingness to carry out the agreement. There are four parties involved. My question is if any one of them violates the agreement, does it then mean that you will be free not to carry out your side of the agreement?

Le Duc Tho: Here the question is, when the agreement is signed then all parties have the obligation to abide by the agreement. If one side, one party, violates the agreement, how can it be forced to the other parties to abide by the agreement? But I should tell you as far as we are concerned we will abide by the agreement. It is something certain, provided that the other side will abide by the agreement too.

Dr. Kissinger: Which means in practice if there is some dispute between the two South Vietnamese sides, whose history of being able to agree on things has not been totally demonstrated, you will have the right not to abide by the agreement. If one side holds pickpockets and you say they are not pickpockets but political prisoners, that means that all other provisions remain in abeyance?

Le Duc Tho: To determine whether a prisoner is a pickpocket or a political prisoner, there must be evidence and there must be legal evidence.

Dr. Kissinger: That may be true. The key point I am making—to get it clearly understood, I am not disputing it—you are saying, one, of course you will carry out the agreement; and two, if any of the parties however does not keep the agreement then you too do not have to keep the agreement. It is not an unreasonable position. I am just trying to understand. Therefore you are saying the release of any prisoners is linked to the release of all the prisoners.

Le Duc Tho: Naturally there are four signatories to the agreement, and it is agreed that all the prisoners should be released. Therefore the four signatories should insure that all prisoners be released. As for North Vietnam, we insure that all the prisoners will be released, but in South Vietnam the two parties should also insure the release of all prisoners. In South Vietnam the release of prisoners is under the responsibility of the two South Vietnamese parties signatory to the agreement. But you, the United States, has also the responsibility in insuring these prisoners to be released.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, I understand. So this links all four provisions of Article 8 to each other.

Le Duc Tho: For North Vietnam there is no problem. We will release all the prisoners simultaneously with the withdrawal of U.S. forces. There is no link at all between the release of such prisoners with the release of prisoners in South Vietnam, between the two South Vietnamese. This is also a fact, that we take into account of your problem. We do not want to link the question of prisoners in North Vietnam, detained in North Vietnam, with the question of civilian prisoners of the two South Vietnamese parties and military prisoners in South Vietnam.

Dr. Kissinger: According to our calculations there are 108 American prisoners of war in South Vietnam held by the PRG and there are 495 missing in action. How are they affected by these provisions?

Le Duc Tho: The prisoners, military or civilian, captured and detained by the two South Vietnamese parties, they have to be released completely.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand, but . . .

Le Duc Tho: Let me finish.

Dr. Kissinger: Excuse me.

Le Duc Tho: As to the parties will help each other in getting information about military or civilian personnel missing in action, that is no difficulty at all.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand that. The question is, we believe there are at least 108 which we know are held as prisoners by your allies in the south and there are 495 missing in action, at least some of whom might be held as prisoners. Since we foresee there will not be complete unanimity between the two South Vietnamese parties, based on what historical experience has been with prisoners, how is the release of the American prisoners affected by the failure of the two South Vietnamese parties to agree as to who constitutes a civilian prisoner?

Le Duc Tho: The lists of prisoners of war will be handed to you at the signing of the agreement. As to those who are missing in action, they are missing in action. But those who are being detained, then at the signing of the agreement there will be a list that will be handed to you. There cannot be any case of missing in action and really being detained by us.

Dr. Kissinger: Not to Cora Weiss.

Le Duc Tho: After the settlement the prisoners will be returned to you.

Dr. Kissinger: To the U.S. government, for a change?

Le Duc Tho: Of course [laughing].

Dr. Kissinger: We don’t want to interrupt well-established procedures but we have better procedures the other way.

Le Duc Tho: [Laughs] Because if the prisoners would not be returned to the U.S. government then there would be a violation of the agreement. But when we sign the agreement we will never violate it.

Dr. Kissinger: Let me ask another question, which is still not clear to me. The Special Advisor said that North Vietnam will of course carry out its agreement and that this is independent of whatever happens between the South Vietnamese parties. However your South Vietnamese allies, according to our calculations, are holding 108 American prisoners. That leaves aside any missing in action. Now you cannot guarantee their release, can you?

Le Duc Tho: We think that once the agreement is signed then we will implement the agreement as the other parties.

Dr. Kissinger: I know. I am not questioning the good faith of the Democratic Republic. I am asking this question, trying to understand your Article. And I don’t want to mislead you about our accepting your Article; I am just trying to understand it. What you are saying is, one, there are separate obligations in the Article; two, the Democratic Republic will absolutely carry out its obligations as they are balanced off in the Article. Therefore you are saying Americans will be released even if there should be difficulties between the South Vietnamese parties. But you do not hold all the American prisoners. Some of the prisoners are held by the South Vietnamese.

Would you like us to close the window? We thought if we could freeze you enough you would agree to our proposals. [Laughter] Since you come from a warm climate. You see, your colleague to your left doesn’t have four years behind him. He is still full of energy. He has to go four more years. [Laughter] You shouldn’t bring reinforcements.

Le Duc Tho: But I am afraid he is not as strong as I am.

North Vietnam is detaining American military personnel. As you said, South Vietnam, the PRG, is holding a number of American personnel. As far as North Vietnam is concerned, as I told you, after the signing of the agreement the release of American military personnel will be carried out simultaneously with the withdrawal of U.S. forces. But in South Vietnam the PRG will release all American personnel in their hands being detained by the PRG. But here there is some relationship between the responsibility of the United States regarding the release of civilian personnel of the PRG being detained. The PRG would like that the U.S. will fulfill its responsibility to insure that the Saigon people will release both the civilian personnel of the PRG. Then the PRG will release all the prisoners, American prisoners as well as Saigonese prisoners.

Dr. Kissinger: Let me sum up. You are saying that the PRG for its part will release all American military personnel as regards Article 8(a) and all foreign civilian personnel as regards Article 8(b), regardless of what happens with regard to Article 8(c).

Le Duc Tho: American personnel, military personnel, being detained in North Vietnam will be released simultaneously with the withdrawal of the U.S. forces. But at the same time military personnel captured and detained in South Vietnam by the parties should be released also within the same period. American military personnel captured in North Vietnam will have no link at all, will be released independently of Vietnamese civilian personnel in South Vietnam.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand. I am just summing it up to make sure I understand. With respect to foreign civilian personnel—they don’t hold any, do they—whatever foreign civilian personnel you hold, they will also be released independently of what happens in South Vietnam. With respect to military personnel.

Le Duc Tho: Right. In North Vietnam.

Dr. Kissinger: In North Vietnam.

Le Duc Tho: Civilian.

Dr. Kissinger: And military.

Le Duc Tho: Civilian personnel being detained in North Vietnam.

Dr. Kissinger: Foreign civilian personnel.

Le Duc Tho: Foreign civilian personnel being detained in North Vietnam, and military, is not linked to the Vietnamese civilian personnel detained in South Vietnam—is not linked to the Vietnamese civilian personnel detained by the two South Vietnamese parties.

Dr. Kissinger: It is not evident from your draft, but I am beginning to understand.

Le Duc Tho: The provision is not written technically, but understood with explanation.

