Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XLII, Vietnam: The Kissinger-Le Duc Tho Negotiations

28. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Paris, November 22, 1972, 2:28–5:58 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• Le Duc Tho, Special Advisor to DRV Delegation to Paris Peace Talks
• Xuan Thuy, Minister, Chief DRV Delegate to Paris Peace Talks
• Nguyen Co Thach, Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs
• Phan Hien, Delegation Member
• Luu Van Loi, Delegation Member
• Trinh Ngoc Thai, Delegation Member
• Tran Quang Co, Delegation Member
• Pham The Dong, Notetaker
• Nguyen Dinh Phuong, Interpreter
• Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• General Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• Ambassador William Sullivan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs
• Winston Lord, NSC Staff
• John D. Negroponte, NSC Staff
• David A. Engel, NSC Staff, Interpreter
• Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff
• Mrs. Mary Stifflemire, Notetaker

Dr. Kissinger: [pointing to his briefing book] I’m going to read this whole thing from cover to cover. [Laughter]

Le Duc Tho: Now comes your turn to speak.

Dr. Kissinger: I think perhaps the best way to proceed, Mr. Special Advisor and Mr. Minister, is for me to go through the Agreement in the light of your comments yesterday and give you our reaction. And then after that I will give you a tentative schedule.

We have studied your views with great care. We have made an effort to take them seriously into account. So let me go through it.

With respect to Article 1, we agree with your formulation as you submitted it yesterday. Oh, the Preamble. With respect to the Preamble, we believe we should leave it as it was in our proposal, that is, “the parties participating in the Paris Conference.” But the signatures should be with the title of each of the signatories. In that way this is no discrimination against either the Government of the Republic of Vietnam nor against the Provisional Revolutionary Government. And the titles of both sides would be listed.

With respect to Article 1, your formulation as you gave it to us yesterday is acceptable.

With respect to Article 2, we recognize your concession in dropping Indochina Time and that is now acceptable. [They laugh.] With respect to “without limit of time” we can consider all of Article 2 settled.

With respect to Article 3, it is as I told you yesterday a matter of great difficulty for us, and we want to make sure that all forces that are in South Vietnam stop military action. But we will accept this present formulation, but we must have an understanding that there are no forces in South Vietnam to whom Article 3 does not apply. We can exchange a piece of paper on that subject, that Article 3 covers all the forces now in South Vietnam. With this proviso, we accept the original formulation.

With respect to Article 3(b), we believe that the phrase “controlled by each party” has a political connotation which should not be in this paragraph. But in order to show our good will and to make progress we will accept returning to the original formulation. [Xuan Thuy confers with Le Duc Tho.]

Does the Minister object to our accepting his position?

Xuan Thuy: We welcome it.

Dr. Kissinger: Article 4—we would like to reserve our position until we complete Chapter IV and then see. The Special Advisor said yesterday that it could be moved, and we want to reserve our position until Chapter IV is completed.

Article 5. The Special Advisor mentioned yesterday with respect to civilian personnel that the United States has assigned foreign personnel to perform functions which used to be performed by military personnel since we last met. We do not believe that this is true. But we are prepared to say that U.S. civilian personnel cannot be assigned to functions they did not perform on November 1st. Or on October 15, if this is more convenient. [They confer.] So as to avoid the impression that we have taken advantage of this interval.

Le Duc Tho: But U.S. civilian personnel associated with military training, use, storage, repair and maintainance of war material previously should be withdrawn, too.

Dr. Kissinger: If they were assigned to it after October 15, that is correct. As for the rest, we have to study what it is you are talking about and what these functions are. I have not yet received a report of the precise implication of this sentence.

Le Duc Tho: We demand that all the troops, military advisers and military personnel be withdrawn from South Vietnam. But now civilian personnel are replaced to serve military tasks in South Vietnam. Therefore, we demand that not only these personnel now assigned but previously should be withdrawn. And these questions have been much spoken about by the press, even in the United States.

Moreover, the Geneva Agreements of 1962 on Laos have the same explicit stipulations because the United States often used civilian personnel to carry out military tasks. But we do not say anything about civilian personnel serving in economic branches.

Dr. Kissinger: We understand. We can agree that we cannot now send in civilian personnel to replace military personnel. And therefore we are willing to say that civilian personnel cannot perform functions which they did not perform prior to October 15, in addition to all the other prohibitions that already exist. So we cannot send in civilian to replace military.

