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  4. Document 81

81. Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State1

Bonn, May 31, 1972, 0950Z.

Secto 075/7581. Following is cleared Memcon between Secretary and NATO SecGen Luns May 30.

Quote:

Memorandum of Conversation

Date: May 30, 1972

Place: Bundesrat, Bonn, Germany

Participants:

  • United States
  • Secretary Rogers
  • Ambassador Kennedy
  • Mr. Goodby
  • NATO International Secretariat
  • Secretary General Luns
  • Assistant Secretary General Kastl
  • Chef du Cabinet Van Campen
  • Subject: The Moscow Summit Meeting: MBFR and CSCE

The Secretary General extended his compliments to the Secretary on the success of the President’s summit meeting in Moscow.2 He remarked that inevitably, however, some people were already asking whether NATO was still important in light of what had been achieved in the summit meeting. In response, the Secretary referred to his Bonn arrival statement in which he had emphasized how important NATO was.3 He added, by way of specific example, that maintaining the strength and cohesion of NATO would be essential if the Allies were to achieve anything in MBFR negotiations.

The Secretary General asked whether the Soviets had explained why they had not received the Brosio mission. The Secretary replied that they had objected to the “bloc-to-bloc” character of the Brosio mis[Page 340]sion. However, the Soviets had agreed that MBFR talks could take place in parallel with CSCE preparatory talks.

The Secretary General asked whether the U.S. was still thinking of beginning CSCE preparatory talks in November, after the American elections. The Secretary confirmed that this was the case.

Mr. Kastl cautioned that there might be some comment from NATO flank countries in the Ministerial meeting about their desire to be included in MBFR negotiations. The Secretary replied that there was nothing in the Moscow communiqué which should give rise to concerns by NATO members.4 In the ensuing discussions of this question, it was agreed that close NATO consultation on MBFR would be essential to alleviate the participation problem.

Prior to the arrival of the Secretary, Mr. Luns mentioned to Ambassador Kennedy that he intended to raise with Secretary Rogers at lunch a problem relating to American personnel assigned to NATO’s International Secretariat. Promotion policies were apparently weighted against such people, a situation which the Secretary General thought was most unfair. The specific case in point was his assistant, John Maresca, an outstanding American Foreign Service officer who had made immense contributions to NATO and who was, nevertheless, unrewarded by advancement. Mr. Kastl also commented on Mr. Maresca’s performance during the lengthy Malta negotiations.

Comment: Mr. Luns later stated that he had raised the matter of Mr. Maresca in the same terms with Secretary Rogers.

Unquote

Rogers
  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Executive Secretariat, Conference Files, 1949–72, CF 497. Confidential. Repeated to USNATO and Moscow.↩
  2. Extensive documentation on the Moscow Summit and the discussions there on MBFR and CSCE is in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972.↩
  3. The Secretary’s statement on his arrival at Bonn on May 29 was reported in “Rogers Flies to Bonn For a NATO Meeting,” New York Times, May 30, 1972, p. 4.↩
  4. For text of the communiqué issued at the end of the Summit talks on May 29, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1972, pp. 635–642.↩