Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XLI, Western Europe; NATO, 1969–1972

92. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, March 25, 1969.

SUBJECT

• Your Final Meeting with Prime Minister Trudeau

You are scheduled to have a final conversation with Trudeau at 11:30 a.m. today (Tuesday); you and he will then make public comments on the results of the visit.²

Members of the State Department and the Canadian Delegation have been working overnight on points that you and the Prime Minister would make in public comments. These should be ready for your and the Prime Minister’s review when you meet at 11:30. Included would be

—a reference to past and future intensive US-Canadian consultations of which this visit was a successful example;

—a reference to your discussions on the ABM; (CAUTION: Your public comment should not in any way seem to prejudge Canada’s final judgment on the ABM, which Trudeau has not yet announced.)

—agreement on an early meeting of senior experts on oil problems;

—agreement to reach an understanding among wheat producing states;

—agreement on an early meeting of the US-Canadian Cabinet Committee.

If you have accepted an invitation to Canada you will wish to announce that fact.

In addition, you will wish to make the general point that the frank, productive and intensive talks of the last day and a half confirmed anew the community of objectives and values shared by our two countries.

In your private conversation you may wish to probe Trudeau further on the probable outcome of the Canadian Defense Review. Members of his entourage have expressed concern that he is still flirting with reducing Canada’s role in NATO;³ they believe some low key remarks by you in private might be beneficial. In particular you may wish to say that

—your trip convinced you of the continued vitality of NATO;

—your examination of the common threat that still faces us has convinced you of the continued need of the alliance;

—you consider full Canadian participation in NATO one of the alliance’s great strengths and mutually reinforcing with our own participation;

—you are convinced that the era of negotiation we are entering requires the maintenance of our joint strength and you envisage NATO as playing a key role through consultation and mutual exchange of information.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 912, VIP Visits, Trudeau, Vol. 1. Secret. Sent for action.
2. No record of the conversation was found. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the two leaders met privately in the Oval Office from 11:30 a.m. to 12:11 p.m. Kissinger joined the discussion from 12:05 to 12:10 p.m. Immediately thereafter Trudeau and Nixon went to the Rose Garden to deliver statements to the press. (Ibid., White House Central Files) For the texts of statements by the President and Prime Minister, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1969, pp. 242–243.
3. A March 17 report by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (REU–18) noted that a full review of Canada’s defense positions, ordered by Trudeau in April 1968, would be ready for Cabinet discussion near the time of his Washington visit. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 670, Country Files—Europe, Canada, Vol. I)