Le Duc Tho: All right that you will not send civilian personnel to replace military personnel, but even civilian personnel serving prior to October 15 should be withdrawn too if they performed military tasks.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, we rejected that once and this is a question that requires further study. You raised it once and we left it out, and it is a question that requires further study. I cannot go further than I have now told you.

Le Duc Tho: Please reconsider your stand. But we maintain our stand. Because the Geneva Agreement of 1962 contained the same stipulation and now this situation happens much more often in South Vietnam now. And actually civilian personnel serving in military tasks is tantamount to military personnel in practice. Please go on. There is no reason for you to maintain your stand. Because we do not object to your introduction of civilian personnel serving in economic branches, to help building in various economic branches of South Vietnam. And this also reflects your intention as to whether you want to continue the war or to have peace. On the one hand you reinforce the rearmament to South Vietnam, and on the other you retain civilian personnel serving the military branches and actually they are military personnel.

Dr. Kissinger: Does the Special Advisor wish to hear the rest of my views on Article 5? [Laughter]

Le Duc Tho: Please go on.

Dr. Kissinger: But we were trying to show our good will by making many concessions. [Le Duc Tho laughs]

Now, with respect to “withdrawal of non-South Vietnamese forces”—the so-called question of the so-called North Vietnamese forces . . . Have I learned the terminology correctly, Mr. Special Advisor? [Laughter]

Le Duc Tho: Correct.

Dr. Kissinger: When I lecture in Hanoi next September I don’t want to be misunderstood.

You know that the issue of withdrawal is a decisive one in obtaining the agreement of the Saigon Administration. On the other hand, we understand your concern not to list the so-called North Vietnamese forces in relation to the United States forces and to relate it to the same time scale as our withdrawal. We therefore accept as a sign of goodwill the original text.

Article 7. In the first paragraph we accept your phrase “the formation of the government”. But we think paragraph 9(i) is not applicable; it is really only 9(b). That is a technical point; we are prepared to discuss it with you. It is really only 9(b).

In the second paragraph, we believe that the phrase “used up” must be maintained. [Discussion among North Vietnamese]

Le Duc Tho: Also, as a show of goodwill, I accept the word “used up” be put here.

Dr. Kissinger: Thank you. I appreciate it.

Le Duc Tho: The words “used up” we accept. It is great goodwill on our part. It means that you will have a free hand to introduce armaments.

Dr. Kissinger: No. We don’t want to continue the war. The important problem, Mr. Special Advisor, if either of us wants to continue the war we can write fifty clauses in here and we shall find a way to do it. The important thing is a political decision that we are not going to have a war against each other again. You fight for too long once you get started.

Le Duc Tho: [Laughs] But if we have to fight once again, I think that you will not enter again. This is what I would guess.

Dr. Kissinger: I would say if this agreement is broken it would be extremely dangerous.

Le Duc Tho: But if the agreement is violated, it is certain it is not we who are the first to violate it. Because if the agreement is signed, we will abide by it.

Dr. Kissinger: So will we.

Le Duc Tho: Particularly Nguyen Van Thieu.

Dr. Kissinger: We will use all our influence. We believe it is important that you keep the agreement, but we also believe it is important that our allies keep the agreement. And we are not entering this agreement cynically.

With respect to Chapter III, I told you before we cannot agree to have the issue of American personnel handled in the same paragraph with that of civilian personnel because this would give too many pretexts to use the American personnel for pressure. And we believe that the original draft, difficult as it was, provided the best basis for a settlement.

Le Duc Tho: But it is not the best way to settle the problem.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand your point. I have never made cheap arguments to you on this point because I recognize it is very painful to you—very difficult. And we have appreciated the goodwill that was shown by your government in its previous position on this.

Now, Chapter IV.

Le Duc Tho: We do not yet agree to this chapter.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand. I’m just going through our reaction to the Special Advisor’s comments yesterday with the intention of eliminating those issues that can be set aside and concentrating on some key issues. This is the approach. Of course, the Special Advisor could surprise me and accept everything. It would be a historic event.

Le Duc Tho: Certainly there will not be such a surprise!

Dr. Kissinger: Chapter IV. We agree to your change that “the Government of the United States and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam undertake to respect the following principles.” That was your proposal yesterday.