Dr. Kissinger: Now let us turn to Article 8(c)—your 8(c). With respect to Article 8(c) the release of the civilian personnel—you maintain that the United States has the responsibility to use its influence to make certain that provision is carried out correctly in South Vietnam.

Le Duc Tho: Regarding Article 8(c), the two South Vietnamese parties have obligations to return the prisoners in their hands. But of course the U.S. has the responsibility to insure that such prisoners be released within 60 days.

Dr. Kissinger: Right. Therefore—I am trying to understand your position—if there should be some difficulty . . . therefore the release of American military personnel and American civilian personnel held by the Provisional Revolutionary Government depends to some extent on the ability of the United States to influence the Saigon government to carry out the provisions of Article 8(c).

Le Duc Tho: Right.

Dr. Kissinger: All right, I understand this point now.

May I ask the Special Advisor another question? When we met on Monday morning the Special Advisor said that he had expected me to discuss with him his proposals of last Thursday [November 23]. And also in the communication to us of the DRV of last Thursday [November 30], of the Thursday before and the Thursday after, the DRV said the Special Advisor made a very significant proposal which could open the way to a solution. And I wanted to understand just what the Special Advisor thought the significance of the proposal was. I am not debating it, I am just trying to understand what its significance was.

Le Duc Tho: What is my intention here? Regarding Article 8(c), if the two South Vietnamese will return the civilian personnel in accordance with Article 21(b) of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities of July 20, 1954 within a period of 60 days, then we will agree with the PRG to redeploy a symbolic redeployment of a number of its armed forces in the extreme north of South Vietnam so as to reduce the tension in this region. The return of mentioning Article 8(c) in the agreement and thereby implementing Article 8(c). It should have been that the release of civilian personnel by the two South Vietnamese is something obligatory, that the two South Vietnamese have the obligation to carry out the obligation. It is something fair. But we know that on this question you have difficulty because you have agreed this with us, and you have divulged or you have published this. Therefore we are willing to make this understanding, to facilitate this question. There is the reason why we make this understanding.

Dr. Kissinger: What do you consider a symbolic number?

Le Duc Tho: How much do you like?

Dr. Kissinger: I gave you a . . .

Le Duc Tho: You want a big number; I want a small one. How shall we settle this question?

Dr. Kissinger: No, I gave you what we count . . . Even we don’t know what you are talking about if you just say a symbolic number.

Le Duc Tho: Some number—certain number. There should be a number.

Dr. Kissinger: That is right. Well, I gave you a number the other day.

Le Duc Tho: [Laughs] It is too big a number. Because we are approaching the settlement we should be realistic.

Dr. Kissinger: I don’t have the impression we are approaching a settlement, but . . .

Le Duc Tho: Therefore your number is too big and our number is too small.

Dr. Kissinger: I haven’t even heard your number yet.

Le Duc Tho: But what is important is whether you agree to our proposal. After that there will come the number. Because if you reject the proposal then the number does not arise.

Dr. Kissinger: I told the Special Advisor once about the man during the war came to the military and said the way to deal with the submarine problem is to heat the ocean and boil them to the surface. And they said, “How do you do that?” He said, “I gave you the idea. How you do it is up to you.”

Le Duc Tho: [Laughs] Too many anecdotes!

Dr. Kissinger: So the Special Advisor is saying, “I have given you the idea; now how you carry it out is your problem.” Like the Minister. For three years the Minister was brutalizing me by telling me, “Set a date, set an unconditional date. As soon as the date is set everything else will follow easily.” And the Minister had three magnificent speeches on this subject which he would give in succession, sometimes all in the same day.

Xuan Thuy: We had a proposal to fix a date but you did not respond to this proposal. Now let us pass over this fixation of dates. Now let us do our work.

Dr. Kissinger: We settled that issue in a more realistic way, perhaps due to my inability to understand the subtlety of the Minister’s presentation. Although I learned one anecdote which I will use on other occasions for the Minister. About the “Free Meal Tomorrow!” [Laughter] So it is not that it was completely wasted.

Le Duc Tho: But actually as a result of this that we are approaching a settlement now. Now let me say this. We have made a concrete proposal. Now in return of Article 8(c) being written in the agreement we have proposed redeployment of a number of forces. Do you agree to that?

Dr. Kissinger: The issue of the release of prisoners, of civilian prisoners, has for us two aspects: One, its impact on the release of American prisoners. Second, its impact on our ability to convince our allies to accept the agreement. I have already stated my view with respect to the first. Let me state my view very clearly as a general principle with respect to the second. It is no secret that there are some disagreements between our allies and ourselves with respect to the draft agreement. And we will even admit that we underestimated the extent of the opposition of our allies to the agreement even as it stood. It is also true that you had a certain advantage over us at the October meeting. This advantage was two-fold: You had time to prepare your position, but we had to improvise our response. You had time to consult your allies; we did not.

Le Duc Tho: It is not what you think, because we have also difficulties with our allies.

Dr. Kissinger: I even believe you. It would be easy for me to do what you are doing to us, but I believe you are right. But at any rate, what is our problem now? I have tried to say it indirectly. I will say it now directly. Even the agreement as it stood, together with the changes that we agreed to last week together with a few changes we are seeking for this week, would require the most massive American effort to implement. It would involve the strongest measures and the full authority of a President newly elected. I am talking reality now, I am not negotiating, and you should understand this reality.

Now you are asking us, as the result of a negotiation, to go back to Saigon with an agreement that is already considered unacceptable in Saigon and to make two changes: One which would paralyze all complex military equipment—because you know as well as we do that they do not yet have sufficiently trained personnel to maintain some of the more complex technical equipment. Even you had Soviet radar technicians in the Democratic Republic when you first received complex radars. I am talking reality now. I am not going to publish this. So if we really want to settle, we have to face reality. The second change you are asking of us is that the Saigon Government should release 10’s of thousands, maybe, of individuals that they consider have conducted armed struggle against it. I don’t know whether that is true, but that is their perception of the problem.

Now what is the position of the President? I am giving you first the theoretical position of the President, and then we can discuss the practical one. First, the political reality is that he was reelected with the largest majority in American political history against a candidate whose platform was to destroy the Saigon Government. The President’s platform was to make an honorable peace. I am now talking American political reality. You can disagree with it completely but I am giving you our facts. I am sure you have your political realities in Hanoi, and they may be as compelling for you as ours are for us. You have one advantage: you have only one newspaper! And we have not yet met the North Vietnamese Cora Weiss. [Laughter] But if you send her we will give her back three prisoners too. [Laughter]

Le Duc Tho: But it is regrettable that you are holding no North Vietnamese prisoners in the U.S. because Vietnam has never sent troops to the U.S.

Dr. Kissinger: A friend of mine wrote me a letter—your telling me about the prisoners—he said we should say there is no Negro problem in the south because there are no Negroes; there is only a so-called Negro problem. [Laughter]

Le Duc Tho: In any case there is a different color of skin between Negroes and you. But in our two country, in Vietnam we are all one people. There is no difference, and all Vietnamese have the same skin color. Therefore you can’t say anything about it! [Laughter]

Dr. Kissinger: I will think of an answer. It may take four years of negotiations! Let me go back to the reality, then I will eventually answer your question, Mr. Special Advisor.

