37. Memorandum From the Chairman of the NSC Ad Hoc Group on Europe (Hillenbrand) to the Chairman of the Review Group (Kissinger)1
- Enlargement of the European Community, NSSM’s 79 and 91
NSSM 79 requested us to examine UK accession to the European Community and NSSM 91 asked us to include a study of EC preferences.2
In the attached memorandum we describe the anticipated development of the European Community, appraise its implications for the United States, and lay out an overall strategy to deal with both the immediate problems of UK accession and the longer-term problems of economic relations with a strengthened European Community.
We then set forth more detailed policy issues for: (a) accession to full membership in the Community of the UK, Denmark, Norway and [Page 129]Ireland; (b) related arrangements for the remaining EFTA countries; and (c) association and other preferential arrangements with other countries, principally in the Mediterranean area and Africa.
The first part of the paper summarizing anticipated developments of the Community (Section I) and appraising the implications for the United States (Section II) is based on a lengthier and more detailed Department of State study paper with annexes which is also submitted herewith.3 In those studies, we examine in greater detail the setting of the negotiations, the various issues which will affect our interests, and set forth the methodology and results of our quantitative estimates of the effects of enlargement on both our agricultural and industrial trade.
Section VI of the memorandum discusses EC preferential arrangements and is in response to NSSM 91. We summarize the main political and economic facts and considerations for each of a number of EC arrangements on which the U.S. will have to take a position. We then discuss the considerations relating to GATT principles and procedures, the problem of protection of our commercial interests and the possibilities and complexities of grouping the countries involved for policy treatment prior to setting forth the options for U.S. policy.
I regret that it has not been possible to reach agreement among the members of the Ad Hoc group on either the substance or presentation of the attached paper. Although the Department consulted interested agencies on the methodology employed, both before and after the quantitative portions of the study were undertaken, a number of agencies do not accept the results as relevant for policy determination. The Department twice extensively redrafted the memorandum in an attempt to meet the agencies’ concerns, but we failed to agree on a common assessment or on a common statement of the problem. We then tried to set forth the differences between us within the structure of the summary paper, with STR attempting to supply a position that would reflect the views of the dissenting agencies. This attempt failed as well. The agencies concerned, the Departments of Treasury, Agriculture, Commerce and STR, prefer to submit their own statements rather than to contribute sections which would fit into the structure of this paper. The Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Council of Economic Advisers, and the Bureau of the Budget participated at different stages in the work of the Ad Hoc group and may also wish to express positions at a later stage of this policy review.
In the circumstances and in order to meet the deadline of the Review Group, I submit the paper as it is, attaching the combined state[Page 130]ment of Treasury, Commerce, and Agriculture4 and the separate statement of Ambassador Gilbert.5 No purpose would be served at this juncture by delaying the consideration of the issue by the Review Group. The paper indicates where it is believed dissenting statements on the appraisal and overall strategy could be made if the Review Group feels that only one paper should be submitted to the NSC.
Option No. 3 on policy related to the accession negotiations was drafted in the earlier attempt to set forth the dissenting agencies’ views. Following completion of our paper we received the attached statements and recommendations from these agencies. Both papers contain modified formulations of Option No. 3. As these agencies want their submissions presented in single consecutive statements and as there are differences between the two versions of the policy option, we have not attempted at this stage to revise further Option No. 3 in the State Department paper.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Executive Secretariat, Files on Select National Security Study Memorandums, 1969–70, Lot 80D212, NSSM 91. Confidential. Cleared by Samuels, Pedersen, Camps, and Trezise. Additional documentation on EC enlargement is in the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Boxes CL 290 and 292. See also Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume III, Foreign Economic Policy, 1969–1972; International Monetary Policy, 1969–1972, Document 40. Kissinger discussed EC enlargement in White House Years, pp. 425–429.↩
- NSSM 79, Document 318; NSSM 91, Document 34.↩
- Attached but not printed. The full response and the Department of State paper are also in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–164, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 79.↩
- Attached but not printed. The Departments of the Treasury, Commerce, and Agriculture expressed concern with “the appraisal of the implications of the enlarged Community for the United States, the discussion of the overall strategy, and the presentation of options with pro and con arguments.” Fundamentally, these Departments thought that the United States should more forcefully state its interests during EC expansion, in view of the enhanced economic and bargaining power that would result from EC enlargement. (Statement by the Departments of the Treasury, Commerce, and Agriculture, April 22)↩
- Attached but not printed. The STR also favored a more proactive posture for expressing U.S. interests during expansion negotiations. (Enlargement of the European Community: Implications for the U.S. and Policy Options—STR Views and Recommendations, undated)↩
- The President submitted his first annual report on foreign policy to Congress on February 18; for text, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1970, pp. 116–190.↩