With respect to the issue whether we should say “general” or “national”, we propose perhaps to use no adjective. Because it is perfectly clear when we say at the end “the government that emerges from this process,” that it has to be for a national institution. We accept your phrase . . . That was in paragraph 9(c) . . . At the end it says “the government that emerges”, and it also says in Article 7 “from the enforcement of the ceasefire to the formation of the government provided for in paragraph 9(b)”. It is in Article 7 and in the new Article 14.

Le Duc Tho: Please go on.

Dr. Kissinger: 9(c): We accept your formulation although we understand your “arrière pensée”.

Le Duc Tho: It is your previous pledge. Now you want to change it?

Dr. Kissinger: Not at all.

Le Duc Tho: And I have written exactly the word you have pledged.

Ambassador Sullivan: Not exactly.

Dr. Kissinger: Not exactly. It will lead to another metaphysical argument about what is foreign.

Le Duc Tho: Call it the debate on metaphysics. It will take years.

Dr. Kissinger: When I was a professor at Harvard, I had a seminar for foreign students. There were 40 foreign students. Each national group was permitted to speak once to an American audience, but we only had 10 evenings. So I asked the representatives of smaller countries to share an evening, which immediately raised the metaphysical question of what is small, and no one admitted it. [Laughter] This is where I became a metaphysician.

Le Duc Tho: And sometimes great powers become small and small powers become great.

Dr. Kissinger: [Laughs] The Special Advisor never quits!

Le Duc Tho: [Laughs] This is of a philosophical nature.

Dr. Kissinger: This is true.

Article 11. We accept “of the people.” [Tho laughs.] As a sign of goodwill and serious intent! I think the Special Advisor was prepared to give it to me as a sign of his goodwill and serious intent. Eventually. [Laughter] I am depriving him of an opportunity to put me under an obligation.

Le Duc Tho: But I think you have not made it stupidly.

Dr. Kissinger: 12(a). I am working from our text because I think that the Vice Minister’s text is too ambitious. [Laughter]

Le Duc Tho: But if we take your paragraph, you are also too ambitious.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand. I am offering a compromise. I propose that we say “set up an administrative structure”—I am returning to “administrative structure”—“called the National Council for National Reconciliation and Concord, representing all political tendencies in South Vietnam and whose members shall be chosen equally by the two parties.” Then where we had deleted the sentence about the local levels we propose to replace it with the following sentence: “After the National Council for National Reconciliation and Concord has been established, the two South Vietnamese parties will consult about its detailed organization.” [Dr. Kissinger then repeats the sentence at the request of the North Vietnamese.]

Le Duc Tho: What is “detailed”? Really this sentence is very abstract.

Dr. Kissinger: I am sorry. I didn’t intend it to be this way!

Le Duc Tho: I don’t know, because as used it is abstract because “its detailed organization” does not make it clear whether the detailed organization of the Council or of the lower levels.

Dr. Kissinger: I think the two parties should discuss this in a spirit of reconciliation and concord.

Le Duc Tho: But I think it should be explicitly written.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, we can discuss it. With respect to 12(b). No, I am operating from our draft, which does not include the 15 days. I am adding to our draft. Even my associates are confused.

Now, 12(b) of the draft we handed you. We agree with you to eliminate the “specific task” and to return to the original phrase “will organize”, or “has the task of organizing”. We are accepting your proposal. You wanted the word “specific” eliminated, and we are accepting that.

Again, we would recommend dropping the adjectives “general” and “national”. And we agree to dropping the word “may”. This is within the context of our draft of 12(b). In other words, we cannot go along with the sentences that, out of courtesy, the Special Advisor added from our September 15 draft. We do not insist on those! That is the sentences about giving a time limit for the election. I think the Vice Minister understood. [Laughter]

Now Article 13. That is really the key element. We understand your issue of principle with respect to phraseology that could look like mutual withdrawal. But we believe that the language we have given you here in Article 13 will be the absolute key to the consultations which we will have to conduct after we complete this agreement.

For your consideration.

Article 14, we accept your revision. You want us to say “under the authority of the government set up after the elections in South Vietnam”. We agree with this, but we simply want to say “after the elections provided for in Article 9(b)”. It is really only a technical change. We accept your proposal except for this one phrase.

Article 15. We are still studying it, because of the Special Advisor’s extraordinary ability to pack double meanings into every word. [Laughter] I may ask you a few questions about it afterwards.