What is the position that we have taken with the Saigon Government? The Saigon Government has made a series of proposals to us whose objective consequence, in our judgment, would be to change totally the character of the agreement we achieved in October. The President has taken the position that if we can obtain an agreement here that we consider reasonable, we will go ahead with that agreement regardless of the opposition of Saigon. He has also indicated that in that case the whole character of our relationship with Saigon would have to change. Now this is a very big decision for the President. Given the nature of his victory, given the nature of his constituency, and given the undoubted criticism to which we will be exposed if even the agreement we had already achieved, say until last Thursday noon, should become the official agreement.

So you are totally wrong in your assessment that what we are trying to do is so to strengthen the Saigon Government that it can destroy the PRG, or to use these negotiations as a trick in order to defeat you. I assure you that if we maintain all the changes that were made two weeks ago and added to them all the changes we proposed on Monday, we would be in a mortal crisis with Saigon anyway. We have said to Saigon, we have said publicly, and we will now say to you; we will not give Saigon a guarantee of victory. But neither can we make an agreement which gives your side a guarantee of victory. What we want is an agreement which gives the real political forces in Vietnam an opportunity over a period of time to develop, so that the Vietnamese people over a period of time can determine their destiny.

I told the Special Advisor on Monday, and I repeat it here, that if we come to an agreement in these sessions we will immediately send the Vice President to Saigon in order to lend the strongest weight to the implementation of this agreement. And as you know, the Vice President is the special favorite of the American conservatives. Although I notice the Special Advisor recently quoted him approvingly. [Laughter] We are taking his speech writers away from him now. [Laughter] We are making General Haig write all his speeches.

Le Duc Tho: Then you mean that Vice President Agnew did not read the speech before reading it? [Laughter]

Dr. Kissinger: In an American political campaign you have no idea of what people say. The truth is, it was translated from the German just five minutes before he delivered it. [Laughter]

Le Duc Tho: So this is why I say that you did not match your deeds with your words.

Dr. Kissinger: So this is our strategy. Now you think we are trying to take unilateral advantage of you.

Mr. Phuong: Strategy or tragedy?

Dr. Kissinger: Strategy, not tragedy. It is also our tragedy! [Laughter] You say we want to get some unilateral advantage. But we are realistic. The Special Advisor himself said on the last Saturday we met that the changes we have so far agreed upon are not significant. I agree with him. They are elaborations and specifications of clear implications of the previous agreement. And the additions that we are still talking about are not substantially different in character. They would, however, enable us to discharge our moral obligations. They would enable us with good conscience to do the extraordinarily difficult thing of achieving an agreement and implementing it. So if peace is your real objective, we are really partners in this enterprise, and you should not look at what we are asking for as an attempt to put you at an additional disadvantage. We can write down anything, but if it isn’t implemented and if we cannot in good conscience implement it, it will be senseless.

Let me say one other general thing, then I will respond to the Special Advisor’s question. There is a great deal at stake in these negotiations, and in this meeting and the next one. First, if the negotiations break down of course the war will continue—and probably intensify. But we have talked about that. And you have proved your courage often enough for me not to say that I know what the outcome will be. And we have enough experience with you to know that you will not be intimidated.

But let me make clear the political implications if it breaks down. If these negotiations break down, the only conclusion we can draw is that we cannot discuss Vietnamese matters with the Vietnamese parties because the hostility is so great that any reasonable compromise will be impossible. We will then have to return to the position that Vietnamese political matters are out of our competence—out of the American competence—and therefore not only will the war change its character but our negotiations will totally change their character. And we will not be prepared to discuss this kind of an agreement again. We may make another one, but not this kind of an agreement.

Now I have talked to you in this frank and direct manner because we will probably spend the rest of our day discussing specific clauses. But it is important for you to understand what we are trying to do. We want to preserve the essence of this agreement. We want some specifications and some elaborations, the greater part of which we have already achieved. And we need the minimum of change that we consider consistent with our moral principles to do the enormously difficult and painful effort that will be required to bring along our allies in Saigon. We are not here as their spokesmen.

Now look at Article 8(c) in this context, and now I answer your question. The objective consequence is: you refuse to withdraw the so-called North Vietnamese forces—and they are so-called North Vietnamese forces because they are North Vietnamese forces. Either that or you are a nation of pacifists and don’t have a single soldier on your soil, and I don’t have that impression. In fact one of my colleagues said to me the other day when you said that North Vietnam . . .

Le Duc Tho: Then you misunderstand the origin of the war in Vietnam.

Dr. Kissinger: No, I understand it very well.

Le Duc Tho: We want peace.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand your problem. I want you to understand ours. When the Special Advisor the other day said North Vietnamese soldiers when they are demobilized can go anywhere they want to, he said they seem to have demobilized their army and they all seem to want to go to Laos and South Vietnam.

Le Duc Tho: [Laughs] They will go to the place of their choice.

Dr. Kissinger: [Laughs] That is what I mean! Maybe we should write into the agreement that there cannot be any demobilization of the North Vietnamese army, and since the North Vietnamese army never leaves North Vietnam we will be in good shape. But let me go back to the problem we face, and I am really talking to you in a very open way. You will not settle the question of the so-called North Vietnamese army in the south. You will not agree to a provision that at least establishes a principle of non-intervention. And then you are asking that, as the result of the negotiation, an agreement that even previously was unacceptable we should impose on our allies, and that now adds tens of thousands of additional enemies to their opposition in the south. Now how can the President justify this? How can the President justify that we emerge from a negotiation with changes that bring about no substantive alteration in your obligation, only elaborations of existing ones, but we totally give up one of the few principal obligations you had assumed, or one of the few possibilities that existed for a real negotiation between the two South Vietnamese parties?

Now there is another inequality. The release is a legal obligation; the redeployment is an understanding not written down anywhere. Now the two have not the same legal significance. Still, if it were clear—just to take an extreme case, which I am not proposing—if it were clear that all of the so-called North Vietnamese forces were to leave South Vietnam, I can assure you that we would insist at any cost on Article 8(c) as you want it. We could not then justify for South Vietnam to maintain one political prisoner in jail under those conditions. I am giving you the theoretical problem. If the number is large we still have an argument. If the number is very small then the thing becomes an absurdity. Therefore we have proposed that we maintain the old Article 8(c). But I would add to it an understanding—which we have even written out—in which the release of the prisoners is tied to a redeployment of some of the forces. Now the Special Advisor has . . .

[They ask Engel to repeat. Tho and Thach confer.]

The Special Advisor has said that I already pointed out to Minister Xuan Thuy on the 17th [of October] that we would use a maximum influence, and therefore he asked me last time what would an additional understanding add to what we have already promised. It is a very good question, and as I have said to the Special Advisor privately, the next time if in this Administration we go to war we will pick an enemy with less endurance and less able negotiators. [They smile.] You remember we inherited you. But it is a very good question. Let me answer it.

Maximum influence is an abstract phrase. And we can use maximum influence and fail. Because there can be honest disagreement, and there can even be dishonest disagreement. What this understanding would do is to provide a precise criterion against which to measure the precise degree of influence which has to be exercised. [They ask Engel to repeat.] And therefore its practical consequence, except for the 90-day period, can be very close to the practical consequence of your paragraph 8(c).