Article 16 through 18—the favorite chapter of your side. [Laughter] We have agreed to reconcile the appropriate paragraphs after we have finished the rest of the document.

Article 18(e), we accept your proposal that we should add the phrase “of South Vietnam” after the word “sovereignty”.

It does raise one problem though, Mr. Special Advisor. As we visualize it, there will be a team in Hanoi for two months to supervise the release of American prisoners. [Vietnamese discussion] And we will be glad to say “of North and South Vietnam”. But you consider it and let us know how you want it. You consider it. To us it is a technical problem. We have no political intention.

Le Duc Tho: We can decide at the time.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. We don’t have to decide it now. Did you have somebody working on this full-time for all the years that the Special Advisor and I were working on this chapter?

Le Duc Tho: [Laughs] Of course. As have you.

Dr. Kissinger: Article 19. We are now agreed.

Article 20. I have given you our preliminary views yesterday and they have not changed. Our intention in the first paragraph was simply to make clear our respect for the Geneva Agreements on Laos and Cambodia, which you have always urged us to observe and which we had always believed was the intention of this first paragraph. And if it does not mean that, it is hard to know what it does mean. Does it mean each side can pick those paragraphs of the Geneva Agreements that it chooses to observe? So we urge you to reconsider this.

In the last paragraph, we are facing first what was a drafting error in the first agreement where we simply want to say “between the Indochinese states” rather than “the three Indochinese countries”. And the last sentence that we added, we are prepared to drop the word “national” before “frontier”. And that is another one of those points which will greatly ease the subsequent procedure. [They confer.]

Mr. Engel [to Dr. Kissinger]: They are talking about eliminating the word “frontier” instead of “national”.

Dr. Kissinger: Oh, I thought they were accepting this. [Laughter]

Le Duc Tho: We may not accept it.

Dr. Kissinger: Chapter VIII. We had proposed that this should be made a separate protocol and we had also proposed some wording changes in this chapter. Because it creates genuine domestic difficulties for us to do it in this way. But instead, to show our goodwill and to speed the agreement we accept that this be part of the overall agreement and we accept the language. In other words, we accept the language. You have already accepted the “traditional policy”. What we accept is to mention the Democratic Republic first. It may seem like a minor point to you but it will present serious problems for us at home.

Article 23 can now be considered completed. [Laughter]

Now on the other matters. On the ceasefire in Laos and Cambodia, we still believe that the ceasefires should be simultaneous, or nearly so, because we have still three weeks to bring them about if we follow the schedule which I will outline to you. And it is very difficult to understand the reason why it should not be simultaneous. We still believe that if a new period should begin in our relations, then all military activities should stop and our leaders on both sides should not have to read military reports as their first item of business every morning about each other. It will start everything on the wrong footing. We believe the same is true about the machinery for Chapter VI.

We are prepared to give you today as a working document a draft outline for a protocol on the International Commission. We may make some changes in it but it is simply to enable you to begin studying it. We are prepared to have Ambassador Sullivan stay here after I leave to work with your experts, though I think you and I should perhaps spend a few hours to get the objections and discussions in principle. And I want to tell you that if we come to an agreement on the basic document, we will approach the discussions of the protocol with extreme goodwill and we will not use it as an excuse to delay the signing or the initialing of the agreement. But we do believe that these protocols should be agreed upon before the initialing, and we would have two weeks at least to do it on the schedule which I will give you.

Here is the International Control Commission protocol. [Hands over document at Tab A.] There is also a brief protocol setting up the Four-Party Joint Military Commission [hands over Tab B], which we shall treat in the same way. We also have a longer protocol for the Four-Party Joint Military Commission, which is however extremely technical and which our experts should work on.

I want to repeat, in case the Special Advisor did not hear it, that we will not permit these protocols to be used to delay the signing on our side, and that we will approach the discussions with goodwill, and if you do it on the same basis we must be able to get them finished before the initialing.

Now let me give you a provisional schedule. Assuming I can leave here preferably Saturday, but no later than Sunday, I would then leave for Saigon on the 3rd of December. This would get me . . . I would spend the 5th, 6th and 7th of December in Saigon. I would spend the 8th and 9th of December in Hanoi. I would return to Washington on the 10th of December. We would announce the agreement on the evening of the 11th, Washington time, and the ceasefire should go into effect then de facto almost immediately—that is to say, at midnight Washington time or at noon on the 12th Indochina time. And the signing should be no later than the 15th but perhaps as early as the 14th.