So my answer to you on your 8(c) is, if you want to proceed by means of the understanding that you have proposed, the number would have to be quite large and even then the outcome would be quite uncertain. If you want to proceed by the understanding we have proposed, we do not have to settle on the number here. And may I read you—I will read you in a minute our . . .

Le Duc Tho: Then your former Article 8(c) will be kept?

Dr. Kissinger: With this understanding. [They confer.] But let me read this. We have two problems. We have all the specific provisions which will occupy us, I guess, for the next several hours. But we have also the problem of understanding. With respect to the problem of our purposes and our objectives, I told you our absolute truth, and there are no other hidden motives. With respect to the practical solutions we will of course discuss. But we will never come to a conclusion if we turn this into a test of strength between you and us, and if you think that we are now trying to take an advantage of you. We were very impressed by the spirit you showed in October. I don’t mean you personally, but your government. We would like very much to use that as the basis of our future relationship. We will never come closer to an agreement. We will never again be able to make this kind of an agreement, no matter how long we fight and no matter how much we inflict on each other. As I said before, if the war continues now, it will be ended by another kind of agreement. Whatever time it takes.

So it isn’t surprising in a war that has lasted so long that in the last stages we would encounter all the suspicions again that produced the war in the first place. The Special Advisor himself pointed that out to me in October. But we are quite literally at a crossroads. If we settle it now, then we can have not only peace in Vietnam but an entirely new relationship between our two countries. We have made enormous efforts in that direction since October, and if we fail now, then it will simply mean that conditions can never exist for this kind of a settlement and no amount of war can change that fact.

Let me read you the understanding which we are proposing for our Article 8(c). But please consider what I said practically as well as what I said theoretically, because they are both very important. The understanding that accompanies 8(c)—our Article 8(c), not your Article 8(c). Of course you can solve the problem of your Article 8(c) by giving me a very large number. [Tho laughs.] Going up on the Ho Chi Minh Trail [laughter]. Or they only go one way [laughter]. They have signs on the side of the road, “sens unique.”

Le Duc Tho: One way, and southward.

Dr. Kissinger: That is right.

Le Duc Tho: Because it is a narrow road. [Laughter]

Dr. Kissinger: Of course, if you understood American psychology you would realize that three years after an economic aid program we would probably pave the road, make it four lanes, and ease everything afterwards. [Laughter]

The only thing is, we would probably put toll booths on the road and charge a fee for using it.

All right. The understanding on Article 8(c) [reading]: “It is understood that, immediately upon signature of this agreement, the Government of the Republic of Vietnam will release a significant number of the civilians currently held prisoner in South Vietnam.” We will give this to you. “And simultaneously, a significant number of the troops which are currently located in the northern part of South Vietnam and which oppose the forces of the Republic of Vietnam will be redeployed. During the three months following the signature of this agreement, the two South Vietnamese parties shall arrange for subsequent simultaneous actions under which additional numbers of civilian detainees will be released in direct numerical ratio to the troops demobilized by both sides. The numbers to be involved in the aforesaid transactions and the numerical ratio of civilian releases to military demobilization will be agreed in discussions to be held by the two South Vietnamese parties.” [He hands copy, Tab A, to DRV side.]

Maybe we should take a little break now, because I understand we have some warm food.

[Mr. Phuong reads again, translating copy handed over.]

Maybe we should take a little break now, because I understand they have some food which will get cold.

Is the Minister making nasty comments again?

Xuan Thuy: We will discuss it later.

Dr. Kissinger: Ambassador Porter is eagerly waiting for you tomorrow.

[The meeting broke for lunch at 12:58. Chinese food was served. The meeting resumed at 1:56.]

Dr. Kissinger: I made one of my 50-minute Harvard speeches before the break, so I think the Special Advisor can now speak.

Le Duc Tho: We can say that we as well as you now want a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam problem. Therefore of late we have made very great efforts as you know. You too have made efforts.

Dr. Kissinger: Give us an adjective too, just for symmetry.

Le Duc Tho: You have also made efforts [laughter], and therefore we have reached an agreement, and then President Nixon himself accepted that the agreement was completed and was satisfied with the further explanation we gave. When I say this, “great effort” and “effort,” there is some fairness in it.

Dr. Kissinger: We have not yet agreed on this proposition. Nor on the historical account completely. But as somebody said, most wars are fought about who is going to write its history.

Le Duc Tho: As you know we have published the agreement. And you have acknowledged that the publication was correct, and you too have published a number of items in it. Therefore it would be difficult if both sides tried to change the agreement. You have your honor; you have responsibility toward your country. We too have our honor and we have also responsibility toward our people, toward our fatherland. Indeed you have difficulties and you have some divergencies with the Saigon people, we know that. But actually we too we have difficulty with regard to our allies. Over the past four years we have been constantly demanding the replacement of Nguyen Van Thieu and now we drop this demand. It is not that the PRG agreed to that immediately. This is a fact. And it is also a fact that not every South Vietnamese agrees to our proposals, agrees to our proposal that we drop the demand to replace Nguyen Van Thieu. Even as to the members of the International Commission, the membership of Indonesia we have agreed with you, but it does not mean that the PRG is agreed to it. Madame Nguyen Thi Binh held two press conferences to oppose that, and the PRG have raised the question of replacing Indonesia as a member of the International Commission but we have not yet told you that. [Laughter] The PRG also utterly disagree to the agreement regarding the civilian prisoners, even regarding the question of Cambodia and the question of Laos. We are agreed with you as reflected in the provision of the agreement regarding the problem of Cambodia and Laos. Lon Nol welcomed this provision. Lon Nol welcomed the provision, but Mr. Khieu Samphan, the Defense Minister of the Royal Government of Cambodia, made the statement that the Paris negotiations cannot go over the shoulder of the Cambodians, so he was alluding to us that we should not settle the problem and interfere in their internal affairs in Cambodia. Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma said that the ceasefire can take place in Laos within 15 days, and then the Patriotic Front of Laos sent us a message to ask us whether we have said so to you in the negotiations.

Dr. Kissinger: Incidentally, we did not say this to him. This was his own idea.

Le Duc Tho: I tell you this to mean that among our allies with us there are also differences. Even among Communists, sometimes they have big differences and divergencies.

Dr. Kissinger: [Laughs] Yes, I have experienced that on my travels.

Le Duc Tho: So we have also difficulties. So we are aware of your difficulties. We partly realize them. But you should realize our difficulties too. And that is why when an agreement is reached if one party asks for modifications then the other party will do the same and will ask for changes. If you ask for big changes, we will also ask for big changes. If you ask for small changes, we will do the same and ask for small changes. It is something necessary for each party, and it is some fairness when we do that. It cannot do if one side can ask for changes and the other side will accept the changes. It cannot do. So changes come after changes. How can we complete the agreement then? Moreover each side has its own principles and it cannot be changed because it has been agreed to between the two parties. For instance, Article 8(c), you can’t change it, and as for me, the question I have raised to you I can’t change that too. The questions contain real difficulties.

We want a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam problem like you. How shall we get out of this deadlock? It is a problem, and we should be realistic to solve it and to meet the real, the practical difficulties.