And the only other subject I have that we should discuss while I am in Paris—we need not settle it, but we would appreciate hearing your preliminary reactions—we would be prepared after peace is made and after our prisoners are returned to establish diplomatic relations with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, as a contribution to the normalization of our relations. We would be interested to hear your reactions. We can discuss this in Hanoi in greater detail, but it would be useful to help us to make our preparations to have your general attitude.

Le Duc Tho: Have you finished?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Le Duc Tho: I propose a little break now.

[There was a break, from 4:00 p.m. til 4:55, during which tea and light refreshments were served to the U.S. side in the meeting room. The meeting then resumed.]

Dr. Kissinger: I was afraid you had gone out the back door and weren’t going to come back. [Laughter]

Ambassador Porter tells me he has been on his best behavior in the past few weeks. Is that true, Mr. Minister?

Xuan Thuy: Yes. The last session he was actually sweeter. Probably he received new instructions.

Dr. Kissinger: It is true. He says you were much friendlier too.

Xuan Thuy: I responded immediately.

Dr. Kissinger: He says you bow to each other now when you meet in the hall.

Xuan Thuy: We greet each other.

Dr. Kissinger: I think you will progress to shaking hands any day now.

Xuan Thuy: It is my hope.

Dr. Kissinger: So is it mine.

Le Duc Tho: Let me now speak.

Mr. Special Advisor, I have heard your statement yesterday, and today you have entered the agreement. I have realized that in your statement today you have shown goodwill in a number of considerations of detail, of concrete questions. But as to the great questions of principle you have not yet responded, such as the question of Chapter III of captured people; Chapter IV regarding the political question. Regarding Chapter IV you have now agreed to what had been agreed previously already, regarding some words, some details, but as to the great changes you had proposed previously, you maintained them. The third question, regarding the denomination of the PRG, you are still unwilling to have it mentioned in the agreement. As for us we want to have the name of the PRG appear at the beginning of the agreement as the other governments, the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the Government of the PRG of the Republic of South Vietnam, the Government of the U.S. and the Government of the Republic of Vietnam. Regarding the so-called question of North Vietnamese forces you have amended a number of words and sentences implying the so-called North Vietnamese forces. But you are still haunted by this idea.

Dr. Kissinger: Only two sentences now. We have taken it out of every other place.

Le Duc Tho: Moreover there are still a number of concrete questions you have not expressed a definite view on. Such as the question of the withdrawal of civilian personnel associated with the military tasks.

Now regarding Chapter V, the reunification of Vietnam, this chapter is still under your consideration. Regarding the question of Laos and Cambodia, the last sentence, we shall have to discuss this question because it is an important one.

Dr. Kissinger: I agree.

Le Duc Tho: Therefore I would like to know whether Mr. Special Advisor wanted to say anything more concrete regarding these specific questions. So that anything regarding each question shall be clear and I can express my stand.

Dr. Kissinger: I think I have explained to the Special Advisor essentially what our position is in detail. I must say a word about what our position is in general so that we can be realistic. The tendency of the questions to which the Special Advisor has asked me to answer, especially in Chapter IV and in Chapter III, is to make the agreement even more difficult for our allies and therefore to compound the obstacles which caused our problems at the end of October to begin with. We are in the position—the President is in the position that he does not want and cannot begin a new Administration by giving up the principles which caused him to ask for a clarification of some of these points to begin with.

What we have presented to you was far from what it was recommended to us we should present to you. And already for example in Chapter II, which I believe is now essentially completed, we have accepted what you have described to us as very important questions of principle. We are told, for example, that within the context of the withdrawal of what you call the so-called North Vietnamese forces the question of the prisoners can be very easily settled. But of the changes we are still discussing, from our point of view the one in Article 13 and the other in Article 20 and one in 12(a), those are the important ones. [Discussion among the Vietnamese.]

Le Duc Tho: There are three major changes you propose.

Dr. Kissinger: That’s right.

Le Duc Tho: The changes you proposed are important ones and they are also important questions for us.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand.

Le Duc Tho: The question is now how to solve these questions. Have you any new initiative for that purpose?

Dr. Kissinger: I have given you a whole list of concessions before. I think we should hear from you now about where we should go.

Le Duc Tho: Actually you have made some concessions, but these concessions are relating to the details, minor questions. As to the major questions, you have not made any concessions. Moreover, these major questions are what you have agreed to with us before. Moreover, the agreements we have reached previously have been achieved through great efforts from our part. Now what do you suggest us to do, because these are major questions of principles on which we can no longer make concessions. Moreover, these questions have been agreed to by we both, you and us. Moreover, we have reached these agreements through very hard discussions between us. Moreover, we have been wracking our minds and we have made very great effort to have come to these concessions to you.

We can say that our October 8 proposal is very commendable one that paved the way for the present agreement we have reached. Moreover, these are very great questions of principles and we have agreed to them before. Moreover, the agreement we have reached now has been reversed by your side, and I all the same came here to meet you again for the minor questions. But these are questions of principle and substance. It would be very difficult for us to bring about the change.

We can say that we partly understand that Mr. Advisor may have some difficulties with the Saigon people. We can understand that. But finally you are the people who have the decision voice and you should understand that on our side we have also difficulties. You see, over the past four years how can we tell our people how we have announced our demands to the whole world, throughout the world, our demands?

However in order to settle the problem we have made great effort to overcome these difficulties. We can say that in the political field we have dropped very great major questions, for instance the question of the three-segment government, the question of resignation of Nguyen Van Thieu. Moreover, the questions we are raising now are still subjected to the consultation, the discussion, of the two South Vietnamese parties to resolve them within three months, and they are not put in practice immediately. However, you want to change it. Moreover, we in our minds, the questions we have raised here are very reasonable and logical.

And we have the impression that after each effort from our part you put forward new demands. It is continuously, throughout the whole process of the negotiations. You probably still remember that when I was in Hanoi you sent us messages and we have responded to your messages and met your demands. You could realize how great our effort was, and you realized how you had responded. It is known to you now. Now you requested to have another meeting, and I came back to Paris. You said that we need more meetings for minor changes and they would not be changes regarding the substance and the principles. But actually these are great questions of principle and substance, great political questions.

Now militarily you are demanding the withdrawal of the so-called North Vietnamese troops. You put forward your demand regarding the replacement of armaments. Politically now we have dropped our demand of the formation of the three-segment government and the resignation [Le Duc Tho was corrected here by Mr. Thach] and the immediate resignation of Nguyen Van Thieu. And we only demand the formation of the administrative structure of National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord, but you want to reduce the meaning of this body. What would it be? So now our requirement in the political field of South Vietnam would become meaningless.

The question of the captured people is a very great question. I have expressed my views to you on many occasions. Because of our desire to end the war and to restore peace in Vietnam we have met your requirement in responding to your message regarding this question.

Now regarding the question of Laos and Cambodia . . . the questions of Laos and Cambodia will come under the authority, the sovereignty of these countries. The American captives in Laos come under the sovereignty of Laos, but because of our goodwill we have discussed it with our allies and friendly countries and we agree to return the American prisoners. And this question of American captives in Laos should have been . . . we have no right to solve this question but we have done that. Moreover, the unilateral understandings we have given to you regarding this question was a great deal of goodwill from our part. And the question of ceasefire in Laos. All this, what does this show? It shows our goodwill and the desire to have a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam problem.

So we have made very tremendous efforts on many questions. But in spite of these efforts from our part, you always seek means for further gains. And you put forward new changes and these changes are great, political changes. And if we can’t find a solution to these questions I am afraid that the problem cannot be solved. When I say this I like to mean that we have made great efforts. Therefore, I would invite you to think carefully over my views. You should recall the whole process of negotiation with us. When we come here, it is not that we want to drag on the negotiations or we do not want a solution. Otherwise what is the purpose of my coming here? Therefore, I would hope that you would carefully think over my views and find out an appropriate solution. And when you put forward an appropriate, a satisfactory solution, then we will show our goodwill too.

Through your statement today actually you have made some effort, you have shown goodwill. But there still remain a number of major questions of principle and a number of specific questions you have not yet clearly expressed yourself. Therefore, I hope that Mr. Special Advisor would think over my views. And I will expect that Mr. Special Advisor would make great efforts. And if you do so, we will also make great effort to settle the problem. And throughout our negotiation I have repeatedly told Mr. Special Advisor that we will do what we say. If the agreement is signed, from our part we can assure you that we will abide by the agreement. Because if it is our intention to continue the war, we would not have put forward such proposals. It is obvious therefore. It is what I would invite you to carefully think over.