In our view there are two ways to do. First, either we will return to the agreement we have agreed to, both sides have agreed to, and respect the provisions agreed to, and we will change the details which does not relate to the substance of the agreements. Or secondly, both sides will ask for changes. You will ask change for one point, I will ask change for another. And if changes are asked for, then we have to discuss again a number of questions. And each party has its principles and its stand. Then the discussions may drag on, and it will be difficult. This is the two ways of doing I have in mind.

Therefore in my view the best way is to maintain the questions of principle, the basic questions of the text of the agreement which the two parties have agreed to. We can propose changes for the details not relating to the substance, and we will have a number of unilateral understandings for a number of your problems. So of these two ways whichever you choose we are prepared to do that. But to my mind the best way, the most rapid way, is to maintain the basic essence, the substance of the agreement. As President Nixon said, when the correct agreement is ready he will not sign it one day later. When the agreement is not a durable, a lasting one, then he will not rush to sign it. This sentence can be applied to us too.

Dr. Kissinger: He did not think this was durable.

Le Duc Tho: If a correct settlement is reached, then, only then do we sign it. And if the agreement is correct we will not be late by one minute to sign it. So we will be faster in signing it than President Nixon.

Dr. Kissinger: I caught that nuance. You are beating him by 23 hours and 59 minutes. [Laughter]

Le Duc Tho: Because if the agreement is correct we will sign it immediately. So there is two ways of negotiating now. Whichever way you choose, we are prepared to do that. But I always would think that the most rapid way is to maintain the basic things of the agreement, and we will change only the details not relating to the principles. Of course we should make an effort to come to an agreement.

Naturally there are two possibilities: whether we can reach a settlement, whether we will not reach a settlement. But we should make an effort, utmost effort, to come to the first possibility. Whether we can have the first possibility, greatly it will depend on you. Both of us, you and we, want peace, beneficial to both sides. If you can settle the Vietnam problem then by this agreement then you have achieved one of your most basic requirements. Because by such an agreement you can withdraw your forces, you can end your involvement in the war, while you can maintain the Saigon Administration, you will not have to accept the three-segment government, Nguyen Van Thieu will remain in place, moreover American military personnel can be brought home. So the agreement has opened the way for you to pull out from Vietnam honorably.

Now what do you want further? If the war continues, you have no other objective than those you have achieved through the agreements. As I share your views when you said the other day that you have no objective if the war is continued because all your objectives have been achieved. If you push your demands too far, then the problem cannot be solved and the war will continue. And the continuation of the war will bring no interest to you. It will bring only losses. It is something evident too. Because when peace is restored then the situation in the United States will be stabilized. You will be able to engage in economic construction in South Vietnam. You will establish a new relationship with North Vietnam and you will participate in the economic construction of North Vietnam. And the relationship between the two countries will be put on a new basis beneficial to both sides. And with the settlement of the Vietnam problem it will facilitate the development of your policy in other international questions, as far as you are concerned.

As for us, we have been experiencing 27 years of war. And there is not any oppressed people who have achieved so many successes as we have done. But also there is no oppressed people who have suffered more destruction than our people too during the war. We too want peace to reconstruct our country. It is something evident too. So with the restoration of peace we have the advantages I have told you. Moreover we will have established relationship with other countries in the world including the United States, and we will establish relations in our national reconstruction too.

Now for the time being our political objectives have been reflected in the concrete provisions of the agreement. We are not demanding anything more than that. But at the same time we can’t lower our demands below what has been reflected. If these objectives cannot be achieved for our vital interest, for the vital interest of our people, our nation, we will have to continue our struggle. It is an objective necessity. You want peace. We too, we want peace. We should understand each other’s requirements, each other’s difficulties, in a realistic way and objective way. When we put out our October 8 proposal we looked into the real situation. We are realistic in making that proposal to allow you to pull out of South Vietnam honorably. And you should also realize our legitimate requirements and to bring about a correct solution. What I am telling you is not an ultimatum. But it is the fact that we have come to the limits which we can’t go beyond. It is not our intention to have to create some serious or some grave situation between you and us.

Settlement is possible or not. We have done all possible efforts. If no settlement is possible, then it is beyond our subjective intention and desire. It is not us who have created such a serious situation, but really the responsibility lies with your side. Therefore if a settlement is to be found to the problem, both sides should adopt a very serious attitude and make the utmost efforts and respect the points on which the two parties have agreed to.

We are prepared to leave your former Article 8(c). We are willing to leave the question of the withdrawal of civilian personnel associated with military service. We only demand that the point we have raised you will keep it too. Besides these two questions, if there are some other questions of detail we may discuss. Only in this way can we settle the problem, because we have our principles, you have yours. If we want to propose changes to your questions of principle you will not agree to that. If you ask for changes to our questions of principle we will not agree to that, and no settlement is possible because these are very great questions.

I have heard your statement regarding Article 8(c). You have discussed this question with me and on October 17 you discussed this question with Minister Xuan Thuy. At that time, on October 17, you said that you will have an understanding that the United States will use its maximum influence so that the Saigon people will release the greater part of the civilian personnel it detains within two months and the rest will be released completely in the third month. But now you put forward new conditions. On November 21 you said that if there is a satisfactory redeployment of forces then the civilian prisoners will be satisfactorily solved too. But now you put forward new conditions. You have said that the number of civilian prisoners will be released proportionately to the number of troops redeployed and the additional number of civilian personnel will be released in the same ratio as the troops being demobilized. So if we compare your proposal today and with what you have agreed to previously, you have added new conditions. I think that if we negotiate in such a way no settlement is possible.

On the points we have agreed to, at the next meetings you will ask for changes to what your previous statement, and the changes you propose always bring about more further the level of your requirements. And if we review what I have put forward to you I have never raised the level of our demands.

Dr. Kissinger: It is hard to do. I have told the Special Advisor that when he moves from the impossible to the intolerable he treats it as a concession. If we had started demanding the resignation of Prime Minister Pham Van Dong we could now treat it as a concession that we don’t ask for it any more.

Le Duc Tho: But when I put forward that we no longer ask for the resignation of Nguyen Van Thieu you yourself admitted that it was a concession.

Dr. Kissinger: It was a concession. I won’t make a debating point. It was a concession. It only got us where we should have started. It is not easy to convince a government that it should accept an agreement that begins with its overthrow.

Le Duc Tho: Let me speak about Article 8(c). We do not put any further demands. We know you have difficulty on this subject. Therefore we have thought out a formula to settle the problem. But if you disagree then we will leave it that way and we maintain your commitments. I think that you raise the proposal, but you put new conditions. It will make the settlement more difficult. Therefore I think that the best way of doing is to maintain what we have, the questions we have agreed to, and we will discuss on the points of detail. We maintain the provisions we have agreed to and we will discuss on the changes of the details. But on the contrary, if you insist on the changes you have proposed we will do the same and we will insist on the changes we propose, the questions of the provisions of principle, then no progress can be made.

I think that then the best way to remove the roadblock, to get out of the deadlock is what I have proposed. Because if we insist on the changes to Article 8(c) and we insist on the withdrawal of civilian personnel associated with military branches, then you will disagree to that, but at the same time if you insist on the changes you propose we will disagree too and no settlement can be reached. This is something practical. I do not mean an ultimatum at all. It is the actual situation, the real situation. You will not accept the changes to Article 8(c). We know you have difficulty, and we too have difficulties on this provision too. But if you keep the other provisions we will keep 8(c) as it was. And if you keep the other provisions we will propose you to keep the provisions as it was.

I know that [if] Article 8(c) is left as it was in the agreement, the people of South Vietnam population and the PRG will never agree to that. You should know this difficulty of ours because this is a very great political question to us and a sentimental issue too. I have explained at great length to you. But in order to enable the prompt signing of the agreement, I agreed to leave as it was.

We know that you have tens of thousands of civilian personnel in South Vietnam. If you agree to keep the provisions we have proposed as it were, we will drop even the question of American civilian personnel associated with military branches. It is also a very great question for us. Because once the US withdraws its forces from South Vietnam no American can be left in South Vietnam behind. We know that. Everyone should be withdrawn. But since we have agreed with you we will allow it to be left behind. So what we demand is that you will maintain also the provisions we have in mind. It is a fair reciprocity.

These are two big questions for us. It is obvious that we want the settling, in such a way that the agreement can be signed. No other demand. And to sum up, these are two very big questions for us, particularly the question of 8(c). But now you want to keep 8(c) and you want the other provisions to be changed. How can we settle the problem then? It is really something unfair if we do that. Today I have been telling you with frankness and straightforwardness to let you know that we should do in such a way to settle the problem here. What way should we find out to get out of this deadlock? I think that what I have been telling you is clear enough.

Dr. Kissinger: I appreciate . . .

Le Duc Tho: Before you speak I would like to say that in order to settle the problem both sides should understand each other’s problem, difficulty. Both sides should have mutual comprehension. But if you adopt the second way of doing, and you will propose one change, I will do the same and propose one change. If you propose about two changes, I will propose two changes too. And when we get to the questions of principle then no solution is possible, because you have your principle and we have ours and there must be a mutual respect for each other’s principles if a settlement is to be found. Therefore the best way in my mind is to keep the basic provisions of the agreement, and for the changes of the details we will discuss.

It does not mean that we don’t understand your difficulties. But when we have agreed to you with regard to some provision it does not mean that we don’t have any difficulty with regard to these provisions. Particularly with regard to Article 8(c). How many hours I have spent to discuss with you on this article I no longer remember. But finally I agree to keep Article 8(c) as it was, but you should also keep the other provisions as we propose.

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Special Advisor, first of all I think you have spoken in a very constructive tone. And I understand that your side too has problems. And it is one of the tragedies of this situation that the parties that have been fighting for so long are mostly conscious of their own difficulties and cannot see the problems of the other side as clearly. We both have our principles and we both have our honor. And I know that it isn’t easy for you to be in a position where having published major parts of the agreement it now appears as if all the changes were made to your disadvantage. Actually we have taken great account of your views in not presenting many proposals that were pressed on us. But let us not go into the past right now.

I understand that the changes we made last week, or the last time we met, were really all changes of detail. They did not involve questions of principle. They were elaborations of what we had already agreed upon. Is that a correct understanding? I think Greenwich Mean Time is not an issue of principle. [Laughter]

Le Duc Tho: I agree with you on this point of GMT.

Dr. Kissinger: Indeed, as one looks over those provisions one has to say they are all elaborations of existing provisions. Now if that is understood then I believe we can look again at the additional changes that we proposed to you Monday to see what can be omitted for the sake of staying within the spirit of what you have said, what can be omitted to stay within the principles.

Le Duc Tho: All right.

Dr. Kissinger: So what I would like to propose, Mr. Special Advisor, because this is truly a very difficult matter for us and a difficult matter—and in a sense deeper than for you. When the Defense Minister of the Royal Cambodian Government speaks he is in the somewhat anomalous position of a royal minister in a communist capital. This is not the most frequent combination of circumstances of which history informs us. And while we recognize that it is an embarrassment for you, it is not of the same order of difficulty that we will confront when we conclude an agreement along the lines that we are now discussing. You know that the agreement as it now stands, that is with the details we agreed upon between us plus the changes we presented on Monday, will be declared totally unacceptable in Saigon. You know that. I am not saying it as a bluff. If we now reduce this even further, to take account of your principles, you know we will have a very massive, major public confrontation. That is a fact. I mean I am not arguing it.

So what I would like to do, Mr. Special Advisor, in order to avoid misunderstanding, is to ask for a recess until tomorrow to consult with the President [about] what of those provisions that we proposed to you on Monday can be dropped, to get the true minimum position that the President feels he must have for what will then be ahead of him. I will propose a great effort, and then when we meet tomorrow what I will tell you will be what we absolutely feel we must have and it will be something less than what we gave you on Monday. But it is senseless for me now to make a proposal, because we should attempt then—we are only talking now about four sentences on our side—to make a proposal to see which of those we can condense, eliminate, phrase in a way that your principle is preserved. And then we will at least know finally whether an agreement is possible. We will not ask you to accept exactly what we proposed on Monday.

But there is one point that we will not be able to agree to, because I know that now. And that is your word for “administrative,” and I will tell you why. All of his political life the President has said that he will never accept a coalition government. You read his record and you will find it. When we met on October 9 you proposed first that we call the council “Administration for National Concord.” We rejected that because it was too close to “government.” You then proposed, under the influence of your friend here [Xuan Thuy] “administrative structure.” [Xuan Thuy laughs.] And you proposed it in English. Now in English it clearly means much less than “government.” Now when you put it into Vietnamese, in which my proficiency is not yet perfect despite my many years of talking to you, it sounds almost the same as “Administration for National Concord.” [Vietnamese laugh.] Now unintentionally this creates the impression of a trick. Now my experts tell me that they never agreed to this translation on that Thursday when they met with your experts [Oct. 12].

So I don’t put this into the category of a change we are making afterwards. We are putting this into the category of something we had always maintained. I am not asking for an answer now, but this is something that is impossible for the President in terms of his whole history. Maybe we can find another formulation. We don’t want to change the English meaning. But unfortunately your language is subtler than ours, so you have this connotation and I had not understood the complexity of the Special Advisor’s proposal. So . . .

Le Duc Tho: Politically this is complicated.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand. But it is politically complicated really on both sides. So I want you to know that is why we are not dealing with it frivolously, and it comes in a separate category from others because we had never agreed to it and we had never frankly understood the Advisor’s subtlety.

Le Duc Tho: But it is also an important problem for us too.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand it has become this. But speaking now very frankly, when your Prime Minister made his interview we were all outraged because we thought he was lying. We now understood that he was using the word which we had not understood in a special Vietnamese meaning and precisely because it leads to this ambiguity we have this difficulty, because I can assure you our President would never have agreed to any term that implies even vaguely coalition government. It is almost a religious conviction to him. To read his record over, his political life shows this.

This is not something we brought up after the event. It is something to which Mr. Engel tells me he never agreed as a correct translation, and which I did not even understand. I understood in English “administrative structure” is clearly something less than government and that was frankly its attraction to me. Otherwise I would have accepted the phrase “Administration for National Concord.”