Of course if you make an effort, we will do the same and we will make an effort too to assure the schedule you have proposed. This is some fact I would like to bring to your knowledge for your good understanding. And I can assure you again that if you make an effort and if you are determined to bring peace, we will do the same. We are determined. But Mr. Special Advisor should understand that there are questions of principle, questions of substance, major questions. If they are not settled, not resolved, it would be very difficult for us.

Now the statements you have made today, we shall carefully consider them tonight. And I would urge you to carefully think over my views. And regarding certain specific questions, I would propose to you that tomorrow you will explicitly express your views so that we can see it. And tomorrow after listening to your views, then we shall make an effort. And we will make every effort to insure the schedule you have proposed. But I think, frankly speaking, the schedule you propose, you should not use it to make pressure on us.

Dr. Kissinger: I can’t win! Shall we say January 15?

Le Duc Tho: [Laughs] It is up to you. And when the schedule is decided, please don’t change it. This is what I have drawn especially from past experience. Please imagine you have caused me to return to Hanoi and then you did not come to Hanoi. How do you think I feel?

Dr. Kissinger: I was thinking of the Special Advisor’s family.

Le Duc Tho: So I can say that I was the victim, the direct victim of your deception. You should understand that. So you should insure the schedule. I agree to this schedule. But I would like to repeat that we should draw experience from that. When we have decided a schedule, both sides should spend efforts to insure it. This is what I want, only this, no other. And I think that tomorrow you will make an effort, we will make an effort and we will solve the matter tomorrow. Because your statements today it needs further consideration.

Dr. Kissinger: Are you finished, Mr. Special Advisor?

Le Duc Tho: I have finished.

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Special Advisor, we have expressed on a number of occasions our regret about the circumstances that caused you to return to Hanoi and await us in vain. And I can say, speaking for myself, that I have never hidden the great respect I have for the Special Advisor and I am personally sorry if any actions of mine have caused him any inconvenience. History has made us opponents but we have not taken each other lightly, or any other member of the North Vietnamese delegation. I feel I owe this statement to the Special Advisor.

But now let us turn to the reality of the situation which we face. [Le Duc Tho nods.] One of the causes of the difficulty in October was that the Special Advisor sometimes seemed more concerned with establishing a schedule in this room than with the ability to carry it out.

We are more cautious now because we don’t want to make another schedule that cannot be kept. If we make another schedule that will not be kept, you and we both know the consequences. So it is a very serious matter. And a schedule has two components: it has the element of time, and it has the subject matter which has to be accomplished within that time period. So I will tell you frankly, a schedule is a form of pressure on both of us, not because we desire it but it is a fact. It is for both of us a problem.

Now what is it that must be done? We have not really asked. We have made a very great effort to eliminate those issues of principle for you that concern our mutual relations. And you made the same effort yesterday in your presentation to me. The changes you have made in Chapter II—that we have made in Chapter II—do concern very important matters of principle, and we have taken out any reference to “non-South Vietnamese forces” in Chapter II which deals with your relations to us, more or less. We have removed it from Article 3 and from Article 5, and we have taken out the vague references to “political process” and similar matters.

What are the key things that we are asking? They are not new issues of principle but elaborations of points already agreed upon, to permit the rapid implementation of the agreement and to avoid confusion later on.

In Article 12(a), we are giving full recognition to the fact that the Special Advisor has often pointed out to us, that there are two forces, two administrations and essentially two parties. And this is what we are emphasizing. And this is why we are referring to the other forces in a more general way. But we are not denying the essence of the problem.

In Article 13 we are not introducing a new point. We are adding one sentence to elaborate the procedure for implementing the principle that is already accepted and to which you have often referred in public statements.

And the Special Advisor himself pointed out yesterday that the sentence we are adding to the end of Article 20 is really implicit in 20(b). So it is again not a new principle we are introducing but an elaboration of an existing one.

These are the key sentences. The other ones we can find some solution to. And even here we are willing to discuss it.

Mr. Special Advisor, I have been forced by circumstances to study your history, the history of the leaders of the Politburo and the history of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. We cannot trick you. We cannot put you at a permanent disadvantage. If you want to fight again, we will not be able to wave an agreement at you. We have a mutual interest that you do not want to fight again. Because if you do, and we fight with each other again—as we will if the agreement gets violated—then we will be repeating the same process which neither of us wants.