Le Duc Tho: Have you finished?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, just an explanation of our position.

Le Duc Tho: I will not debate on that point now. Let me say one sentence. We know that the question is important for you as well as for us. And when I make the proposal I spoke in Vietnamese. Probably Mr. Engel your interpreter should understand that. But because the word “administrative structure” it can be translated into Vietnamese in four ways, many ways.

Dr. Kissinger: You have chosen the most sacramental one.

Le Duc Tho: [Laughs] Because we should not choose the best translation. Now I would like to add that you want a settlement of the problem; we too want a settlement of the problem so that we can go to peace. But as I told you, the best way to get out of that point is to return to the former agreement and whatever details you want to change we can discuss later. But the basic provisions of the agreement should be maintained. I am aware that with regard to a few provisions, some provisions, one or two provisions, you have some difficulties with the Saigon people.

Dr. Kissinger: [Laughs] He must have studied understatement in England. The only one with which we don’t have trouble is Article 23 since you eliminated the French text. [Laughter]

Le Duc Tho: As for me we have some difficulty too, some provisions which may be difficult for us. We have been fighting for tens of years and now tens of thousands of people are in jail for the time being and now they are not yet assured of being released. It is a problem of great political significance. I am not subjective, but our difficulties are greater than what you think. But we are willing to keep it as it was. So the other basic provisions, the other provisions, should be kept as they were and we can change in the details of it. So both sides have difficulties. We understand your difficulties.

Dr. Kissinger: I have one secret dream, which is to be able to participate at a negotiation between Minister Xuan Thuy and Special Advisor Duc from Saigon. [Laughter] They will spend four years deciding why it is immoral for one of them to sit on which side of the table.

Xuan Thuy: You have met Mr. Duc. Please convey me your experiences.

Dr. Kissinger: I spent last week 15 hours with Mr. Duc . . .

Le Duc Tho: But we spent three months regarding the form of the table.

Dr. Kissinger: . . . at the end of which he said exactly what he said at the beginning. With a special Vietnamese ability of breaking your heart. For 14½ of those hours I thought I was making an impression—until I heard his final statement. This is why since this is our house I won’t permit the Special Advisor to make a final statement. [Laughter]

But let me sum up my understanding of where we are, because it is important. I understand what you have said and it is constructive. What I would like to do is to say to the President that the changes that were agreed on last week will be treated as matters of detail, and that of the remaining changes which we suggested to you on Monday he should reexamine them very carefully to eliminate as many of your concerns of principle as we possibly can. So that of those changes if anything remains, whatever remains will be questions of detail and not questions of principle, and that then we conclude on that basis tomorrow. That is what I would like to discuss with him.

Le Duc Tho: Your statement is not yet clear to us. The points we have agreed last week, some we proposed an amendment to it. For instance, the question of “The United States respects the fundamental right of the Vietnamese people,” as I told you, and one or two other points have been proposed by you yourself and these points are not questions of detail, for instance the question of the DMZ. You have proposed a change to that point different with the agreements as it was in October. But the day before yesterday we proposed another thing to that point too, on the DMZ. As to the other points we shall further discuss them. There are a number of points we have agreed with you [that] we will keep it. As to the question of principles you said that it will be reduced to the minimum, but since they are questions of principle they should not be changed.

Dr. Kissinger: Let me separate the thing into two parts. With respect to the DMZ, last week you agreed to a sentence that the DMZ should be respected. That is really implied in the preceding paragraph. That is just an elaboration. That is not an issue of principle. Then on Monday we proposed adding to it the phrase “and respect each other’s territory.” That you say is a question of principle, and that we will consider overnight.

Le Duc Tho: But we proposed you delete this sentence and to add the sentence “the two South Vietnamese parties will agree on the statute of the DMZ.” Because the situation is different from it was now.

Dr. Kissinger: Which do you want to delete—“respect each other’s territory,” or the whole sentence on the DMZ?

Le Duc Tho: To delete the “respect each other’s territory.”

Dr. Kissinger: That you want to delete.

Le Duc Tho: And to add the sentence, “the statute of the DMZ will be agreed upon by the two zones of Vietnam, North and South.”

Dr. Kissinger: After the sentence that they shall respect it. I understand now.

Le Duc Tho: Because the two parties should discuss how to cross the demarcation line for trade, etc., between North and South Vietnam.

Dr. Kissinger: All right. I understand your point now.

Le Duc Tho: You will present your views tomorrow. But I would like to say that the provisions of the agreement should be kept as they were on October 20. And we shall discuss the details, with good will.

Dr. Kissinger: You undoubtedly will contact Hanoi and we will contact Washington. I will be accused of being too trusting of you, and God knows what you will be accused of.

Le Duc Tho: You ask me that question?

Dr. Kissinger: I am not asking you, I am just telling you. I just thought maybe you had thought of an answer. But seriously, let us—since we are coming to a point where we have to make a decision which way to go—I want to tell you exactly what the thinking is in Washington because I have been in very close contact the last few days. There is no chance whatsoever that the President will agree to exactly the text of the end of October. For many reasons, which you will understand. So what we have before us is, can we keep the changes to a minimum that is tolerable to both sides? This is the problem we now have.

Le Duc Tho: The details acceptable to both sides.

Dr. Kissinger: The details . . .

Le Duc Tho: Not relating to the principle, the substance.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand your point. Now we consider the changes that were made changes of detail that were agreed to last week. Changes of detail. That is, what we agreed to before I left here. And so does the Special Advisor, because he did not permit me to say we had made progress, claiming that all the changes were very insignificant. Now we understand that the proposals we made to you on Monday involve issues of principles. And we can recommend to the President to reconsider those changes and reduce them to what he considers to be the absolute minimum he needs to do what will be ahead of us if we come to an agreement. Of course, you are not obliged to accept that, and after you consider what I will present to you tomorrow you may still decide that it does involve a question of principle and that therefore we cannot come to an agreement. But at least we will then have reduced it to the absolute essential minimum.

Le Duc Tho: Let me say now, if we review our discussions last time and this time with you, all the changes have been proposed by you and our proposals have not been responded by you in any way. This is a fact. Among the 5 or 6 provisions or points we have made an effort to change last week, there are some which are details but others are great big points and substantial points. Therefore on these points maybe for some we will keep as it was, but on others we may add some new sentences or new changes.

Dr. Kissinger: I think Mr. Thach has an obsession with the word “status of the DMZ.”

Le Duc Tho: As to your statement about reducing the changes to the minimum, since we have kept Article 8(c) as it was then the other provisions you should also keep them.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, I have tried this morning to explain our realities to you. I will present to you tomorrow what we will consider our absolute minimum position. We will then decide. You are not committed to accept our position. You have not agreed to accept our position. And therefore we may still part tomorrow without an agreement. But at least we will then know something.

Le Duc Tho [heatedly]: If you ask for changes how can we then come to an agreement?

Dr. Kissinger: Maybe we cannot. I have tried to explain to you this morning what our realities are. We will look at one or two changes of detail from your side—we understand your problem—so that it isn’t just one-sided.

Le Duc Tho: We will discuss tomorrow. But please remember what I have been telling you today. And I have listened to you and I will study.

Dr. Kissinger: But study very carefully. I really spoke to you about the realities, and you must understand you will not find again or at least not for many years a situation in which the people on our side of the table have thought as much about your problems.

Le Duc Tho: I have listened to you.

Dr. Kissinger: Even this agreement, maintaining all the changes and adding a few more—you don’t have to agree with us—but even with adding all this it will be extremely difficult for us in America, not to speak of Saigon. That is a fact. It may be unjust but it is a fact.

Le Duc Tho: I understand that you have a number of difficulties, but the points I have raised to you are also very difficult for us.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand.

Le Duc Tho: You have not known yet what our cadres in our country, what they have told us, and the PRG what they have told us when I accepted Article 8(c). After a settlement, I will tell you about their views.

Dr. Kissinger: Since you are a gentleman I won’t tell you what I have been told about the agreement by your compatriots [laughter].

Le Duc Tho: Then comes one day when you will tell us what they have told you and I will tell you what they have told me! All the points I have agreed with you here, it doesn’t mean that they are agreed to by all people in Hanoi and the PRG too. After the settlement we will become the confidant for each other.

Dr. Kissinger: Either that or we will both be out of a job. [Laughter] Since I know the Special Advisor is an ardent student of history I have here a list of treaties whose preambles do not mention the parties. I thought the Minister especially will be interested. This is a summary. We have a much longer list. [Hands over list at Tab B.]

Le Duc Tho: For my information only.

Dr. Kissinger: I think as a present this evening to Madame Binh.

Le Duc Tho: If I show this to Madame Binh she will be very angry against me. Because I have told you that there is no agreement that there is no mention of the governments signatory to the agreement. She will be very angry with me.

Dr. Kissinger: After the war you will tell me whether there is ever a time when Madame Binh is not angry. [Laughter]

Shall we meet at 11 tomorrow morning? You have Kleber tomorrow. Shall we cancel Kleber tomorrow, by mutual agreement? [They confer.]

Le Duc Tho: Because we shall have to consult Madame Binh, probably we shall keep this session, as it is habitual.

Dr. Kissinger: Of course. Well, what time should we meet tomorrow?

Le Duc Tho: Let us keep the session at Kleber as habitual.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, what time shall we meet?

Le Duc Tho: It is up to you.

Dr. Kissinger: 11—or does it conflict with Kleber?

Le Duc Tho: 3:00 in the afternoon.

Dr. Kissinger: All right. Where?

Le Duc Tho: Gif-sur-Yvette! [Laughter] And we will not go to the house where the elephant tusks are!

Dr. Kissinger: All right. In Gif you have it built into the beams. [Laughter] 3:00 at Gif.

How shall we conduct ourselves at the plenary session tomorrow? If Ambassador Porter behaves in a restrained fashion, will the Minister be on his good behavior?

Xuan Thuy: I will show restraint too in return.

Dr. Kissinger: So it will be a short session, because you have to be at Gif at 3:00. Will I urge Ambassador Porter to keep it short, seriously? [They nod yes.] I will urge Ambassador Porter to keep it very short and if you can . . .

Xuan Thuy: I will also tell Madame Binh.

Dr. Kissinger: Who speaks first tomorrow? I am afraid that if we tell Ambassador Lam to keep it short that you will be there until 6:00. I think I will tell him to make it long and you will be out fast. We will urge restraint on our side. Ambassador Porter I can guarantee it. Ambassador Lam I will urge it strongly.

Xuan Thuy: For the last few sessions Mr. Lam has been making long speeches and differently from your language.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Xuan Thuy: Our side did not make the long speeches, but Madame Binh when she is angry then she is . . .

Dr. Kissinger: In other words in her normal condition! [Laughter] All right, we will meet then tomorrow at 3:00 at Gif.

[The meeting ended at 3:50 p.m.]

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 865, For the President’s Files (Winston Lord)—China Trip/Vietnam Negotiations, Camp David Memcons, December 1972 [3 of 3]. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting took place at 31 Boulevard de la Saussaye, Neuilly-sur-Seine. All brackets are in the original. The tabs are attached but not printed.

   On the day before this meeting, President Nixon sent Kissinger a message with instructions. He was not to go back to the October agreement, but was to follow a course that Kissinger and Nixon both felt would probably lead to a breakdown of the talks. That is, Kissinger was to insist that the agreement now be based on the changes negotiated in the November round. It should also include 1) a better translation of the term “administrative structure” so that the organization established by the agreement to implement the negotiated settlement could not be seen as a governmental structure and 2) a formulation that made clear that North Vietnamese troops in the South had no right to be there indefinitely.

   Furthermore, Nixon’s message continued:

   “You should make the record as clear as possible in the talks that the responsibility for the breakdown rests with the North Vietnamese. You should make a clear record of the fact that they have reneged; first as to the meaning of the agreement on the political side by reasons of the translation problem and second because they have insisted on maintaining the right of North Vietnamese forces to remain permanently in South Vietnam.”

   In anticipation of the possible failure of the talks, Nixon also focused on the military option:

   “Keeping the negotiations going with postponements, etc. is in our interest. In the meantime, however, you can assume that I will order a very substantial increase in military action against the North, including the use of B–52s over the Hanoi-Haiphong complex. I would be willing to order that tomorrow prior to the next meeting. I would like your recommendation on this. In any event we should have the whole salvo ready to go when the talks break down, if they do.” (Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. IX, Vietnam, October 1972–January 1973, Document 141)

   In contrast, the Politburo directed Le Duc Tho to return to the October agreement as the basis for a settlement, telling him: “The points that were agreed to on 23 November are not good for our side.” (Message from Politburo to Le Duc Tho and Xuan Thuy, 5–6 December 1972, in Doan Duc, et al., compilers, Major Events: The Diplomatic Struggle and International Activities during the Resistance War Against the Americans to Save the Nation, 1954–1975, volume 4, p. 355)

   In summary, the negotiations seemed to have reached absolute gridlock. While Nixon instructed Kissinger not to return to the October draft agreement, the Politburo instructed Le Duc Tho to insist on a return to it.

   Kissinger replied to Nixon’s guidance several hours later:

   “Assuming the negotiations do break off, here are my further thoughts on our course of action. We will have to take the initiative both on the military front, by drastically stepping up the bombing, and on the public relations front, by seizing the initiative with respect to explaining the negotiations. I should of course give a detailed briefing on the negotiating record which I will make as impeccable as possible from our standpoint before any breakdown. We have a strong case.” (Message Hakto 13 quoted in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. IX, Vietnam, October 1972–January 1973, Document 142)

   After the meeting, Kissinger filed the following report to the President:

   “We held a brutal five-hour session this afternoon at our location. Both sides reviewed the present negotiating situation and essentially stuck to their positions. I again emphasized your willingness to make a settlement but only if we got the changes needed to undertake the necessary massive effort with Saigon. Their position remained essentially as it was on Monday, i.e., offering us the choice of returning to the October agreement or exacting concessions from us in exchange for any changes they would accept. All their proposed changes are unacceptable. At the end we decided to make one final effort tomorrow in which I told them we would present our absolute minimum conditions on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Tho held to his position that there would be no changes in the provisions of the agreement, but that we could discuss ʻdetails’.” (Ibid., Document 144)