Le Duc Tho: Of course, when the agreement is violated then the hostilities will resume. But we can assure you that when the agreement is signed, we will not violate it.

Dr. Kissinger: So therefore we are still opponents but we also have a common objective, which is to make an agreement now so that we can start a new relationship between our two countries. So we both now must take a farsighted view. It has not been easy for your leadership to take some of the decisions you have taken. And if you look at the history of President Nixon, it has also not been easy for him to take some of the decisions he has taken—especially now when he has this overwhelming majority and has no real restraint on any of his actions.

We have not raised these points with you frivolously. We will not raise new points. And we will do everything to meet the schedule that we shall agree upon. And it may well appear that the changes we have asked have not been designed to achieve an advantage over you but they have been designed to make the agreement more permanent and more rapid to implement. This is the spirit with which we will meet you tomorrow. We have come so far that we should not leave tomorrow to resume the war. We should leave tomorrow with a schedule that we can be confident can be kept because it meets the essential principles and which you know will be kept because we have promised it to you.

That is all I want to say today. What time do you think we should meet tomorrow?

Le Duc Tho: Let me say this. We have had many meetings between us, particularly during the last few months. What I think Mr. Special Advisor has realized is that it is our great determination to have a peaceful settlement. But I think you have also realized how great our determination when we have to fight. I have come here this time with hope in looking forward to a peaceful settlement with you. It is known to the whole world that you did not sign the agreement on October 31.

Dr. Kissinger: Because of you.

Le Duc Tho: But in any case I have come here to meet you again. And I have repeatedly told you also that once we reached an agreement then a new era of new relationship between our two countries will be opened up. And actually we have in view not only the immediate period but long-term period.

So tomorrow we both will come here with the same spirit and in the next few days we should come to a settlement. Naturally the schedule will make no pressure on either of us, but in any case this schedule is a landmark for us to make an effort to insure. The question is whether we both want a peaceful settlement of the war. If we are animated with the desire of a peaceful settlement, then we can achieve sooner than the schedule fixed, but if we don’t then we can drag on for a long time. It is obvious. And so, since you have proposed a schedule, you should make an effort to realize it and we shall do the same. Because this time too you have proposed a schedule. So tomorrow we shall both make an effort. I expect that you will make a great effort and we shall make a great effort, and we should take into account of each other’s principles and each other’s difficulty.

Dr. Kissinger: But you will remember that I have already made an effort today and you mustn’t just bank this and ask for another tomorrow. [Laughter]

Le Duc Tho: I shall have many things to ask from you and you will make an effort and I shall make an effort.

Dr. Kissinger: All right.

Le Duc Tho: Because I will have to examine your statement and tomorrow my statement will be in full, more adequate. Any time tomorrow. It is up to you to decide. In the morning would be more convenient.

Dr. Kissinger: All right, let’s say 10:30.

Le Duc Tho: All right.

Dr. Kissinger: Good.

[The meeting broke up at 6:03 p.m.]

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 858, For the President’s Files (Winston Lord)—China Trip/Vietnam Negotiations, Sensitive, Camp David, Vol. XXI, Minutes of Meetings. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting took place at 108 Avenue du Général Leclerc in Gif-sur-Yvette. All brackets are in the original. The tabs are attached but not printed.

   Kissinger assessed this day’s meeting for the President as follows:

   “I touched upon each of the positions outlined by Le Duc Tho at yesterday’s session. We dropped several of our less important changes, calling concessions what actually amounted to returning to previously agreed upon language in the October draft. I stayed firm on the political section, the troops in the South issue, withdrawal of U.S. civilian personnel, South Vietnamese civilian prisoners, and Laos and Cambodia. I deferred our definitive position on the status of the DMZ, on which they had moved part way yesterday.”

   Le Duc Tho continued to focus on Kissinger’s attempts to change the text of the agreement negotiated in October. Kissinger told Nixon that he answered Tho “firmly,” telling him: “we were not asking Hanoi to abandon principles but rather to elaborate more fully on principles they had already agreed to. I noted that you [Nixon] were making an exceptional effort in search of peace at a time when you had a strong mandate from the American people which removed any restrictions on your course of action.” (Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. IX, Vietnam, October 1972–January 1973, Document 117)